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  1. 07 8月, 2018 1 次提交
    • M
      xen/pv: Call get_cpu_address_sizes to set x86_virt/phys_bits · 405c018a
      由 M. Vefa Bicakci 提交于 
      Commit d94a155c ("x86/cpu: Prevent cpuinfo_x86::x86_phys_bits
adjustment corruption") has moved the query and calculation of the
x86_virt_bits and x86_phys_bits fields of the cpuinfo_x86 struct
from the get_cpu_cap function to a new function named
get_cpu_address_sizes.

One of the call sites related to Xen PV VMs was unfortunately missed
in the aforementioned commit. This prevents successful boot-up of
kernel versions 4.17 and up in Xen PV VMs if CONFIG_DEBUG_VIRTUAL
is enabled, due to the following code path:

  enlighten_pv.c::xen_start_kernel
    mmu_pv.c::xen_reserve_special_pages
      page.h::__pa
        physaddr.c::__phys_addr
          physaddr.h::phys_addr_valid

phys_addr_valid uses boot_cpu_data.x86_phys_bits to validate physical
addresses. boot_cpu_data.x86_phys_bits is no longer populated before
the call to xen_reserve_special_pages due to the aforementioned commit
though, so the validation performed by phys_addr_valid fails, which
causes __phys_addr to trigger a BUG, preventing boot-up.
Signed-off-by: NM. Vefa Bicakci <m.v.b@runbox.com>
Reviewed-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: NBoris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # for v4.17 and up
Fixes: d94a155c ("x86/cpu: Prevent cpuinfo_x86::x86_phys_bits adjustment corruption")
Signed-off-by: NBoris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
      405c018a
  3. 27 7月, 2018 1 次提交
  5. 18 7月, 2018 2 次提交
    • P
      kvmclock: fix TSC calibration for nested guests · e10f7805
      由 Peng Hao 提交于 
      Inside a nested guest, access to hardware can be slow enough that
tsc_read_refs always return ULLONG_MAX, causing tsc_refine_calibration_work
to be called periodically and the nested guest to spend a lot of time
reading the ACPI timer.

However, if the TSC frequency is available from the pvclock page,
we can just set X86_FEATURE_TSC_KNOWN_FREQ and avoid the recalibration.
'refine' operation.
Suggested-by: NPeter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: NPeng Hao <peng.hao2@zte.com.cn>
[Commit message rewritten. - Paolo]
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
      e10f7805
    • L
      KVM: VMX: Mark VMXArea with revision_id of physical CPU even when eVMCS enabled · 2307af1c
      由 Liran Alon 提交于 
      When eVMCS is enabled, all VMCS allocated to be used by KVM are marked
with revision_id of KVM_EVMCS_VERSION instead of revision_id reported
by MSR_IA32_VMX_BASIC.

However, even though not explictly documented by TLFS, VMXArea passed
as VMXON argument should still be marked with revision_id reported by
physical CPU.

This issue was found by the following setup:
* L0 = KVM which expose eVMCS to it's L1 guest.
* L1 = KVM which consume eVMCS reported by L0.
This setup caused the following to occur:
1) L1 execute hardware_enable().
2) hardware_enable() calls kvm_cpu_vmxon() to execute VMXON.
3) L0 intercept L1 VMXON and execute handle_vmon() which notes
vmxarea->revision_id != VMCS12_REVISION and therefore fails with
nested_vmx_failInvalid() which sets RFLAGS.CF.
4) L1 kvm_cpu_vmxon() don't check RFLAGS.CF for failure and therefore
hardware_enable() continues as usual.
5) L1 hardware_enable() then calls ept_sync_global() which executes
INVEPT.
6) L0 intercept INVEPT and execute handle_invept() which notes
!vmx->nested.vmxon and thus raise a #UD to L1.
7) Raised #UD caused L1 to panic.
Reviewed-by: NKrish Sadhukhan <krish.sadhukhan@oracle.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 773e8a04Signed-off-by: NLiran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
      2307af1c
  7. 17 7月, 2018 1 次提交
  9. 16 7月, 2018 2 次提交
    • V
      x86/apm: Don't access __preempt_count with zeroed fs · 6f6060a5
      由 Ville Syrjälä 提交于 
      APM_DO_POP_SEGS does not restore fs/gs which were zeroed by
APM_DO_ZERO_SEGS. Trying to access __preempt_count with
zeroed fs doesn't really work.

Move the ibrs call outside the APM_DO_SAVE_SEGS/APM_DO_RESTORE_SEGS
invocations so that fs is actually restored before calling
preempt_enable().

Fixes the following sort of oopses:
[    0.313581] general protection fault: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
[    0.313803] Modules linked in:
[    0.314040] CPU: 0 PID: 268 Comm: kapmd Not tainted 4.16.0-rc1-triton-bisect-00090-gdd84441a #19
[    0.316161] EIP: __apm_bios_call_simple+0xc8/0x170
[    0.316161] EFLAGS: 00210016 CPU: 0
[    0.316161] EAX: 00000102 EBX: 00000000 ECX: 00000102 EDX: 00000000
[    0.316161] ESI: 0000530e EDI: dea95f64 EBP: dea95f18 ESP: dea95ef0
[    0.316161]  DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 0000 GS: 0000 SS: 0068
[    0.316161] CR0: 80050033 CR2: 00000000 CR3: 015d3000 CR4: 000006d0
[    0.316161] Call Trace:
[    0.316161]  ? cpumask_weight.constprop.15+0x20/0x20
[    0.316161]  on_cpu0+0x44/0x70
[    0.316161]  apm+0x54e/0x720
[    0.316161]  ? __switch_to_asm+0x26/0x40
[    0.316161]  ? __schedule+0x17d/0x590
[    0.316161]  kthread+0xc0/0xf0
[    0.316161]  ? proc_apm_show+0x150/0x150
[    0.316161]  ? kthread_create_worker_on_cpu+0x20/0x20
[    0.316161]  ret_from_fork+0x2e/0x38
[    0.316161] Code: da 8e c2 8e e2 8e ea 57 55 2e ff 1d e0 bb 5d b1 0f 92 c3 5d 5f 07 1f 89 47 0c 90 8d b4 26 00 00 00 00 90 8d b4 26 00 00 00 00 90 <64> ff 0d 84 16 5c b1 74 7f 8b 45 dc 8e e0 8b 45 d8 8e e8 8b 45
[    0.316161] EIP: __apm_bios_call_simple+0xc8/0x170 SS:ESP: 0068:dea95ef0
[    0.316161] ---[ end trace 656253db2deaa12c ]---

Fixes: dd84441a ("x86/speculation: Use IBRS if available before calling into firmware")
Signed-off-by: NVille Syrjälä <ville.syrjala@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc:  David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc:  "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc:  x86@kernel.org
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180709133534.5963-1-ville.syrjala@linux.intel.com
      6f6060a5
    • D
      x86/asm/memcpy_mcsafe: Fix copy_to_user_mcsafe() exception handling · 092b31aa
      由 Dan Williams 提交于 
      All copy_to_user() implementations need to be prepared to handle faults
accessing userspace. The __memcpy_mcsafe() implementation handles both
mmu-faults on the user destination and machine-check-exceptions on the
source buffer. However, the memcpy_mcsafe() wrapper may silently
fallback to memcpy() depending on build options and cpu-capabilities.

Force copy_to_user_mcsafe() to always use __memcpy_mcsafe() when
available, and otherwise disable all of the copy_to_user_mcsafe()
infrastructure when __memcpy_mcsafe() is not available, i.e.
CONFIG_X86_MCE=n.

This fixes crashes of the form:
    run fstests generic/323 at 2018-07-02 12:46:23
    BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 00007f0d50001000
    RIP: 0010:__memcpy+0x12/0x20
    [..]
    Call Trace:
     copyout_mcsafe+0x3a/0x50
     _copy_to_iter_mcsafe+0xa1/0x4a0
     ? dax_alive+0x30/0x50
     dax_iomap_actor+0x1f9/0x280
     ? dax_iomap_rw+0x100/0x100
     iomap_apply+0xba/0x130
     ? dax_iomap_rw+0x100/0x100
     dax_iomap_rw+0x95/0x100
     ? dax_iomap_rw+0x100/0x100
     xfs_file_dax_read+0x7b/0x1d0 [xfs]
     xfs_file_read_iter+0xa7/0xc0 [xfs]
     aio_read+0x11c/0x1a0
Reported-by: NRoss Zwisler <ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com>
Tested-by: NRoss Zwisler <ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NDan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Fixes: 8780356e ("x86/asm/memcpy_mcsafe: Define copy_to_iter_mcsafe()")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/153108277790.37979.1486841789275803399.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.comSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      092b31aa
  11. 15 7月, 2018 7 次提交
  13. 13 7月, 2018 1 次提交
  15. 12 7月, 2018 1 次提交
  17. 11 7月, 2018 1 次提交
    • A
      efi/x86: Fix mixed mode reboot loop by removing pointless call to PciIo->Attributes() · e2967018
      由 Ard Biesheuvel 提交于 
      Hans de Goede reported that his mixed EFI mode Bay Trail tablet
would not boot at all any more, but enter a reboot loop without
any logs printed by the kernel.

Unbreak 64-bit Linux/x86 on 32-bit UEFI:

When it was first introduced, the EFI stub code that copies the
contents of PCI option ROMs originally only intended to do so if
the EFI_PCI_IO_ATTRIBUTE_EMBEDDED_ROM attribute was *not* set.

The reason was that the UEFI spec permits PCI option ROM images
to be provided by the platform directly, rather than via the ROM
BAR, and in this case, the OS can only access them at runtime if
they are preserved at boot time by copying them from the areas
described by PciIo->RomImage and PciIo->RomSize.

However, it implemented this check erroneously, as can be seen in
commit:

  dd5fc854 ("EFI: Stash ROMs if they're not in the PCI BAR")

which introduced:

    if (!attributes & EFI_PCI_IO_ATTRIBUTE_EMBEDDED_ROM)
            continue;

and given that the numeric value of EFI_PCI_IO_ATTRIBUTE_EMBEDDED_ROM
is 0x4000, this condition never becomes true, and so the option ROMs
were copied unconditionally.

This was spotted and 'fixed' by commit:

  886d751a ("x86, efi: correct precedence of operators in setup_efi_pci")

but inadvertently inverted the logic at the same time, defeating
the purpose of the code, since it now only preserves option ROM
images that can be read from the ROM BAR as well.

Unsurprisingly, this broke some systems, and so the check was removed
entirely in the following commit:

  73970188 ("x86, efi: remove attribute check from setup_efi_pci")

It is debatable whether this check should have been included in the
first place, since the option ROM image provided to the UEFI driver by
the firmware may be different from the one that is actually present in
the card's flash ROM, and so whatever PciIo->RomImage points at should
be preferred regardless of whether the attribute is set.

As this was the only use of the attributes field, we can remove
the call to PciIo->Attributes() entirely, which is especially
nice because its prototype involves uint64_t type by-value
arguments which the EFI mixed mode has trouble dealing with.

Any mixed mode system with PCI is likely to be affected.
Tested-by: NWilfried Klaebe <linux-kernel@lebenslange-mailadresse.de>
Tested-by: NHans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NArd Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180711090235.9327-2-ard.biesheuvel@linaro.orgSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      e2967018
  19. 08 7月, 2018 1 次提交
  21. 06 7月, 2018 1 次提交
  23. 03 7月, 2018 5 次提交
  25. 01 7月, 2018 1 次提交
  27. 29 6月, 2018 1 次提交
    • N
      x86/e820: put !E820_TYPE_RAM regions into memblock.reserved · 124049de
      由 Naoya Horiguchi 提交于 
      There is a kernel panic that is triggered when reading /proc/kpageflags
on the kernel booted with kernel parameter 'memmap=nn[KMG]!ss[KMG]':

  BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at fffffffffffffffe
  PGD 9b20e067 P4D 9b20e067 PUD 9b210067 PMD 0
  Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
  CPU: 2 PID: 1728 Comm: page-types Not tainted 4.17.0-rc6-mm1-v4.17-rc6-180605-0816-00236-g2dfb086ef02c+ #160
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.11.0-2.fc28 04/01/2014
  RIP: 0010:stable_page_flags+0x27/0x3c0
  Code: 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 85 ff 0f 84 a0 03 00 00 41 54 55 49 89 fc 53 48 8b 57 08 48 8b 2f 48 8d 42 ff 83 e2 01 48 0f 44 c7 <48> 8b 00 f6 c4 01 0f 84 10 03 00 00 31 db 49 8b 54 24 08 4c 89 e7
  RSP: 0018:ffffbbd44111fde0 EFLAGS: 00010202
  RAX: fffffffffffffffe RBX: 00007fffffffeff9 RCX: 0000000000000000
  RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000202 RDI: ffffed1182fff5c0
  RBP: ffffffffffffffff R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000001
  R10: ffffbbd44111fed8 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffed1182fff5c0
  R13: 00000000000bffd7 R14: 0000000002fff5c0 R15: ffffbbd44111ff10
  FS:  00007efc4335a500(0000) GS:ffff93a5bfc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
  CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
  CR2: fffffffffffffffe CR3: 00000000b2a58000 CR4: 00000000001406e0
  Call Trace:
   kpageflags_read+0xc7/0x120
   proc_reg_read+0x3c/0x60
   __vfs_read+0x36/0x170
   vfs_read+0x89/0x130
   ksys_pread64+0x71/0x90
   do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x160
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
  RIP: 0033:0x7efc42e75e23
  Code: 09 00 ba 9f 01 00 00 e8 ab 81 f4 ff 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 83 3d 29 0a 2d 00 00 75 13 49 89 ca b8 11 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 34 c3 48 83 ec 08 e8 db d3 01 00 48 89 04 24

According to kernel bisection, this problem became visible due to commit
f7f99100 ("mm: stop zeroing memory during allocation in vmemmap")
which changes how struct pages are initialized.

Memblock layout affects the pfn ranges covered by node/zone.  Consider
that we have a VM with 2 NUMA nodes and each node has 4GB memory, and
the default (no memmap= given) memblock layout is like below:

  MEMBLOCK configuration:
   memory size = 0x00000001fff75c00 reserved size = 0x000000000300c000
   memory.cnt  = 0x4
   memory[0x0]     [0x0000000000001000-0x000000000009efff], 0x000000000009e000 bytes on node 0 flags: 0x0
   memory[0x1]     [0x0000000000100000-0x00000000bffd6fff], 0x00000000bfed7000 bytes on node 0 flags: 0x0
   memory[0x2]     [0x0000000100000000-0x000000013fffffff], 0x0000000040000000 bytes on node 0 flags: 0x0
   memory[0x3]     [0x0000000140000000-0x000000023fffffff], 0x0000000100000000 bytes on node 1 flags: 0x0
   ...

If you give memmap=1G!4G (so it just covers memory[0x2]),
the range [0x100000000-0x13fffffff] is gone:

  MEMBLOCK configuration:
   memory size = 0x00000001bff75c00 reserved size = 0x000000000300c000
   memory.cnt  = 0x3
   memory[0x0]     [0x0000000000001000-0x000000000009efff], 0x000000000009e000 bytes on node 0 flags: 0x0
   memory[0x1]     [0x0000000000100000-0x00000000bffd6fff], 0x00000000bfed7000 bytes on node 0 flags: 0x0
   memory[0x2]     [0x0000000140000000-0x000000023fffffff], 0x0000000100000000 bytes on node 1 flags: 0x0
   ...

This causes shrinking node 0's pfn range because it is calculated by the
address range of memblock.memory.  So some of struct pages in the gap
range are left uninitialized.

We have a function zero_resv_unavail() which does zeroing the struct pages
within the reserved unavailable range (i.e.  memblock.memory &&
!memblock.reserved).  This patch utilizes it to cover all unavailable
ranges by putting them into memblock.reserved.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180615072947.GB23273@hori1.linux.bs1.fc.nec.co.jp
Fixes: f7f99100 ("mm: stop zeroing memory during allocation in vmemmap")
Signed-off-by: NNaoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com>
Tested-by: NOscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de>
Tested-by: N"Herton R. Krzesinski" <herton@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NMichal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: NPavel Tatashin <pasha.tatashin@oracle.com>
Cc: Steven Sistare <steven.sistare@oracle.com>
Cc: Daniel Jordan <daniel.m.jordan@oracle.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      124049de
  29. 27 6月, 2018 4 次提交
  31. 26 6月, 2018 3 次提交
  33. 24 6月, 2018 1 次提交
    • A
      efi/x86: Fix incorrect invocation of PciIo->Attributes() · 2e6eb40c
      由 Ard Biesheuvel 提交于 
      The following commit:

  2c3625cb ("efi/x86: Fold __setup_efi_pci32() and __setup_efi_pci64() into one function")

... merged the two versions of __setup_efi_pciXX(), without taking into
account that the 32-bit version used a rather dodgy trick to pass an
immediate 0 constant as argument for a uint64_t parameter.

The issue is caused by the fact that on x86, UEFI protocol method calls
are redirected via struct efi_config::call(), which is a variadic function,
and so the compiler has to infer the types of the parameters from the
arguments rather than from the prototype.

As the 32-bit x86 calling convention passes arguments via the stack,
passing the unqualified constant 0 twice is the same as passing 0ULL,
which is why the 32-bit code in __setup_efi_pci32() contained the
following call:

  status = efi_early->call(pci->attributes, pci,
                           EfiPciIoAttributeOperationGet, 0, 0,
                           &attributes);

to invoke this UEFI protocol method:

  typedef
  EFI_STATUS
  (EFIAPI *EFI_PCI_IO_PROTOCOL_ATTRIBUTES) (
    IN  EFI_PCI_IO_PROTOCOL                     *This,
    IN  EFI_PCI_IO_PROTOCOL_ATTRIBUTE_OPERATION Operation,
    IN  UINT64                                  Attributes,
    OUT UINT64                                  *Result OPTIONAL
    );

After the merge, we inadvertently ended up with this version for both
32-bit and 64-bit builds, breaking the latter.

So replace the two zeroes with the explicitly typed constant 0ULL,
which works as expected on both 32-bit and 64-bit builds.

Wilfried tested the 64-bit build, and I checked the generated assembly
of a 32-bit build with and without this patch, and they are identical.
Reported-by: NWilfried Klaebe <linux-kernel@lebenslange-mailadresse.de>
Tested-by: NWilfried Klaebe <linux-kernel@lebenslange-mailadresse.de>
Signed-off-by: NArd Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: hdegoede@redhat.com
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      2e6eb40c
  35. 23 6月, 2018 4 次提交
  37. 22 6月, 2018 2 次提交