If the first mounter fails to recover one of the journals
during mount, the mount should fail.
Signed-off-by: NDavid Teigland <teigland@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteven Whitehouse <swhiteho@redhat.com>

Previously, a spectator mount would not even attempt to do
journal recovery for a failed node.  This meant that if all
mounted nodes were spectators, everyone would be stuck after
a node failed, all waiting for recovery to be performed.
This is unnecessary since the failed node had a clean journal.

Instead, allow a spectator mount to do a partial "read only"
recovery, which means it will check if the failed journal is
clean, and if so, report a successful recovery.  If the failed
journal is not clean, it reports that journal recovery failed.
This makes it work the same as a read only mount on a read only
block device.
Signed-off-by: NDavid Teigland <teigland@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteven Whitehouse <swhiteho@redhat.com>

In function gfs2_inplace_release it was trying to unlock a gfs2_holder
structure associated with a reservation, after said reservation was
freed. The problem is that the statements have the wrong order.
This patch corrects the order so that the reservation is freed after
the gfs2_holder is unlocked.
Signed-off-by: NBob Peterson <rpeterso@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteven Whitehouse <swhiteho@redhat.com>

This new method of managing recovery is an alternative to
the previous approach of using the userland gfs_controld.

- use dlm slot numbers to assign journal id's
- use dlm recovery callbacks to initiate journal recovery
- use a dlm lock to determine the first node to mount fs
- use a dlm lock to track journals that need recovery
Signed-off-by: NDavid Teigland <teigland@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteven Whitehouse <swhiteho@redhat.com>

Add support for mount options to restrict access to /proc/PID/
directories.  The default backward-compatible "relaxed" behaviour is left
untouched.

The first mount option is called "hidepid" and its value defines how much
info about processes we want to be available for non-owners:

hidepid=0 (default) means the old behavior - anybody may read all
world-readable /proc/PID/* files.

hidepid=1 means users may not access any /proc/<pid>/ directories, but
their own.  Sensitive files like cmdline, sched*, status are now protected
against other users.  As permission checking done in proc_pid_permission()
and files' permissions are left untouched, programs expecting specific
files' modes are not confused.

hidepid=2 means hidepid=1 plus all /proc/PID/ will be invisible to other
users.  It doesn't mean that it hides whether a process exists (it can be
learned by other means, e.g.  by kill -0 $PID), but it hides process' euid
and egid.  It compicates intruder's task of gathering info about running
processes, whether some daemon runs with elevated privileges, whether
another user runs some sensitive program, whether other users run any
program at all, etc.

gid=XXX defines a group that will be able to gather all processes' info
(as in hidepid=0 mode).  This group should be used instead of putting
nonroot user in sudoers file or something.  However, untrusted users (like
daemons, etc.) which are not supposed to monitor the tasks in the whole
system should not be added to the group.

hidepid=1 or higher is designed to restrict access to procfs files, which
might reveal some sensitive private information like precise keystrokes
timings:

http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2011/11/05/3

hidepid=1/2 doesn't break monitoring userspace tools.  ps, top, pgrep, and
conky gracefully handle EPERM/ENOENT and behave as if the current user is
the only user running processes.  pstree shows the process subtree which
contains "pstree" process.

Note: the patch doesn't deal with setuid/setgid issues of keeping
preopened descriptors of procfs files (like
https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/2/7/368).  We rely on that the leaked
information like the scheduling counters of setuid apps doesn't threaten
anybody's privacy - only the user started the setuid program may read the
counters.
Signed-off-by: NVasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@xenotime.net>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com>
Cc: Theodore Tso <tytso@MIT.EDU>
Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Add support for procfs mount options.  Actual mount options are coming in
the next patches.
Signed-off-by: NVasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@xenotime.net>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com>
Cc: Theodore Tso <tytso@MIT.EDU>
Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

This one behaves similarly to the /proc/<pid>/fd/ one - it contains
symlinks one for each mapping with file, the name of a symlink is
"vma->vm_start-vma->vm_end", the target is the file.  Opening a symlink
results in a file that point exactly to the same inode as them vma's one.

For example the ls -l of some arbitrary /proc/<pid>/map_files/

 | lr-x------ 1 root root 64 Aug 26 06:40 7f8f80403000-7f8f80404000 -> /lib64/libc-2.5.so
 | lr-x------ 1 root root 64 Aug 26 06:40 7f8f8061e000-7f8f80620000 -> /lib64/libselinux.so.1
 | lr-x------ 1 root root 64 Aug 26 06:40 7f8f80826000-7f8f80827000 -> /lib64/libacl.so.1.1.0
 | lr-x------ 1 root root 64 Aug 26 06:40 7f8f80a2f000-7f8f80a30000 -> /lib64/librt-2.5.so
 | lr-x------ 1 root root 64 Aug 26 06:40 7f8f80a30000-7f8f80a4c000 -> /lib64/ld-2.5.so

This *helps* checkpointing process in three ways:

1. When dumping a task mappings we do know exact file that is mapped
   by particular region.  We do this by opening
   /proc/$pid/map_files/$address symlink the way we do with file
   descriptors.

2. This also helps in determining which anonymous shared mappings are
   shared with each other by comparing the inodes of them.

3. When restoring a set of processes in case two of them has a mapping
   shared, we map the memory by the 1st one and then open its
   /proc/$pid/map_files/$address file and map it by the 2nd task.

Using /proc/$pid/maps for this is quite inconvenient since it brings
repeatable re-reading and reparsing for this text file which slows down
restore procedure significantly.  Also as being pointed in (3) it is a way
easier to use top level shared mapping in children as
/proc/$pid/map_files/$address when needed.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
[gorcunov@openvz.org: make map_files depend on CHECKPOINT_RESTORE]
Signed-off-by: NPavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Signed-off-by: NCyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Reviewed-by: NVasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Reviewed-by: N"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Prepare the ground for the next "map_files" patch which needs a name of a
link file to analyse.
Signed-off-by: NCyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Nothing requires that we lock the filesystem until the root inode is
provided.

Also iget5_locked() triggers a warning because we are holding the
filesystem lock while allocating the inode, which result in a lockdep
suspicion that we have a lock inversion against the reclaim path:

[ 1986.896979] =================================
[ 1986.896990] [ INFO: inconsistent lock state ]
[ 1986.896997] 3.1.1-main #8
[ 1986.897001] ---------------------------------
[ 1986.897007] inconsistent {RECLAIM_FS-ON-W} -> {IN-RECLAIM_FS-W} usage.
[ 1986.897016] kswapd0/16 [HC0[0]:SC0[0]:HE1:SE1] takes:
[ 1986.897023]  (&REISERFS_SB(s)->lock){+.+.?.}, at: [<c01f8bd4>] reiserfs_write_lock+0x20/0x2a
[ 1986.897044] {RECLAIM_FS-ON-W} state was registered at:
[ 1986.897050]   [<c014a5b9>] mark_held_locks+0xae/0xd0
[ 1986.897060]   [<c014aab3>] lockdep_trace_alloc+0x7d/0x91
[ 1986.897068]   [<c0190ee0>] kmem_cache_alloc+0x1a/0x93
[ 1986.897078]   [<c01e7728>] reiserfs_alloc_inode+0x13/0x3d
[ 1986.897088]   [<c01a5b06>] alloc_inode+0x14/0x5f
[ 1986.897097]   [<c01a5cb9>] iget5_locked+0x62/0x13a
[ 1986.897106]   [<c01e99e0>] reiserfs_fill_super+0x410/0x8b9
[ 1986.897114]   [<c01953da>] mount_bdev+0x10b/0x159
[ 1986.897123]   [<c01e764d>] get_super_block+0x10/0x12
[ 1986.897131]   [<c0195b38>] mount_fs+0x59/0x12d
[ 1986.897138]   [<c01a80d1>] vfs_kern_mount+0x45/0x7a
[ 1986.897147]   [<c01a83e3>] do_kern_mount+0x2f/0xb0
[ 1986.897155]   [<c01a987a>] do_mount+0x5c2/0x612
[ 1986.897163]   [<c01a9a72>] sys_mount+0x61/0x8f
[ 1986.897170]   [<c044060c>] sysenter_do_call+0x12/0x32
[ 1986.897181] irq event stamp: 7509691
[ 1986.897186] hardirqs last  enabled at (7509691): [<c0190f34>] kmem_cache_alloc+0x6e/0x93
[ 1986.897197] hardirqs last disabled at (7509690): [<c0190eea>] kmem_cache_alloc+0x24/0x93
[ 1986.897209] softirqs last  enabled at (7508896): [<c01294bd>] __do_softirq+0xee/0xfd
[ 1986.897222] softirqs last disabled at (7508859): [<c01030ed>] do_softirq+0x50/0x9d
[ 1986.897234]
[ 1986.897235] other info that might help us debug this:
[ 1986.897242]  Possible unsafe locking scenario:
[ 1986.897244]
[ 1986.897250]        CPU0
[ 1986.897254]        ----
[ 1986.897257]   lock(&REISERFS_SB(s)->lock);
[ 1986.897265] <Interrupt>
[ 1986.897269]     lock(&REISERFS_SB(s)->lock);
[ 1986.897276]
[ 1986.897277]  *** DEADLOCK ***
[ 1986.897278]
[ 1986.897286] no locks held by kswapd0/16.
[ 1986.897291]
[ 1986.897292] stack backtrace:
[ 1986.897299] Pid: 16, comm: kswapd0 Not tainted 3.1.1-main #8
[ 1986.897306] Call Trace:
[ 1986.897314]  [<c0439e76>] ? printk+0xf/0x11
[ 1986.897324]  [<c01482d1>] print_usage_bug+0x20e/0x21a
[ 1986.897332]  [<c01479b8>] ? print_irq_inversion_bug+0x172/0x172
[ 1986.897341]  [<c014855c>] mark_lock+0x27f/0x483
[ 1986.897349]  [<c0148d88>] __lock_acquire+0x628/0x1472
[ 1986.897358]  [<c0149fae>] lock_acquire+0x47/0x5e
[ 1986.897366]  [<c01f8bd4>] ? reiserfs_write_lock+0x20/0x2a
[ 1986.897384]  [<c01f8bd4>] ? reiserfs_write_lock+0x20/0x2a
[ 1986.897397]  [<c043b5ef>] mutex_lock_nested+0x35/0x26f
[ 1986.897409]  [<c01f8bd4>] ? reiserfs_write_lock+0x20/0x2a
[ 1986.897421]  [<c01f8bd4>] reiserfs_write_lock+0x20/0x2a
[ 1986.897433]  [<c01e2edd>] map_block_for_writepage+0xc9/0x590
[ 1986.897448]  [<c01b1706>] ? create_empty_buffers+0x33/0x8f
[ 1986.897461]  [<c0121124>] ? get_parent_ip+0xb/0x31
[ 1986.897472]  [<c043ef7f>] ? sub_preempt_count+0x81/0x8e
[ 1986.897485]  [<c043cae0>] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x27/0x3d
[ 1986.897496]  [<c0121124>] ? get_parent_ip+0xb/0x31
[ 1986.897508]  [<c01e355d>] reiserfs_writepage+0x1b9/0x3e7
[ 1986.897521]  [<c0173b40>] ? clear_page_dirty_for_io+0xcb/0xde
[ 1986.897533]  [<c014a6e3>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x108/0x138
[ 1986.897546]  [<c014a71e>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xb/0xd
[ 1986.897559]  [<c0177b38>] shrink_page_list+0x34f/0x5e2
[ 1986.897572]  [<c01780a7>] shrink_inactive_list+0x172/0x22c
[ 1986.897585]  [<c0178464>] shrink_zone+0x303/0x3b1
[ 1986.897597]  [<c043cae0>] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x27/0x3d
[ 1986.897611]  [<c01788c9>] kswapd+0x3b7/0x5f2

The deadlock shouldn't happen since we are doing that allocation in the
mount path, the filesystem is not available for any reclaim.  Still the
warning is annoying.

To solve this, acquire the lock later only where we need it, right before
calling reiserfs_read_locked_inode() that wants to lock to walk the tree.
Reported-by: NKnut Petersen <Knut_Petersen@t-online.de>
Signed-off-by: NFrederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Jeff Mahoney <jeffm@suse.com>
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

journal_init() doesn't need the lock since no operation on the filesystem
is involved there.  journal_read() and get_list_bitmap() have yet to be
reviewed carefully though before removing the lock there.  Just keep the
it around these two calls for safety.
Signed-off-by: NFrederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Jeff Mahoney <jeffm@suse.com>
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

In the mount path, transactions that are made before journal
initialization don't involve the filesystem.  We can delay the reiserfs
lock until we play with the journal.
Signed-off-by: NFrederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Jeff Mahoney <jeffm@suse.com>
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Signed-off-by: NDavidlohr Bueso <dave@gnu.org>
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Randomization of PIE load address is hard coded in binfmt_elf.c for X86
and ARM.  Create a new Kconfig variable
(CONFIG_ARCH_BINFMT_ELF_RANDOMIZE_PIE) for this and use it instead.  Thus
architecture specific policy is pushed out of the generic binfmt_elf.c and
into the architecture Kconfig files.

X86 and ARM Kconfigs are modified to select the new variable so there is
no change in behavior.  A follow on patch will select it for MIPS too.
Signed-off-by: NDavid Daney <david.daney@cavium.com>
Cc: Russell King <linux@arm.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Acked-by: NH. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

oom_score_adj is used for guarding processes from OOM-Killer.  One of
problem is that it's inherited at fork().  When a daemon set oom_score_adj
and make children, it's hard to know where the value is set.

This patch adds some tracepoints useful for debugging. This patch adds
3 trace points.
  - creating new task
  - renaming a task (exec)
  - set oom_score_adj

To debug, users need to enable some trace pointer. Maybe filtering is useful as

# EVENT=/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events/task/
# echo "oom_score_adj != 0" > $EVENT/task_newtask/filter
# echo "oom_score_adj != 0" > $EVENT/task_rename/filter
# echo 1 > $EVENT/enable
# EVENT=/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events/oom/
# echo 1 > $EVENT/enable

output will be like this.
# grep oom /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/trace
bash-7699  [007] d..3  5140.744510: oom_score_adj_update: pid=7699 comm=bash oom_score_adj=-1000
bash-7699  [007] ...1  5151.818022: task_newtask: pid=7729 comm=bash clone_flags=1200011 oom_score_adj=-1000
ls-7729  [003] ...2  5151.818504: task_rename: pid=7729 oldcomm=bash newcomm=ls oom_score_adj=-1000
bash-7699  [002] ...1  5175.701468: task_newtask: pid=7730 comm=bash clone_flags=1200011 oom_score_adj=-1000
grep-7730  [007] ...2  5175.701993: task_rename: pid=7730 oldcomm=bash newcomm=grep oom_score_adj=-1000
Signed-off-by: NKAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Acked-by: NDavid Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Tell the page allocator that pages allocated for a buffered write are
expected to become dirty soon.
Signed-off-by: NJohannes Weiner <jweiner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NRik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NMel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan.kim@gmail.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz>
Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: Wu Fengguang <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
Cc: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: Shaohua Li <shaohua.li@intel.com>
Cc: Chris Mason <chris.mason@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Inode cache pruning indirectly reclaims page-cache by invalidating mapping
pages.  Let's account them into reclaim-state to notice this progress in
memory reclaimer.
Signed-off-by: NKonstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@openvz.org>
Cc: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Commit 503358ae ("ext4: avoid divide by
zero when trying to mount a corrupted file system") fixes CVE-2009-4307
by performing a sanity check on s_log_groups_per_flex, since it can be
set to a bogus value by an attacker.

	sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex = sbi->s_es->s_log_groups_per_flex;
	groups_per_flex = 1 << sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex;

	if (groups_per_flex < 2) { ... }

This patch fixes two potential issues in the previous commit.

1) The sanity check might only work on architectures like PowerPC.
On x86, 5 bits are used for the shifting amount.  That means, given a
large s_log_groups_per_flex value like 36, groups_per_flex = 1 << 36
is essentially 1 << 4 = 16, rather than 0.  This will bypass the check,
leaving s_log_groups_per_flex and groups_per_flex inconsistent.

2) The sanity check relies on undefined behavior, i.e., oversized shift.
A standard-confirming C compiler could rewrite the check in unexpected
ways.  Consider the following equivalent form, assuming groups_per_flex
is unsigned for simplicity.

	groups_per_flex = 1 << sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex;
	if (groups_per_flex == 0 || groups_per_flex == 1) {

We compile the code snippet using Clang 3.0 and GCC 4.6.  Clang will
completely optimize away the check groups_per_flex == 0, leaving the
patched code as vulnerable as the original.  GCC keeps the check, but
there is no guarantee that future versions will do the same.
Signed-off-by: NXi Wang <xi.wang@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: N"Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org

d_alloc_root() with iput() in case of allocation failure...
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

select_parent currently abuses the dentry cache LRU to provide
cleanup features for child dentries that need to be freed. It moves
them to the tail of the LRU, then tells shrink_dcache_parent() to
calls __shrink_dcache_sb to unconditionally move them to a dispose
list (as DCACHE_REFERENCED is ignored). __shrink_dcache_sb() has to
relock the dentries to move them off the LRU onto the dispose list,
but otherwise does not touch the dentries that select_parent() moved
to the tail of the LRU. It then passses the dispose list to
shrink_dentry_list() which tries to free the dentries.

IOWs, the use of __shrink_dcache_sb() is superfluous - we can build
exactly the same list of dentries for disposal directly in
select_parent() and call shrink_dentry_list() instead of calling
__shrink_dcache_sb() to do that. This means that we avoid long holds
on the lru lock walking the LRU moving dentries to the dispose list
We also avoid the need to relock each dentry just to move it off the
LRU, reducing the numebr of times we lock each dentry to dispose of
them in shrink_dcache_parent() from 3 to 2 times.

Further, we remove one of the two callers of __shrink_dcache_sb().
This also means that __shrink_dcache_sb can be moved into back into
prune_dcache_sb() and we no longer have to handle referenced
dentries conditionally, simplifying the code.
Signed-off-by: NDave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

... and ceph_init_dentry(NULL) will oops
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

a) leaking root dentry is bad
b) in case of failed ext4_mb_init() we don't want to do ext4_mb_release()
c) OTOH, in the same case we *do* want ext4_ext_release()
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Now that the use of numeric uids/gids is officially sanctioned in
RFC3530bis, it is time to change the default here to 'enabled'.

By doing so, we ensure that NFSv4 copies the behaviour of NFSv3 when we're
using the default AUTH_SYS authentication (i.e. when the client uses the
numeric uids/gids as authentication tokens), so that when new files are
created, they will appear to have the correct user/group.
It also fixes a number of backward compatibility issues when migrating
from NFSv3 to NFSv4 on a platform where the server uses different uid/gid
mappings than the client.

Note also that this setting has been successfully tested against servers
that do not support numeric uids/gids at several Connectathon/Bakeathon
events at this point, and the fall back to using string names/groups has
been shown to work well in all those test cases.
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

Instead, use the new 'mtd_can_have_bb()', or just rely on 'mtd_block_markbad()'
return code, which will be -EOPNOTSUPP if bad blocks are not supported.
Signed-off-by: NArtem Bityutskiy <artem.bityutskiy@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>

Instead, use the new 'mtd_can_have_bb()' helper.

Cc: Jörn Engel <joern@logfs.org>
Signed-off-by: NArtem Bityutskiy <artem.bityutskiy@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>

This patch teaches 'mtd_sync()' to do nothing when the MTD driver does
not have the '->sync()' method, which allows us to remove all direct
'mtd->sync' accesses.
Signed-off-by: NArtem Bityutskiy <artem.bityutskiy@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>

This patch makes the 'mtd_writev()' function more usable and logical. We first
teach it to fall-back to the 'default_mtd_writev()' function if the MTD driver
does not define its own '->writev()' method. Then we make block2mtd and JFFS2
just 'mtd_writev()' instead of 'default_mtd_writev()' function. This means we
can now stop exporting 'default_mtd_writev()' and instead, export
'mtd_writev()'. This is much cleaner and more logical, as well as allows us to
get read of another direct 'mtd->writev' access in JFFS2.
Signed-off-by: NArtem Bityutskiy <artem.bityutskiy@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>

Remove direct usage of mtd->get_unmapped_area. Instead, just call
'mtd_get_unmapped_area()' which will return -EOPNOTSUPP if the function
is not implemented, and then test for this code.

We also translate -EOPNOTSUPP to -ENOSYS because this return code is
probably part of the kernel ABI which we do not want to break.

Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NArtem Bityutskiy <artem.bityutskiy@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>

Remove direct usage of the "mtd->point" function pointer. Instead,
test the mtd_point() return code for '-EOPNOTSUPP'.
Signed-off-by: NArtem Bityutskiy <artem.bityutskiy@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>

Instead, use 'default_mtd_writev()' function which MTD provides.
Signed-off-by: NArtem Bityutskiy <artem.bityutskiy@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>

Signed-off-by: NArtem Bityutskiy <artem.bityutskiy@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>

Signed-off-by: NArtem Bityutskiy <artem.bityutskiy@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>

Signed-off-by: NArtem Bityutskiy <artem.bityutskiy@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>

Signed-off-by: NArtem Bityutskiy <artem.bityutskiy@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>

Signed-off-by: NArtem Bityutskiy <artem.bityutskiy@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>

Signed-off-by: NArtem Bityutskiy <artem.bityutskiy@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>

Signed-off-by: NArtem Bityutskiy <artem.bityutskiy@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>

Signed-off-by: NArtem Bityutskiy <artem.bityutskiy@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>

Signed-off-by: NArtem Bityutskiy <artem.bityutskiy@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>

Signed-off-by: NArtem Bityutskiy <artem.bityutskiy@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>

Signed-off-by: NArtem Bityutskiy <artem.bityutskiy@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>