1. 27 1月, 2016 1 次提交
  2. 23 1月, 2016 1 次提交
    • A
      wrappers for ->i_mutex access · 5955102c
      Al Viro 提交于
      parallel to mutex_{lock,unlock,trylock,is_locked,lock_nested},
      inode_foo(inode) being mutex_foo(&inode->i_mutex).
      
      Please, use those for access to ->i_mutex; over the coming cycle
      ->i_mutex will become rwsem, with ->lookup() done with it held
      only shared.
      Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
      5955102c
  3. 15 1月, 2016 1 次提交
    • V
      kmemcg: account certain kmem allocations to memcg · 5d097056
      Vladimir Davydov 提交于
      Mark those kmem allocations that are known to be easily triggered from
      userspace as __GFP_ACCOUNT/SLAB_ACCOUNT, which makes them accounted to
      memcg.  For the list, see below:
      
       - threadinfo
       - task_struct
       - task_delay_info
       - pid
       - cred
       - mm_struct
       - vm_area_struct and vm_region (nommu)
       - anon_vma and anon_vma_chain
       - signal_struct
       - sighand_struct
       - fs_struct
       - files_struct
       - fdtable and fdtable->full_fds_bits
       - dentry and external_name
       - inode for all filesystems. This is the most tedious part, because
         most filesystems overwrite the alloc_inode method.
      
      The list is far from complete, so feel free to add more objects.
      Nevertheless, it should be close to "account everything" approach and
      keep most workloads within bounds.  Malevolent users will be able to
      breach the limit, but this was possible even with the former "account
      everything" approach (simply because it did not account everything in
      fact).
      
      [akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
      Signed-off-by: NVladimir Davydov <vdavydov@virtuozzo.com>
      Acked-by: NJohannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
      Acked-by: NMichal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
      Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
      Cc: Greg Thelen <gthelen@google.com>
      Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
      Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
      Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
      Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
      Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      5d097056
  4. 31 12月, 2015 1 次提交
  5. 09 12月, 2015 1 次提交
    • A
      replace ->follow_link() with new method that could stay in RCU mode · 6b255391
      Al Viro 提交于
      new method: ->get_link(); replacement of ->follow_link().  The differences
      are:
      	* inode and dentry are passed separately
      	* might be called both in RCU and non-RCU mode;
      the former is indicated by passing it a NULL dentry.
      	* when called that way it isn't allowed to block
      and should return ERR_PTR(-ECHILD) if it needs to be called
      in non-RCU mode.
      
      It's a flagday change - the old method is gone, all in-tree instances
      converted.  Conversion isn't hard; said that, so far very few instances
      do not immediately bail out when called in RCU mode.  That'll change
      in the next commits.
      Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
      6b255391
  6. 07 12月, 2015 1 次提交
  7. 21 10月, 2015 1 次提交
    • D
      KEYS: Merge the type-specific data with the payload data · 146aa8b1
      David Howells 提交于
      Merge the type-specific data with the payload data into one four-word chunk
      as it seems pointless to keep them separate.
      
      Use user_key_payload() for accessing the payloads of overloaded
      user-defined keys.
      Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
      cc: linux-cifs@vger.kernel.org
      cc: ecryptfs@vger.kernel.org
      cc: linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org
      cc: linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net
      cc: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org
      cc: ceph-devel@vger.kernel.org
      cc: linux-ima-devel@lists.sourceforge.net
      146aa8b1
  8. 29 9月, 2015 1 次提交
  9. 19 8月, 2015 2 次提交
  10. 07 8月, 2015 1 次提交
  11. 10 7月, 2015 1 次提交
  12. 15 5月, 2015 1 次提交
  13. 11 5月, 2015 2 次提交
    • A
      don't pass nameidata to ->follow_link() · 6e77137b
      Al Viro 提交于
      its only use is getting passed to nd_jump_link(), which can obtain
      it from current->nameidata
      Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
      6e77137b
    • A
      new ->follow_link() and ->put_link() calling conventions · 680baacb
      Al Viro 提交于
      a) instead of storing the symlink body (via nd_set_link()) and returning
      an opaque pointer later passed to ->put_link(), ->follow_link() _stores_
      that opaque pointer (into void * passed by address by caller) and returns
      the symlink body.  Returning ERR_PTR() on error, NULL on jump (procfs magic
      symlinks) and pointer to symlink body for normal symlinks.  Stored pointer
      is ignored in all cases except the last one.
      
      Storing NULL for opaque pointer (or not storing it at all) means no call
      of ->put_link().
      
      b) the body used to be passed to ->put_link() implicitly (via nameidata).
      Now only the opaque pointer is.  In the cases when we used the symlink body
      to free stuff, ->follow_link() now should store it as opaque pointer in addition
      to returning it.
      Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
      680baacb
  14. 16 4月, 2015 1 次提交
  15. 12 4月, 2015 1 次提交
  16. 26 3月, 2015 1 次提交
  17. 14 3月, 2015 1 次提交
  18. 03 3月, 2015 1 次提交
    • T
      eCryptfs: don't pass fs-specific ioctl commands through · 6d65261a
      Tyler Hicks 提交于
      eCryptfs can't be aware of what to expect when after passing an
      arbitrary ioctl command through to the lower filesystem. The ioctl
      command may trigger an action in the lower filesystem that is
      incompatible with eCryptfs.
      
      One specific example is when one attempts to use the Btrfs clone
      ioctl command when the source file is in the Btrfs filesystem that
      eCryptfs is mounted on top of and the destination fd is from a new file
      created in the eCryptfs mount. The ioctl syscall incorrectly returns
      success because the command is passed down to Btrfs which thinks that it
      was able to do the clone operation. However, the result is an empty
      eCryptfs file.
      
      This patch allows the trim, {g,s}etflags, and {g,s}etversion ioctl
      commands through and then copies up the inode metadata from the lower
      inode to the eCryptfs inode to catch any changes made to the lower
      inode's metadata. Those five ioctl commands are mostly common across all
      filesystems but the whitelist may need to be further pruned in the
      future.
      
      https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=93691
      https://launchpad.net/bugs/1305335Signed-off-by: NTyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
      Cc: Rocko <rockorequin@hotmail.com>
      Cc: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
      Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v2.6.36+: c43f7b8f eCryptfs: Handle ioctl calls with unlocked and compat functions
      6d65261a
  19. 25 2月, 2015 1 次提交
    • C
      eCryptfs: ensure copy to crypt_stat->cipher does not overrun · 2a559a8b
      Colin Ian King 提交于
      The patch 237fead6: "[PATCH] ecryptfs: fs/Makefile and
      fs/Kconfig" from Oct 4, 2006, leads to the following static checker
      warning:
      
        fs/ecryptfs/crypto.c:846 ecryptfs_new_file_context()
        error: off-by-one overflow 'crypt_stat->cipher' size 32.  rl = '0-32'
      
      There is a mismatch between the size of ecryptfs_crypt_stat.cipher
      and ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat.global_default_cipher_name causing the
      copy of the cipher name to cause a off-by-one string copy error. This
      fix ensures the space reserved for this string is the same size including
      the trailing zero at the end throughout ecryptfs.
      
      This fix avoids increasing the size of ecryptfs_crypt_stat.cipher
      and also ecryptfs_parse_tag_70_packet_silly_stack.cipher_string and instead
      reduces the of ECRYPTFS_MAX_CIPHER_NAME_SIZE to 31 and includes the + 1 for
      the end of string terminator.
      
      NOTE: An overflow is not possible in practice since the value copied
      into global_default_cipher_name is validated by
      ecryptfs_code_for_cipher_string() at mount time. None of the allowed
      cipher strings are long enough to cause the potential buffer overflow
      fixed by this patch.
      Signed-off-by: NColin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
      Reported-by: NDan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
      [tyhicks: Added the NOTE about the overflow not being triggerable]
      Signed-off-by: NTyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
      2a559a8b
  20. 23 2月, 2015 1 次提交
    • D
      VFS: (Scripted) Convert S_ISLNK/DIR/REG(dentry->d_inode) to d_is_*(dentry) · e36cb0b8
      David Howells 提交于
      Convert the following where appropriate:
      
       (1) S_ISLNK(dentry->d_inode) to d_is_symlink(dentry).
      
       (2) S_ISREG(dentry->d_inode) to d_is_reg(dentry).
      
       (3) S_ISDIR(dentry->d_inode) to d_is_dir(dentry).  This is actually more
           complicated than it appears as some calls should be converted to
           d_can_lookup() instead.  The difference is whether the directory in
           question is a real dir with a ->lookup op or whether it's a fake dir with
           a ->d_automount op.
      
      In some circumstances, we can subsume checks for dentry->d_inode not being
      NULL into this, provided we the code isn't in a filesystem that expects
      d_inode to be NULL if the dirent really *is* negative (ie. if we're going to
      use d_inode() rather than d_backing_inode() to get the inode pointer).
      
      Note that the dentry type field may be set to something other than
      DCACHE_MISS_TYPE when d_inode is NULL in the case of unionmount, where the VFS
      manages the fall-through from a negative dentry to a lower layer.  In such a
      case, the dentry type of the negative union dentry is set to the same as the
      type of the lower dentry.
      
      However, if you know d_inode is not NULL at the call site, then you can use
      the d_is_xxx() functions even in a filesystem.
      
      There is one further complication: a 0,0 chardev dentry may be labelled
      DCACHE_WHITEOUT_TYPE rather than DCACHE_SPECIAL_TYPE.  Strictly, this was
      intended for special directory entry types that don't have attached inodes.
      
      The following perl+coccinelle script was used:
      
      use strict;
      
      my @callers;
      open($fd, 'git grep -l \'S_IS[A-Z].*->d_inode\' |') ||
          die "Can't grep for S_ISDIR and co. callers";
      @callers = <$fd>;
      close($fd);
      unless (@callers) {
          print "No matches\n";
          exit(0);
      }
      
      my @cocci = (
          '@@',
          'expression E;',
          '@@',
          '',
          '- S_ISLNK(E->d_inode->i_mode)',
          '+ d_is_symlink(E)',
          '',
          '@@',
          'expression E;',
          '@@',
          '',
          '- S_ISDIR(E->d_inode->i_mode)',
          '+ d_is_dir(E)',
          '',
          '@@',
          'expression E;',
          '@@',
          '',
          '- S_ISREG(E->d_inode->i_mode)',
          '+ d_is_reg(E)' );
      
      my $coccifile = "tmp.sp.cocci";
      open($fd, ">$coccifile") || die $coccifile;
      print($fd "$_\n") || die $coccifile foreach (@cocci);
      close($fd);
      
      foreach my $file (@callers) {
          chomp $file;
          print "Processing ", $file, "\n";
          system("spatch", "--sp-file", $coccifile, $file, "--in-place", "--no-show-diff") == 0 ||
      	die "spatch failed";
      }
      
      [AV: overlayfs parts skipped]
      Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
      e36cb0b8
  21. 21 1月, 2015 2 次提交
  22. 27 11月, 2014 1 次提交
  23. 20 11月, 2014 1 次提交
  24. 01 11月, 2014 1 次提交
  25. 30 10月, 2014 1 次提交
  26. 24 10月, 2014 1 次提交
    • M
      fs: limit filesystem stacking depth · 69c433ed
      Miklos Szeredi 提交于
      Add a simple read-only counter to super_block that indicates how deep this
      is in the stack of filesystems.  Previously ecryptfs was the only stackable
      filesystem and it explicitly disallowed multiple layers of itself.
      
      Overlayfs, however, can be stacked recursively and also may be stacked
      on top of ecryptfs or vice versa.
      
      To limit the kernel stack usage we must limit the depth of the
      filesystem stack.  Initially the limit is set to 2.
      Signed-off-by: NMiklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
      69c433ed
  27. 23 10月, 2014 1 次提交
    • T
      eCryptfs: Force RO mount when encrypted view is enabled · 332b122d
      Tyler Hicks 提交于
      The ecryptfs_encrypted_view mount option greatly changes the
      functionality of an eCryptfs mount. Instead of encrypting and decrypting
      lower files, it provides a unified view of the encrypted files in the
      lower filesystem. The presence of the ecryptfs_encrypted_view mount
      option is intended to force a read-only mount and modifying files is not
      supported when the feature is in use. See the following commit for more
      information:
      
        e77a56dd [PATCH] eCryptfs: Encrypted passthrough
      
      This patch forces the mount to be read-only when the
      ecryptfs_encrypted_view mount option is specified by setting the
      MS_RDONLY flag on the superblock. Additionally, this patch removes some
      broken logic in ecryptfs_open() that attempted to prevent modifications
      of files when the encrypted view feature was in use. The check in
      ecryptfs_open() was not sufficient to prevent file modifications using
      system calls that do not operate on a file descriptor.
      Signed-off-by: NTyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
      Reported-by: NPriya Bansal <p.bansal@samsung.com>
      Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v2.6.21+: e77a56dd [PATCH] eCryptfs: Encrypted passthrough
      332b122d
  28. 09 10月, 2014 1 次提交
  29. 07 10月, 2014 1 次提交
  30. 06 10月, 2014 1 次提交
    • C
      ecryptfs: avoid to access NULL pointer when write metadata in xattr · 35425ea2
      Chao Yu 提交于
      Christopher Head 2014-06-28 05:26:20 UTC described:
      "I tried to reproduce this on 3.12.21. Instead, when I do "echo hello > foo"
      in an ecryptfs mount with ecryptfs_xattr specified, I get a kernel crash:
      
      BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at           (null)
      IP: [<ffffffff8110eb39>] fsstack_copy_attr_all+0x2/0x61
      PGD d7840067 PUD b2c3c067 PMD 0
      Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP
      Modules linked in: nvidia(PO)
      CPU: 3 PID: 3566 Comm: bash Tainted: P           O 3.12.21-gentoo-r1 #2
      Hardware name: ASUSTek Computer Inc. G60JX/G60JX, BIOS 206 03/15/2010
      task: ffff8801948944c0 ti: ffff8800bad70000 task.ti: ffff8800bad70000
      RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8110eb39>]  [<ffffffff8110eb39>] fsstack_copy_attr_all+0x2/0x61
      RSP: 0018:ffff8800bad71c10  EFLAGS: 00010246
      RAX: 00000000000181a4 RBX: ffff880198648480 RCX: 0000000000000000
      RDX: 0000000000000004 RSI: ffff880172010450 RDI: 0000000000000000
      RBP: ffff880198490e40 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
      R10: ffff880172010450 R11: ffffea0002c51e80 R12: 0000000000002000
      R13: 000000000000001a R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff880198490e40
      FS:  00007ff224caa700(0000) GS:ffff88019fcc0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
      CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
      CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 00000000bb07f000 CR4: 00000000000007e0
      Stack:
      ffffffff811826e8 ffff8800a39d8000 0000000000000000 000000000000001a
      ffff8800a01d0000 ffff8800a39d8000 ffffffff81185fd5 ffffffff81082c2c
      00000001a39d8000 53d0abbc98490e40 0000000000000037 ffff8800a39d8220
      Call Trace:
      [<ffffffff811826e8>] ? ecryptfs_setxattr+0x40/0x52
      [<ffffffff81185fd5>] ? ecryptfs_write_metadata+0x1b3/0x223
      [<ffffffff81082c2c>] ? should_resched+0x5/0x23
      [<ffffffff8118322b>] ? ecryptfs_initialize_file+0xaf/0xd4
      [<ffffffff81183344>] ? ecryptfs_create+0xf4/0x142
      [<ffffffff810f8c0d>] ? vfs_create+0x48/0x71
      [<ffffffff810f9c86>] ? do_last.isra.68+0x559/0x952
      [<ffffffff810f7ce7>] ? link_path_walk+0xbd/0x458
      [<ffffffff810fa2a3>] ? path_openat+0x224/0x472
      [<ffffffff810fa7bd>] ? do_filp_open+0x2b/0x6f
      [<ffffffff81103606>] ? __alloc_fd+0xd6/0xe7
      [<ffffffff810ee6ab>] ? do_sys_open+0x65/0xe9
      [<ffffffff8157d022>] ? system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
      RIP  [<ffffffff8110eb39>] fsstack_copy_attr_all+0x2/0x61
      RSP <ffff8800bad71c10>
      CR2: 0000000000000000
      ---[ end trace df9dba5f1ddb8565 ]---"
      
      If we create a file when we mount with ecryptfs_xattr_metadata option, we will
      encounter a crash in this path:
      ->ecryptfs_create
        ->ecryptfs_initialize_file
          ->ecryptfs_write_metadata
            ->ecryptfs_write_metadata_to_xattr
              ->ecryptfs_setxattr
                ->fsstack_copy_attr_all
      It's because our dentry->d_inode used in fsstack_copy_attr_all is NULL, and it
      will be initialized when ecryptfs_initialize_file finish.
      
      So we should skip copying attr from lower inode when the value of ->d_inode is
      invalid.
      Signed-off-by: NChao Yu <chao2.yu@samsung.com>
      Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.2+: b59db43a eCryptfs: Prevent file create race condition
      Signed-off-by: NTyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
      35425ea2
  31. 15 7月, 2014 1 次提交
  32. 04 7月, 2014 3 次提交
  33. 07 5月, 2014 2 次提交
  34. 04 4月, 2014 1 次提交
    • J
      mm + fs: store shadow entries in page cache · 91b0abe3
      Johannes Weiner 提交于
      Reclaim will be leaving shadow entries in the page cache radix tree upon
      evicting the real page.  As those pages are found from the LRU, an
      iput() can lead to the inode being freed concurrently.  At this point,
      reclaim must no longer install shadow pages because the inode freeing
      code needs to ensure the page tree is really empty.
      
      Add an address_space flag, AS_EXITING, that the inode freeing code sets
      under the tree lock before doing the final truncate.  Reclaim will check
      for this flag before installing shadow pages.
      Signed-off-by: NJohannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
      Reviewed-by: NRik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
      Reviewed-by: NMinchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
      Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
      Cc: Bob Liu <bob.liu@oracle.com>
      Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
      Cc: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
      Cc: Greg Thelen <gthelen@google.com>
      Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
      Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
      Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
      Cc: Luigi Semenzato <semenzato@google.com>
      Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
      Cc: Metin Doslu <metin@citusdata.com>
      Cc: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com>
      Cc: Ozgun Erdogan <ozgun@citusdata.com>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Roman Gushchin <klamm@yandex-team.ru>
      Cc: Ryan Mallon <rmallon@gmail.com>
      Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
      Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
      Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      91b0abe3