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  1. 16 1月, 2018 6 次提交
    • K
      usercopy: Allow strict enforcement of whitelists · 2d891fbc
      由 Kees Cook 提交于 
      This introduces CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY_FALLBACK to control the
behavior of hardened usercopy whitelist violations. By default, whitelist
violations will continue to WARN() so that any bad or missing usercopy
whitelists can be discovered without being too disruptive.

If this config is disabled at build time or a system is booted with
"slab_common.usercopy_fallback=0", usercopy whitelists will BUG() instead
of WARN(). This is useful for admins that want to use usercopy whitelists
immediately.
Suggested-by: NMatthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
      2d891fbc
    • K
      usercopy: WARN() on slab cache usercopy region violations · afcc90f8
      由 Kees Cook 提交于 
      This patch adds checking of usercopy cache whitelisting, and is modified
from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's PAX_USERCOPY whitelisting code in the
last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my understanding of the
code. Changes or omissions from the original code are mine and don't
reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code.

The SLAB and SLUB allocators are modified to WARN() on all copy operations
in which the kernel heap memory being modified falls outside of the cache's
defined usercopy region.

Based on an earlier patch from David Windsor.

Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: linux-xfs@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
      afcc90f8
    • D
      usercopy: Prepare for usercopy whitelisting · 8eb8284b
      由 David Windsor 提交于 
      This patch prepares the slab allocator to handle caches having annotations
(useroffset and usersize) defining usercopy regions.

This patch is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's PAX_USERCOPY
whitelisting code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on
my understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original
code are mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code.

Currently, hardened usercopy performs dynamic bounds checking on slab
cache objects. This is good, but still leaves a lot of kernel memory
available to be copied to/from userspace in the face of bugs. To further
restrict what memory is available for copying, this creates a way to
whitelist specific areas of a given slab cache object for copying to/from
userspace, allowing much finer granularity of access control. Slab caches
that are never exposed to userspace can declare no whitelist for their
objects, thereby keeping them unavailable to userspace via dynamic copy
operations. (Note, an implicit form of whitelisting is the use of constant
sizes in usercopy operations and get_user()/put_user(); these bypass
hardened usercopy checks since these sizes cannot change at runtime.)

To support this whitelist annotation, usercopy region offset and size
members are added to struct kmem_cache. The slab allocator receives a
new function, kmem_cache_create_usercopy(), that creates a new cache
with a usercopy region defined, suitable for declaring spans of fields
within the objects that get copied to/from userspace.

In this patch, the default kmem_cache_create() marks the entire allocation
as whitelisted, leaving it semantically unchanged. Once all fine-grained
whitelists have been added (in subsequent patches), this will be changed
to a usersize of 0, making caches created with kmem_cache_create() not
copyable to/from userspace.

After the entire usercopy whitelist series is applied, less than 15%
of the slab cache memory remains exposed to potential usercopy bugs
after a fresh boot:

Total Slab Memory:           48074720
Usercopyable Memory:          6367532  13.2%
         task_struct                    0.2%         4480/1630720
         RAW                            0.3%            300/96000
         RAWv6                          2.1%           1408/64768
         ext4_inode_cache               3.0%       269760/8740224
         dentry                        11.1%       585984/5273856
         mm_struct                     29.1%         54912/188448
         kmalloc-8                    100.0%          24576/24576
         kmalloc-16                   100.0%          28672/28672
         kmalloc-32                   100.0%          81920/81920
         kmalloc-192                  100.0%          96768/96768
         kmalloc-128                  100.0%        143360/143360
         names_cache                  100.0%        163840/163840
         kmalloc-64                   100.0%        167936/167936
         kmalloc-256                  100.0%        339968/339968
         kmalloc-512                  100.0%        350720/350720
         kmalloc-96                   100.0%        455616/455616
         kmalloc-8192                 100.0%        655360/655360
         kmalloc-1024                 100.0%        812032/812032
         kmalloc-4096                 100.0%        819200/819200
         kmalloc-2048                 100.0%      1310720/1310720

After some kernel build workloads, the percentage (mainly driven by
dentry and inode caches expanding) drops under 10%:

Total Slab Memory:           95516184
Usercopyable Memory:          8497452   8.8%
         task_struct                    0.2%         4000/1456000
         RAW                            0.3%            300/96000
         RAWv6                          2.1%           1408/64768
         ext4_inode_cache               3.0%     1217280/39439872
         dentry                        11.1%     1623200/14608800
         mm_struct                     29.1%         73216/251264
         kmalloc-8                    100.0%          24576/24576
         kmalloc-16                   100.0%          28672/28672
         kmalloc-32                   100.0%          94208/94208
         kmalloc-192                  100.0%          96768/96768
         kmalloc-128                  100.0%        143360/143360
         names_cache                  100.0%        163840/163840
         kmalloc-64                   100.0%        245760/245760
         kmalloc-256                  100.0%        339968/339968
         kmalloc-512                  100.0%        350720/350720
         kmalloc-96                   100.0%        563520/563520
         kmalloc-8192                 100.0%        655360/655360
         kmalloc-1024                 100.0%        794624/794624
         kmalloc-4096                 100.0%        819200/819200
         kmalloc-2048                 100.0%      1257472/1257472
Signed-off-by: NDavid Windsor <dave@nullcore.net>
[kees: adjust commit log, split out a few extra kmalloc hunks]
[kees: add field names to function declarations]
[kees: convert BUGs to WARNs and fail closed]
[kees: add attack surface reduction analysis to commit log]
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: linux-xfs@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: NChristoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
      8eb8284b
    • K
      usercopy: Include offset in hardened usercopy report · f4e6e289
      由 Kees Cook 提交于 
      This refactors the hardened usercopy code so that failure reporting can
happen within the checking functions instead of at the top level. This
simplifies the return value handling and allows more details and offsets
to be included in the report. Having the offset can be much more helpful
in understanding hardened usercopy bugs.
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
      f4e6e289
    • K
      usercopy: Enhance and rename report_usercopy() · b394d468
      由 Kees Cook 提交于 
      In preparation for refactoring the usercopy checks to pass offset to
the hardened usercopy report, this renames report_usercopy() to the
more accurate usercopy_abort(), marks it as noreturn because it is,
adds a hopefully helpful comment for anyone investigating such reports,
makes the function available to the slab allocators, and adds new "detail"
and "offset" arguments.
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
      b394d468
    • K
      usercopy: Remove pointer from overflow report · 4f5e8386
      由 Kees Cook 提交于 
      Using %p was already mostly useless in the usercopy overflow reports,
so this removes it entirely to avoid confusion now that %p-hashing
is enabled.

Fixes: ad67b74d ("printk: hash addresses printed with %p")
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
      4f5e8386
  3. 30 11月, 2017 15 次提交
  5. 29 11月, 2017 1 次提交
  7. 28 11月, 2017 3 次提交
    • L
      Rename superblock flags (MS_xyz -> SB_xyz) · 1751e8a6
      由 Linus Torvalds 提交于 
      This is a pure automated search-and-replace of the internal kernel
superblock flags.

The s_flags are now called SB_*, with the names and the values for the
moment mirroring the MS_* flags that they're equivalent to.

Note how the MS_xyz flags are the ones passed to the mount system call,
while the SB_xyz flags are what we then use in sb->s_flags.

The script to do this was:

    # places to look in; re security/*: it generally should *not* be
    # touched (that stuff parses mount(2) arguments directly), but
    # there are two places where we really deal with superblock flags.
    FILES="drivers/mtd drivers/staging/lustre fs ipc mm \
            include/linux/fs.h include/uapi/linux/bfs_fs.h \
            security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c security/apparmor/include/lib.h"
    # the list of MS_... constants
    SYMS="RDONLY NOSUID NODEV NOEXEC SYNCHRONOUS REMOUNT MANDLOCK \
          DIRSYNC NOATIME NODIRATIME BIND MOVE REC VERBOSE SILENT \
          POSIXACL UNBINDABLE PRIVATE SLAVE SHARED RELATIME KERNMOUNT \
          I_VERSION STRICTATIME LAZYTIME SUBMOUNT NOREMOTELOCK NOSEC BORN \
          ACTIVE NOUSER"

    SED_PROG=
    for i in $SYMS; do SED_PROG="$SED_PROG -e s/MS_$i/SB_$i/g"; done

    # we want files that contain at least one of MS_...,
    # with fs/namespace.c and fs/pnode.c excluded.
    L=$(for i in $SYMS; do git grep -w -l MS_$i $FILES; done| sort|uniq|grep -v '^fs/namespace.c'|grep -v '^fs/pnode.c')

    for f in $L; do sed -i $f $SED_PROG; done
Requested-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      1751e8a6
    • K
      mm, thp: Do not make pmd/pud dirty without a reason · 152e93af
      由 Kirill A. Shutemov 提交于 
      Currently we make page table entries dirty all the time regardless of
access type and don't even consider if the mapping is write-protected.
The reasoning is that we don't really need dirty tracking on THP and
making the entry dirty upfront may save some time on first write to the
page.

Unfortunately, such approach may result in false-positive
can_follow_write_pmd() for huge zero page or read-only shmem file.

Let's only make page dirty only if we about to write to the page anyway
(as we do for small pages).

I've restructured the code to make entry dirty inside
maybe_p[mu]d_mkwrite(). It also takes into account if the vma is
write-protected.
Signed-off-by: NKirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: NMichal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      152e93af
    • K
      mm, thp: Do not make page table dirty unconditionally in touch_p[mu]d() · a8f97366
      由 Kirill A. Shutemov 提交于 
      Currently, we unconditionally make page table dirty in touch_pmd().
It may result in false-positive can_follow_write_pmd().

We may avoid the situation, if we would only make the page table entry
dirty if caller asks for write access -- FOLL_WRITE.

The patch also changes touch_pud() in the same way.
Signed-off-by: NKirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      a8f97366
  9. 22 11月, 2017 1 次提交
    • K
      block/laptop_mode: Convert timers to use timer_setup() · bca237a5
      由 Kees Cook 提交于 
      In preparation for unconditionally passing the struct timer_list pointer to
all timer callbacks, switch to using the new timer_setup() and from_timer()
to pass the timer pointer explicitly.

Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Cc: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov.dev@gmail.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <mawilcox@microsoft.com>
Cc: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-block@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
      bca237a5
  11. 20 11月, 2017 2 次提交
  13. 18 11月, 2017 8 次提交
  15. 16 11月, 2017 4 次提交