1. 16 6月, 2014 1 次提交
    • T
      rtmutex: Plug slow unlock race · 27e35715
      Thomas Gleixner 提交于
      When the rtmutex fast path is enabled the slow unlock function can
      create the following situation:
      
      spin_lock(foo->m->wait_lock);
      foo->m->owner = NULL;
      	    			rt_mutex_lock(foo->m); <-- fast path
      				free = atomic_dec_and_test(foo->refcnt);
      				rt_mutex_unlock(foo->m); <-- fast path
      				if (free)
      				   kfree(foo);
      
      spin_unlock(foo->m->wait_lock); <--- Use after free.
      
      Plug the race by changing the slow unlock to the following scheme:
      
           while (!rt_mutex_has_waiters(m)) {
           	    /* Clear the waiters bit in m->owner */
      	    clear_rt_mutex_waiters(m);
            	    owner = rt_mutex_owner(m);
            	    spin_unlock(m->wait_lock);
            	    if (cmpxchg(m->owner, owner, 0) == owner)
            	       return;
            	    spin_lock(m->wait_lock);
           }
      
      So in case of a new waiter incoming while the owner tries the slow
      path unlock we have two situations:
      
       unlock(wait_lock);
      					lock(wait_lock);
       cmpxchg(p, owner, 0) == owner
       	    	   			mark_rt_mutex_waiters(lock);
      	 				acquire(lock);
      
      Or:
      
       unlock(wait_lock);
      					lock(wait_lock);
      	 				mark_rt_mutex_waiters(lock);
       cmpxchg(p, owner, 0) != owner
      					enqueue_waiter();
      					unlock(wait_lock);
       lock(wait_lock);
       wakeup_next waiter();
       unlock(wait_lock);
      					lock(wait_lock);
      					acquire(lock);
      
      If the fast path is disabled, then the simple
      
         m->owner = NULL;
         unlock(m->wait_lock);
      
      is sufficient as all access to m->owner is serialized via
      m->wait_lock;
      
      Also document and clarify the wakeup_next_waiter function as suggested
      by Oleg Nesterov.
      Reported-by: NSteven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
      Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Reviewed-by: NSteven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140611183852.937945560@linutronix.de
      Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
      Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      27e35715
  2. 07 6月, 2014 2 次提交
    • T
      rtmutex: Detect changes in the pi lock chain · 82084984
      Thomas Gleixner 提交于
      When we walk the lock chain, we drop all locks after each step. So the
      lock chain can change under us before we reacquire the locks. That's
      harmless in principle as we just follow the wrong lock path. But it
      can lead to a false positive in the dead lock detection logic:
      
      T0 holds L0
      T0 blocks on L1 held by T1
      T1 blocks on L2 held by T2
      T2 blocks on L3 held by T3
      T4 blocks on L4 held by T4
      
      Now we walk the chain
      
      lock T1 -> lock L2 -> adjust L2 -> unlock T1 -> 
           lock T2 ->  adjust T2 ->  drop locks
      
      T2 times out and blocks on L0
      
      Now we continue:
      
      lock T2 -> lock L0 -> deadlock detected, but it's not a deadlock at all.
      
      Brad tried to work around that in the deadlock detection logic itself,
      but the more I looked at it the less I liked it, because it's crystal
      ball magic after the fact.
      
      We actually can detect a chain change very simple:
      
      lock T1 -> lock L2 -> adjust L2 -> unlock T1 -> lock T2 -> adjust T2 ->
      
           next_lock = T2->pi_blocked_on->lock;
      
      drop locks
      
      T2 times out and blocks on L0
      
      Now we continue:
      
      lock T2 -> 
      
           if (next_lock != T2->pi_blocked_on->lock)
           	   return;
      
      So if we detect that T2 is now blocked on a different lock we stop the
      chain walk. That's also correct in the following scenario:
      
      lock T1 -> lock L2 -> adjust L2 -> unlock T1 -> lock T2 -> adjust T2 ->
      
           next_lock = T2->pi_blocked_on->lock;
      
      drop locks
      
      T3 times out and drops L3
      T2 acquires L3 and blocks on L4 now
      
      Now we continue:
      
      lock T2 -> 
      
           if (next_lock != T2->pi_blocked_on->lock)
           	   return;
      
      We don't have to follow up the chain at that point, because T2
      propagated our priority up to T4 already.
      
      [ Folded a cleanup patch from peterz ]
      Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Reported-by: NBrad Mouring <bmouring@ni.com>
      Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140605152801.930031935@linutronix.de
      Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
      82084984
    • T
      rtmutex: Handle deadlock detection smarter · 3d5c9340
      Thomas Gleixner 提交于
      Even in the case when deadlock detection is not requested by the
      caller, we can detect deadlocks. Right now the code stops the lock
      chain walk and keeps the waiter enqueued, even on itself. Silly not to
      yell when such a scenario is detected and to keep the waiter enqueued.
      
      Return -EDEADLK unconditionally and handle it at the call sites.
      
      The futex calls return -EDEADLK. The non futex ones dequeue the
      waiter, throw a warning and put the task into a schedule loop.
      
      Tagged for stable as it makes the code more robust.
      Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Brad Mouring <bmouring@ni.com>
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140605152801.836501969@linutronix.de
      Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
      Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      3d5c9340
  3. 06 6月, 2014 6 次提交
    • L
      Merge branch 'perf-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip · 951e2730
      Linus Torvalds 提交于
      Pull perf fixes from Ingo Molnar:
       "Two last minute tooling fixes"
      
      * 'perf-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
        perf probe: Fix perf probe to find correct variable DIE
        perf probe: Fix a segfault if asked for variable it doesn't find
      951e2730
    • L
      Merge branch 'futex-fixes' (futex fixes from Thomas Gleixner) · 1c5aefb5
      Linus Torvalds 提交于
      Merge futex fixes from Thomas Gleixner:
       "So with more awake and less futex wreckaged brain, I went through my
        list of points again and came up with the following 4 patches.
      
        1) Prevent pi requeueing on the same futex
      
           I kept Kees check for uaddr1 == uaddr2 as a early check for private
           futexes and added a key comparison to both futex_requeue and
           futex_wait_requeue_pi.
      
           Sebastian, sorry for the confusion yesterday night.  I really
           misunderstood your question.
      
           You are right the check is pointless for shared futexes where the
           same physical address is mapped to two different virtual addresses.
      
        2) Sanity check atomic acquisiton in futex_lock_pi_atomic
      
           That's basically what Darren suggested.
      
           I just simplified it to use futex_top_waiter() to find kernel
           internal state.  If state is found return -EINVAL and do not bother
           to fix up the user space variable.  It's corrupted already.
      
        3) Ensure state consistency in futex_unlock_pi
      
           The code is silly versus the owner died bit.  There is no point to
           preserve it on unlock when the user space thread owns the futex.
      
           What's worse is that it does not update the user space value when
           the owner died bit is set.  So the kernel itself creates observable
           inconsistency.
      
           Another "optimization" is to retry an atomic unlock.  That's
           pointless as in a sane environment user space would not call into
           that code if it could have unlocked it atomically.  So we always
           check whether there is kernel state around and only if there is
           none, we do the unlock by setting the user space value to 0.
      
        4) Sanitize lookup_pi_state
      
           lookup_pi_state is ambigous about TID == 0 in the user space value.
      
           This can be a valid state even if there is kernel state on this
           uaddr, but we miss a few corner case checks.
      
           I tried to come up with a smaller solution hacking the checks into
           the current cruft, but it turned out to be ugly as hell and I got
           more confused than I was before.  So I rewrote the sanity checks
           along the state documentation with awful lots of commentry"
      
      * emailed patches from Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>:
        futex: Make lookup_pi_state more robust
        futex: Always cleanup owner tid in unlock_pi
        futex: Validate atomic acquisition in futex_lock_pi_atomic()
        futex-prevent-requeue-pi-on-same-futex.patch futex: Forbid uaddr == uaddr2 in futex_requeue(..., requeue_pi=1)
      1c5aefb5
    • T
      futex: Make lookup_pi_state more robust · 54a21788
      Thomas Gleixner 提交于
      The current implementation of lookup_pi_state has ambigous handling of
      the TID value 0 in the user space futex.  We can get into the kernel
      even if the TID value is 0, because either there is a stale waiters bit
      or the owner died bit is set or we are called from the requeue_pi path
      or from user space just for fun.
      
      The current code avoids an explicit sanity check for pid = 0 in case
      that kernel internal state (waiters) are found for the user space
      address.  This can lead to state leakage and worse under some
      circumstances.
      
      Handle the cases explicit:
      
             Waiter | pi_state | pi->owner | uTID      | uODIED | ?
      
        [1]  NULL   | ---      | ---       | 0         | 0/1    | Valid
        [2]  NULL   | ---      | ---       | >0        | 0/1    | Valid
      
        [3]  Found  | NULL     | --        | Any       | 0/1    | Invalid
      
        [4]  Found  | Found    | NULL      | 0         | 1      | Valid
        [5]  Found  | Found    | NULL      | >0        | 1      | Invalid
      
        [6]  Found  | Found    | task      | 0         | 1      | Valid
      
        [7]  Found  | Found    | NULL      | Any       | 0      | Invalid
      
        [8]  Found  | Found    | task      | ==taskTID | 0/1    | Valid
        [9]  Found  | Found    | task      | 0         | 0      | Invalid
        [10] Found  | Found    | task      | !=taskTID | 0/1    | Invalid
      
       [1] Indicates that the kernel can acquire the futex atomically. We
           came came here due to a stale FUTEX_WAITERS/FUTEX_OWNER_DIED bit.
      
       [2] Valid, if TID does not belong to a kernel thread. If no matching
           thread is found then it indicates that the owner TID has died.
      
       [3] Invalid. The waiter is queued on a non PI futex
      
       [4] Valid state after exit_robust_list(), which sets the user space
           value to FUTEX_WAITERS | FUTEX_OWNER_DIED.
      
       [5] The user space value got manipulated between exit_robust_list()
           and exit_pi_state_list()
      
       [6] Valid state after exit_pi_state_list() which sets the new owner in
           the pi_state but cannot access the user space value.
      
       [7] pi_state->owner can only be NULL when the OWNER_DIED bit is set.
      
       [8] Owner and user space value match
      
       [9] There is no transient state which sets the user space TID to 0
           except exit_robust_list(), but this is indicated by the
           FUTEX_OWNER_DIED bit. See [4]
      
      [10] There is no transient state which leaves owner and user space
           TID out of sync.
      Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
      Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
      Cc: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
      Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      54a21788
    • T
      futex: Always cleanup owner tid in unlock_pi · 13fbca4c
      Thomas Gleixner 提交于
      If the owner died bit is set at futex_unlock_pi, we currently do not
      cleanup the user space futex.  So the owner TID of the current owner
      (the unlocker) persists.  That's observable inconsistant state,
      especially when the ownership of the pi state got transferred.
      
      Clean it up unconditionally.
      Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
      Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
      Cc: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
      Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      13fbca4c
    • T
      futex: Validate atomic acquisition in futex_lock_pi_atomic() · b3eaa9fc
      Thomas Gleixner 提交于
      We need to protect the atomic acquisition in the kernel against rogue
      user space which sets the user space futex to 0, so the kernel side
      acquisition succeeds while there is existing state in the kernel
      associated to the real owner.
      
      Verify whether the futex has waiters associated with kernel state.  If
      it has, return -EINVAL.  The state is corrupted already, so no point in
      cleaning it up.  Subsequent calls will fail as well.  Not our problem.
      
      [ tglx: Use futex_top_waiter() and explain why we do not need to try
        	restoring the already corrupted user space state. ]
      Signed-off-by: NDarren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
      Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
      Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
      Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      b3eaa9fc
    • T
      futex-prevent-requeue-pi-on-same-futex.patch futex: Forbid uaddr == uaddr2 in... · e9c243a5
      Thomas Gleixner 提交于
      futex-prevent-requeue-pi-on-same-futex.patch futex: Forbid uaddr == uaddr2 in futex_requeue(..., requeue_pi=1)
      
      If uaddr == uaddr2, then we have broken the rule of only requeueing from
      a non-pi futex to a pi futex with this call.  If we attempt this, then
      dangling pointers may be left for rt_waiter resulting in an exploitable
      condition.
      
      This change brings futex_requeue() in line with futex_wait_requeue_pi()
      which performs the same check as per commit 6f7b0a2a ("futex: Forbid
      uaddr == uaddr2 in futex_wait_requeue_pi()")
      
      [ tglx: Compare the resulting keys as well, as uaddrs might be
        	different depending on the mapping ]
      
      Fixes CVE-2014-3153.
      
      Reported-by: Pinkie Pie
      Signed-off-by: NWill Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
      Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
      Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
      Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Reviewed-by: NDarren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
      Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      e9c243a5
  4. 05 6月, 2014 3 次提交
    • I
      Merge tag 'perf-urgent-for-mingo' of... · 22c91aa2
      Ingo Molnar 提交于
      Merge tag 'perf-urgent-for-mingo' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jolsa/perf into perf/urgent
      
      Pull perf/urgent fixes from Jiri Olsa:
      
       * Fix perf probe to find correct variable DIE (Masami Hiramatsu)
      
       * Fix a segfault in perf probe if asked for variable it doesn't find (Masami Hiramatsu)
      Signed-off-by: NJiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
      Acked-by: NPeter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      22c91aa2
    • L
      Merge branch 'for-3.15-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tj/percpu · 54539cd2
      Linus Torvalds 提交于
      Pull percpu fix from Tejun Heo:
       "It is very late but this is an important percpu-refcount fix from
        Sebastian Ott.
      
        The problem is that percpu_ref_*() used __this_cpu_*() instead of
        this_cpu_*().  The difference between the two is that the latter is
        atomic on the local cpu while the former is not.  this_cpu_inc() is
        guaranteed to increment the percpu counter on the cpu that the
        operation is executed on without any synchronization; however,
        __this_cpu_inc() doesn't and if the local cpu invokes the function
        from different contexts (e.g.  process and irq) of the same CPU, it's
        not guaranteed to actually increment as it may be implemented as rmw.
      
        This bug existed from the get-go but it hasn't been noticed earlier
        probably because on x86 __this_cpu_inc() is equivalent to
        this_cpu_inc() as both get translated into single instruction;
        however, s390 uses the generic rmw implementation and gets affected by
        the bug.  Kudos to Sebastian and Heiko for diagnosing it.
      
        The change is very low risk and fixes a critical issue on the affected
        architectures, so I think it's a good candidate for inclusion although
        it's very late in the devel cycle.  On the other hand, this has been
        broken since v3.11, so backporting it through -stable post -rc1 won't
        be the end of the world.
      
        I'll ping Christoph whether __this_cpu_*() ops can be better annotated
        so that it can trigger lockdep warning when used from multiple
        contexts"
      
      * 'for-3.15-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tj/percpu:
        percpu-refcount: fix usage of this_cpu_ops
      54539cd2
    • S
      percpu-refcount: fix usage of this_cpu_ops · 0c36b390
      Sebastian Ott 提交于
      The percpu-refcount infrastructure uses the underscore variants of
      this_cpu_ops in order to modify percpu reference counters.
      (e.g. __this_cpu_inc()).
      
      However the underscore variants do not atomically update the percpu
      variable, instead they may be implemented using read-modify-write
      semantics (more than one instruction).  Therefore it is only safe to
      use the underscore variant if the context is always the same (process,
      softirq, or hardirq). Otherwise it is possible to lose updates.
      
      This problem is something that Sebastian has seen within the aio
      subsystem which uses percpu refcounters both in process and softirq
      context leading to reference counts that never dropped to zeroes; even
      though the number of "get" and "put" calls matched.
      
      Fix this by using the non-underscore this_cpu_ops variant which
      provides correct per cpu atomic semantics and fixes the corrupted
      reference counts.
      
      Cc: Kent Overstreet <kmo@daterainc.com>
      Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.11+
      Reported-by: NSebastian Ott <sebott@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
      Signed-off-by: NHeiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
      Signed-off-by: NTejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
      References: http://lkml.kernel.org/g/alpine.LFD.2.11.1406041540520.21183@denkbrett
      0c36b390
  5. 04 6月, 2014 6 次提交
    • L
      Merge tag 'pm-3.15-final' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rafael/linux-pm · c717d156
      Linus Torvalds 提交于
      Pull intel pstate fixes from Rafael Wysocki:
       "Final power management fixes for 3.15
      
         - Taking non-idle time into account when calculating core busy time
           was a mistake and led to a performance regression.  Since the
           problem it was supposed to address is now taken care of in a
           different way, we don't need to do it any more, so drop the
           non-idle time tracking from intel_pstate.  Dirk Brandewie.
      
         - Changing to fixed point math throughout the busy calculation
           introduced rounding errors that adversely affect the accuracy of
           intel_pstate's computations.  Fix from Dirk Brandewie.
      
         - The PID controller algorithm used by intel_pstate assumes that the
           time interval between two adjacent samples will always be the same
           which is not the case for deferable timers (used by intel_pstate)
           when the system is idle.  This leads to inaccurate predictions and
           artificially increases convergence times for the minimum P-state.
           Fix from Dirk Brandewie.
      
         - intel_pstate carries out computations using 32-bit variables that
           may overflow for large enough values of APERF/MPERF.  Switch to
           using 64-bit variables for computations, from Doug Smythies"
      
      * tag 'pm-3.15-final' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rafael/linux-pm:
        intel_pstate: Improve initial busy calculation
        intel_pstate: add sample time scaling
        intel_pstate: Correct rounding in busy calculation
        intel_pstate: Remove C0 tracking
      c717d156
    • L
      Merge branch 'drm-fixes' of git://people.freedesktop.org/~airlied/linux · 9e9a928e
      Linus Torvalds 提交于
      Pull drm fixes from Dave Airlie:
       "All fairly small: radeon stability and a panic path fix.
      
        Mostly radeon fixes, suspend/resume fix, stability on the CIK
        chipsets, along with a locking check avoidance patch for panic times
        regression"
      
      * 'drm-fixes' of git://people.freedesktop.org/~airlied/linux:
        drm/radeon: use the CP DMA on CIK
        drm/radeon: sync page table updates
        drm/radeon: fix vm buffer size estimation
        drm/crtc-helper: skip locking checks in panicking path
        drm/radeon/dpm: resume fixes for some systems
      9e9a928e
    • M
      perf probe: Fix perf probe to find correct variable DIE · 082f96a9
      Masami Hiramatsu 提交于
      Fix perf probe to find correct variable DIE which has location or
      external instance by tracking down the lexical blocks.
      
      Current die_find_variable() expects that the all variable DIEs
      which has DW_TAG_variable have a location. However, since recent
      dwarf information may have declaration variable DIEs at the
      entry of function (subprogram), die_find_variable() returns it.
      
      To solve this problem, it must track down the DIE tree to find
      a DIE which has an actual location or a reference for external
      instance.
      
      e.g. finding a DIE which origin is <0xdc73>;
      
       <1><11496>: Abbrev Number: 95 (DW_TAG_subprogram)
          <11497>   DW_AT_abstract_origin: <0xdc42>
          <1149b>   DW_AT_low_pc      : 0x1850
      [...]
       <2><114cc>: Abbrev Number: 119 (DW_TAG_variable) <- this is a declaration
          <114cd>   DW_AT_abstract_origin: <0xdc73>
       <2><114d1>: Abbrev Number: 119 (DW_TAG_variable)
      [...]
       <3><115a7>: Abbrev Number: 105 (DW_TAG_lexical_block)
          <115a8>   DW_AT_ranges      : 0xaa0
       <4><115ac>: Abbrev Number: 96 (DW_TAG_variable) <- this has a location
          <115ad>   DW_AT_abstract_origin: <0xdc73>
          <115b1>   DW_AT_location    : 0x486c        (location list)
      Signed-off-by: NMasami Hiramatsu <masami.hiramatsu.pt@hitachi.com>
      Tested-by: NArnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
      Acked-by: NArnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
      Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
      Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
      Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
      Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140529121930.30879.87092.stgit@ltc230.yrl.intra.hitachi.co.jpSigned-off-by: NJiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
      082f96a9
    • M
      perf probe: Fix a segfault if asked for variable it doesn't find · 0c188a07
      Masami Hiramatsu 提交于
      Fix a segfault bug by asking for variable it doesn't find.
      Since the convert_variable() didn't handle error code returned
      from convert_variable_location(), it just passed an incomplete
      variable field and then a segfault was occurred when formatting
      the field.
      
      This fixes that bug by handling success code correctly in
      convert_variable(). Other callers of convert_variable_location()
      are correctly checking the return code.
      
      This bug was introduced by following commit. But another hidden
      erroneous error handling has been there previously (-ENOMEM case).
      
       commit 3d918a12Signed-off-by: NMasami Hiramatsu <masami.hiramatsu.pt@hitachi.com>
      Reported-by: NArnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
      Tested-by: NArnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
      Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
      Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
      Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140529105232.28251.30447.stgit@ltc230.yrl.intra.hitachi.co.jpSigned-off-by: NJiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
      0c188a07
    • D
      Merge branch 'drm-fixes-3.15' of git://people.freedesktop.org/~deathsimple/linux into drm-fixes · 0a4ae727
      Dave Airlie 提交于
      The first one is a one liner fixing a stupid typo in the VM handling code and is only relevant if play with one of the VM defines.
      
      The other two switches CIK to use the CPDMA instead of the SDMA for buffer moves, as it turned out the SDMA is still sometimes not 100% reliable.
      
      * 'drm-fixes-3.15' of git://people.freedesktop.org/~deathsimple/linux:
        drm/radeon: use the CP DMA on CIK
        drm/radeon: sync page table updates
        drm/radeon: fix vm buffer size estimation
      0a4ae727
    • L
      Merge tag 'sound-3.15' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tiwai/sound · d2cfd310
      Linus Torvalds 提交于
      Pull sound fixes from Takashi Iwai:
       "A few addition of HD-audio fixups for ALC260 and AD1986A codecs.  All
        marked as stable fixes.
      
        The fixes are pretty local and they are old machines, so quite safe to
        apply"
      
      * tag 'sound-3.15' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tiwai/sound:
        ALSA: hda/realtek - Fix COEF widget NID for ALC260 replacer fixup
        ALSA: hda/realtek - Correction of fixup codes for PB V7900 laptop
        ALSA: hda/analog - Fix silent output on ASUS A8JN
      d2cfd310
  6. 03 6月, 2014 18 次提交
  7. 02 6月, 2014 4 次提交