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  1. 10 1月, 2014 1 次提交
  3. 24 11月, 2013 8 次提交
  5. 16 11月, 2013 1 次提交
  7. 25 10月, 2013 1 次提交
  9. 28 9月, 2013 1 次提交
    • D
      FS-Cache: Provide the ability to enable/disable cookies · 94d30ae9
      由 David Howells 提交于 
      Provide the ability to enable and disable fscache cookies.  A disabled cookie
will reject or ignore further requests to:

	Acquire a child cookie
	Invalidate and update backing objects
	Check the consistency of a backing object
	Allocate storage for backing page
	Read backing pages
	Write to backing pages

but still allows:

	Checks/waits on the completion of already in-progress objects
	Uncaching of pages
	Relinquishment of cookies

Two new operations are provided:

 (1) Disable a cookie:

	void fscache_disable_cookie(struct fscache_cookie *cookie,
				    bool invalidate);

     If the cookie is not already disabled, this locks the cookie against other
     dis/enablement ops, marks the cookie as being disabled, discards or
     invalidates any backing objects and waits for cessation of activity on any
     associated object.

     This is a wrapper around a chunk split out of fscache_relinquish_cookie(),
     but it reinitialises the cookie such that it can be reenabled.

     All possible failures are handled internally.  The caller should consider
     calling fscache_uncache_all_inode_pages() afterwards to make sure all page
     markings are cleared up.

 (2) Enable a cookie:

	void fscache_enable_cookie(struct fscache_cookie *cookie,
				   bool (*can_enable)(void *data),
				   void *data)

     If the cookie is not already enabled, this locks the cookie against other
     dis/enablement ops, invokes can_enable() and, if the cookie is not an
     index cookie, will begin the procedure of acquiring backing objects.

     The optional can_enable() function is passed the data argument and returns
     a ruling as to whether or not enablement should actually be permitted to
     begin.

     All possible failures are handled internally.  The cookie will only be
     marked as enabled if provisional backing objects are allocated.

A later patch will introduce these to NFS.  Cookie enablement during nfs_open()
is then contingent on i_writecount <= 0.  can_enable() checks for a race
between open(O_RDONLY) and open(O_WRONLY/O_RDWR).  This simplifies NFS's cookie
handling and allows us to get rid of open(O_RDONLY) accidentally introducing
caching to an inode that's open for writing already.

One operation has its API modified:

 (3) Acquire a cookie.

	struct fscache_cookie *fscache_acquire_cookie(
		struct fscache_cookie *parent,
		const struct fscache_cookie_def *def,
		void *netfs_data,
		bool enable);

     This now has an additional argument that indicates whether the requested
     cookie should be enabled by default.  It doesn't need the can_enable()
     function because the caller must prevent multiple calls for the same netfs
     object and it doesn't need to take the enablement lock because no one else
     can get at the cookie before this returns.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com
      94d30ae9
  11. 18 9月, 2013 2 次提交
  13. 26 8月, 2013 1 次提交
    • W
      fs/9p: avoid accessing utsname after namespace has been torn down · 50192abe
      由 Will Deacon 提交于 
      During trinity fuzzing in a kvmtool guest, I stumbled across the
following:

Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000004
PC is at v9fs_file_do_lock+0xc8/0x1a0
LR is at v9fs_file_do_lock+0x48/0x1a0
[<c01e2ed0>] (v9fs_file_do_lock+0xc8/0x1a0) from [<c0119154>] (locks_remove_flock+0x8c/0x124)
[<c0119154>] (locks_remove_flock+0x8c/0x124) from [<c00d9bf0>] (__fput+0x58/0x1e4)
[<c00d9bf0>] (__fput+0x58/0x1e4) from [<c0044340>] (task_work_run+0xac/0xe8)
[<c0044340>] (task_work_run+0xac/0xe8) from [<c002e36c>] (do_exit+0x6bc/0x8d8)
[<c002e36c>] (do_exit+0x6bc/0x8d8) from [<c002e674>] (do_group_exit+0x3c/0xb0)
[<c002e674>] (do_group_exit+0x3c/0xb0) from [<c002e6f8>] (__wake_up_parent+0x0/0x18)

I believe this is due to an attempt to access utsname()->nodename, after
exit_task_namespaces() has been called, leaving current->nsproxy->uts_ns
as NULL and causing the above dereference.

A similar issue was fixed for lockd in 9a1b6bf8 ("LOCKD: Don't call
utsname()->nodename from nlmclnt_setlockargs"), so this patch attempts
something similar for 9pfs.

Cc: Eric Van Hensbergen <ericvh@gmail.com>
Cc: Ron Minnich <rminnich@sandia.gov>
Cc: Latchesar Ionkov <lucho@ionkov.net>
Cc: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: NEric Van Hensbergen <ericvh@gmail.com>
      50192abe
  15. 30 7月, 2013 1 次提交
  17. 08 7月, 2013 2 次提交
  19. 29 6月, 2013 1 次提交
  21. 22 5月, 2013 1 次提交
    • L
      mm: change invalidatepage prototype to accept length · d47992f8
      由 Lukas Czerner 提交于 
      Currently there is no way to truncate partial page where the end
truncate point is not at the end of the page. This is because it was not
needed and the functionality was enough for file system truncate
operation to work properly. However more file systems now support punch
hole feature and it can benefit from mm supporting truncating page just
up to the certain point.

Specifically, with this functionality truncate_inode_pages_range() can
be changed so it supports truncating partial page at the end of the
range (currently it will BUG_ON() if 'end' is not at the end of the
page).

This commit changes the invalidatepage() address space operation
prototype to accept range to be invalidated and update all the instances
for it.

We also change the block_invalidatepage() in the same way and actually
make a use of the new length argument implementing range invalidation.

Actual file system implementations will follow except the file systems
where the changes are really simple and should not change the behaviour
in any way .Implementation for truncate_page_range() which will be able
to accept page unaligned ranges will follow as well.
Signed-off-by: NLukas Czerner <lczerner@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
      d47992f8
  23. 08 5月, 2013 1 次提交
  25. 04 3月, 2013 1 次提交
    • E
      fs: Limit sys_mount to only request filesystem modules. · 7f78e035
      由 Eric W. Biederman 提交于 
      Modify the request_module to prefix the file system type with "fs-"
and add aliases to all of the filesystems that can be built as modules
to match.

A common practice is to build all of the kernel code and leave code
that is not commonly needed as modules, with the result that many
users are exposed to any bug anywhere in the kernel.

Looking for filesystems with a fs- prefix limits the pool of possible
modules that can be loaded by mount to just filesystems trivially
making things safer with no real cost.

Using aliases means user space can control the policy of which
filesystem modules are auto-loaded by editing /etc/modprobe.d/*.conf
with blacklist and alias directives.  Allowing simple, safe,
well understood work-arounds to known problematic software.

This also addresses a rare but unfortunate problem where the filesystem
name is not the same as it's module name and module auto-loading
would not work.  While writing this patch I saw a handful of such
cases.  The most significant being autofs that lives in the module
autofs4.

This is relevant to user namespaces because we can reach the request
module in get_fs_type() without having any special permissions, and
people get uncomfortable when a user specified string (in this case
the filesystem type) goes all of the way to request_module.

After having looked at this issue I don't think there is any
particular reason to perform any filtering or permission checks beyond
making it clear in the module request that we want a filesystem
module.  The common pattern in the kernel is to call request_module()
without regards to the users permissions.  In general all a filesystem
module does once loaded is call register_filesystem() and go to sleep.
Which means there is not much attack surface exposed by loading a
filesytem module unless the filesystem is mounted.  In a user
namespace filesystems are not mounted unless .fs_flags = FS_USERNS_MOUNT,
which most filesystems do not set today.
Acked-by: NSerge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Acked-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reported-by: NKees Cook <keescook@google.com>
Signed-off-by: N"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
      7f78e035
  27. 28 2月, 2013 8 次提交
  29. 26 2月, 2013 7 次提交
  31. 23 2月, 2013 1 次提交
  33. 22 2月, 2013 1 次提交
  35. 12 2月, 2013 1 次提交