- 04 9月, 2013 1 次提交
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由 Al Viro 提交于
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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- 05 8月, 2013 1 次提交
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由 Andy Lutomirski 提交于
O_TMPFILE, like O_CREAT, should respect the requested mode and should create regular files. This fixes two bugs: O_TMPFILE required privilege (because the mode ended up as 000) and it produced bogus inodes with no type. Signed-off-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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- 20 7月, 2013 1 次提交
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由 Al Viro 提交于
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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- 13 7月, 2013 1 次提交
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由 Al Viro 提交于
[suggested by Rasmus Villemoes] make O_DIRECTORY | O_RDWR part of O_TMPFILE; that will fail on old kernels in a lot more cases than what I came up with. And make sure O_CREAT doesn't get there... Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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- 29 6月, 2013 2 次提交
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由 Al Viro 提交于
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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由 Al Viro 提交于
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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- 04 3月, 2013 2 次提交
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由 Al Viro 提交于
... and switch i386 to HAVE_SYSCALL_WRAPPERS, killing open-coded uses of asmlinkage_protect() in a bunch of syscalls. Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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由 Al Viro 提交于
... and convert a bunch of SYSCALL_DEFINE ones to SYSCALL_DEFINE<n>, killing the boilerplate crap around them. Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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- 02 3月, 2013 1 次提交
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由 Al Viro 提交于
Note that this thing does *not* contribute to inode refcount; it's pinned down by dentry. Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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- 26 2月, 2013 1 次提交
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由 Al Viro 提交于
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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- 25 2月, 2013 1 次提交
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由 Al Viro 提交于
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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- 23 2月, 2013 2 次提交
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由 Al Viro 提交于
Based on parts from Anatol's patch (the rest is the next commit). Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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由 Al Viro 提交于
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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- 21 12月, 2012 7 次提交
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由 Jeff Layton 提交于
Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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由 Jeff Layton 提交于
Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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由 Jeff Layton 提交于
Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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由 Jeff Layton 提交于
Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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由 Jeff Layton 提交于
Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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由 Jeff Layton 提交于
Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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由 David Howells 提交于
Make a more complete truncate operation available to CacheFiles (including security checks and suchlike) so that it can use this to clear invalidated cache files. Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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- 19 11月, 2012 1 次提交
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由 Eric W. Biederman 提交于
Once you are confined to a user namespace applications can not gain privilege and escape the user namespace so there is no longer a reason to restrict chroot. Acked-by: NSerge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: N"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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- 13 10月, 2012 2 次提交
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由 Jeff Layton 提交于
...and fix up the callers. For do_file_open_root, just declare a struct filename on the stack and fill out the .name field. For do_filp_open, make it also take a struct filename pointer, and fix up its callers to call it appropriately. For filp_open, add a variant that takes a struct filename pointer and turn filp_open into a wrapper around it. Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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由 Jeff Layton 提交于
getname() is intended to copy pathname strings from userspace into a kernel buffer. The result is just a string in kernel space. It would however be quite helpful to be able to attach some ancillary info to the string. For instance, we could attach some audit-related info to reduce the amount of audit-related processing needed. When auditing is enabled, we could also call getname() on the string more than once and not need to recopy it from userspace. This patchset converts the getname()/putname() interfaces to return a struct instead of a string. For now, the struct just tracks the string in kernel space and the original userland pointer for it. Later, we'll add other information to the struct as it becomes convenient. Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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- 12 10月, 2012 1 次提交
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由 Jeff Layton 提交于
Currently, this gets set mostly by happenstance when we call into audit_inode_child. While that might be a little more efficient, it seems wrong. If the syscall ends up failing before audit_inode_child ever gets called, then you'll have an audit_names record that shows the full path but has the parent inode info attached. Fix this by passing in a parent flag when we call audit_inode that gets set to the value of LOOKUP_PARENT. We can then fix up the pathname for the audit entry correctly from the get-go. While we're at it, clean up the no-op macro for audit_inode in the !CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL case. Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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- 27 9月, 2012 7 次提交
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由 Al Viro 提交于
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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由 Al Viro 提交于
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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由 Al Viro 提交于
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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由 Al Viro 提交于
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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由 Al Viro 提交于
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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由 Al Viro 提交于
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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由 Al Viro 提交于
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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- 21 9月, 2012 1 次提交
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由 Eric W. Biederman 提交于
Don't make the security modules deal with raw user space uid and gids instead pass in a kuid_t and a kgid_t so that security modules only have to deal with internal kernel uids and gids. Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Cc: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Acked-by: NSerge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: NEric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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- 15 8月, 2012 1 次提交
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由 Miklos Szeredi 提交于
Userspace can pass weird create mode in open(2) that we canonicalize to "(mode & S_IALLUGO) | S_IFREG" in vfs_create(). The problem is that we use the uncanonicalized mode before calling vfs_create() with unforseen consequences. So do the canonicalization early in build_open_flags(). Signed-off-by: NMiklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz> Tested-by: NRichard W.M. Jones <rjones@redhat.com> CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
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- 04 8月, 2012 1 次提交
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由 Al Viro 提交于
This one ought to be __mnt_drop_write(), to match __mnt_want_write() in the beginning... Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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- 31 7月, 2012 2 次提交
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由 Jan Kara 提交于
There are several entry points which dirty pages in a filesystem. mmap (handled by block_page_mkwrite()), buffered write (handled by __generic_file_aio_write()), splice write (generic_file_splice_write), truncate, and fallocate (these can dirty last partial page - handled inside each filesystem separately). Protect these places with sb_start_write() and sb_end_write(). ->page_mkwrite() calls are particularly complex since they are called with mmap_sem held and thus we cannot use standard sb_start_write() due to lock ordering constraints. We solve the problem by using a special freeze protection sb_start_pagefault() which ranks below mmap_sem. BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/897421Tested-by: NKamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com> Tested-by: NPeter M. Petrakis <peter.petrakis@canonical.com> Tested-by: NDann Frazier <dann.frazier@canonical.com> Tested-by: NMassimo Morana <massimo.morana@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: NJan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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由 Jan Kara 提交于
Most of places where we want freeze protection coincides with the places where we also have remount-ro protection. So make mnt_want_write() and mnt_drop_write() (and their _file alternative) prevent freezing as well. For the few cases that are really interested only in remount-ro protection provide new function variants. BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/897421Tested-by: NKamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com> Tested-by: NPeter M. Petrakis <peter.petrakis@canonical.com> Tested-by: NDann Frazier <dann.frazier@canonical.com> Tested-by: NMassimo Morana <massimo.morana@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: NJan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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- 30 7月, 2012 1 次提交
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由 Al Viro 提交于
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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- 23 7月, 2012 1 次提交
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由 Al Viro 提交于
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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- 14 7月, 2012 2 次提交
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由 David Howells 提交于
Make the chown() and lchown() syscalls jump to the fchownat() syscall with the appropriate extra arguments. Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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由 Al Viro 提交于
we want to take it out of mark_files_ro() reach *before* we start checking if we ought to drop write access. Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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