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  1. 16 6月, 2015 2 次提交
  3. 11 6月, 2015 2 次提交
  5. 07 6月, 2015 1 次提交
    • A
      bpf: allow programs to write to certain skb fields · d691f9e8
      由 Alexei Starovoitov 提交于 
      allow programs read/write skb->mark, tc_index fields and
((struct qdisc_skb_cb *)cb)->data.

mark and tc_index are generically useful in TC.
cb[0]-cb[4] are primarily used to pass arguments from one
program to another called via bpf_tail_call() which can
be seen in sockex3_kern.c example.

All fields of 'struct __sk_buff' are readable to socket and tc_cls_act progs.
mark, tc_index are writeable from tc_cls_act only.
cb[0]-cb[4] are writeable by both sockets and tc_cls_act.

Add verifier tests and improve sample code.
Signed-off-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      d691f9e8
  7. 05 6月, 2015 1 次提交
    • H
      compat: cleanup coding in compat_get_bitmap() and compat_put_bitmap() · 9b7b819c
      由 Helge Deller 提交于 
      In the functions compat_get_bitmap() and compat_put_bitmap() the
variable nr_compat_longs stores how many compat_ulong_t words should be
copied in a loop.

The copy loop itself is this:
  if (nr_compat_longs-- > 0) {
      if (__get_user(um, umask)) return -EFAULT;
  } else {
      um = 0;
  }

Since nr_compat_longs gets unconditionally decremented in each loop and
since it's type is unsigned this could theoretically lead to out of
bounds accesses to userspace if nr_compat_longs wraps around to
(unsigned)(-1).

Although the callers currently do not trigger out-of-bounds accesses, we
should better implement the loop in a safe way to completely avoid such
warp-arounds.
Signed-off-by: NHelge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
      9b7b819c
  9. 01 6月, 2015 2 次提交
  11. 31 5月, 2015 1 次提交
  13. 27 5月, 2015 2 次提交
  15. 22 5月, 2015 1 次提交
    • A
      bpf: allow bpf programs to tail-call other bpf programs · 04fd61ab
      由 Alexei Starovoitov 提交于 
      introduce bpf_tail_call(ctx, &jmp_table, index) helper function
which can be used from BPF programs like:
int bpf_prog(struct pt_regs *ctx)
{
  ...
  bpf_tail_call(ctx, &jmp_table, index);
  ...
}
that is roughly equivalent to:
int bpf_prog(struct pt_regs *ctx)
{
  ...
  if (jmp_table[index])
    return (*jmp_table[index])(ctx);
  ...
}
The important detail that it's not a normal call, but a tail call.
The kernel stack is precious, so this helper reuses the current
stack frame and jumps into another BPF program without adding
extra call frame.
It's trivially done in interpreter and a bit trickier in JITs.
In case of x64 JIT the bigger part of generated assembler prologue
is common for all programs, so it is simply skipped while jumping.
Other JITs can do similar prologue-skipping optimization or
do stack unwind before jumping into the next program.

bpf_tail_call() arguments:
ctx - context pointer
jmp_table - one of BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY maps used as the jump table
index - index in the jump table

Since all BPF programs are idenitified by file descriptor, user space
need to populate the jmp_table with FDs of other BPF programs.
If jmp_table[index] is empty the bpf_tail_call() doesn't jump anywhere
and program execution continues as normal.

New BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY map type is introduced so that user space can
populate this jmp_table array with FDs of other bpf programs.
Programs can share the same jmp_table array or use multiple jmp_tables.

The chain of tail calls can form unpredictable dynamic loops therefore
tail_call_cnt is used to limit the number of calls and currently is set to 32.

Use cases:
Acked-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>

==========
- simplify complex programs by splitting them into a sequence of small programs

- dispatch routine
  For tracing and future seccomp the program may be triggered on all system
  calls, but processing of syscall arguments will be different. It's more
  efficient to implement them as:
  int syscall_entry(struct seccomp_data *ctx)
  {
     bpf_tail_call(ctx, &syscall_jmp_table, ctx->nr /* syscall number */);
     ... default: process unknown syscall ...
  }
  int sys_write_event(struct seccomp_data *ctx) {...}
  int sys_read_event(struct seccomp_data *ctx) {...}
  syscall_jmp_table[__NR_write] = sys_write_event;
  syscall_jmp_table[__NR_read] = sys_read_event;

  For networking the program may call into different parsers depending on
  packet format, like:
  int packet_parser(struct __sk_buff *skb)
  {
     ... parse L2, L3 here ...
     __u8 ipproto = load_byte(skb, ... offsetof(struct iphdr, protocol));
     bpf_tail_call(skb, &ipproto_jmp_table, ipproto);
     ... default: process unknown protocol ...
  }
  int parse_tcp(struct __sk_buff *skb) {...}
  int parse_udp(struct __sk_buff *skb) {...}
  ipproto_jmp_table[IPPROTO_TCP] = parse_tcp;
  ipproto_jmp_table[IPPROTO_UDP] = parse_udp;

- for TC use case, bpf_tail_call() allows to implement reclassify-like logic

- bpf_map_update_elem/delete calls into BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY jump table
  are atomic, so user space can build chains of BPF programs on the fly

Implementation details:
=======================
- high performance of bpf_tail_call() is the goal.
  It could have been implemented without JIT changes as a wrapper on top of
  BPF_PROG_RUN() macro, but with two downsides:
  . all programs would have to pay performance penalty for this feature and
    tail call itself would be slower, since mandatory stack unwind, return,
    stack allocate would be done for every tailcall.
  . tailcall would be limited to programs running preempt_disabled, since
    generic 'void *ctx' doesn't have room for 'tail_call_cnt' and it would
    need to be either global per_cpu variable accessed by helper and by wrapper
    or global variable protected by locks.

  In this implementation x64 JIT bypasses stack unwind and jumps into the
  callee program after prologue.

- bpf_prog_array_compatible() ensures that prog_type of callee and caller
  are the same and JITed/non-JITed flag is the same, since calling JITed
  program from non-JITed is invalid, since stack frames are different.
  Similarly calling kprobe type program from socket type program is invalid.

- jump table is implemented as BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY to reuse 'map'
  abstraction, its user space API and all of verifier logic.
  It's in the existing arraymap.c file, since several functions are
  shared with regular array map.
Signed-off-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      04fd61ab
  17. 20 5月, 2015 1 次提交
  19. 19 5月, 2015 2 次提交
    • S
      sched: always use blk_schedule_flush_plug in io_schedule_out · 10d784ea
      由 Shaohua Li 提交于 
      block plug callback could sleep, so we introduce a parameter
'from_schedule' and corresponding drivers can use it to destinguish a
schedule plug flush or a plug finish. Unfortunately io_schedule_out
still uses blk_flush_plug(). This causes below output (Note, I added a
might_sleep() in raid1_unplug to make it trigger faster, but the whole
thing doesn't matter if I add might_sleep). In raid1/10, this can cause
deadlock.

This patch makes io_schedule_out always uses blk_schedule_flush_plug.
This should only impact drivers (as far as I know, raid 1/10) which are
sensitive to the 'from_schedule' parameter.

[  370.817949] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[  370.817960] WARNING: CPU: 7 PID: 145 at ../kernel/sched/core.c:7306 __might_sleep+0x7f/0x90()
[  370.817969] do not call blocking ops when !TASK_RUNNING; state=2 set at [<ffffffff81092fcf>] prepare_to_wait+0x2f/0x90
[  370.817971] Modules linked in: raid1
[  370.817976] CPU: 7 PID: 145 Comm: kworker/u16:9 Tainted: G        W       4.0.0+ #361
[  370.817977] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.7.5-20140709_153802- 04/01/2014
[  370.817983] Workqueue: writeback bdi_writeback_workfn (flush-9:1)
[  370.817985]  ffffffff81cd83be ffff8800ba8cb298 ffffffff819dd7af 0000000000000001
[  370.817988]  ffff8800ba8cb2e8 ffff8800ba8cb2d8 ffffffff81051afc ffff8800ba8cb2c8
[  370.817990]  ffffffffa00061a8 000000000000041e 0000000000000000 ffff8800ba8cba28
[  370.817993] Call Trace:
[  370.817999]  [<ffffffff819dd7af>] dump_stack+0x4f/0x7b
[  370.818002]  [<ffffffff81051afc>] warn_slowpath_common+0x8c/0xd0
[  370.818004]  [<ffffffff81051b86>] warn_slowpath_fmt+0x46/0x50
[  370.818006]  [<ffffffff81092fcf>] ? prepare_to_wait+0x2f/0x90
[  370.818008]  [<ffffffff81092fcf>] ? prepare_to_wait+0x2f/0x90
[  370.818010]  [<ffffffff810776ef>] __might_sleep+0x7f/0x90
[  370.818014]  [<ffffffffa0000c03>] raid1_unplug+0xd3/0x170 [raid1]
[  370.818024]  [<ffffffff81421d9a>] blk_flush_plug_list+0x8a/0x1e0
[  370.818028]  [<ffffffff819e3550>] ? bit_wait+0x50/0x50
[  370.818031]  [<ffffffff819e21b0>] io_schedule_timeout+0x130/0x140
[  370.818033]  [<ffffffff819e3586>] bit_wait_io+0x36/0x50
[  370.818034]  [<ffffffff819e31b5>] __wait_on_bit+0x65/0x90
[  370.818041]  [<ffffffff8125b67c>] ? ext4_read_block_bitmap_nowait+0xbc/0x630
[  370.818043]  [<ffffffff819e3550>] ? bit_wait+0x50/0x50
[  370.818045]  [<ffffffff819e3302>] out_of_line_wait_on_bit+0x72/0x80
[  370.818047]  [<ffffffff810935e0>] ? autoremove_wake_function+0x40/0x40
[  370.818050]  [<ffffffff811de744>] __wait_on_buffer+0x44/0x50
[  370.818053]  [<ffffffff8125ae80>] ext4_wait_block_bitmap+0xe0/0xf0
[  370.818058]  [<ffffffff812975d6>] ext4_mb_init_cache+0x206/0x790
[  370.818062]  [<ffffffff8114bc6c>] ? lru_cache_add+0x1c/0x50
[  370.818064]  [<ffffffff81297c7e>] ext4_mb_init_group+0x11e/0x200
[  370.818066]  [<ffffffff81298231>] ext4_mb_load_buddy+0x341/0x360
[  370.818068]  [<ffffffff8129a1a3>] ext4_mb_find_by_goal+0x93/0x2f0
[  370.818070]  [<ffffffff81295b54>] ? ext4_mb_normalize_request+0x1e4/0x5b0
[  370.818072]  [<ffffffff8129ab67>] ext4_mb_regular_allocator+0x67/0x460
[  370.818074]  [<ffffffff81295b54>] ? ext4_mb_normalize_request+0x1e4/0x5b0
[  370.818076]  [<ffffffff8129ca4b>] ext4_mb_new_blocks+0x4cb/0x620
[  370.818079]  [<ffffffff81290956>] ext4_ext_map_blocks+0x4c6/0x14d0
[  370.818081]  [<ffffffff812a4d4e>] ? ext4_es_lookup_extent+0x4e/0x290
[  370.818085]  [<ffffffff8126399d>] ext4_map_blocks+0x14d/0x4f0
[  370.818088]  [<ffffffff81266fbd>] ext4_writepages+0x76d/0xe50
[  370.818094]  [<ffffffff81149691>] do_writepages+0x21/0x50
[  370.818097]  [<ffffffff811d5c00>] __writeback_single_inode+0x60/0x490
[  370.818099]  [<ffffffff811d630a>] writeback_sb_inodes+0x2da/0x590
[  370.818103]  [<ffffffff811abf4b>] ? trylock_super+0x1b/0x50
[  370.818105]  [<ffffffff811abf4b>] ? trylock_super+0x1b/0x50
[  370.818107]  [<ffffffff811d665f>] __writeback_inodes_wb+0x9f/0xd0
[  370.818109]  [<ffffffff811d69db>] wb_writeback+0x34b/0x3c0
[  370.818111]  [<ffffffff811d70df>] bdi_writeback_workfn+0x23f/0x550
[  370.818116]  [<ffffffff8106bbd8>] process_one_work+0x1c8/0x570
[  370.818117]  [<ffffffff8106bb5b>] ? process_one_work+0x14b/0x570
[  370.818119]  [<ffffffff8106c09b>] worker_thread+0x11b/0x470
[  370.818121]  [<ffffffff8106bf80>] ? process_one_work+0x570/0x570
[  370.818124]  [<ffffffff81071868>] kthread+0xf8/0x110
[  370.818126]  [<ffffffff81071770>] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x210/0x210
[  370.818129]  [<ffffffff819e9322>] ret_from_fork+0x42/0x70
[  370.818131]  [<ffffffff81071770>] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x210/0x210
[  370.818132] ---[ end trace 7b4deb71e68b6605 ]---

V2: don't change ->in_iowait

Cc: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: NShaohua Li <shli@fb.com>
Reviewed-by: NJeff Moyer <jmoyer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
      10d784ea
    • P
      watchdog: Fix merge 'conflict' · ab992dc3
      由 Peter Zijlstra 提交于 
      Two watchdog changes that came through different trees had a non
conflicting conflict, that is, one changed the semantics of a variable
but no actual code conflict happened. So the merge appeared fine, but
the resulting code did not behave as expected.

Commit 195daf66 ("watchdog: enable the new user interface of the
watchdog mechanism") changes the semantics of watchdog_user_enabled,
which thereafter is only used by the functions introduced by
b3738d29 ("watchdog: Add watchdog enable/disable all functions").

There further appears to be a distinct lack of serialization between
setting and using watchdog_enabled, so perhaps we should wrap the
{en,dis}able_all() things in watchdog_proc_mutex.

This patch fixes a s2r failure reported by Michal; which I cannot
readily explain. But this does make the code internally consistent
again.
Reported-and-tested-by: NMichal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      ab992dc3
  21. 13 5月, 2015 1 次提交
  23. 10 5月, 2015 2 次提交
  25. 09 5月, 2015 1 次提交
  27. 08 5月, 2015 3 次提交
  29. 07 5月, 2015 1 次提交
  31. 01 5月, 2015 1 次提交
  33. 29 4月, 2015 1 次提交
  35. 28 4月, 2015 1 次提交
  37. 27 4月, 2015 1 次提交
  39. 25 4月, 2015 2 次提交
  41. 23 4月, 2015 1 次提交
    • M
      kexec: allocate the kexec control page with KEXEC_CONTROL_MEMORY_GFP · 7e01b5ac
      由 Martin Schwidefsky 提交于 
      Introduce KEXEC_CONTROL_MEMORY_GFP to allow the architecture code
to override the gfp flags of the allocation for the kexec control
page. The loop in kimage_alloc_normal_control_pages allocates pages
with GFP_KERNEL until a page is found that happens to have an
address smaller than the KEXEC_CONTROL_MEMORY_LIMIT. On systems
with a large memory size but a small KEXEC_CONTROL_MEMORY_LIMIT
the loop will keep allocating memory until the oom killer steps in.
Signed-off-by: NMartin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
      7e01b5ac
  43. 20 4月, 2015 1 次提交
  45. 17 4月, 2015 9 次提交