1. 16 9月, 2011 1 次提交
  2. 27 7月, 2011 1 次提交
  3. 23 2月, 2011 1 次提交
  4. 24 9月, 2010 1 次提交
  5. 14 9月, 2010 1 次提交
  6. 13 7月, 2010 1 次提交
  7. 29 6月, 2010 1 次提交
  8. 07 4月, 2010 2 次提交
  9. 02 4月, 2010 1 次提交
  10. 26 11月, 2008 1 次提交
  11. 07 11月, 2008 1 次提交
  12. 26 6月, 2008 1 次提交
  13. 19 4月, 2008 1 次提交
  14. 08 2月, 2008 2 次提交
  15. 29 1月, 2008 1 次提交
  16. 26 1月, 2008 1 次提交
    • G
      cpu-hotplug: replace lock_cpu_hotplug() with get_online_cpus() · 86ef5c9a
      Gautham R Shenoy 提交于
      Replace all lock_cpu_hotplug/unlock_cpu_hotplug from the kernel and use
      get_online_cpus and put_online_cpus instead as it highlights the
      refcount semantics in these operations.
      
      The new API guarantees protection against the cpu-hotplug operation, but
      it doesn't guarantee serialized access to any of the local data
      structures. Hence the changes needs to be reviewed.
      
      In case of pseries_add_processor/pseries_remove_processor, use
      cpu_maps_update_begin()/cpu_maps_update_done() as we're modifying the
      cpu_present_map there.
      Signed-off-by: NGautham R Shenoy <ego@in.ibm.com>
      Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
      86ef5c9a
  17. 24 10月, 2007 1 次提交
  18. 20 7月, 2007 1 次提交
    • P
      mm: Remove slab destructors from kmem_cache_create(). · 20c2df83
      Paul Mundt 提交于
      Slab destructors were no longer supported after Christoph's
      c59def9f change. They've been
      BUGs for both slab and slub, and slob never supported them
      either.
      
      This rips out support for the dtor pointer from kmem_cache_create()
      completely and fixes up every single callsite in the kernel (there were
      about 224, not including the slab allocator definitions themselves,
      or the documentation references).
      Signed-off-by: NPaul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
      20c2df83
  19. 10 5月, 2007 1 次提交
    • R
      Add suspend-related notifications for CPU hotplug · 8bb78442
      Rafael J. Wysocki 提交于
      Since nonboot CPUs are now disabled after tasks and devices have been
      frozen and the CPU hotplug infrastructure is used for this purpose, we need
      special CPU hotplug notifications that will help the CPU-hotplug-aware
      subsystems distinguish normal CPU hotplug events from CPU hotplug events
      related to a system-wide suspend or resume operation in progress.  This
      patch introduces such notifications and causes them to be used during
      suspend and resume transitions.  It also changes all of the
      CPU-hotplug-aware subsystems to take these notifications into consideration
      (for now they are handled in the same way as the corresponding "normal"
      ones).
      
      [oleg@tv-sign.ru: cleanups]
      Signed-off-by: NRafael J. Wysocki <rjw@sisk.pl>
      Cc: Gautham R Shenoy <ego@in.ibm.com>
      Cc: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
      Signed-off-by: NOleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru>
      Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      8bb78442
  20. 24 1月, 2007 1 次提交
  21. 08 12月, 2006 3 次提交
  22. 12 10月, 2006 1 次提交
    • J
      IPsec: propagate security module errors up from flow_cache_lookup · 134b0fc5
      James Morris 提交于
      When a security module is loaded (in this case, SELinux), the
      security_xfrm_policy_lookup() hook can return an access denied permission
      (or other error).  We were not handling that correctly, and in fact
      inverting the return logic and propagating a false "ok" back up to
      xfrm_lookup(), which then allowed packets to pass as if they were not
      associated with an xfrm policy.
      
      The way I was seeing the problem was when connecting via IPsec to a
      confined service on an SELinux box (vsftpd), which did not have the
      appropriate SELinux policy permissions to send packets via IPsec.
      
      The first SYNACK would be blocked, because of an uncached lookup via
      flow_cache_lookup(), which would fail to resolve an xfrm policy because
      the SELinux policy is checked at that point via the resolver.
      
      However, retransmitted SYNACKs would then find a cached flow entry when
      calling into flow_cache_lookup() with a null xfrm policy, which is
      interpreted by xfrm_lookup() as the packet not having any associated
      policy and similarly to the first case, allowing it to pass without
      transformation.
      
      The solution presented here is to first ensure that errno values are
      correctly propagated all the way back up through the various call chains
      from security_xfrm_policy_lookup(), and handled correctly.
      
      Then, flow_cache_lookup() is modified, so that if the policy resolver
      fails (typically a permission denied via the security module), the flow
      cache entry is killed rather than having a null policy assigned (which
      indicates that the packet can pass freely).  This also forces any future
      lookups for the same flow to consult the security module (e.g. SELinux)
      for current security policy (rather than, say, caching the error on the
      flow cache entry).
      Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
      134b0fc5
  23. 23 9月, 2006 2 次提交
  24. 11 4月, 2006 1 次提交
  25. 10 4月, 2006 1 次提交
  26. 21 3月, 2006 1 次提交
  27. 04 1月, 2006 1 次提交
    • T
      [LSM-IPSec]: Security association restriction. · df71837d
      Trent Jaeger 提交于
      This patch series implements per packet access control via the
      extension of the Linux Security Modules (LSM) interface by hooks in
      the XFRM and pfkey subsystems that leverage IPSec security
      associations to label packets.  Extensions to the SELinux LSM are
      included that leverage the patch for this purpose.
      
      This patch implements the changes necessary to the XFRM subsystem,
      pfkey interface, ipv4/ipv6, and xfrm_user interface to restrict a
      socket to use only authorized security associations (or no security
      association) to send/receive network packets.
      
      Patch purpose:
      
      The patch is designed to enable access control per packets based on
      the strongly authenticated IPSec security association.  Such access
      controls augment the existing ones based on network interface and IP
      address.  The former are very coarse-grained, and the latter can be
      spoofed.  By using IPSec, the system can control access to remote
      hosts based on cryptographic keys generated using the IPSec mechanism.
      This enables access control on a per-machine basis or per-application
      if the remote machine is running the same mechanism and trusted to
      enforce the access control policy.
      
      Patch design approach:
      
      The overall approach is that policy (xfrm_policy) entries set by
      user-level programs (e.g., setkey for ipsec-tools) are extended with a
      security context that is used at policy selection time in the XFRM
      subsystem to restrict the sockets that can send/receive packets via
      security associations (xfrm_states) that are built from those
      policies.
      
      A presentation available at
      www.selinux-symposium.org/2005/presentations/session2/2-3-jaeger.pdf
      from the SELinux symposium describes the overall approach.
      
      Patch implementation details:
      
      On output, the policy retrieved (via xfrm_policy_lookup or
      xfrm_sk_policy_lookup) must be authorized for the security context of
      the socket and the same security context is required for resultant
      security association (retrieved or negotiated via racoon in
      ipsec-tools).  This is enforced in xfrm_state_find.
      
      On input, the policy retrieved must also be authorized for the socket
      (at __xfrm_policy_check), and the security context of the policy must
      also match the security association being used.
      
      The patch has virtually no impact on packets that do not use IPSec.
      The existing Netfilter (outgoing) and LSM rcv_skb hooks are used as
      before.
      
      Also, if IPSec is used without security contexts, the impact is
      minimal.  The LSM must allow such policies to be selected for the
      combination of socket and remote machine, but subsequent IPSec
      processing proceeds as in the original case.
      
      Testing:
      
      The pfkey interface is tested using the ipsec-tools.  ipsec-tools have
      been modified (a separate ipsec-tools patch is available for version
      0.5) that supports assignment of xfrm_policy entries and security
      associations with security contexts via setkey and the negotiation
      using the security contexts via racoon.
      
      The xfrm_user interface is tested via ad hoc programs that set
      security contexts.  These programs are also available from me, and
      contain programs for setting, getting, and deleting policy for testing
      this interface.  Testing of sa functions was done by tracing kernel
      behavior.
      Signed-off-by: NTrent Jaeger <tjaeger@cse.psu.edu>
      Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      df71837d
  28. 30 8月, 2005 1 次提交
  29. 17 4月, 2005 1 次提交
    • L
      Linux-2.6.12-rc2 · 1da177e4
      Linus Torvalds 提交于
      Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history,
      even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git
      archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about
      3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early
      git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good
      infrastructure for it.
      
      Let it rip!
      1da177e4