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  1. 24 5月, 2017 16 次提交
  3. 17 5月, 2017 1 次提交
  5. 06 5月, 2017 2 次提交
    • B
      GFS2: Allow glocks to be unlocked after withdraw · ed17545d
      由 Bob Peterson 提交于 
      This bug fixes a regression introduced by patch 0d1c7ae9.

The intent of the patch was to stop promoting glocks after a
file system is withdrawn due to a variety of errors, because doing
so results in a BUG(). (You should be able to unmount after a
withdraw rather than having the kernel panic.)

Unfortunately, it also stopped demotions, so glocks could not be
unlocked after withdraw, which means the unmount would hang.

This patch allows function do_xmote to demote locks to an
unlocked state after a withdraw, but not promote them.
Signed-off-by: NBob Peterson <rpeterso@redhat.com>
      ed17545d
    • E
      xfs: fix use-after-free in xfs_finish_page_writeback · 161f55ef
      由 Eryu Guan 提交于 
      Commit 28b783e4 ("xfs: bufferhead chains are invalid after
end_page_writeback") fixed one use-after-free issue by
pre-calculating the loop conditionals before calling bh->b_end_io()
in the end_io processing loop, but it assigned 'next' pointer before
checking end offset boundary & breaking the loop, at which point the
bh might be freed already, and caused use-after-free.

This is caught by KASAN when running fstests generic/127 on sub-page
block size XFS.

[ 2517.244502] run fstests generic/127 at 2017-04-27 07:30:50
[ 2747.868840] ==================================================================
[ 2747.876949] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in xfs_destroy_ioend+0x3d3/0x4e0 [xfs] at addr ffff8801395ae698
...
[ 2747.918245] Call Trace:
[ 2747.920975]  dump_stack+0x63/0x84
[ 2747.924673]  kasan_object_err+0x21/0x70
[ 2747.928950]  kasan_report+0x271/0x530
[ 2747.933064]  ? xfs_destroy_ioend+0x3d3/0x4e0 [xfs]
[ 2747.938409]  ? end_page_writeback+0xce/0x110
[ 2747.943171]  __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x19/0x20
[ 2747.948545]  xfs_destroy_ioend+0x3d3/0x4e0 [xfs]
[ 2747.953724]  xfs_end_io+0x1af/0x2b0 [xfs]
[ 2747.958197]  process_one_work+0x5ff/0x1000
[ 2747.962766]  worker_thread+0xe4/0x10e0
[ 2747.966946]  kthread+0x2d3/0x3d0
[ 2747.970546]  ? process_one_work+0x1000/0x1000
[ 2747.975405]  ? kthread_create_on_node+0xc0/0xc0
[ 2747.980457]  ? syscall_return_slowpath+0xe6/0x140
[ 2747.985706]  ? do_page_fault+0x30/0x80
[ 2747.989887]  ret_from_fork+0x2c/0x40
[ 2747.993874] Object at ffff8801395ae690, in cache buffer_head size: 104
[ 2748.001155] Allocated:
[ 2748.003782] PID = 8327
[ 2748.006411]  save_stack_trace+0x1b/0x20
[ 2748.010688]  save_stack+0x46/0xd0
[ 2748.014383]  kasan_kmalloc+0xad/0xe0
[ 2748.018370]  kasan_slab_alloc+0x12/0x20
[ 2748.022648]  kmem_cache_alloc+0xb8/0x1b0
[ 2748.027024]  alloc_buffer_head+0x22/0xc0
[ 2748.031399]  alloc_page_buffers+0xd1/0x250
[ 2748.035968]  create_empty_buffers+0x30/0x410
[ 2748.040730]  create_page_buffers+0x120/0x1b0
[ 2748.045493]  __block_write_begin_int+0x17a/0x1800
[ 2748.050740]  iomap_write_begin+0x100/0x2f0
[ 2748.055308]  iomap_zero_range_actor+0x253/0x5c0
[ 2748.060362]  iomap_apply+0x157/0x270
[ 2748.064347]  iomap_zero_range+0x5a/0x80
[ 2748.068624]  iomap_truncate_page+0x6b/0xa0
[ 2748.073227]  xfs_setattr_size+0x1f7/0xa10 [xfs]
[ 2748.078312]  xfs_vn_setattr_size+0x68/0x140 [xfs]
[ 2748.083589]  xfs_file_fallocate+0x4ac/0x820 [xfs]
[ 2748.088838]  vfs_fallocate+0x2cf/0x780
[ 2748.093021]  SyS_fallocate+0x48/0x80
[ 2748.097006]  do_syscall_64+0x18a/0x430
[ 2748.101186]  return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x6a
[ 2748.105948] Freed:
[ 2748.108189] PID = 8327
[ 2748.110816]  save_stack_trace+0x1b/0x20
[ 2748.115093]  save_stack+0x46/0xd0
[ 2748.118788]  kasan_slab_free+0x73/0xc0
[ 2748.122969]  kmem_cache_free+0x7a/0x200
[ 2748.127247]  free_buffer_head+0x41/0x80
[ 2748.131524]  try_to_free_buffers+0x178/0x250
[ 2748.136316]  xfs_vm_releasepage+0x2e9/0x3d0 [xfs]
[ 2748.141563]  try_to_release_page+0x100/0x180
[ 2748.146325]  invalidate_inode_pages2_range+0x7da/0xcf0
[ 2748.152087]  xfs_shift_file_space+0x37d/0x6e0 [xfs]
[ 2748.157557]  xfs_collapse_file_space+0x49/0x120 [xfs]
[ 2748.163223]  xfs_file_fallocate+0x2a7/0x820 [xfs]
[ 2748.168462]  vfs_fallocate+0x2cf/0x780
[ 2748.172642]  SyS_fallocate+0x48/0x80
[ 2748.176629]  do_syscall_64+0x18a/0x430
[ 2748.180810]  return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x6a

Fixed it by checking on offset against end & breaking out first,
dereference bh only if there're still bufferheads to process.
Signed-off-by: NEryu Guan <eguan@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: NDarrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NDarrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
      161f55ef
  7. 05 5月, 2017 5 次提交
  9. 04 5月, 2017 16 次提交
    • E
      ext4: clean up ext4_match() and callers · d9b9f8d5
      由 Eric Biggers 提交于 
      When ext4 encryption was originally merged, we were encrypting the
user-specified filename in ext4_match(), introducing a lot of additional
complexity into ext4_match() and its callers.  This has since been
changed to encrypt the filename earlier, so we can remove the gunk
that's no longer needed.  This more or less reverts ext4_search_dir()
and ext4_find_dest_de() to the way they were in the v4.0 kernel.
Signed-off-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
      d9b9f8d5
    • E
      f2fs: switch to using fscrypt_match_name() · 1f73d491
      由 Eric Biggers 提交于 
      Switch f2fs directory searches to use the fscrypt_match_name() helper
function.  There should be no functional change.
Signed-off-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Acked-by: NJaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
      1f73d491
    • E
      ext4: switch to using fscrypt_match_name() · 067d1023
      由 Eric Biggers 提交于 
      Switch ext4 directory searches to use the fscrypt_match_name() helper
function.  There should be no functional change.
Signed-off-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
      067d1023
    • E
      fscrypt: introduce helper function for filename matching · 17159420
      由 Eric Biggers 提交于 
      Introduce a helper function fscrypt_match_name() which tests whether a
fscrypt_name matches a directory entry.  Also clean up the magic numbers
and document things properly.
Signed-off-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
      17159420
    • E
      fscrypt: avoid collisions when presenting long encrypted filenames · 6b06cdee
      由 Eric Biggers 提交于 
      When accessing an encrypted directory without the key, userspace must
operate on filenames derived from the ciphertext names, which contain
arbitrary bytes.  Since we must support filenames as long as NAME_MAX,
we can't always just base64-encode the ciphertext, since that may make
it too long.  Currently, this is solved by presenting long names in an
abbreviated form containing any needed filesystem-specific hashes (e.g.
to identify a directory block), then the last 16 bytes of ciphertext.
This needs to be sufficient to identify the actual name on lookup.

However, there is a bug.  It seems to have been assumed that due to the
use of a CBC (ciphertext block chaining)-based encryption mode, the last
16 bytes (i.e. the AES block size) of ciphertext would depend on the
full plaintext, preventing collisions.  However, we actually use CBC
with ciphertext stealing (CTS), which handles the last two blocks
specially, causing them to appear "flipped".  Thus, it's actually the
second-to-last block which depends on the full plaintext.

This caused long filenames that differ only near the end of their
plaintexts to, when observed without the key, point to the wrong inode
and be undeletable.  For example, with ext4:

    # echo pass | e4crypt add_key -p 16 edir/
    # seq -f "edir/abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz012345%.0f" 100000 | xargs touch
    # find edir/ -type f | xargs stat -c %i | sort | uniq | wc -l
    100000
    # sync
    # echo 3 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches
    # keyctl new_session
    # find edir/ -type f | xargs stat -c %i | sort | uniq | wc -l
    2004
    # rm -rf edir/
    rm: cannot remove 'edir/_A7nNFi3rhkEQlJ6P,hdzluhODKOeWx5V': Structure needs cleaning
    ...

To fix this, when presenting long encrypted filenames, encode the
second-to-last block of ciphertext rather than the last 16 bytes.

Although it would be nice to solve this without depending on a specific
encryption mode, that would mean doing a cryptographic hash like SHA-256
which would be much less efficient.  This way is sufficient for now, and
it's still compatible with encryption modes like HEH which are strong
pseudorandom permutations.  Also, changing the presented names is still
allowed at any time because they are only provided to allow applications
to do things like delete encrypted directories.  They're not designed to
be used to persistently identify files --- which would be hard to do
anyway, given that they're encrypted after all.

For ease of backports, this patch only makes the minimal fix to both
ext4 and f2fs.  It leaves ubifs as-is, since ubifs doesn't compare the
ciphertext block yet.  Follow-on patches will clean things up properly
and make the filesystems use a shared helper function.

Fixes: 5de0b4d0 ("ext4 crypto: simplify and speed up filename encryption")
Reported-by: NGwendal Grignou <gwendal@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
      6b06cdee
    • J
      f2fs: check entire encrypted bigname when finding a dentry · 6332cd32
      由 Jaegeuk Kim 提交于 
      If user has no key under an encrypted dir, fscrypt gives digested dentries.
Previously, when looking up a dentry, f2fs only checks its hash value with
first 4 bytes of the digested dentry, which didn't handle hash collisions fully.
This patch enhances to check entire dentry bytes likewise ext4.

Eric reported how to reproduce this issue by:

 # seq -f "edir/abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz012345%.0f" 100000 | xargs touch
 # find edir -type f | xargs stat -c %i | sort | uniq | wc -l
100000
 # sync
 # echo 3 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches
 # keyctl new_session
 # find edir -type f | xargs stat -c %i | sort | uniq | wc -l
99999

Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reported-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NJaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
(fixed f2fs_dentry_hash() to work even when the hash is 0)
Signed-off-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
      6332cd32
    • E
      ubifs: check for consistent encryption contexts in ubifs_lookup() · 413d5a9e
      由 Eric Biggers 提交于 
      As ext4 and f2fs do, ubifs should check for consistent encryption
contexts during ->lookup() in an encrypted directory.  This protects
certain users of filesystem encryption against certain types of offline
attacks.
Signed-off-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
      413d5a9e
    • E
      f2fs: sync f2fs_lookup() with ext4_lookup() · faac7fd9
      由 Eric Biggers 提交于 
      As for ext4, now that fscrypt_has_permitted_context() correctly handles
the case where we have the key for the parent directory but not the
child, f2fs_lookup() no longer has to work around it.  Also add the same
warning message that ext4 uses.
Signed-off-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
      faac7fd9
    • E
      ext4: remove "nokey" check from ext4_lookup() · 8c68084b
      由 Eric Biggers 提交于 
      Now that fscrypt_has_permitted_context() correctly handles the case
where we have the key for the parent directory but not the child, we
don't need to try to work around this in ext4_lookup().
Signed-off-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
      8c68084b
    • E
      fscrypt: fix context consistency check when key(s) unavailable · 272f98f6
      由 Eric Biggers 提交于 
      To mitigate some types of offline attacks, filesystem encryption is
designed to enforce that all files in an encrypted directory tree use
the same encryption policy (i.e. the same encryption context excluding
the nonce).  However, the fscrypt_has_permitted_context() function which
enforces this relies on comparing struct fscrypt_info's, which are only
available when we have the encryption keys.  This can cause two
incorrect behaviors:

1. If we have the parent directory's key but not the child's key, or
   vice versa, then fscrypt_has_permitted_context() returned false,
   causing applications to see EPERM or ENOKEY.  This is incorrect if
   the encryption contexts are in fact consistent.  Although we'd
   normally have either both keys or neither key in that case since the
   master_key_descriptors would be the same, this is not guaranteed
   because keys can be added or removed from keyrings at any time.

2. If we have neither the parent's key nor the child's key, then
   fscrypt_has_permitted_context() returned true, causing applications
   to see no error (or else an error for some other reason).  This is
   incorrect if the encryption contexts are in fact inconsistent, since
   in that case we should deny access.

To fix this, retrieve and compare the fscrypt_contexts if we are unable
to set up both fscrypt_infos.

While this slightly hurts performance when accessing an encrypted
directory tree without the key, this isn't a case we really need to be
optimizing for; access *with* the key is much more important.
Furthermore, the performance hit is barely noticeable given that we are
already retrieving the fscrypt_context and doing two keyring searches in
fscrypt_get_encryption_info().  If we ever actually wanted to optimize
this case we might start by caching the fscrypt_contexts.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.0+
Signed-off-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
      272f98f6
    • J
      jbd2: cleanup write flags handling from jbd2_write_superblock() · 17f423b5
      由 Jan Kara 提交于 
      Currently jbd2_write_superblock() silently adds REQ_SYNC to flags with
which journal superblock is written. Make this explicit by making flags
passed down to jbd2_write_superblock() contain REQ_SYNC.

CC: linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NJan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
      17f423b5
    • J
      ext4: mark superblock writes synchronous for nobarrier mounts · 00473374
      由 Jan Kara 提交于 
      Commit b685d3d6 "block: treat REQ_FUA and REQ_PREFLUSH as
synchronous" removed REQ_SYNC flag from WRITE_FUA implementation.
generic_make_request_checks() however strips REQ_FUA flag from a bio
when the storage doesn't report volatile write cache and thus write
effectively becomes asynchronous which can lead to performance
regressions. This affects superblock writes for ext4. Fix the problem
by marking superblock writes always as synchronous.

Fixes: b685d3d6
CC: linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NJan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
      00473374
    • J
      nfs: Fix bdi handling for cloned superblocks · 9052c7cf
      由 Jan Kara 提交于 
      In commit 0d3b12584972 "nfs: Convert to separately allocated bdi" I have
wrongly cloned bdi reference in nfs_clone_super(). Further inspection
has shown that originally the code was actually allocating a new bdi (in
->clone_server callback) which was later registered in
nfs_fs_mount_common() and used for sb->s_bdi in nfs_initialise_sb().
This could later result in bdi for the original superblock not getting
unregistered when that superblock got shutdown (as the cloned sb still
held bdi reference) and later when a new superblock was created under
the same anonymous device number, a clash in sysfs has happened on bdi
registration:

------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 10284 at /linux-next/fs/sysfs/dir.c:31 sysfs_warn_dup+0x64/0x74
sysfs: cannot create duplicate filename '/devices/virtual/bdi/0:32'
Modules linked in: axp20x_usb_power gpio_axp209 nvmem_sunxi_sid sun4i_dma sun4i_ss virt_dma
CPU: 1 PID: 10284 Comm: mount.nfs Not tainted 4.11.0-rc4+ #14
Hardware name: Allwinner sun7i (A20) Family
[<c010f19c>] (unwind_backtrace) from [<c010bc74>] (show_stack+0x10/0x14)
[<c010bc74>] (show_stack) from [<c03c6e24>] (dump_stack+0x78/0x8c)
[<c03c6e24>] (dump_stack) from [<c0122200>] (__warn+0xe8/0x100)
[<c0122200>] (__warn) from [<c0122250>] (warn_slowpath_fmt+0x38/0x48)
[<c0122250>] (warn_slowpath_fmt) from [<c02ac178>] (sysfs_warn_dup+0x64/0x74)
[<c02ac178>] (sysfs_warn_dup) from [<c02ac254>] (sysfs_create_dir_ns+0x84/0x94)
[<c02ac254>] (sysfs_create_dir_ns) from [<c03c8b8c>] (kobject_add_internal+0x9c/0x2ec)
[<c03c8b8c>] (kobject_add_internal) from [<c03c8e24>] (kobject_add+0x48/0x98)
[<c03c8e24>] (kobject_add) from [<c048d75c>] (device_add+0xe4/0x5a0)
[<c048d75c>] (device_add) from [<c048ddb4>] (device_create_groups_vargs+0xac/0xbc)
[<c048ddb4>] (device_create_groups_vargs) from [<c048dde4>] (device_create_vargs+0x20/0x28)
[<c048dde4>] (device_create_vargs) from [<c02075c8>] (bdi_register_va+0x44/0xfc)
[<c02075c8>] (bdi_register_va) from [<c023d378>] (super_setup_bdi_name+0x48/0xa4)
[<c023d378>] (super_setup_bdi_name) from [<c0312ef4>] (nfs_fill_super+0x1a4/0x204)
[<c0312ef4>] (nfs_fill_super) from [<c03133f0>] (nfs_fs_mount_common+0x140/0x1e8)
[<c03133f0>] (nfs_fs_mount_common) from [<c03335cc>] (nfs4_remote_mount+0x50/0x58)
[<c03335cc>] (nfs4_remote_mount) from [<c023ef98>] (mount_fs+0x14/0xa4)
[<c023ef98>] (mount_fs) from [<c025cba0>] (vfs_kern_mount+0x54/0x128)
[<c025cba0>] (vfs_kern_mount) from [<c033352c>] (nfs_do_root_mount+0x80/0xa0)
[<c033352c>] (nfs_do_root_mount) from [<c0333818>] (nfs4_try_mount+0x28/0x3c)
[<c0333818>] (nfs4_try_mount) from [<c0313874>] (nfs_fs_mount+0x2cc/0x8c4)
[<c0313874>] (nfs_fs_mount) from [<c023ef98>] (mount_fs+0x14/0xa4)
[<c023ef98>] (mount_fs) from [<c025cba0>] (vfs_kern_mount+0x54/0x128)
[<c025cba0>] (vfs_kern_mount) from [<c02600f0>] (do_mount+0x158/0xc7c)
[<c02600f0>] (do_mount) from [<c0260f98>] (SyS_mount+0x8c/0xb4)
[<c0260f98>] (SyS_mount) from [<c0107840>] (ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x3c)

Fix the problem by always creating new bdi for a superblock as we used
to do.
Reported-and-tested-by: NCorentin Labbe <clabbe.montjoie@gmail.com>
Fixes: 0d3b12584972ce5781179ad3f15cca3cdb5cae05
Signed-off-by: NJan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: NJens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
      9052c7cf
    • S
      SMB3: Work around mount failure when using SMB3 dialect to Macs · 7db0a6ef
      由 Steve French 提交于 
      Macs send the maximum buffer size in response on ioctl to validate
negotiate security information, which causes us to fail the mount
as the response buffer is larger than the expected response.

Changed ioctl response processing to allow for padding of validate
negotiate ioctl response and limit the maximum response size to
maximum buffer size.
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <steve.french@primarydata.com>
CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
      7db0a6ef
    • Y
      f2fs: fix a mount fail for wrong next_scan_nid · e9cdd307
      由 Yunlei He 提交于 
      -write_checkpoint
   -do_checkpoint
      -next_free_nid    <--- something wrong with next free nid

-f2fs_fill_super
   -build_node_manager
      -build_free_nids
          -get_current_nat_page
             -__get_meta_page   <--- attempt to access beyond end of device
Signed-off-by: NYunlei He <heyunlei@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NJaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
      e9cdd307
    • D
      cifs: fix CIFS_IOC_GET_MNT_INFO oops · d8a6e505
      由 David Disseldorp 提交于 
      An open directory may have a NULL private_data pointer prior to readdir.

Fixes: 0de1f4c6 ("Add way to query server fs info for smb3")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NDavid Disseldorp <ddiss@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
      d8a6e505