Merge branch 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security

Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
 "The main change in this kernel is Casey's generalized LSM stacking
  work, which removes the hard-coding of Capabilities and Yama stacking,
  allowing multiple arbitrary "small" LSMs to be stacked with a default
  monolithic module (e.g.  SELinux, Smack, AppArmor).

  See
        https://lwn.net/Articles/636056/

  This will allow smaller, simpler LSMs to be incorporated into the
  mainline kernel and arbitrarily stacked by users.  Also, this is a
  useful cleanup of the LSM code in its own right"

* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (38 commits)
  tpm, tpm_crb: fix le64_to_cpu conversions in crb_acpi_add()
  vTPM: set virtual device before passing to ibmvtpm_reset_crq
  tpm_ibmvtpm: remove unneccessary message level.
  ima: update builtin policies
  ima: extend "mask" policy matching support
  ima: add support for new "euid" policy condition
  ima: fix ima_show_template_data_ascii()
  Smack: freeing an error pointer in smk_write_revoke_subj()
  selinux: fix setting of security labels on NFS
  selinux: Remove unused permission definitions
  selinux: enable genfscon labeling for sysfs and pstore files
  selinux: enable per-file labeling for debugfs files.
  selinux: update netlink socket classes
  signals: don't abuse __flush_signals() in selinux_bprm_committed_creds()
  selinux: Print 'sclass' as string when unrecognized netlink message occurs
  Smack: allow multiple labels in onlycap
  Smack: fix seq operations in smackfs
  ima: pass iint to ima_add_violation()
  ima: wrap event related data to the new ima_event_data structure
  integrity: add validity checks for 'path' parameter
  ...

Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy

@@ -20,17 +20,19 @@ Description:
 		action: measure | dont_measure | appraise | dont_appraise | audit
 		condition:= base | lsm  [option]
 			base:	[[func=] [mask=] [fsmagic=] [fsuuid=] [uid=]
-				 [fowner]]
+				[euid=] [fowner=]]
 			lsm:	[[subj_user=] [subj_role=] [subj_type=]
 				 [obj_user=] [obj_role=] [obj_type=]]
 			option:	[[appraise_type=]] [permit_directio]
 
 		base: 	func:= [BPRM_CHECK][MMAP_CHECK][FILE_CHECK][MODULE_CHECK]
 				[FIRMWARE_CHECK]
-			mask:= [MAY_READ] [MAY_WRITE] [MAY_APPEND] [MAY_EXEC]
+			mask:= [[^]MAY_READ] [[^]MAY_WRITE] [[^]MAY_APPEND]
+			       [[^]MAY_EXEC]
 			fsmagic:= hex value
 			fsuuid:= file system UUID (e.g 8bcbe394-4f13-4144-be8e-5aa9ea2ce2f6)
 			uid:= decimal value
+			euid:= decimal value
 			fowner:=decimal value
 		lsm:  	are LSM specific
 		option:	appraise_type:= [imasig]
@@ -49,11 +51,25 @@ Description:
 			dont_measure fsmagic=0x01021994
 			dont_appraise fsmagic=0x01021994
 			# RAMFS_MAGIC
-			dont_measure fsmagic=0x858458f6
 			dont_appraise fsmagic=0x858458f6
+			# DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC
+			dont_measure fsmagic=0x1cd1
+			dont_appraise fsmagic=0x1cd1
+			# BINFMTFS_MAGIC
+			dont_measure fsmagic=0x42494e4d
+			dont_appraise fsmagic=0x42494e4d
 			# SECURITYFS_MAGIC
 			dont_measure fsmagic=0x73636673
 			dont_appraise fsmagic=0x73636673
+			# SELINUX_MAGIC
+			dont_measure fsmagic=0xf97cff8c
+			dont_appraise fsmagic=0xf97cff8c
+			# CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC
+			dont_measure fsmagic=0x27e0eb
+			dont_appraise fsmagic=0x27e0eb
+			# NSFS_MAGIC
+			dont_measure fsmagic=0x6e736673
+			dont_appraise fsmagic=0x6e736673
 
 			measure func=BPRM_CHECK
 			measure func=FILE_MMAP mask=MAY_EXEC
@@ -70,10 +86,6 @@ Description:
 		Examples of LSM specific definitions:
 
 		SELinux:
-			# SELINUX_MAGIC
-			dont_measure fsmagic=0xf97cff8c
-			dont_appraise fsmagic=0xf97cff8c
-
 			dont_measure obj_type=var_log_t
 			dont_appraise obj_type=var_log_t
 			dont_measure obj_type=auditd_log_t

Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt

@@ -1413,7 +1413,15 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes can also be entirely omitted.
 			The list of supported hash algorithms is defined
 			in crypto/hash_info.h.
 
-	ima_tcb		[IMA]
+	ima_policy=	[IMA]
+			The builtin measurement policy to load during IMA
+			setup.  Specyfing "tcb" as the value, measures all
+			programs exec'd, files mmap'd for exec, and all files
+			opened with the read mode bit set by either the
+			effective uid (euid=0) or uid=0.
+			Format: "tcb"
+
+	ima_tcb		[IMA] Deprecated.  Use ima_policy= instead.
 			Load a policy which meets the needs of the Trusted
 			Computing Base.  This means IMA will measure all
 			programs exec'd, files mmap'd for exec, and all files
@@ -1421,7 +1429,7 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes can also be entirely omitted.
 
 	ima_template=   [IMA]
 			Select one of defined IMA measurements template formats.
-			Formats: { "ima" | "ima-ng" }
+			Formats: { "ima" | "ima-ng" | "ima-sig" }
 			Default: "ima-ng"
 
 	ima_template_fmt=

Documentation/security/Smack.txt

@@ -206,11 +206,11 @@ netlabel
 	label. The format accepted on write is:
 		"%d.%d.%d.%d label" or "%d.%d.%d.%d/%d label".
 onlycap
-	This contains the label processes must have for CAP_MAC_ADMIN
+	This contains labels processes must have for CAP_MAC_ADMIN
 	and CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE to be effective. If this file is empty
 	these capabilities are effective at for processes with any
-	label. The value is set by writing the desired label to the
-	file or cleared by writing "-" to the file.
+	label. The values are set by writing the desired labels, separated
+	by spaces, to the file or cleared by writing "-" to the file.
 ptrace
 	This is used to define the current ptrace policy
 	0 - default: this is the policy that relies on Smack access rules.

crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_keys.h

@@ -11,6 +11,9 @@
 
 extern struct asymmetric_key_id *asymmetric_key_hex_to_key_id(const char *id);
 
+extern int __asymmetric_key_hex_to_key_id(const char *id,
+					  struct asymmetric_key_id *match_id,
+					  size_t hexlen);
 static inline
 const struct asymmetric_key_ids *asymmetric_key_ids(const struct key *key)
 {

crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c

@@ -104,6 +104,15 @@ static bool asymmetric_match_key_ids(
 	return false;
 }
 
+/* helper function can be called directly with pre-allocated memory */
+inline int __asymmetric_key_hex_to_key_id(const char *id,
+				   struct asymmetric_key_id *match_id,
+				   size_t hexlen)
+{
+	match_id->len = hexlen;
+	return hex2bin(match_id->data, id, hexlen);
+}
+
 /**
  * asymmetric_key_hex_to_key_id - Convert a hex string into a key ID.
  * @id: The ID as a hex string.
@@ -111,21 +120,20 @@ static bool asymmetric_match_key_ids(
 struct asymmetric_key_id *asymmetric_key_hex_to_key_id(const char *id)
 {
 	struct asymmetric_key_id *match_id;
-	size_t hexlen;
+	size_t asciihexlen;
 	int ret;
 
 	if (!*id)
 		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
-	hexlen = strlen(id);
-	if (hexlen & 1)
+	asciihexlen = strlen(id);
+	if (asciihexlen & 1)
 		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
 
-	match_id = kmalloc(sizeof(struct asymmetric_key_id) + hexlen / 2,
+	match_id = kmalloc(sizeof(struct asymmetric_key_id) + asciihexlen / 2,
 			   GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!match_id)
 		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
-	match_id->len = hexlen / 2;
-	ret = hex2bin(match_id->data, id, hexlen / 2);
+	ret = __asymmetric_key_hex_to_key_id(id, match_id, asciihexlen / 2);
 	if (ret < 0) {
 		kfree(match_id);
 		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);

crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c

@@ -28,17 +28,30 @@ static bool use_builtin_keys;
 static struct asymmetric_key_id *ca_keyid;
 
 #ifndef MODULE
+static struct {
+	struct asymmetric_key_id id;
+	unsigned char data[10];
+} cakey;
+
 static int __init ca_keys_setup(char *str)
 {
 	if (!str)		/* default system keyring */
 		return 1;
 
 	if (strncmp(str, "id:", 3) == 0) {
-		struct asymmetric_key_id *p;
-		p = asymmetric_key_hex_to_key_id(str + 3);
-		if (p == ERR_PTR(-EINVAL))
-			pr_err("Unparsable hex string in ca_keys\n");
-		else if (!IS_ERR(p))
+		struct asymmetric_key_id *p = &cakey.id;
+		size_t hexlen = (strlen(str) - 3) / 2;
+		int ret;
+
+		if (hexlen == 0 || hexlen > sizeof(cakey.data)) {
+			pr_err("Missing or invalid ca_keys id\n");
+			return 1;
+		}
+
+		ret = __asymmetric_key_hex_to_key_id(str + 3, p, hexlen);
+		if (ret < 0)
+			pr_err("Unparsable ca_keys id hex string\n");
+		else
 			ca_keyid = p;	/* owner key 'id:xxxxxx' */
 	} else if (strcmp(str, "builtin") == 0) {
 		use_builtin_keys = true;

drivers/char/tpm/tpm_crb.c

@@ -267,7 +267,7 @@ static int crb_acpi_add(struct acpi_device *device)
 
 	memcpy_fromio(&pa, &priv->cca->cmd_pa, 8);
 	pa = le64_to_cpu(pa);
-	priv->cmd = devm_ioremap_nocache(dev, le64_to_cpu(pa),
+	priv->cmd = devm_ioremap_nocache(dev, pa,
 					 ioread32(&priv->cca->cmd_size));
 	if (!priv->cmd) {
 		dev_err(dev, "ioremap of the command buffer failed\n");
@@ -276,7 +276,7 @@ static int crb_acpi_add(struct acpi_device *device)
 
 	memcpy_fromio(&pa, &priv->cca->rsp_pa, 8);
 	pa = le64_to_cpu(pa);
-	priv->rsp = devm_ioremap_nocache(dev, le64_to_cpu(pa),
+	priv->rsp = devm_ioremap_nocache(dev, pa,
 					 ioread32(&priv->cca->rsp_size));
 	if (!priv->rsp) {
 		dev_err(dev, "ioremap of the response buffer failed\n");

drivers/char/tpm/tpm_ibmvtpm.c

@@ -578,6 +578,9 @@ static int tpm_ibmvtpm_probe(struct vio_dev *vio_dev,
 		goto cleanup;
 	}
 
+	ibmvtpm->dev = dev;
+	ibmvtpm->vdev = vio_dev;
+
 	crq_q = &ibmvtpm->crq_queue;
 	crq_q->crq_addr = (struct ibmvtpm_crq *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!crq_q->crq_addr) {
@@ -622,8 +625,6 @@ static int tpm_ibmvtpm_probe(struct vio_dev *vio_dev,
 
 	crq_q->index = 0;
 
-	ibmvtpm->dev = dev;
-	ibmvtpm->vdev = vio_dev;
 	TPM_VPRIV(chip) = (void *)ibmvtpm;
 
 	spin_lock_init(&ibmvtpm->rtce_lock);

drivers/char/tpm/tpm_of.c

@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ int read_log(struct tpm_bios_log *log)
 
 	basep = of_get_property(np, "linux,sml-base", NULL);
 	if (basep == NULL) {
-		pr_err(KERN_ERR "%s: ERROR - SML not found\n", __func__);
+		pr_err("%s: ERROR - SML not found\n", __func__);
 		goto cleanup_eio;
 	}
 

fs/xattr.c

@@ -298,18 +298,18 @@ vfs_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
 
 	mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
 	error = security_inode_removexattr(dentry, name);
-	if (error) {
-		mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
-		return error;
-	}
+	if (error)
+		goto out;
 
 	error = inode->i_op->removexattr(dentry, name);
-	mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
 
 	if (!error) {
 		fsnotify_xattr(dentry);
 		evm_inode_post_removexattr(dentry, name);
 	}
+
+out:
+	mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
 	return error;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(vfs_removexattr);

include/linux/sched.h

@@ -2421,7 +2421,6 @@ extern void sched_dead(struct task_struct *p);
 
 extern void proc_caches_init(void);
 extern void flush_signals(struct task_struct *);
-extern void __flush_signals(struct task_struct *);
 extern void ignore_signals(struct task_struct *);
 extern void flush_signal_handlers(struct task_struct *, int force_default);
 extern int dequeue_signal(struct task_struct *tsk, sigset_t *mask, siginfo_t *info);

kernel/signal.c

@@ -414,21 +414,16 @@ void flush_sigqueue(struct sigpending *queue)
 }
 
 /*
- * Flush all pending signals for a task.
+ * Flush all pending signals for this kthread.
  */
-void __flush_signals(struct task_struct *t)
-{
-	clear_tsk_thread_flag(t, TIF_SIGPENDING);
-	flush_sigqueue(&t->pending);
-	flush_sigqueue(&t->signal->shared_pending);
-}
-
 void flush_signals(struct task_struct *t)
 {
 	unsigned long flags;
 
 	spin_lock_irqsave(&t->sighand->siglock, flags);
-	__flush_signals(t);
+	clear_tsk_thread_flag(t, TIF_SIGPENDING);
+	flush_sigqueue(&t->pending);
+	flush_sigqueue(&t->signal->shared_pending);
 	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&t->sighand->siglock, flags);
 }
 

security/Makefile

@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ obj-y					+= commoncap.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_MMU)			+= min_addr.o
 
 # Object file lists
-obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY)			+= security.o capability.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY)			+= security.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITYFS)		+= inode.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX)		+= selinux/
 obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK)		+= smack/

security/apparmor/domain.c

@@ -347,9 +347,7 @@ int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 		file_inode(bprm->file)->i_mode
 	};
 	const char *name = NULL, *target = NULL, *info = NULL;
-	int error = cap_bprm_set_creds(bprm);
-	if (error)
-		return error;
+	int error = 0;
 
 	if (bprm->cred_prepared)
 		return 0;
@@ -531,15 +529,13 @@ int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
  */
 int apparmor_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 {
-	int ret = cap_bprm_secureexec(bprm);
-
 	/* the decision to use secure exec is computed in set_creds
 	 * and stored in bprm->unsafe.
 	 */
-	if (!ret && (bprm->unsafe & AA_SECURE_X_NEEDED))
-		ret = 1;
+	if (bprm->unsafe & AA_SECURE_X_NEEDED)
+		return 1;
 
-	return ret;
+	return 0;
 }
 
 /**

security/apparmor/lsm.c

@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@
  * License.
  */
 
-#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
 #include <linux/moduleparam.h>
 #include <linux/mm.h>
 #include <linux/mman.h>
@@ -96,19 +96,11 @@ static void apparmor_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
 static int apparmor_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
 					unsigned int mode)
 {
-	int error = cap_ptrace_access_check(child, mode);
-	if (error)
-		return error;
-
 	return aa_ptrace(current, child, mode);
 }
 
 static int apparmor_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
 {
-	int error = cap_ptrace_traceme(parent);
-	if (error)
-		return error;
-
 	return aa_ptrace(parent, current, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH);
 }
 
@@ -123,10 +115,10 @@ static int apparmor_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
 	cred = __task_cred(target);
 	profile = aa_cred_profile(cred);
 
-	*effective = cred->cap_effective;
-	*inheritable = cred->cap_inheritable;
-	*permitted = cred->cap_permitted;
-
+	/*
+	 * cap_capget is stacked ahead of this and will
+	 * initialize effective and permitted.
+	 */
 	if (!unconfined(profile) && !COMPLAIN_MODE(profile)) {
 		*effective = cap_intersect(*effective, profile->caps.allow);
 		*permitted = cap_intersect(*permitted, profile->caps.allow);
@@ -140,13 +132,11 @@ static int apparmor_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
 			    int cap, int audit)
 {
 	struct aa_profile *profile;
-	/* cap_capable returns 0 on success, else -EPERM */
-	int error = cap_capable(cred, ns, cap, audit);
-	if (!error) {
-		profile = aa_cred_profile(cred);
-		if (!unconfined(profile))
-			error = aa_capable(profile, cap, audit);
-	}
+	int error = 0;
+
+	profile = aa_cred_profile(cred);
+	if (!unconfined(profile))
+		error = aa_capable(profile, cap, audit);
 	return error;
 }
 
@@ -615,49 +605,46 @@ static int apparmor_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *task,
 	return error;
 }
 
-static struct security_operations apparmor_ops = {
-	.name =				"apparmor",
-
-	.ptrace_access_check =		apparmor_ptrace_access_check,
-	.ptrace_traceme =		apparmor_ptrace_traceme,
-	.capget =			apparmor_capget,
-	.capable =			apparmor_capable,
-
-	.path_link =			apparmor_path_link,
-	.path_unlink =			apparmor_path_unlink,
-	.path_symlink =			apparmor_path_symlink,
-	.path_mkdir =			apparmor_path_mkdir,
-	.path_rmdir =			apparmor_path_rmdir,
-	.path_mknod =			apparmor_path_mknod,
-	.path_rename =			apparmor_path_rename,
-	.path_chmod =			apparmor_path_chmod,
-	.path_chown =			apparmor_path_chown,
-	.path_truncate =		apparmor_path_truncate,
-	.inode_getattr =                apparmor_inode_getattr,
-
-	.file_open =			apparmor_file_open,
-	.file_permission =		apparmor_file_permission,
-	.file_alloc_security =		apparmor_file_alloc_security,
-	.file_free_security =		apparmor_file_free_security,
-	.mmap_file =			apparmor_mmap_file,
-	.mmap_addr =			cap_mmap_addr,
-	.file_mprotect =		apparmor_file_mprotect,
-	.file_lock =			apparmor_file_lock,
-
-	.getprocattr =			apparmor_getprocattr,
-	.setprocattr =			apparmor_setprocattr,
-
-	.cred_alloc_blank =		apparmor_cred_alloc_blank,
-	.cred_free =			apparmor_cred_free,
-	.cred_prepare =			apparmor_cred_prepare,
-	.cred_transfer =		apparmor_cred_transfer,
-
-	.bprm_set_creds =		apparmor_bprm_set_creds,
-	.bprm_committing_creds =	apparmor_bprm_committing_creds,
-	.bprm_committed_creds =		apparmor_bprm_committed_creds,
-	.bprm_secureexec =		apparmor_bprm_secureexec,
-
-	.task_setrlimit =		apparmor_task_setrlimit,
+static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] = {
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, apparmor_ptrace_access_check),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, apparmor_ptrace_traceme),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(capget, apparmor_capget),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, apparmor_capable),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_link, apparmor_path_link),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_unlink, apparmor_path_unlink),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_symlink, apparmor_path_symlink),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_mkdir, apparmor_path_mkdir),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_rmdir, apparmor_path_rmdir),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_mknod, apparmor_path_mknod),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_rename, apparmor_path_rename),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_chmod, apparmor_path_chmod),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_chown, apparmor_path_chown),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_truncate, apparmor_path_truncate),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getattr, apparmor_inode_getattr),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_open, apparmor_file_open),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_permission, apparmor_file_permission),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_alloc_security, apparmor_file_alloc_security),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_free_security, apparmor_file_free_security),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, apparmor_mmap_file),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_mprotect, apparmor_file_mprotect),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_lock, apparmor_file_lock),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(getprocattr, apparmor_getprocattr),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(setprocattr, apparmor_setprocattr),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_alloc_blank, apparmor_cred_alloc_blank),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_free, apparmor_cred_free),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, apparmor_cred_prepare),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_transfer, apparmor_cred_transfer),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_set_creds, apparmor_bprm_set_creds),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committing_creds, apparmor_bprm_committing_creds),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committed_creds, apparmor_bprm_committed_creds),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_secureexec, apparmor_bprm_secureexec),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setrlimit, apparmor_task_setrlimit),
 };
 
 /*
@@ -898,7 +885,7 @@ static int __init apparmor_init(void)
 {
 	int error;
 
-	if (!apparmor_enabled || !security_module_enable(&apparmor_ops)) {
+	if (!apparmor_enabled || !security_module_enable("apparmor")) {
 		aa_info_message("AppArmor disabled by boot time parameter");
 		apparmor_enabled = 0;
 		return 0;
@@ -913,17 +900,10 @@ static int __init apparmor_init(void)
 	error = set_init_cxt();
 	if (error) {
 		AA_ERROR("Failed to set context on init task\n");
-		goto register_security_out;
-	}
-
-	error = register_security(&apparmor_ops);
-	if (error) {
-		struct cred *cred = (struct cred *)current->real_cred;
-		aa_free_task_context(cred_cxt(cred));
-		cred_cxt(cred) = NULL;
-		AA_ERROR("Unable to register AppArmor\n");
-		goto register_security_out;
+		aa_free_root_ns();
+		goto alloc_out;
 	}
+	security_add_hooks(apparmor_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(apparmor_hooks));
 
 	/* Report that AppArmor successfully initialized */
 	apparmor_initialized = 1;
@@ -936,9 +916,6 @@ static int __init apparmor_init(void)
 
 	return error;
 
-register_security_out:
-	aa_free_root_ns();
-
 alloc_out:
 	aa_destroy_aafs();
 

security/commoncap.c

@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@
 #include <linux/module.h>
 #include <linux/init.h>
 #include <linux/kernel.h>
-#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
 #include <linux/file.h>
 #include <linux/mm.h>
 #include <linux/mman.h>
@@ -53,11 +53,6 @@ static void warn_setuid_and_fcaps_mixed(const char *fname)
 	}
 }
 
-int cap_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
 /**
  * cap_capable - Determine whether a task has a particular effective capability
  * @cred: The credentials to use
@@ -941,7 +936,7 @@ int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
  * @pages: The size of the mapping
  *
  * Determine whether the allocation of a new virtual mapping by the current
- * task is permitted, returning 0 if permission is granted, -ve if not.
+ * task is permitted, returning 1 if permission is granted, 0 if not.
  */
 int cap_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
 {
@@ -950,7 +945,7 @@ int cap_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
 	if (cap_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
 			SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT) == 0)
 		cap_sys_admin = 1;
-	return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin);
+	return cap_sys_admin;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -981,3 +976,33 @@ int cap_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
 {
 	return 0;
 }
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
+
+struct security_hook_list capability_hooks[] = {
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, cap_capable),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(settime, cap_settime),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, cap_ptrace_access_check),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, cap_ptrace_traceme),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(capget, cap_capget),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(capset, cap_capset),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_set_creds, cap_bprm_set_creds),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_secureexec, cap_bprm_secureexec),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_need_killpriv, cap_inode_need_killpriv),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_killpriv, cap_inode_killpriv),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_addr, cap_mmap_addr),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, cap_mmap_file),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_fix_setuid, cap_task_fix_setuid),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_prctl, cap_task_prctl),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setscheduler, cap_task_setscheduler),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setioprio, cap_task_setioprio),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setnice, cap_task_setnice),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(vm_enough_memory, cap_vm_enough_memory),
+};
+
+void __init capability_add_hooks(void)
+{
+	security_add_hooks(capability_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(capability_hooks));
+}
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */

security/integrity/digsig.c

@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ int __init integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id)
 	return err;
 }
 
-int __init integrity_load_x509(const unsigned int id, char *path)
+int __init integrity_load_x509(const unsigned int id, const char *path)
 {
 	key_ref_t key;
 	char *data;

security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c

@@ -296,6 +296,17 @@ static int evm_protect_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
 		iint = integrity_iint_find(d_backing_inode(dentry));
 		if (iint && (iint->flags & IMA_NEW_FILE))
 			return 0;
+
+		/* exception for pseudo filesystems */
+		if (dentry->d_inode->i_sb->s_magic == TMPFS_MAGIC
+		    || dentry->d_inode->i_sb->s_magic == SYSFS_MAGIC)
+			return 0;
+
+		integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_METADATA,
+				    dentry->d_inode, dentry->d_name.name,
+				    "update_metadata",
+				    integrity_status_msg[evm_status],
+				    -EPERM, 0);
 	}
 out:
 	if (evm_status != INTEGRITY_PASS)
@@ -376,17 +387,16 @@ void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
  * @xattr_name: pointer to the affected extended attribute name
  *
  * Update the HMAC stored in 'security.evm' to reflect removal of the xattr.
+ *
+ * No need to take the i_mutex lock here, as this function is called from
+ * vfs_removexattr() which takes the i_mutex.
  */
 void evm_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name)
 {
-	struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
-
 	if (!evm_initialized || !evm_protected_xattr(xattr_name))
 		return;
 
-	mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
 	evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, xattr_name, NULL, 0);
-	mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
 }
 
 /**

security/integrity/iint.c

@@ -213,6 +213,9 @@ int __init integrity_read_file(const char *path, char **data)
 	char *buf;
 	int rc = -EINVAL;
 
+	if (!path || !*path)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	file = filp_open(path, O_RDONLY, 0);
 	if (IS_ERR(file)) {
 		rc = PTR_ERR(file);

security/integrity/ima/ima.h

@@ -52,6 +52,16 @@ extern int ima_used_chip;
 extern int ima_hash_algo;
 extern int ima_appraise;
 
+/* IMA event related data */
+struct ima_event_data {
+	struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
+	struct file *file;
+	const unsigned char *filename;
+	struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value;
+	int xattr_len;
+	const char *violation;
+};
+
 /* IMA template field data definition */
 struct ima_field_data {
 	u8 *data;
@@ -61,12 +71,10 @@ struct ima_field_data {
 /* IMA template field definition */
 struct ima_template_field {
 	const char field_id[IMA_TEMPLATE_FIELD_ID_MAX_LEN];
-	int (*field_init) (struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
-			   const unsigned char *filename,
-			   struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
-			   int xattr_len, struct ima_field_data *field_data);
-	void (*field_show) (struct seq_file *m, enum ima_show_type show,
-			    struct ima_field_data *field_data);
+	int (*field_init)(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
+			  struct ima_field_data *field_data);
+	void (*field_show)(struct seq_file *m, enum ima_show_type show,
+			   struct ima_field_data *field_data);
 };
 
 /* IMA template descriptor definition */
@@ -103,10 +111,11 @@ int ima_calc_field_array_hash(struct ima_field_data *field_data,
 			      struct ima_digest_data *hash);
 int __init ima_calc_boot_aggregate(struct ima_digest_data *hash);
 void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
+		       struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 		       const char *op, const char *cause);
 int ima_init_crypto(void);
 void ima_putc(struct seq_file *m, void *data, int datalen);
-void ima_print_digest(struct seq_file *m, u8 *digest, int size);
+void ima_print_digest(struct seq_file *m, u8 *digest, u32 size);
 struct ima_template_desc *ima_template_desc_current(void);
 int ima_init_template(void);
 
@@ -140,10 +149,8 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
 			   int xattr_len);
 void ima_audit_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 			   const unsigned char *filename);
-int ima_alloc_init_template(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
-			    struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
-			    struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
-			    int xattr_len, struct ima_template_entry **entry);
+int ima_alloc_init_template(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
+			    struct ima_template_entry **entry);
 int ima_store_template(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation,
 		       struct inode *inode, const unsigned char *filename);
 void ima_free_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry);

security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c

@@ -37,10 +37,8 @@ void ima_free_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry)
 /*
  * ima_alloc_init_template - create and initialize a new template entry
  */
-int ima_alloc_init_template(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
-			    struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
-			    struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
-			    int xattr_len, struct ima_template_entry **entry)
+int ima_alloc_init_template(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
+			    struct ima_template_entry **entry)
 {
 	struct ima_template_desc *template_desc = ima_template_desc_current();
 	int i, result = 0;
@@ -55,8 +53,7 @@ int ima_alloc_init_template(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 		struct ima_template_field *field = template_desc->fields[i];
 		u32 len;
 
-		result = field->field_init(iint, file, filename,
-					   xattr_value, xattr_len,
+		result = field->field_init(event_data,
 					   &((*entry)->template_data[i]));
 		if (result != 0)
 			goto out;
@@ -129,18 +126,20 @@ int ima_store_template(struct ima_template_entry *entry,
  * value is invalidated.
  */
 void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
+		       struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 		       const char *op, const char *cause)
 {
 	struct ima_template_entry *entry;
 	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
+	struct ima_event_data event_data = {iint, file, filename, NULL, 0,
+					    cause};
 	int violation = 1;
 	int result;
 
 	/* can overflow, only indicator */
 	atomic_long_inc(&ima_htable.violations);
 
-	result = ima_alloc_init_template(NULL, file, filename,
-					 NULL, 0, &entry);
+	result = ima_alloc_init_template(&event_data, &entry);
 	if (result < 0) {
 		result = -ENOMEM;
 		goto err_out;
@@ -267,13 +266,14 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 	int result = -ENOMEM;
 	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
 	struct ima_template_entry *entry;
+	struct ima_event_data event_data = {iint, file, filename, xattr_value,
+					    xattr_len, NULL};
 	int violation = 0;
 
 	if (iint->flags & IMA_MEASURED)
 		return;
 
-	result = ima_alloc_init_template(iint, file, filename,
-					 xattr_value, xattr_len, &entry);
+	result = ima_alloc_init_template(&event_data, &entry);
 	if (result < 0) {
 		integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR, inode, filename,
 				    op, audit_cause, result, 0);

security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c

@@ -378,10 +378,14 @@ int ima_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
 	result = ima_protect_xattr(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value,
 				   xattr_value_len);
 	if (result == 1) {
+		bool digsig;
+
 		if (!xattr_value_len || (xvalue->type >= IMA_XATTR_LAST))
 			return -EINVAL;
-		ima_reset_appraise_flags(d_backing_inode(dentry),
-			 (xvalue->type == EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG) ? 1 : 0);
+		digsig = (xvalue->type == EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG);
+		if (!digsig && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE))
+			return -EPERM;
+		ima_reset_appraise_flags(d_backing_inode(dentry), digsig);
 		result = 0;
 	}
 	return result;

security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c

@@ -190,9 +190,9 @@ static const struct file_operations ima_measurements_ops = {
 	.release = seq_release,
 };
 
-void ima_print_digest(struct seq_file *m, u8 *digest, int size)
+void ima_print_digest(struct seq_file *m, u8 *digest, u32 size)
 {
-	int i;
+	u32 i;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < size; i++)
 		seq_printf(m, "%02x", *(digest + i));

security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c

@@ -24,12 +24,6 @@
 #include <crypto/hash_info.h>
 #include "ima.h"
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_X509_PATH
-#define IMA_X509_PATH	CONFIG_IMA_X509_PATH
-#else
-#define IMA_X509_PATH	"/etc/keys/x509_ima.der"
-#endif
-
 /* name for boot aggregate entry */
 static const char *boot_aggregate_name = "boot_aggregate";
 int ima_used_chip;
@@ -55,6 +49,8 @@ static int __init ima_add_boot_aggregate(void)
 	const char *audit_cause = "ENOMEM";
 	struct ima_template_entry *entry;
 	struct integrity_iint_cache tmp_iint, *iint = &tmp_iint;
+	struct ima_event_data event_data = {iint, NULL, boot_aggregate_name,
+					    NULL, 0, NULL};
 	int result = -ENOMEM;
 	int violation = 0;
 	struct {
@@ -76,8 +72,7 @@ static int __init ima_add_boot_aggregate(void)
 		}
 	}
 
-	result = ima_alloc_init_template(iint, NULL, boot_aggregate_name,
-					 NULL, 0, &entry);
+	result = ima_alloc_init_template(&event_data, &entry);
 	if (result < 0) {
 		audit_cause = "alloc_entry";
 		goto err_out;
@@ -103,7 +98,7 @@ void __init ima_load_x509(void)
 	int unset_flags = ima_policy_flag & IMA_APPRAISE;
 
 	ima_policy_flag &= ~unset_flags;
-	integrity_load_x509(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA, IMA_X509_PATH);
+	integrity_load_x509(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA, CONFIG_IMA_X509_PATH);
 	ima_policy_flag |= unset_flags;
 }
 #endif

security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c

@@ -106,9 +106,10 @@ static void ima_rdwr_violation_check(struct file *file,
 	*pathname = ima_d_path(&file->f_path, pathbuf);
 
 	if (send_tomtou)
-		ima_add_violation(file, *pathname, "invalid_pcr", "ToMToU");
+		ima_add_violation(file, *pathname, iint,
+				  "invalid_pcr", "ToMToU");
 	if (send_writers)
-		ima_add_violation(file, *pathname,
+		ima_add_violation(file, *pathname, iint,
 				  "invalid_pcr", "open_writers");
 }
 

security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c

@@ -27,6 +27,8 @@
 #define IMA_UID		0x0008
 #define IMA_FOWNER	0x0010
 #define IMA_FSUUID	0x0020
+#define IMA_INMASK	0x0040
+#define IMA_EUID	0x0080
 
 #define UNKNOWN		0
 #define MEASURE		0x0001	/* same as IMA_MEASURE */
@@ -42,6 +44,8 @@ enum lsm_rule_types { LSM_OBJ_USER, LSM_OBJ_ROLE, LSM_OBJ_TYPE,
 	LSM_SUBJ_USER, LSM_SUBJ_ROLE, LSM_SUBJ_TYPE
 };
 
+enum policy_types { ORIGINAL_TCB = 1, DEFAULT_TCB };
+
 struct ima_rule_entry {
 	struct list_head list;
 	int action;
@@ -70,7 +74,7 @@ struct ima_rule_entry {
  * normal users can easily run the machine out of memory simply building
  * and running executables.
  */
-static struct ima_rule_entry default_rules[] = {
+static struct ima_rule_entry dont_measure_rules[] = {
 	{.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = PROC_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
 	{.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = SYSFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
 	{.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = DEBUGFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
@@ -79,12 +83,31 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry default_rules[] = {
 	{.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = BINFMTFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
 	{.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = SECURITYFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
 	{.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = SELINUX_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+	{.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC,
+	 .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+	{.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = NSFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}
+};
+
+static struct ima_rule_entry original_measurement_rules[] = {
 	{.action = MEASURE, .func = MMAP_CHECK, .mask = MAY_EXEC,
 	 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK},
 	{.action = MEASURE, .func = BPRM_CHECK, .mask = MAY_EXEC,
 	 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK},
-	{.action = MEASURE, .func = FILE_CHECK, .mask = MAY_READ, .uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID,
-	 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK | IMA_UID},
+	{.action = MEASURE, .func = FILE_CHECK, .mask = MAY_READ,
+	 .uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK | IMA_UID},
+	{.action = MEASURE, .func = MODULE_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC},
+	{.action = MEASURE, .func = FIRMWARE_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC},
+};
+
+static struct ima_rule_entry default_measurement_rules[] = {
+	{.action = MEASURE, .func = MMAP_CHECK, .mask = MAY_EXEC,
+	 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK},
+	{.action = MEASURE, .func = BPRM_CHECK, .mask = MAY_EXEC,
+	 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK},
+	{.action = MEASURE, .func = FILE_CHECK, .mask = MAY_READ,
+	 .uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_INMASK | IMA_EUID},
+	{.action = MEASURE, .func = FILE_CHECK, .mask = MAY_READ,
+	 .uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_INMASK | IMA_UID},
 	{.action = MEASURE, .func = MODULE_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC},
 	{.action = MEASURE, .func = FIRMWARE_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC},
 };
@@ -99,6 +122,7 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry default_appraise_rules[] = {
 	{.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = BINFMTFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
 	{.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = SECURITYFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
 	{.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = SELINUX_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+	{.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = NSFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
 	{.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
 #ifndef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_SIGNED_INIT
 	{.action = APPRAISE, .fowner = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, .flags = IMA_FOWNER},
@@ -115,14 +139,29 @@ static struct list_head *ima_rules;
 
 static DEFINE_MUTEX(ima_rules_mutex);
 
-static bool ima_use_tcb __initdata;
+static int ima_policy __initdata;
 static int __init default_measure_policy_setup(char *str)
 {
-	ima_use_tcb = 1;
+	if (ima_policy)
+		return 1;
+
+	ima_policy = ORIGINAL_TCB;
 	return 1;
 }
 __setup("ima_tcb", default_measure_policy_setup);
 
+static int __init policy_setup(char *str)
+{
+	if (ima_policy)
+		return 1;
+
+	if (strcmp(str, "tcb") == 0)
+		ima_policy = DEFAULT_TCB;
+
+	return 1;
+}
+__setup("ima_policy=", policy_setup);
+
 static bool ima_use_appraise_tcb __initdata;
 static int __init default_appraise_policy_setup(char *str)
 {
@@ -182,6 +221,9 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule,
 	if ((rule->flags & IMA_MASK) &&
 	    (rule->mask != mask && func != POST_SETATTR))
 		return false;
+	if ((rule->flags & IMA_INMASK) &&
+	    (!(rule->mask & mask) && func != POST_SETATTR))
+		return false;
 	if ((rule->flags & IMA_FSMAGIC)
 	    && rule->fsmagic != inode->i_sb->s_magic)
 		return false;
@@ -190,6 +232,16 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule,
 		return false;
 	if ((rule->flags & IMA_UID) && !uid_eq(rule->uid, cred->uid))
 		return false;
+	if (rule->flags & IMA_EUID) {
+		if (has_capability_noaudit(current, CAP_SETUID)) {
+			if (!uid_eq(rule->uid, cred->euid)
+			    && !uid_eq(rule->uid, cred->suid)
+			    && !uid_eq(rule->uid, cred->uid))
+				return false;
+		} else if (!uid_eq(rule->uid, cred->euid))
+			return false;
+	}
+
 	if ((rule->flags & IMA_FOWNER) && !uid_eq(rule->fowner, inode->i_uid))
 		return false;
 	for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
@@ -333,21 +385,31 @@ void __init ima_init_policy(void)
 {
 	int i, measure_entries, appraise_entries;
 
-	/* if !ima_use_tcb set entries = 0 so we load NO default rules */
-	measure_entries = ima_use_tcb ? ARRAY_SIZE(default_rules) : 0;
+	/* if !ima_policy set entries = 0 so we load NO default rules */
+	measure_entries = ima_policy ? ARRAY_SIZE(dont_measure_rules) : 0;
 	appraise_entries = ima_use_appraise_tcb ?
 			 ARRAY_SIZE(default_appraise_rules) : 0;
 
-	for (i = 0; i < measure_entries + appraise_entries; i++) {
-		if (i < measure_entries)
-			list_add_tail(&default_rules[i].list,
-				      &ima_default_rules);
-		else {
-			int j = i - measure_entries;
+	for (i = 0; i < measure_entries; i++)
+		list_add_tail(&dont_measure_rules[i].list, &ima_default_rules);
 
-			list_add_tail(&default_appraise_rules[j].list,
+	switch (ima_policy) {
+	case ORIGINAL_TCB:
+		for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(original_measurement_rules); i++)
+			list_add_tail(&original_measurement_rules[i].list,
 				      &ima_default_rules);
-		}
+		break;
+	case DEFAULT_TCB:
+		for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(default_measurement_rules); i++)
+			list_add_tail(&default_measurement_rules[i].list,
+				      &ima_default_rules);
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
+
+	for (i = 0; i < appraise_entries; i++) {
+		list_add_tail(&default_appraise_rules[i].list,
+			      &ima_default_rules);
 	}
 
 	ima_rules = &ima_default_rules;
@@ -373,7 +435,8 @@ enum {
 	Opt_audit,
 	Opt_obj_user, Opt_obj_role, Opt_obj_type,
 	Opt_subj_user, Opt_subj_role, Opt_subj_type,
-	Opt_func, Opt_mask, Opt_fsmagic, Opt_uid, Opt_fowner,
+	Opt_func, Opt_mask, Opt_fsmagic,
+	Opt_uid, Opt_euid, Opt_fowner,
 	Opt_appraise_type, Opt_fsuuid, Opt_permit_directio
 };
 
@@ -394,6 +457,7 @@ static match_table_t policy_tokens = {
 	{Opt_fsmagic, "fsmagic=%s"},
 	{Opt_fsuuid, "fsuuid=%s"},
 	{Opt_uid, "uid=%s"},
+	{Opt_euid, "euid=%s"},
 	{Opt_fowner, "fowner=%s"},
 	{Opt_appraise_type, "appraise_type=%s"},
 	{Opt_permit_directio, "permit_directio"},
@@ -435,6 +499,7 @@ static void ima_log_string(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *key, char *value)
 static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
 {
 	struct audit_buffer *ab;
+	char *from;
 	char *p;
 	int result = 0;
 
@@ -525,18 +590,23 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
 			if (entry->mask)
 				result = -EINVAL;
 
-			if ((strcmp(args[0].from, "MAY_EXEC")) == 0)
+			from = args[0].from;
+			if (*from == '^')
+				from++;
+
+			if ((strcmp(from, "MAY_EXEC")) == 0)
 				entry->mask = MAY_EXEC;
-			else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "MAY_WRITE") == 0)
+			else if (strcmp(from, "MAY_WRITE") == 0)
 				entry->mask = MAY_WRITE;
-			else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "MAY_READ") == 0)
+			else if (strcmp(from, "MAY_READ") == 0)
 				entry->mask = MAY_READ;
-			else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "MAY_APPEND") == 0)
+			else if (strcmp(from, "MAY_APPEND") == 0)
 				entry->mask = MAY_APPEND;
 			else
 				result = -EINVAL;
 			if (!result)
-				entry->flags |= IMA_MASK;
+				entry->flags |= (*args[0].from == '^')
+				     ? IMA_INMASK : IMA_MASK;
 			break;
 		case Opt_fsmagic:
 			ima_log_string(ab, "fsmagic", args[0].from);
@@ -566,6 +636,9 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
 			break;
 		case Opt_uid:
 			ima_log_string(ab, "uid", args[0].from);
+		case Opt_euid:
+			if (token == Opt_euid)
+				ima_log_string(ab, "euid", args[0].from);
 
 			if (uid_valid(entry->uid)) {
 				result = -EINVAL;
@@ -574,11 +647,14 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
 
 			result = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 10, &lnum);
 			if (!result) {
-				entry->uid = make_kuid(current_user_ns(), (uid_t)lnum);
-				if (!uid_valid(entry->uid) || (((uid_t)lnum) != lnum))
+				entry->uid = make_kuid(current_user_ns(),
+						       (uid_t) lnum);
+				if (!uid_valid(entry->uid) ||
+				    (uid_t)lnum != lnum)
 					result = -EINVAL;
 				else
-					entry->flags |= IMA_UID;
+					entry->flags |= (token == Opt_uid)
+					    ? IMA_UID : IMA_EUID;
 			}
 			break;
 		case Opt_fowner:

security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c

@@ -70,7 +70,8 @@ static void ima_show_template_data_ascii(struct seq_file *m,
 					 enum data_formats datafmt,
 					 struct ima_field_data *field_data)
 {
-	u8 *buf_ptr = field_data->data, buflen = field_data->len;
+	u8 *buf_ptr = field_data->data;
+	u32 buflen = field_data->len;
 
 	switch (datafmt) {
 	case DATA_FMT_DIGEST_WITH_ALGO:
@@ -195,9 +196,7 @@ static int ima_eventdigest_init_common(u8 *digest, u32 digestsize, u8 hash_algo,
 /*
  * This function writes the digest of an event (with size limit).
  */
-int ima_eventdigest_init(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
-			 const unsigned char *filename,
-			 struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len,
+int ima_eventdigest_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
 			 struct ima_field_data *field_data)
 {
 	struct {
@@ -211,25 +210,25 @@ int ima_eventdigest_init(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
 
 	memset(&hash, 0, sizeof(hash));
 
-	if (!iint)		/* recording a violation. */
+	if (event_data->violation)	/* recording a violation. */
 		goto out;
 
-	if (ima_template_hash_algo_allowed(iint->ima_hash->algo)) {
-		cur_digest = iint->ima_hash->digest;
-		cur_digestsize = iint->ima_hash->length;
+	if (ima_template_hash_algo_allowed(event_data->iint->ima_hash->algo)) {
+		cur_digest = event_data->iint->ima_hash->digest;
+		cur_digestsize = event_data->iint->ima_hash->length;
 		goto out;
 	}
 
-	if (!file)		/* missing info to re-calculate the digest */
+	if (!event_data->file)	/* missing info to re-calculate the digest */
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	inode = file_inode(file);
+	inode = file_inode(event_data->file);
 	hash.hdr.algo = ima_template_hash_algo_allowed(ima_hash_algo) ?
 	    ima_hash_algo : HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
-	result = ima_calc_file_hash(file, &hash.hdr);
+	result = ima_calc_file_hash(event_data->file, &hash.hdr);
 	if (result) {
 		integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA, inode,
-				    filename, "collect_data",
+				    event_data->filename, "collect_data",
 				    "failed", result, 0);
 		return result;
 	}
@@ -243,48 +242,43 @@ int ima_eventdigest_init(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
 /*
  * This function writes the digest of an event (without size limit).
  */
-int ima_eventdigest_ng_init(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
-			    struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
-			    struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
-			    int xattr_len, struct ima_field_data *field_data)
+int ima_eventdigest_ng_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
+			    struct ima_field_data *field_data)
 {
 	u8 *cur_digest = NULL, hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
 	u32 cur_digestsize = 0;
 
-	/* If iint is NULL, we are recording a violation. */
-	if (!iint)
+	if (event_data->violation)	/* recording a violation. */
 		goto out;
 
-	cur_digest = iint->ima_hash->digest;
-	cur_digestsize = iint->ima_hash->length;
+	cur_digest = event_data->iint->ima_hash->digest;
+	cur_digestsize = event_data->iint->ima_hash->length;
 
-	hash_algo = iint->ima_hash->algo;
+	hash_algo = event_data->iint->ima_hash->algo;
 out:
 	return ima_eventdigest_init_common(cur_digest, cur_digestsize,
 					   hash_algo, field_data);
 }
 
-static int ima_eventname_init_common(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
-				     struct file *file,
-				     const unsigned char *filename,
+static int ima_eventname_init_common(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
 				     struct ima_field_data *field_data,
 				     bool size_limit)
 {
 	const char *cur_filename = NULL;
 	u32 cur_filename_len = 0;
 
-	BUG_ON(filename == NULL && file == NULL);
+	BUG_ON(event_data->filename == NULL && event_data->file == NULL);
 
-	if (filename) {
-		cur_filename = filename;
-		cur_filename_len = strlen(filename);
+	if (event_data->filename) {
+		cur_filename = event_data->filename;
+		cur_filename_len = strlen(event_data->filename);
 
 		if (!size_limit || cur_filename_len <= IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX)
 			goto out;
 	}
 
-	if (file) {
-		cur_filename = file->f_path.dentry->d_name.name;
+	if (event_data->file) {
+		cur_filename = event_data->file->f_path.dentry->d_name.name;
 		cur_filename_len = strlen(cur_filename);
 	} else
 		/*
@@ -300,36 +294,30 @@ static int ima_eventname_init_common(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 /*
  * This function writes the name of an event (with size limit).
  */
-int ima_eventname_init(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
-		       const unsigned char *filename,
-		       struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len,
+int ima_eventname_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
 		       struct ima_field_data *field_data)
 {
-	return ima_eventname_init_common(iint, file, filename,
-					 field_data, true);
+	return ima_eventname_init_common(event_data, field_data, true);
 }
 
 /*
  * This function writes the name of an event (without size limit).
  */
-int ima_eventname_ng_init(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
-			  const unsigned char *filename,
-			  struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len,
+int ima_eventname_ng_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
 			  struct ima_field_data *field_data)
 {
-	return ima_eventname_init_common(iint, file, filename,
-					 field_data, false);
+	return ima_eventname_init_common(event_data, field_data, false);
 }
 
 /*
  *  ima_eventsig_init - include the file signature as part of the template data
  */
-int ima_eventsig_init(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
-		      const unsigned char *filename,
-		      struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len,
+int ima_eventsig_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
 		      struct ima_field_data *field_data)
 {
 	enum data_formats fmt = DATA_FMT_HEX;
+	struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value = event_data->xattr_value;
+	int xattr_len = event_data->xattr_len;
 	int rc = 0;
 
 	if ((!xattr_value) || (xattr_value->type != EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG))

security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.h

@@ -26,24 +26,14 @@ void ima_show_template_string(struct seq_file *m, enum ima_show_type show,
 			      struct ima_field_data *field_data);
 void ima_show_template_sig(struct seq_file *m, enum ima_show_type show,
 			   struct ima_field_data *field_data);
-int ima_eventdigest_init(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
-			 const unsigned char *filename,
-			 struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len,
+int ima_eventdigest_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
 			 struct ima_field_data *field_data);
-int ima_eventname_init(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
-		       const unsigned char *filename,
-		       struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len,
+int ima_eventname_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
 		       struct ima_field_data *field_data);
-int ima_eventdigest_ng_init(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
-			    struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
-			    struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
-			    int xattr_len, struct ima_field_data *field_data);
-int ima_eventname_ng_init(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
-			  const unsigned char *filename,
-			  struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len,
+int ima_eventdigest_ng_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
+			    struct ima_field_data *field_data);
+int ima_eventname_ng_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
 			  struct ima_field_data *field_data);
-int ima_eventsig_init(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
-		      const unsigned char *filename,
-		      struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len,
+int ima_eventsig_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
 		      struct ima_field_data *field_data);
 #endif /* __LINUX_IMA_TEMPLATE_LIB_H */

security/integrity/integrity.h

@@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id, const char *sig, int siglen,
 			    const char *digest, int digestlen);
 
 int __init integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id);
-int __init integrity_load_x509(const unsigned int id, char *path);
+int __init integrity_load_x509(const unsigned int id, const char *path);
 #else
 
 static inline int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id,

security/selinux/include/classmap.h

@@ -2,12 +2,12 @@
     "getattr", "setattr", "lock", "relabelfrom", "relabelto", "append"
 
 #define COMMON_FILE_PERMS COMMON_FILE_SOCK_PERMS, "unlink", "link", \
-    "rename", "execute", "swapon", "quotaon", "mounton", "audit_access", \
+    "rename", "execute", "quotaon", "mounton", "audit_access", \
     "open", "execmod"
 
 #define COMMON_SOCK_PERMS COMMON_FILE_SOCK_PERMS, "bind", "connect", \
     "listen", "accept", "getopt", "setopt", "shutdown", "recvfrom",  \
-    "sendto", "recv_msg", "send_msg", "name_bind"
+    "sendto", "name_bind"
 
 #define COMMON_IPC_PERMS "create", "destroy", "getattr", "setattr", "read", \
 	    "write", "associate", "unix_read", "unix_write"
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = {
 	    "audit_control", "setfcap", NULL } },
 	{ "filesystem",
 	  { "mount", "remount", "unmount", "getattr",
-	    "relabelfrom", "relabelto", "transition", "associate", "quotamod",
+	    "relabelfrom", "relabelto", "associate", "quotamod",
 	    "quotaget", NULL } },
 	{ "file",
 	  { COMMON_FILE_PERMS,
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = {
 	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
 	{ "tcp_socket",
 	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS,
-	    "connectto", "newconn", "acceptfrom", "node_bind", "name_connect",
+	    "node_bind", "name_connect",
 	    NULL } },
 	{ "udp_socket",
 	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS,
@@ -76,13 +76,9 @@ struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = {
 	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS,
 	    "node_bind", NULL } },
 	{ "node",
-	  { "tcp_recv", "tcp_send", "udp_recv", "udp_send",
-	    "rawip_recv", "rawip_send", "enforce_dest",
-	    "dccp_recv", "dccp_send", "recvfrom", "sendto", NULL } },
+	  { "recvfrom", "sendto", NULL } },
 	{ "netif",
-	  {  "tcp_recv", "tcp_send", "udp_recv", "udp_send",
-	     "rawip_recv", "rawip_send", "dccp_recv", "dccp_send",
-	     "ingress", "egress", NULL } },
+	  { "ingress", "egress", NULL } },
 	{ "netlink_socket",
 	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
 	{ "packet_socket",
@@ -90,11 +86,9 @@ struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = {
 	{ "key_socket",
 	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
 	{ "unix_stream_socket",
-	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, "connectto", "newconn", "acceptfrom", NULL
-	  } },
+	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, "connectto", NULL } },
 	{ "unix_dgram_socket",
-	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL
-	  } },
+	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
 	{ "sem",
 	  { COMMON_IPC_PERMS, NULL } },
 	{ "msg", { "send", "receive", NULL } },
@@ -107,9 +101,6 @@ struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = {
 	{ "netlink_route_socket",
 	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS,
 	    "nlmsg_read", "nlmsg_write", NULL } },
-	{ "netlink_firewall_socket",
-	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS,
-	    "nlmsg_read", "nlmsg_write", NULL } },
 	{ "netlink_tcpdiag_socket",
 	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS,
 	    "nlmsg_read", "nlmsg_write", NULL } },
@@ -120,19 +111,32 @@ struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = {
 	    "nlmsg_read", "nlmsg_write", NULL } },
 	{ "netlink_selinux_socket",
 	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "netlink_iscsi_socket",
+	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
 	{ "netlink_audit_socket",
 	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS,
 	    "nlmsg_read", "nlmsg_write", "nlmsg_relay", "nlmsg_readpriv",
 	    "nlmsg_tty_audit", NULL } },
-	{ "netlink_ip6fw_socket",
-	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS,
-	    "nlmsg_read", "nlmsg_write", NULL } },
+	{ "netlink_fib_lookup_socket",
+	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "netlink_connector_socket",
+	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "netlink_netfilter_socket",
+	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
 	{ "netlink_dnrt_socket",
 	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
 	{ "association",
 	  { "sendto", "recvfrom", "setcontext", "polmatch", NULL } },
 	{ "netlink_kobject_uevent_socket",
 	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "netlink_generic_socket",
+	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "netlink_scsitransport_socket",
+	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "netlink_rdma_socket",
+	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "netlink_crypto_socket",
+	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
 	{ "appletalk_socket",
 	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
 	{ "packet",

security/selinux/include/security.h

@@ -56,6 +56,7 @@
 /* Non-mount related flags */
 #define SE_SBINITIALIZED	0x0100
 #define SE_SBPROC		0x0200
+#define SE_SBGENFS		0x0400
 
 #define CONTEXT_STR	"context="
 #define FSCONTEXT_STR	"fscontext="

security/smack/smack.h

@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@
 
 #include <linux/capability.h>
 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
-#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
 #include <linux/in.h>
 #include <net/netlabel.h>
 #include <linux/list.h>
@@ -138,6 +138,11 @@ struct smk_port_label {
 	struct smack_known	*smk_out;	/* outgoing label */
 };
 
+struct smack_onlycap {
+	struct list_head	list;
+	struct smack_known	*smk_label;
+};
+
 /*
  * Mount options
  */
@@ -249,6 +254,7 @@ int smk_netlbl_mls(int, char *, struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *, int);
 struct smack_known *smk_import_entry(const char *, int);
 void smk_insert_entry(struct smack_known *skp);
 struct smack_known *smk_find_entry(const char *);
+int smack_privileged(int cap);
 
 /*
  * Shared data.
@@ -257,7 +263,6 @@ extern int smack_enabled;
 extern int smack_cipso_direct;
 extern int smack_cipso_mapped;
 extern struct smack_known *smack_net_ambient;
-extern struct smack_known *smack_onlycap;
 extern struct smack_known *smack_syslog_label;
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
 extern struct smack_known *smack_unconfined;
@@ -276,7 +281,8 @@ extern struct mutex	smack_known_lock;
 extern struct list_head smack_known_list;
 extern struct list_head smk_netlbladdr_list;
 
-extern struct security_operations smack_ops;
+extern struct mutex     smack_onlycap_lock;
+extern struct list_head smack_onlycap_list;
 
 #define SMACK_HASH_SLOTS 16
 extern struct hlist_head smack_known_hash[SMACK_HASH_SLOTS];
@@ -333,21 +339,6 @@ static inline struct smack_known *smk_of_current(void)
 	return smk_of_task(current_security());
 }
 
-/*
- * Is the task privileged and allowed to be privileged
- * by the onlycap rule.
- */
-static inline int smack_privileged(int cap)
-{
-	struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
-
-	if (!capable(cap))
-		return 0;
-	if (smack_onlycap == NULL || smack_onlycap == skp)
-		return 1;
-	return 0;
-}
-
 /*
  * logging functions
  */