提交 aa6acde6 编写于 作者: W Will Deacon 提交者: Catalin Marinas

arm64: Implement branch predictor hardening for affected Cortex-A CPUs

Cortex-A57, A72, A73 and A75 are susceptible to branch predictor aliasing
and can theoretically be attacked by malicious code.

This patch implements a PSCI-based mitigation for these CPUs when available.
The call into firmware will invalidate the branch predictor state, preventing
any malicious entries from affecting other victim contexts.
Co-developed-by: NMarc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: NCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
上级 a65d219f
......@@ -53,3 +53,27 @@ ENTRY(__bp_harden_hyp_vecs_start)
vectors __kvm_hyp_vector
.endr
ENTRY(__bp_harden_hyp_vecs_end)
ENTRY(__psci_hyp_bp_inval_start)
sub sp, sp, #(8 * 18)
stp x16, x17, [sp, #(16 * 0)]
stp x14, x15, [sp, #(16 * 1)]
stp x12, x13, [sp, #(16 * 2)]
stp x10, x11, [sp, #(16 * 3)]
stp x8, x9, [sp, #(16 * 4)]
stp x6, x7, [sp, #(16 * 5)]
stp x4, x5, [sp, #(16 * 6)]
stp x2, x3, [sp, #(16 * 7)]
stp x0, x1, [sp, #(16 * 8)]
mov x0, #0x84000000
smc #0
ldp x16, x17, [sp, #(16 * 0)]
ldp x14, x15, [sp, #(16 * 1)]
ldp x12, x13, [sp, #(16 * 2)]
ldp x10, x11, [sp, #(16 * 3)]
ldp x8, x9, [sp, #(16 * 4)]
ldp x6, x7, [sp, #(16 * 5)]
ldp x4, x5, [sp, #(16 * 6)]
ldp x2, x3, [sp, #(16 * 7)]
ldp x0, x1, [sp, #(16 * 8)]
add sp, sp, #(8 * 18)
ENTRY(__psci_hyp_bp_inval_end)
......@@ -53,6 +53,8 @@ static int cpu_enable_trap_ctr_access(void *__unused)
DEFINE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY(struct bp_hardening_data, bp_hardening_data);
#ifdef CONFIG_KVM
extern char __psci_hyp_bp_inval_start[], __psci_hyp_bp_inval_end[];
static void __copy_hyp_vect_bpi(int slot, const char *hyp_vecs_start,
const char *hyp_vecs_end)
{
......@@ -94,6 +96,9 @@ static void __install_bp_hardening_cb(bp_hardening_cb_t fn,
spin_unlock(&bp_lock);
}
#else
#define __psci_hyp_bp_inval_start NULL
#define __psci_hyp_bp_inval_end NULL
static void __install_bp_hardening_cb(bp_hardening_cb_t fn,
const char *hyp_vecs_start,
const char *hyp_vecs_end)
......@@ -118,6 +123,21 @@ static void install_bp_hardening_cb(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry,
__install_bp_hardening_cb(fn, hyp_vecs_start, hyp_vecs_end);
}
#include <linux/psci.h>
static int enable_psci_bp_hardening(void *data)
{
const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry = data;
if (psci_ops.get_version)
install_bp_hardening_cb(entry,
(bp_hardening_cb_t)psci_ops.get_version,
__psci_hyp_bp_inval_start,
__psci_hyp_bp_inval_end);
return 0;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR */
#define MIDR_RANGE(model, min, max) \
......@@ -260,6 +280,28 @@ const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_errata[] = {
.capability = ARM64_WORKAROUND_858921,
MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A73),
},
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
{
.capability = ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR,
MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A57),
.enable = enable_psci_bp_hardening,
},
{
.capability = ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR,
MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A72),
.enable = enable_psci_bp_hardening,
},
{
.capability = ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR,
MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A73),
.enable = enable_psci_bp_hardening,
},
{
.capability = ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR,
MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A75),
.enable = enable_psci_bp_hardening,
},
#endif
{
}
......
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