Bluetooth: Fix sending wrong authentication requirements

Until we support any pairing method (Passkey Entry, OOB) that gives
MITM protection we shouldn't send that we have MITM protection.
Signed-off-by: NVinicius Costa Gomes <vinicius.gomes@openbossa.org>
Signed-off-by: NGustavo F. Padovan <padovan@profusion.mobi>

net/bluetooth/smp.c

@@ -187,18 +187,6 @@ static void smp_send_cmd(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 code, u16 len, void *data)
 					msecs_to_jiffies(SMP_TIMEOUT));
 }
 
-static __u8 seclevel_to_authreq(__u8 level)
-{
-	switch (level) {
-	case BT_SECURITY_HIGH:
-		/* Right now we don't support bonding */
-		return SMP_AUTH_MITM;
-
-	default:
-		return SMP_AUTH_NONE;
-	}
-}
-
 static void build_pairing_cmd(struct l2cap_conn *conn,
 				struct smp_cmd_pairing *req,
 				struct smp_cmd_pairing *rsp,
@@ -542,7 +530,6 @@ int smp_conn_security(struct l2cap_conn *conn, __u8 sec_level)
 {
 	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
 	struct smp_chan *smp = conn->smp_chan;
-	__u8 authreq;
 
 	BT_DBG("conn %p hcon %p level 0x%2.2x", conn, hcon, sec_level);
 
@@ -580,19 +567,17 @@ int smp_conn_security(struct l2cap_conn *conn, __u8 sec_level)
 
 	smp = smp_chan_create(conn);
 
-	authreq = seclevel_to_authreq(sec_level);
-
 	if (hcon->link_mode & HCI_LM_MASTER) {
 		struct smp_cmd_pairing cp;
 
-		build_pairing_cmd(conn, &cp, NULL, authreq);
+		build_pairing_cmd(conn, &cp, NULL, SMP_AUTH_NONE);
 		smp->preq[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ;
 		memcpy(&smp->preq[1], &cp, sizeof(cp));
 
 		smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ, sizeof(cp), &cp);
 	} else {
 		struct smp_cmd_security_req cp;
-		cp.auth_req = authreq;
+		cp.auth_req = SMP_AUTH_NONE;
 		smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_SECURITY_REQ, sizeof(cp), &cp);
 	}