• C
    powerpc/tm: Always reclaim in start_thread() for exec() class syscalls · 8e96a87c
    Cyril Bur 提交于
    Userspace can quite legitimately perform an exec() syscall with a
    suspended transaction. exec() does not return to the old process, rather
    it load a new one and starts that, the expectation therefore is that the
    new process starts not in a transaction. Currently exec() is not treated
    any differently to any other syscall which creates problems.
    
    Firstly it could allow a new process to start with a suspended
    transaction for a binary that no longer exists. This means that the
    checkpointed state won't be valid and if the suspended transaction were
    ever to be resumed and subsequently aborted (a possibility which is
    exceedingly likely as exec()ing will likely doom the transaction) the
    new process will jump to invalid state.
    
    Secondly the incorrect attempt to keep the transactional state while
    still zeroing state for the new process creates at least two TM Bad
    Things. The first triggers on the rfid to return to userspace as
    start_thread() has given the new process a 'clean' MSR but the suspend
    will still be set in the hardware MSR. The second TM Bad Thing triggers
    in __switch_to() as the processor is still transactionally suspended but
    __switch_to() wants to zero the TM sprs for the new process.
    
    This is an example of the outcome of calling exec() with a suspended
    transaction. Note the first 700 is likely the first TM bad thing
    decsribed earlier only the kernel can't report it as we've loaded
    userspace registers. c000000000009980 is the rfid in
    fast_exception_return()
    
      Bad kernel stack pointer 3fffcfa1a370 at c000000000009980
      Oops: Bad kernel stack pointer, sig: 6 [#1]
      CPU: 0 PID: 2006 Comm: tm-execed Not tainted
      NIP: c000000000009980 LR: 0000000000000000 CTR: 0000000000000000
      REGS: c00000003ffefd40 TRAP: 0700   Not tainted
      MSR: 8000000300201031 <SF,ME,IR,DR,LE,TM[SE]>  CR: 00000000  XER: 00000000
      CFAR: c0000000000098b4 SOFTE: 0
      PACATMSCRATCH: b00000010000d033
      GPR00: 0000000000000000 00003fffcfa1a370 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
      GPR04: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
      GPR08: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
      GPR12: 00003fff966611c0 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
      NIP [c000000000009980] fast_exception_return+0xb0/0xb8
      LR [0000000000000000]           (null)
      Call Trace:
      Instruction dump:
      f84d0278 e9a100d8 7c7b03a6 e84101a0 7c4ff120 e8410170 7c5a03a6 e8010070
      e8410080 e8610088 e8810090 e8210078 <4c000024> 48000000 e8610178 88ed023b
    
      Kernel BUG at c000000000043e80 [verbose debug info unavailable]
      Unexpected TM Bad Thing exception at c000000000043e80 (msr 0x201033)
      Oops: Unrecoverable exception, sig: 6 [#2]
      CPU: 0 PID: 2006 Comm: tm-execed Tainted: G      D
      task: c0000000fbea6d80 ti: c00000003ffec000 task.ti: c0000000fb7ec000
      NIP: c000000000043e80 LR: c000000000015a24 CTR: 0000000000000000
      REGS: c00000003ffef7e0 TRAP: 0700   Tainted: G      D
      MSR: 8000000300201033 <SF,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE,TM[SE]>  CR: 28002828  XER: 00000000
      CFAR: c000000000015a20 SOFTE: 0
      PACATMSCRATCH: b00000010000d033
      GPR00: 0000000000000000 c00000003ffefa60 c000000000db5500 c0000000fbead000
      GPR04: 8000000300001033 2222222222222222 2222222222222222 00000000ff160000
      GPR08: 0000000000000000 800000010000d033 c0000000fb7e3ea0 c00000000fe00004
      GPR12: 0000000000002200 c00000000fe00000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
      GPR16: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
      GPR20: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 c0000000fbea7410 00000000ff160000
      GPR24: c0000000ffe1f600 c0000000fbea8700 c0000000fbea8700 c0000000fbead000
      GPR28: c000000000e20198 c0000000fbea6d80 c0000000fbeab680 c0000000fbea6d80
      NIP [c000000000043e80] tm_restore_sprs+0xc/0x1c
      LR [c000000000015a24] __switch_to+0x1f4/0x420
      Call Trace:
      Instruction dump:
      7c800164 4e800020 7c0022a6 f80304a8 7c0222a6 f80304b0 7c0122a6 f80304b8
      4e800020 e80304a8 7c0023a6 e80304b0 <7c0223a6> e80304b8 7c0123a6 4e800020
    
    This fixes CVE-2016-5828.
    
    Fixes: bc2a9408 ("powerpc: Hook in new transactional memory code")
    Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.9+
    Signed-off-by: NCyril Bur <cyrilbur@gmail.com>
    Signed-off-by: NMichael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
    8e96a87c
process.c 48.2 KB