1. 21 5月, 2009 1 次提交
    • A
      Eliminate --disable-gfx-check and make VNC default when SDL not available · f92f8afe
      Anthony Liguori 提交于
       --disable-gfx-check predates VNC server support.  It made sense back then
      because the only thing you could do without SDL was use -nographic mode or
      similar tricks.  Since this is a very advanced mode of operation, gfx-check
      provided a good safety net for casual users.
      
      A casual user is very likely to use VNC to interact with a guest.  In fact, it's
      often frustrating to install QEMU on a server and have to specify
      disable-gfx-check when you only want to use VNC.
      
      This patch eliminates disable-gfx-check and makes SDL behave like every other
      optional dependency.  If SDL is not available, instead of failing ungracefully
      if no special options are specified, we default to -vnc localhost:0,to=99.
      When we do default to VNC, we also print a message to tell the user that we've
      done this include which port we're currently listening on.
      Signed-off-by: NAnthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com>
      f92f8afe
  2. 19 5月, 2009 1 次提交
    • P
      Hardware convenience library · 1ad2134f
      Paul Brook 提交于
      The only target dependency for most hardware is sizeof(target_phys_addr_t).
      Build these files into a convenience library, and use that instead of
      building for every target.
      
      Remove and poison various target specific macros to avoid bogus target
      dependencies creeping back in.
      
      Big/Little endian is not handled because devices should not know or care
      about this to start with.
      Signed-off-by: NPaul Brook <paul@codesourcery.com>
      1ad2134f
  3. 15 5月, 2009 2 次提交
  4. 14 5月, 2009 1 次提交
  5. 08 5月, 2009 1 次提交
    • J
      Drop CONFIG_GDBSTUB · 322f9d01
      Jan Kiszka 提交于
      This is no user-flippable switch, and no arch makes use of disabling
      gdbstub support. So it's pointless to keep the related #ifdefs and
      configure hunks around - and risking breakages like 711c410fdd again.
      Signed-off-by: NJan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@siemens.com>
      322f9d01
  6. 29 4月, 2009 1 次提交
  7. 28 4月, 2009 1 次提交
  8. 25 4月, 2009 1 次提交
  9. 22 4月, 2009 2 次提交
  10. 19 4月, 2009 2 次提交
  11. 18 4月, 2009 1 次提交
  12. 17 4月, 2009 1 次提交
  13. 16 4月, 2009 3 次提交
  14. 14 4月, 2009 5 次提交
  15. 11 4月, 2009 1 次提交
  16. 08 4月, 2009 3 次提交
  17. 06 4月, 2009 3 次提交
  18. 04 4月, 2009 1 次提交
  19. 19 3月, 2009 1 次提交
  20. 10 3月, 2009 1 次提交
  21. 09 3月, 2009 1 次提交
  22. 08 3月, 2009 2 次提交
  23. 07 3月, 2009 2 次提交
    • A
      Support ACLs for controlling VNC access ("Daniel P. Berrange") · 76655d6d
      aliguori 提交于
      This patch introduces a generic internal API for access control lists
      to be used by network servers in QEMU. It adds support for checking
      these ACL in the VNC server, in two places. The first ACL is for the
      SASL authentication mechanism, checking the SASL username. This ACL
      is called 'vnc.username'. The second is for the TLS authentication
      mechanism, when x509 client certificates are turned on, checking against
      the Distinguished Name of the client. This ACL is called 'vnc.x509dname'
      
      The internal API provides for an ACL with the following characteristics
      
       - A unique name, eg  vnc.username, and vnc.x509dname.
       - A default policy, allow or deny
       - An ordered series of match rules, with allow or deny policy
      
      If none of the match rules apply, then the default policy is
      used.
      
      There is a monitor API to manipulate the ACLs, which I'll describe via
      examples
      
        (qemu) acl show vnc.username
        policy: allow
        (qemu) acl policy vnc.username denya
        acl: policy set to 'deny'
        (qemu) acl allow vnc.username fred
        acl: added rule at position 1
        (qemu) acl allow vnc.username bob
        acl: added rule at position 2
        (qemu) acl allow vnc.username joe 1
        acl: added rule at position 1
        (qemu) acl show vnc.username
        policy: deny
        0: allow fred
        1: allow joe
        2: allow bob
      
      
        (qemu) acl show vnc.x509dname
        policy: allow
        (qemu) acl policy vnc.x509dname deny
        acl: policy set to 'deny'
        (qemu) acl allow vnc.x509dname C=GB,O=ACME,L=London,CN=*
        acl: added rule at position 1
        (qemu) acl allow vnc.x509dname C=GB,O=ACME,L=Boston,CN=bob
        acl: added rule at position 2
        (qemu) acl show vnc.x509dname
        policy: deny
        0: allow C=GB,O=ACME,L=London,CN=*
        1: allow C=GB,O=ACME,L=Boston,CN=bob
      
      By default the VNC server will not use any ACLs, allowing access to
      the server if the user successfully authenticates. To enable use of
      ACLs to restrict user access, the ',acl' flag should be given when
      starting QEMU. The initial ACL activated will be a 'deny all' policy
      and should be customized using monitor commands.
      
      eg enable SASL auth and ACLs
      
          qemu ....  -vnc localhost:1,sasl,acl
      
      The next patch will provide a way to load a pre-defined ACL when
      starting up
      
      
       Makefile        |    6 +
       b/acl.c         |  185 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
       b/acl.h         |   74 ++++++++++++++++++++++
       configure       |   18 +++++
       monitor.c       |   95 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
       qemu-doc.texi   |   49 ++++++++++++++
       vnc-auth-sasl.c |   16 +++-
       vnc-auth-sasl.h |    7 ++
       vnc-tls.c       |   19 +++++
       vnc-tls.h       |    3 
       vnc.c           |   21 ++++++
       vnc.h           |    3 
       12 files changed, 491 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
      Signed-off-by: NDaniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NAnthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com>
      
      
      git-svn-id: svn://svn.savannah.nongnu.org/qemu/trunk@6726 c046a42c-6fe2-441c-8c8c-71466251a162
      76655d6d
    • A
      Add SASL authentication support ("Daniel P. Berrange") · 2f9606b3
      aliguori 提交于
      This patch adds the new SASL authentication protocol to the VNC server.
      
      It is enabled by setting the 'sasl' flag when launching VNC. SASL can
      optionally provide encryption via its SSF layer, if a suitable mechanism
      is configured (eg, GSSAPI/Kerberos, or Digest-MD5).  If an SSF layer is
      not available, then it should be combined with the x509 VNC authentication
      protocol which provides encryption.
      
      eg, if using GSSAPI
      
         qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl
      
      eg if using  TLS/x509 for encryption
      
         qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl,tls,x509
      
      
      By default the Cyrus SASL library will look for its configuration in
      the file /etc/sasl2/qemu.conf.  For non-root users, this can be overridden
      by setting the SASL_CONF_PATH environment variable, eg to make it look in
      $HOME/.sasl2.  NB unprivileged users may not have access to the full range
      of SASL mechanisms, since some of them require some administrative privileges
      to configure. The patch includes an example SASL configuration file which
      illustrates config for GSSAPI and Digest-MD5, though it should be noted that
      the latter is not really considered secure any more.
      
      Most of the SASL authentication code is located in a separate source file,
      vnc-auth-sasl.c.  The main vnc.c file only contains minimal integration
      glue, specifically parsing of command line flags / setup, and calls to
      start the SASL auth process, to do encoding/decoding for data.
      
      There are several possible stacks for reading & writing of data, depending
      on the combo of VNC authentication methods in use
      
       - Clear.    read/write straight to socket
       - TLS.      read/write via GNUTLS helpers
       - SASL.     encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write to socket
       - SASL+TLS. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write via GNUTLS
      
      Hence, the vnc_client_read & vnc_client_write methods have been refactored
      a little.
      
         vnc_client_read:  main entry point for reading, calls either
      
             - vnc_client_read_plain   reading, with no intermediate decoding
             - vnc_client_read_sasl    reading, with SASL SSF decoding
      
         These two methods, then call vnc_client_read_buf(). This decides
         whether to write to the socket directly or write via GNUTLS.
      
      The situation is the same for writing data. More extensive comments
      have been added in the code / patch. The vnc_client_read_sasl and
      vnc_client_write_sasl method implementations live in the separate
      vnc-auth-sasl.c file.
      
      The state required for the SASL auth mechanism is kept in a separate
      VncStateSASL struct, defined in vnc-auth-sasl.h and included in the
      main VncState.
      
      The configure script probes for SASL and automatically enables it
      if found, unless --disable-vnc-sasl was given to override it.
      
      
       Makefile            |    7 
       Makefile.target     |    5 
       b/qemu.sasl         |   34 ++
       b/vnc-auth-sasl.c   |  626 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
       b/vnc-auth-sasl.h   |   67 +++++
       configure           |   34 ++
       qemu-doc.texi       |   97 ++++++++
       vnc-auth-vencrypt.c |   12 
       vnc.c               |  249 ++++++++++++++++++--
       vnc.h               |   31 ++
       10 files changed, 1129 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
      Signed-off-by: NDaniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NAnthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com>
      
      
      git-svn-id: svn://svn.savannah.nongnu.org/qemu/trunk@6724 c046a42c-6fe2-441c-8c8c-71466251a162
      2f9606b3
  24. 04 3月, 2009 1 次提交
  25. 23 2月, 2009 1 次提交