Opening an encrypted image takes an additional step: setting the key.
Between open and the key set, the image must not be used.

We have some protection against accidental use in place: you can't
unpause a guest while we're missing keys.  You can, however, hot-plug
block devices lacking keys into a running guest just fine, or insert
media lacking keys.  In the latter case, notifying the guest of the
insert is delayed until the key is set, which may suffice to protect
at least some guests in common usage.

This patch makes the protection apply in more cases, in a rather
heavy-handed way: it doesn't let you open encrypted images unless
we're in a paused state.

It doesn't extend the protection to users other than the guest (block
jobs?).  Use of runstate_check() from block.c is disgusting.  Best I
can do right now.
Signed-off-by: NMarkus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NEric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NStefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>

Signed-off-by: NKevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NBenoit Canet <benoit@irqsave.net>