* Migrate MSR_SMI_COUNT (Liran)
* Update kernel headers (Gerd, myself)
* SEV support (Brijesh)

I have not tested non-x86 compilation, but I reordered the SEV patches
so that all non-x86-specific changes go first to catch any possible
issues (which weren't there anyway :)).

# gpg: Signature made Tue 13 Mar 2018 16:37:06 GMT
# gpg:                using RSA key BFFBD25F78C7AE83
# gpg: Good signature from "Paolo Bonzini <bonzini@gnu.org>"
# gpg:                 aka "Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>"
# Primary key fingerprint: 46F5 9FBD 57D6 12E7 BFD4  E2F7 7E15 100C CD36 69B1
#      Subkey fingerprint: F133 3857 4B66 2389 866C  7682 BFFB D25F 78C7 AE83

* remotes/bonzini/tags/for-upstream-sev: (22 commits)
  sev/i386: add sev_get_capabilities()
  sev/i386: qmp: add query-sev-capabilities command
  sev/i386: qmp: add query-sev-launch-measure command
  sev/i386: hmp: add 'info sev' command
  cpu/i386: populate CPUID 0x8000_001F when SEV is active
  sev/i386: add migration blocker
  sev/i386: finalize the SEV guest launch flow
  sev/i386: add support to LAUNCH_MEASURE command
  target/i386: encrypt bios rom
  sev/i386: add command to encrypt guest memory region
  sev/i386: add command to create launch memory encryption context
  sev/i386: register the guest memory range which may contain encrypted data
  sev/i386: add command to initialize the memory encryption context
  include: add psp-sev.h header file
  sev/i386: qmp: add query-sev command
  target/i386: add Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) object
  kvm: introduce memory encryption APIs
  kvm: add memory encryption context
  docs: add AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV)
  machine: add memory-encryption option
  ...
Signed-off-by: NPeter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>

Some updates to reduce timeouts in Travis

# gpg: Signature made Tue 13 Mar 2018 16:44:46 GMT
# gpg:                using RSA key FBD0DB095A9E2A44
# gpg: Good signature from "Alex Bennée (Master Work Key) <alex.bennee@linaro.org>"
# Primary key fingerprint: 6685 AE99 E751 67BC AFC8  DF35 FBD0 DB09 5A9E 2A44

* remotes/stsquad/tags/pull-travis-speedup-130318-1:
  .travis.yml: add --disable-user with the rest of the disables
  .travis.yml: split default config into system and user
  .travis.yml: drop setting default log output
Signed-off-by: NPeter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>

# gpg: Signature made Tue 13 Mar 2018 15:58:42 GMT
# gpg:                using RSA key F30C38BD3F2FBE3C
# gpg: Good signature from "Laurent Vivier <lvivier@redhat.com>"
# gpg:                 aka "Laurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>"
# gpg:                 aka "Laurent Vivier (Red Hat) <lvivier@redhat.com>"
# Primary key fingerprint: CD2F 75DD C8E3 A4DC 2E4F  5173 F30C 38BD 3F2F BE3C

* remotes/vivier/tags/m68k-for-2.12-pull-request:
  target/m68k: implement fcosh
  target/m68k: implement fsinh
  target/m68k: implement ftanh
  target/m68k: implement fatanh
  target/m68k: implement facos
  target/m68k: implement fasin
  target/m68k: implement fatan
  target/m68k: implement fsincos
  target/m68k: implement fcos
  target/m68k: implement fsin
  target/m68k: implement ftan
Signed-off-by: NPeter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>

# gpg: Signature made Tue 13 Mar 2018 12:28:21 GMT
# gpg:                using RSA key BDBE7B27C0DE3057
# gpg: Good signature from "Jeffrey Cody <jcody@redhat.com>"
# gpg:                 aka "Jeffrey Cody <jeff@codyprime.org>"
# gpg:                 aka "Jeffrey Cody <codyprime@gmail.com>"
# Primary key fingerprint: 9957 4B4D 3474 90E7 9D98  D624 BDBE 7B27 C0DE 3057

* remotes/cody/tags/block-pull-request:
  block: include original filename when reporting invalid URIs
Signed-off-by: NPeter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>

The function can be used to get the current SEV capabilities.
The capabilities include platform diffie-hellman key (pdh) and certificate
chain. The key can be provided to the external entities which wants to
establish a trusted channel between SEV firmware and guest owner.

Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Cc: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NBrijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

The command can be used by libvirt to query the SEV capabilities.

Cc: "Daniel P. Berrangé" <berrange@redhat.com>
Cc: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Cc: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NBrijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

The command can be used by libvirt to retrieve the measurement of SEV guest.
This measurement is a signature of the memory contents that was encrypted
through the LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA.

Cc: "Daniel P. Berrangé" <berrange@redhat.com>
Cc: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Cc: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NEric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NBrijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

The command can be used to show the SEV information when memory
encryption is enabled on AMD platform.

Cc: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Cc: "Daniel P. Berrangé" <berrange@redhat.com>
Cc: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Cc: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: N"Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NBrijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

When SEV is enabled, CPUID 0x8000_001F should provide additional
information regarding the feature (such as which page table bit is used
to mark the pages as encrypted etc).

The details for memory encryption CPUID is available in AMD APM
(https://support.amd.com/TechDocs/24594.pdf) Section E.4.17

Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Cc: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NEduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NBrijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

SEV guest migration is not implemented yet.
Signed-off-by: NBrijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: NDr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

SEV launch flow requires us to issue LAUNCH_FINISH command before guest
is ready to run.

Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Cc: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NBrijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

During machine creation we encrypted the guest bios image, the
LAUNCH_MEASURE command can be used to retrieve the measurement of
the encrypted memory region. This measurement is a signature of
the memory contents that can be sent to the guest owner as an
attestation that the memory was encrypted correctly by the firmware.
VM management tools like libvirt can query the measurement using
query-sev-launch-measure QMP command.

Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Cc: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NBrijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

SEV requires that guest bios must be encrypted before booting the guest.

Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Cc: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NBrijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

The KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA command is used to encrypt a guest memory
region using the VM Encryption Key created using LAUNCH_START.

Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Cc: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NBrijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

The KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_START command creates a new VM encryption key (VEK).
The encryption key created with the command will be used for encrypting
the bootstrap images (such as guest bios).

Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Cc: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NBrijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

When SEV is enabled, the hardware encryption engine uses a tweak such
that the two identical plaintext at different location will have a
different ciphertexts. So swapping or moving a ciphertexts of two guest
pages will not result in plaintexts being swapped. Hence relocating
a physical backing pages of the SEV guest will require some additional
steps in KVM driver. The KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_{UN,}REG_REGION ioctl can be
used to register/unregister the guest memory region which may contain the
encrypted data. KVM driver will internally handle the relocating physical
backing pages of registered memory regions.

Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Cc: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NBrijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

When memory encryption is enabled, KVM_SEV_INIT command is used to
initialize the platform. The command loads the SEV related persistent
data from non-volatile storage and initializes the platform context.
This command should be first issued before invoking any other guest
commands provided by the SEV firmware.

Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Cc: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NBrijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Python queue, 2018-03-12

# gpg: Signature made Mon 12 Mar 2018 22:10:36 GMT
# gpg:                using RSA key 2807936F984DC5A6
# gpg: Good signature from "Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>"
# Primary key fingerprint: 5A32 2FD5 ABC4 D3DB ACCF  D1AA 2807 936F 984D C5A6

* remotes/ehabkost/tags/python-next-pull-request:
  device-crash-test: Use 'python' binary
  qmp.py: Encode json data before sending
  qemu.py: Use items() instead of iteritems()
  device-crash-test: New known crashes
Signed-off-by: NPeter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>

As all the disabled features only affect system emulation we might as
well disable user mode to save compile time.
Signed-off-by: NAlex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: NDaniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>

As the build times have risen we keep timing out. Split the default
config into system and user builds.
Signed-off-by: NAlex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: NDaniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>

The log backend is the default one, we don't need to explicitly set it.
Signed-off-by: NAlex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: NDaniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>

Using a local m68k  floatx80_cosh()
[copied from previous:
Written by Andreas Grabher for Previous, NeXT Computer Emulator.]
Signed-off-by: NLaurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>
Message-Id: <20180312202728.23790-12-laurent@vivier.eu>

Using a local m68k floatx80_sinh()
[copied from previous:
Written by Andreas Grabher for Previous, NeXT Computer Emulator.]
Signed-off-by: NLaurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>
Message-Id: <20180312202728.23790-11-laurent@vivier.eu>

Using local m68k floatx80_tanh() and floatx80_etoxm1()
[copied from previous:
Written by Andreas Grabher for Previous, NeXT Computer Emulator.]
Signed-off-by: NLaurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>
Message-Id: <20180312202728.23790-10-laurent@vivier.eu>

Using a local m68k floatx80_atanh()
[copied from previous:
Written by Andreas Grabher for Previous, NeXT Computer Emulator.]
Signed-off-by: NLaurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>
Message-Id: <20180312202728.23790-9-laurent@vivier.eu>

Using a local m68k floatx80_acos()
[copied from previous:
Written by Andreas Grabher for Previous, NeXT Computer Emulator.]
Signed-off-by: NLaurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>
Message-Id: <20180312202728.23790-8-laurent@vivier.eu>

Using a local m68k floatx80_asin()
[copied from previous:
Written by Andreas Grabher for Previous, NeXT Computer Emulator.]
Signed-off-by: NLaurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>
Message-Id: <20180312202728.23790-7-laurent@vivier.eu>

Using a local m68k floatx80_atan()
[copied from previous:
Written by Andreas Grabher for Previous, NeXT Computer Emulator.]
Signed-off-by: NLaurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>
Message-Id: <20180312202728.23790-6-laurent@vivier.eu>

using floatx80_sin() and floatx80_cos()
Signed-off-by: NLaurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>
Message-Id: <20180312202728.23790-5-laurent@vivier.eu>

Using a local m68k floatx80_cos()
[copied from previous:
Written by Andreas Grabher for Previous, NeXT Computer Emulator.]
Signed-off-by: NLaurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>
Message-Id: <20180312202728.23790-4-laurent@vivier.eu>

Using a local m68k floatx80_sin()
[copied from previous:
Written by Andreas Grabher for Previous, NeXT Computer Emulator.]
Signed-off-by: NLaurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>
Message-Id: <20180312202728.23790-3-laurent@vivier.eu>

Using a local m68k floatx80_tan()
[copied from previous:
Written by Andreas Grabher for Previous, NeXT Computer Emulator.]
Signed-off-by: NLaurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>
Message-Id: <20180312202728.23790-2-laurent@vivier.eu>

x86 queue, 2018-03-12

* Intel Processor Trace support
* KVM_HINTS_DEDICATED

# gpg: Signature made Mon 12 Mar 2018 19:58:39 GMT
# gpg:                using RSA key 2807936F984DC5A6
# gpg: Good signature from "Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>"
# Primary key fingerprint: 5A32 2FD5 ABC4 D3DB ACCF  D1AA 2807 936F 984D C5A6

* remotes/ehabkost/tags/x86-next-pull-request:
  i386: Add support to get/set/migrate Intel Processor Trace feature
  i386: Add Intel Processor Trace feature support
  target-i386: add KVM_HINTS_DEDICATED performance hint
Signed-off-by: NPeter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>

Consider passing a JSON based block driver to "qemu-img commit"

$ qemu-img commit 'json:{"driver":"qcow2","file":{"driver":"gluster",\
                  "volume":"gv0","path":"sn1.qcow2",
                  "server":[{"type":\
		  "tcp","host":"10.73.199.197","port":"24007"}]},}'

Currently it will commit the content and then report an incredibly
useless error message when trying to re-open the committed image:

  qemu-img: invalid URI
  Usage: file=gluster[+transport]://[host[:port]]volume/path[?socket=...][,file.debug=N][,file.logfile=/path/filename.log]

With this fix we get:

  qemu-img: invalid URI json:{"server.0.host": "10.73.199.197",
      "driver": "gluster", "path": "luks.qcow2", "server.0.type":
      "tcp", "server.0.port": "24007", "volume": "gv0"}

Of course the root cause problem still exists, but now we know
what actually needs fixing.
Signed-off-by: NDaniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NEric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Message-id: 20180206105204.14817-1-berrange@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: NJeff Cody <jcody@redhat.com>

docker patches

# gpg: Signature made Mon 12 Mar 2018 17:25:57 GMT
# gpg:                using RSA key CA35624C6A9171C6
# gpg: Good signature from "Fam Zheng <famz@redhat.com>"
# Primary key fingerprint: 5003 7CB7 9706 0F76 F021  AD56 CA35 624C 6A91 71C6

* remotes/famz/tags/staging-pull-request:
  tests: make docker-test-debug@fedora run sanitizers
Signed-off-by: NPeter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>

The header file provide the ioctl command and structure to communicate
with /dev/sev device.

Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Cc: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NBrijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: NBrijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>

The QMP query command can used to retrieve the SEV information when
memory encryption is enabled on AMD platform.

Cc: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Cc: "Daniel P. Berrangé" <berrange@redhat.com>
Cc: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Cc: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NEric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NBrijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Add a new memory encryption object 'sev-guest'. The object will be used
to create encrypted VMs on AMD EPYC CPU. The object provides the properties
to pass guest owner's public Diffie-hellman key, guest policy and session
information required to create the memory encryption context within the
SEV firmware.

e.g to launch SEV guest
 # $QEMU \
    -object sev-guest,id=sev0 \
    -machine ....,memory-encryption=sev0

Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Cc: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NBrijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Inorder to integerate the Secure Encryption Virtualization (SEV) support
add few high-level memory encryption APIs which can be used for encrypting
the guest memory region.

Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NBrijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Split from a patch by Brijesh Singh (brijesh.singh@amd.com).
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NBrijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>