expose the count that logs the times of updating the dirty bitmap to
end user.
Signed-off-by: NChenLiang <chenliang88@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NGonglei <arei.gonglei@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NEric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJuan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>

Add counts to log the times of updating the dirty bitmap.
Signed-off-by: NChenLiang <chenliang88@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NGonglei <arei.gonglei@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NEric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJuan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>

The page may not be inserted into cache after executing save_xbzrle_page.
In case of failure to insert, the original page should be sent rather
than the page in the cache.
Signed-off-by: NChenLiang <chenliang88@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NGonglei <arei.gonglei@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NJuan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJuan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>

version_id is checked twice in the ram_load.
Signed-off-by: NChenLiang <chenliang88@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NGonglei <arei.gonglei@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NJuan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>

Coverity defects 1005733 & 1005734 complain about passing a negative
value to closesocket in the error paths on incoming migration.

Stash the error value and print it in the message (previously we gave
no indication of the reason for the failure)

Use error_report
Signed-off-by: NDr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NMarkus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJuan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>

Initialising the XBZRLE.lock earlier simplifies the lock use.

Based on Markus's patch in:
http://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/qemu-devel/2014-03/msg03879.htmlSigned-off-by: NDr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NGonglei <arei.gonglei@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NMarkus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJuan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>

Provide ram_mig_init (like blk_mig_init) for vl.c to initialise stuff
to do with ram migration (currently in arch_init.c).
Signed-off-by: NDr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NGonglei <arei.gonglei@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NMarkus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJuan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>

This is a fix for a bug* triggered by a migration after hot unplugging
a few virtio-net NICs, that caused migration never to converge, because
'migration_dirty_pages' is incorrectly initialised.

'migration_dirty_pages' is used as a tally of the number of outstanding
dirty pages, to give the migration code an idea of how much more data
will need to be transferred, and thus whether it can end the iterative
phase.

It was initialised to the total size of the RAMBlock address space,
however hotunplug can leave this space sparse, and hence
migration_dirty_pages ended up too large.
Signed-off-by: NDr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>

(* https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1074913 )
Signed-off-by: NJuan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>

Make qemu_peek_buffer repeatedly call fill_buffer until it gets
all the data it requires, or until there is an error.

  At the moment, qemu_peek_buffer will try one qemu_fill_buffer if there
  isn't enough data waiting, however the kernel is entitled to return
  just a few bytes, and still leave qemu_peek_buffer with less bytes
  than it needed.  I've seen this fail in a dev world, and I think it
  could theoretically fail in the peeking of the subsection headers in
  the current world.

Comment qemu_peek_byte to point out it's not guaranteed to work for
  non-continuous peeks
Signed-off-by: NDr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NChenLiang <chenliang0016@icloud.com>
Signed-off-by: NJuan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>

QEMU will assert if you attempt to start an outgoing migration on
a QEMU that's sitting waiting for an incoming migration (started
with -incoming), so disallow it with a proper error.

(This is a fix for https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1086987 )
Signed-off-by: NDr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NAndreas Färber <afaerber@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: NEric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJuan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>

Malformed input can have config_len in migration stream
exceed the array size allocated on destination, the
result will be heap overflow.

To fix, that config_len matches on both sides.

CVE-2014-0182
Reported-by: N"Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NMichael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJuan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>

--

v2: use %ix and %zx to print config_len values
Signed-off-by: NJuan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>

CVE-2013-4149 QEMU 1.3.0 out-of-bounds buffer write in
virtio_net_load()@hw/net/virtio-net.c

>         } else if (n->mac_table.in_use) {
>             uint8_t *buf = g_malloc0(n->mac_table.in_use);

We are allocating buffer of size n->mac_table.in_use

>             qemu_get_buffer(f, buf, n->mac_table.in_use * ETH_ALEN);

and read to the n->mac_table.in_use size buffer n->mac_table.in_use *
ETH_ALEN bytes, corrupting memory.

If adversary controls state then memory written there is controlled
by adversary.
Reviewed-by: NMichael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NMichael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJuan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>

CVE-2013-4534

opp->nb_cpus is read from the wire and used to determine how many
IRQDest elements to read into opp->dst[]. If the value exceeds the
length of opp->dst[], MAX_CPU, opp->dst[] can be overrun with arbitrary
data from the wire.

Fix this by failing migration if the value read from the wire exceeds
MAX_CPU.
Signed-off-by: NMichael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: NAlexander Graf <agraf@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: NMichael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJuan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>

CVE-2013-4537

s->arglen is taken from wire and used as idx
in ssi_sd_transfer().

Validate it before access.
Signed-off-by: NMichael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJuan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>

At the moment we require vmstate definitions to set minimum_version_id_old
to the same value as minimum_version_id if they do not provide a
load_state_old handler. Since the load_state_old functionality is
required only for a handful of devices that need to retain migration
compatibility with a pre-vmstate implementation, this means the bulk
of devices have pointless boilerplate. Relax the definition so that
minimum_version_id_old is ignored if there is no load_state_old handler.

Note that under the old scheme we would segfault if the vmstate
specified a minimum_version_id_old that was less than minimum_version_id
but did not provide a load_state_old function, and the incoming state
specified a version number between minimum_version_id_old and
minimum_version_id. Under the new scheme this will just result in
our failing the migration.
Signed-off-by: NPeter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: NMichael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NMichael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJuan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>

CVE-2013-4541

s->setup_len and s->setup_index are fed into usb_packet_copy as
size/offset into s->data_buf, it's possible for invalid state to exploit
this to load arbitrary data.

setup_len and setup_index should be checked to make sure
they are not negative.

Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NMichael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NGerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJuan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>

As the macro verifies the value is positive, rename it
to make the function clearer.
Signed-off-by: NMichael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJuan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>

CVE-2013-4542

hw/scsi/scsi-bus.c invokes load_request.

 virtio_scsi_load_request does:
    qemu_get_buffer(f, (unsigned char *)&req->elem, sizeof(req->elem));

this probably can make elem invalid, for example,
make in_num or out_num huge, then:

    virtio_scsi_parse_req(s, vs->cmd_vqs[n], req);

will do:

    if (req->elem.out_num > 1) {
        qemu_sgl_init_external(req, &req->elem.out_sg[1],
                               &req->elem.out_addr[1],
                               req->elem.out_num - 1);
    } else {
        qemu_sgl_init_external(req, &req->elem.in_sg[1],
                               &req->elem.in_addr[1],
                               req->elem.in_num - 1);
    }

and this will access out of array bounds.

Note: this adds security checks within assert calls since
SCSIBusInfo's load_request cannot fail.
For now simply disable builds with NDEBUG - there seems
to be little value in supporting these.

Cc: Andreas Färber <afaerber@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: NMichael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJuan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>

CVE-2013-4540

Within scoop_gpio_handler_update, if prev_level has a high bit set, then
we get bit > 16 and that causes a buffer overrun.

Since prev_level comes from wire indirectly, this can
happen on invalid state load.

Similarly for gpio_level and gpio_dir.

To fix, limit to 16 bit.
Reported-by: NMichael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NMichael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NDr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJuan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>

CVE-2013-4539

s->precision, nextprecision, function and nextfunction
come from wire and are used
as idx into resolution[] in TSC_CUT_RESOLUTION.

Validate after load to avoid buffer overrun.

Cc: Andreas Färber <afaerber@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: NMichael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJuan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>

CVE-2013-4538

s->cmd_len used as index in ssd0323_transfer() to store 32-bit field.
Possible this field might then be supplied by guest to overwrite a
return addr somewhere. Same for row/col fields, which are indicies into
framebuffer array.

To fix validate after load.

Additionally, validate that the row/col_start/end are within bounds;
otherwise the guest can provoke an overrun by either setting the _end
field so large that the row++ increments just walk off the end of the
array, or by setting the _start value to something bogus and then
letting the "we hit end of row" logic reset row to row_start.

For completeness, validate mode as well.
Signed-off-by: NMichael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NPeter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: NJuan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>

CVE-2013-4533

s->rx_level is read from the wire and used to determine how many bytes
to subsequently read into s->rx_fifo[]. If s->rx_level exceeds the
length of s->rx_fifo[] the buffer can be overrun with arbitrary data
from the wire.

Fix this by validating rx_level against the size of s->rx_fifo.

Cc: Don Koch <dkoch@verizon.com>
Reported-by: NMichael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NMichael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NPeter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: NDon Koch <dkoch@verizon.com>
Signed-off-by: NJuan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>

CVE-2013-4535
CVE-2013-4536

Both virtio-block and virtio-serial read,
VirtQueueElements are read in as buffers, and passed to
virtqueue_map_sg(), where num_sg is taken from the wire and can force
writes to indicies beyond VIRTQUEUE_MAX_SIZE.

To fix, validate num_sg.
Reported-by: NMichael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NMichael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: Amit Shah <amit.shah@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJuan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>

CVE-2013-6399

vdev->queue_sel is read from the wire, and later used in the
emulation code as an index into vdev->vq[]. If the value of
vdev->queue_sel exceeds the length of vdev->vq[], currently
allocated to be VIRTIO_PCI_QUEUE_MAX elements, subsequent PIO
operations such as VIRTIO_PCI_QUEUE_PFN can be used to overrun
the buffer with arbitrary data originating from the source.

Fix this by failing migration if the value from the wire exceeds
VIRTIO_PCI_QUEUE_MAX.
Signed-off-by: NMichael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NMichael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NPeter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: NJuan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>

CVE-2013-4531

cpreg_vmstate_indexes is a VARRAY_INT32. A negative value for
cpreg_vmstate_array_len will cause a buffer overflow.

VMSTATE_INT32_LE was supposed to protect against this
but doesn't because it doesn't validate that input is
non-negative.

Fix this macro to valide the value appropriately.

The only other user of VMSTATE_INT32_LE doesn't
ever use negative numbers so it doesn't care.
Reported-by: NAnthony Liguori <anthony@codemonkey.ws>
Signed-off-by: NMichael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJuan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>

CVE-2013-4530

pl022.c did not bounds check tx_fifo_head and
rx_fifo_head after loading them from file and
before they are used to dereference array.

Reported-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com
Reported-by: NAnthony Liguori <anthony@codemonkey.ws>
Signed-off-by: NMichael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJuan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>

4) CVE-2013-4529
hw/pci/pcie_aer.c    pcie aer log can overrun the buffer if log_num is
                     too large

There are two issues in this file:
1. log_max from remote can be larger than on local
then buffer will overrun with data coming from state file.
2. log_num can be larger then we get data corruption
again with an overflow but not adversary controlled.

Fix both issues.
Reported-by: NAnthony Liguori <anthony@codemonkey.ws>
Reported-by: NMichael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NMichael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NDr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJuan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>

CVE-2013-4527 hw/timer/hpet.c buffer overrun

hpet is a VARRAY with a uint8 size but static array of 32

To fix, make sure num_timers is valid using VMSTATE_VALID hook.
Reported-by: NAnthony Liguori <anthony@codemonkey.ws>
Signed-off-by: NMichael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NDr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJuan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>

CVE-2013-4526

Within hw/ide/ahci.c, VARRAY refers to ports which is also loaded.  So
we use the old version of ports to read the array but then allow any
value for ports.  This can cause the code to overflow.

There's no reason to migrate ports - it never changes.
So just make sure it matches.
Reported-by: NAnthony Liguori <anthony@codemonkey.ws>
Signed-off-by: NMichael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NPeter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: NJuan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>

CVE-2013-4151 QEMU 1.0 out-of-bounds buffer write in
virtio_load@hw/virtio/virtio.c

So we have this code since way back when:

    num = qemu_get_be32(f);

    for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
        vdev->vq[i].vring.num = qemu_get_be32(f);

array of vqs has size VIRTIO_PCI_QUEUE_MAX, so
on invalid input this will write beyond end of buffer.
Signed-off-by: NMichael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NMichael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NJuan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>

CVE-2013-4150 QEMU 1.5.0 out-of-bounds buffer write in
virtio_net_load()@hw/net/virtio-net.c

This code is in hw/net/virtio-net.c:

    if (n->max_queues > 1) {
        if (n->max_queues != qemu_get_be16(f)) {
            error_report("virtio-net: different max_queues ");
            return -1;
        }

        n->curr_queues = qemu_get_be16(f);
        for (i = 1; i < n->curr_queues; i++) {
            n->vqs[i].tx_waiting = qemu_get_be32(f);
        }
    }

Number of vqs is max_queues, so if we get invalid input here,
for example if max_queues = 2, curr_queues = 3, we get
write beyond end of the buffer, with data that comes from
wire.

This might be used to corrupt qemu memory in hard to predict ways.
Since we have lots of function pointers around, RCE might be possible.
Signed-off-by: NMichael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NJason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NMichael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NJuan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>

CVE-2013-4148 QEMU 1.0 integer conversion in
virtio_net_load()@hw/net/virtio-net.c

Deals with loading a corrupted savevm image.

>         n->mac_table.in_use = qemu_get_be32(f);

in_use is int so it can get negative when assigned 32bit unsigned value.

>         /* MAC_TABLE_ENTRIES may be different from the saved image */
>         if (n->mac_table.in_use <= MAC_TABLE_ENTRIES) {

passing this check ^^^

>             qemu_get_buffer(f, n->mac_table.macs,
>                             n->mac_table.in_use * ETH_ALEN);

with good in_use value, "n->mac_table.in_use * ETH_ALEN" can get
positive and bigger than mac_table.macs. For example 0x81000000
satisfies this condition when ETH_ALEN is 6.

Fix it by making the value unsigned.
For consistency, change first_multi as well.

Note: all call sites were audited to confirm that
making them unsigned didn't cause any issues:
it turns out we actually never do math on them,
so it's easy to validate because both values are
always <= MAC_TABLE_ENTRIES.
Reviewed-by: NMichael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NMichael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NLaszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJuan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>

Validate state using VMS_ARRAY with num = 0 and VMS_MUST_EXIST
Signed-off-by: NMichael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJuan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>

Can be used to verify a required field exists or validate
state in some other way.
Signed-off-by: NMichael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NDr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJuan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>

move size offset and number of elements math out
to functions, to reduce code duplication.
Signed-off-by: NMichael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJuan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>

target-arm queue:
 * implement XScale cache lockdown cp15 ops
 * fix v7M CPUID base register
 * implement WFE and YIELD as yields for A64
 * fix A64 "BLR LR"
 * support Cortex-A57 in virt machine model
 * a few other minor AArch64 bugfixes

# gpg: Signature made Thu 01 May 2014 15:42:17 BST using RSA key ID 14360CDE
# gpg: Good signature from "Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>"

* remotes/pmaydell/tags/pull-target-arm-20140501:
  hw/arm/virt: Add support for Cortex-A57
  hw/arm/virt: Put GIC register banks on 64K boundaries
  hw/arm/virt: Create the GIC ourselves rather than (ab)using a15mpcore_priv
  target-arm: Correct a comment refering to EL0
  target-arm: A64: Fix a typo when declaring TLBI ops
  target-arm: A64: Handle blr lr
  target-arm: Make vbar_write 64bit friendly on 32bit hosts
  target-arm: implement WFE/YIELD as a yield for AArch64
  armv7m_nvic: fix CPUID Base Register
  target-arm: Implement XScale cache lockdown operations as NOPs
Signed-off-by: NPeter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>

Block patches

# gpg: Signature made Wed 30 Apr 2014 19:19:32 BST using RSA key ID C88F2FD6
# gpg: Good signature from "Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>"

* remotes/kevin/tags/for-upstream: (31 commits)
  curl: Fix hang reading from slow connections
  curl: Ensure all informationals are checked for completion
  curl: Eliminate unnecessary use of curl_multi_socket_all
  curl: Remove unnecessary explicit calls to internal event handler
  curl: Remove erroneous sleep waiting for curl completion
  curl: Fix return from curl_read_cb with invalid state
  curl: Remove unnecessary use of goto
  curl: Fix long line
  block/vdi: Error out immediately in vdi_create()
  block/bochs: Fix error handling for seek_to_sector()
  qcow2: Check min_size in qcow2_grow_l1_table()
  qcow2: Catch bdrv_getlength() error
  block: Use correct width in format strings
  qcow2: Avoid overflow in alloc_clusters_noref()
  block: Use error_abort in bdrv_image_info_specific_dump()
  block: Fix open_flags in bdrv_reopen()
  Revert "block: another bdrv_append fix"
  block: Unlink temporary files in raw-posix/win32
  block: Remove BDRV_O_COPY_ON_READ for bs->file
  block: Create bdrv_backing_flags()
  ...
Signed-off-by: NPeter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>

Add helpers for enabling kvm capabilities and convert the existing
s390x and ppc users to use them.

# gpg: Signature made Wed 30 Apr 2014 14:48:45 BST using RSA key ID C6F02FAF
# gpg: Can't check signature: public key not found

* remotes/cohuck/tags/kvm_cap_helpers:
  ppc: use kvm_vcpu_enable_cap()
  s390x: use kvm_vcpu_enable_cap()
  kvm: add kvm_{vm,vcpu}_enable_cap
Signed-off-by: NPeter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>

vga: add secondary stdvga variant

# gpg: Signature made Mon 28 Apr 2014 10:11:44 BST using RSA key ID D3E87138
# gpg: Good signature from "Gerd Hoffmann (work) <kraxel@redhat.com>"
# gpg:                 aka "Gerd Hoffmann <gerd@kraxel.org>"
# gpg:                 aka "Gerd Hoffmann (private) <kraxel@gmail.com>"

* remotes/kraxel/tags/pull-vga-2:
  add secondary-vga to display-vga test
  add display-vga test
  vga: add secondary stdvga variant
  vga: allow non-global vmstate
Signed-off-by: NPeter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>

Support the Cortex-A57 in the virt machine model.
Signed-off-by: NPeter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Message-id: 1398362083-17737-4-git-send-email-peter.maydell@linaro.org