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  1. 16 6月, 2014 3 次提交
  3. 30 5月, 2014 3 次提交
  5. 28 5月, 2014 3 次提交
  7. 22 4月, 2014 1 次提交
    • K
      block: Add errp to bdrv_new() · 98522f63
      由 Kevin Wolf 提交于 
      This patch adds an errp parameter to bdrv_new() and updates all its
callers. The next patches will make use of this in order to check for
duplicate IDs. Most of the callers know that their ID is fine, so they
can simply assert that there is no error.

Behaviour doesn't change with this patch yet as bdrv_new() doesn't
actually assign errors to errp.
Signed-off-by: NKevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NEric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
      98522f63
  9. 01 4月, 2014 1 次提交
  11. 22 2月, 2014 3 次提交
  13. 18 2月, 2014 1 次提交
  15. 07 1月, 2014 1 次提交
  17. 13 12月, 2013 1 次提交
    • S
      block/vvfat: Fix compiler warnings for OpenBSD · f671d173
      由 Stefan Weil 提交于 
      The buildbot shows these compiler warnings:

block/vvfat.c: In function 'create_short_and_long_name':
block/vvfat.c:620: warning: array size (8) smaller than bound length (11)
block/vvfat.c:620: warning: array size (8) smaller than bound length (11)
block/vvfat.c:635: warning: array size (8) smaller than bound length (11)
block/vvfat.c:635: warning: array size (8) smaller than bound length (11)

They are caused by tricky code where 8 characters for the name are followed
by 3 characters for the extension, and some operations touch both name and
extension.

Using an 11 character name which includes the extension fixes the compiler
warning, satisfies cppcheck, valgrind and maybe other static and dynamic
code checkers, and even simplifies some parts of the code.
Signed-off-by: NStefan Weil <sw@weilnetz.de>
Reviewed-by: NStefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NKevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
      f671d173
  19. 12 9月, 2013 3 次提交
  21. 06 9月, 2013 4 次提交
  23. 19 7月, 2013 1 次提交
  25. 22 4月, 2013 2 次提交
  27. 23 3月, 2013 1 次提交
  29. 15 3月, 2013 1 次提交
  31. 11 1月, 2013 1 次提交
  33. 19 12月, 2012 3 次提交
  35. 15 8月, 2012 2 次提交
  37. 17 7月, 2012 2 次提交
    • M
      vvfat: Do not clobber the user's geometry · 4480e0f9
      由 Markus Armbruster 提交于 
      vvfat creates a virtual VFAT filesystem with a certain logical
geometry that depends on its options.  It sets the "geometry hint" to
this geometry.  It is the only block driver to do this.

The geometry hint is about about *physical* geometry, and used only by
certain hard disk device models.

vvfat's hint is normally invisible for device models, because
bdrv_open() puts a raw format on top of vvfat's fat protocol.  That
raw format is where drive_init() puts the user's geometry (if any),
and where the device model gets it from.

Nobody complained, because the default physical geometry is the same
as vvfat's logical geometry:

    opts        LCHS        def. PCHS
                1024,16,63  same
    :32:        1024,16,63  same
    :16:        1024,16,63  same
    :12:          64,16,63  same

Except when you specify :floppy:

    opts        LCHS        def. PCHS
       :floppy:   80, 2,36  5,16,63
    :32:floppy:   80, 2,36  5,16,63
    :16:floppy:   80, 2,36  5,16,63
    :12:floppy:   80, 2,18  2,16,63

Silly thing to do for use with a hard disk.

However, the "raw" format can be suppressed by adding an
redundant-looking "format=vvfat" to "file=fat:FOO".  Then, vvfat's
hint clobbers the user's geometry, i.e. -drive options cyls, heads,
secs get silently ignored.  Don't do that.

No change without format=vvfat.  With it, the user's hard disk
geometry (-drive options cyls, heads, secs) is now obeyed, and the
default hard disk geometry with :floppy: now matches the one without
format=vvfat.
Signed-off-by: NMarkus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NKevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
      4480e0f9
    • M
      vvfat: Fix partition table · f91cbefe
      由 Markus Armbruster 提交于 
      Unless parameter ":floppy:" is given, vvfat creates a virtual image
with DOS MBR defining a single partition which holds the FAT file
system.  The size of the virtual image depends on the width of the
FAT: 32 MiB (CHS 64, 16, 63) for 12 bit FAT, 504 MiB (CHS 1024, 16,
63) for 16 and 32 bit FAT, leaving (64*16-1)*63 = 64449 and
(1024*16-1)*64 = 1032129 sectors for the partition.

However, it screws up the end of the partition in the MBR:

    FAT width param.  start CHS  end CHS     start LBA  size
        :32:          0,1,1      1023,14,63       63    1032065
        :16:          0,1,1      1023,14,55       63    1032057
        :12:          0,1,1        63,14,55       63      64377

The actual FAT file system nevertheless assumes the partition has
1032129 or 64449 sectors.  Oops.
Signed-off-by: NMarkus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NKevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
      f91cbefe
  39. 30 5月, 2012 2 次提交
    • J
      block: prevent snapshot mode $TMPDIR symlink attack · c2d76497
      由 Jim Meyering 提交于 
      In snapshot mode, bdrv_open creates an empty temporary file without
checking for mkstemp or close failure, and ignoring the possibility
of a buffer overrun given a surprisingly long $TMPDIR.
Change the get_tmp_filename function to return int (not void),
so that it can inform its two callers of those failures.
Also avoid the risk of buffer overrun and do not ignore mkstemp
or close failure.
Update both callers (in block.c and vvfat.c) to propagate
temp-file-creation failure to their callers.

get_tmp_filename creates and closes an empty file, while its
callers later open that presumed-existing file with O_CREAT.
The problem was that a malicious user could provoke mkstemp failure
and race to create a symlink with the selected temporary file name,
thus causing the qemu process (usually root owned) to open through
the symlink, overwriting an attacker-chosen file.

This addresses CVE-2012-2652.
http://bugzilla.redhat.com/CVE-2012-2652Signed-off-by: NJim Meyering <meyering@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NStefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NKevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
      c2d76497
    • J
      block: prevent snapshot mode $TMPDIR symlink attack · eba25057
      由 Jim Meyering 提交于 
      In snapshot mode, bdrv_open creates an empty temporary file without
checking for mkstemp or close failure, and ignoring the possibility
of a buffer overrun given a surprisingly long $TMPDIR.
Change the get_tmp_filename function to return int (not void),
so that it can inform its two callers of those failures.
Also avoid the risk of buffer overrun and do not ignore mkstemp
or close failure.
Update both callers (in block.c and vvfat.c) to propagate
temp-file-creation failure to their callers.

get_tmp_filename creates and closes an empty file, while its
callers later open that presumed-existing file with O_CREAT.
The problem was that a malicious user could provoke mkstemp failure
and race to create a symlink with the selected temporary file name,
thus causing the qemu process (usually root owned) to open through
the symlink, overwriting an attacker-chosen file.

This addresses CVE-2012-2652.
http://bugzilla.redhat.com/CVE-2012-2652Reviewed-by: NStefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NJim Meyering <meyering@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAnthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com>
      eba25057
  41. 10 5月, 2012 1 次提交