Signed-off-by: NJiri Denemark <jdenemar@redhat.com>

Signed-off-by: NMichal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>

So, majority of the code is just ready as-is. Well, with one
slight change: differentiate between dimm and nvdimm in places
like device alias generation, generating the command line and so
on.

Speaking of the command line, we also need to append 'nvdimm=on'
to the '-machine' argument so that the nvdimm feature is
advertised in the ACPI tables properly.
Signed-off-by: NMichal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>

NVDIMM is new type of memory introduced into QEMU 2.6. The idea
is that we have a Non-Volatile memory module that keeps the data
persistent across domain reboots.

At the domain XML level, we already have some representation of
'dimm' modules. Long story short, NVDIMM will utilize the
existing <memory/> element that lives under <devices/> by adding
a new attribute 'nvdimm' to the existing @model and introduce a
new <path/> element for <source/> while reusing other fields. The
resulting XML would appear as:

    <memory model='nvdimm'>
      <source>
        <path>/tmp/nvdimm</path>
      </source>
      <target>
        <size unit='KiB'>523264</size>
        <node>0</node>
      </target>
      <address type='dimm' slot='0'/>
    </memory>

So far, this is just a XML parser/formatter extension. QEMU
driver implementation is in the next commit.

For more info on NVDIMM visit the following web page:

    http://pmem.io/Signed-off-by: NMichal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>

https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1431112

Yeah, that's right. A mount point doesn't have to be a directory.
It can be a file too. However, the code that tries to preserve
mount points under /dev for new namespace for qemu does not count
with that option.
Signed-off-by: NMichal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>

https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1430634

If a qemu process has died, we get EOF on its monitor. At this
point, since qemu process was the only one running in the
namespace kernel has already cleaned the namespace up. Any
attempt of ours to enter it has to fail.

This really happened in the bug linked above. We've tried to
attach a disk to qemu and while we were in the monitor talking to
qemu it just died. Therefore our code tried to do some roll back
(e.g. deny the device in cgroups again, restore labels, etc.).
However, during the roll back (esp. when restoring labels) we
still thought that domain has a namespace. So we used secdriver's
transactions. This failed as there is no namespace to enter.
Signed-off-by: NMichal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>

When libvirtd is started we call qemuDomainRecheckInternalPaths
to detect whether a domain has VNC socket path generated by libvirt
based on option from qemu.conf.  However if we are parsing status XML
for running domain the existing socket path can be generated also if
the config XML uses the new <listen type='socket'/> element without
specifying any socket.

The current code doesn't make difference how the socket was generated
and always marks it as "fromConfig".  We need to store the
"autoGenerated" value in the status XML in order to preserve that
information.

The difference between "fromConfig" and "autoGenerated" is important
for migration, because if the socket is based on "fromConfig" we don't
print it into the migratable XML and we assume that user has properly
configured qemu.conf on both hosts.  However if the socket is based
on "autoGenerated" it means that a new feature was used and therefore
we need to leave the socket in migratable XML to make sure that if
this feature is not supported on destination the migration will fail.
Signed-off-by: NPavel Hrdina <phrdina@redhat.com>

Rename 'secretUsageType' to 'usageType' since it's superfluous in an
API qemu*Secret*

Building upon the qemuDomainSecretInfoNew, create a helper which will
build the secret used for TLS.
Signed-off-by: NJohn Ferlan <jferlan@redhat.com>

Create a helper which will create the secinfo used for disks, hostdevs,
and chardevs.
Signed-off-by: NJohn Ferlan <jferlan@redhat.com>

Signed-off-by: NPavel Hrdina <phrdina@redhat.com>

Signed-off-by: NPavel Hrdina <phrdina@redhat.com>

Now that we have some qemuSecurity wrappers over
virSecurityManager APIs, lets make sure everybody sticks with
them. We have them for a reason and calling virSecurityManager
API directly instead of wrapper may lead into accidentally
labelling a file on the host instead of namespace.
Signed-off-by: NMichal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>

The functions in virCommand() after fork() must be careful with regard
to accessing any mutexes that may have been locked by other threads in
the parent process. It is possible that another thread in the parent
process holds the lock for the virQEMUDriver while fork() is called.
This leads to a deadlock in the child process when
'virQEMUDriverGetConfig(driver)' is called and therefore the handshake
never completes between the child and the parent process. Ultimately
the virDomainObjectPtr will never be unlocked.

It gets much worse if the other thread of the parent process, that
holds the lock for the virQEMUDriver, tries to lock the already locked
virDomainObject. This leads to a completely unresponsive libvirtd.

It's possible to reproduce this case with calling 'virsh start XXX'
and 'virsh managedsave XXX' in a tight loop for multiple domains.

This commit fixes the deadlock in the same way as it is described in
commit 61b52d2e.
Signed-off-by: NMarc Hartmayer <mhartmay@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: NBoris Fiuczynski <fiuczy@linux.vnet.ibm.com>

When enabling virgl, qemu opens /dev/dri/render*. So far, we are
not allowing that in devices CGroup nor creating the file in
domain's namespace and thus requiring users to set the paths in
qemu.conf. This, however, is suboptimal as it allows access to
ALL qemu processes even those which don't have virgl configured.
Now that we have a way to specify render node that qemu will use
we can be more cautious and enable just that.
Signed-off-by: NMichal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>

So far, qemuDomainGetHostdevPath has no knowledge of the reasong
it is called and thus reports /dev/vfio/vfio for every VFIO
backed device. This is suboptimal, as we want it to:

a) report /dev/vfio/vfio on every addition or domain startup
b) report /dev/vfio/vfio only on last VFIO device being unplugged

If a domain is being stopped then namespace and CGroup die with
it so no need to worry about that. I mean, even when a domain
that's exiting has more than one VFIO devices assigned to it,
this function does not clean /dev/vfio/vfio in CGroup nor in the
namespace. But that doesn't matter.
Signed-off-by: NMichal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NMarc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>

So far, we are allowing /dev/vfio/vfio in the devices cgroup
unconditionally (and creating it in the namespace too). Even if
domain has no hostdev assignment configured. This is potential
security hole. Therefore, when starting the domain (or
hotplugging a hostdev) create & allow /dev/vfio/vfio too (if
needed).
Signed-off-by: NMichal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NMarc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>

Since these two functions are nearly identical (with
qemuSetupHostdevCgroup actually calling virCgroupAllowDevicePath)
we can have one function call the other and thus de-duplicate
some code.
Signed-off-by: NMichal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NMarc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>

The bare fact that mnt namespace is available is not enough for
us to allow/enable qemu namespaces feature. There are other
requirements: we must copy all the ACL & SELinux labels otherwise
we might grant access that is administratively forbidden or vice
versa.
At the same time, the check for namespace prerequisites is moved
from domain startup time to qemu.conf parser as it doesn't make
much sense to allow users to start misconfigured libvirt just to
find out they can't start a single domain.
Signed-off-by: NMichal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>

mknod() is affected my the current umask, so we're not
guaranteed the newly-created device node will have the
right permissions.

Call chmod(), which is not affected by the current umask,
immediately afterwards to solve the issue.

Resolves: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1421036

This controller only allows up to 15 ports.

https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1375417

Just like we need wrappers over other virSecurityManager APIs, we
need one for virSecurityManagerSetImageLabel and
virSecurityManagerRestoreImageLabel. Otherwise we might end up
relabelling device in wrong namespace.
Signed-off-by: NMichal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>

Firstly, instead of checking for next->path the
virStorageSourceIsEmpty() function should be used which also
takes disk type into account.
Secondly, not every disk source passed has the correct type set
(due to our laziness). Therefore, instead of checking for
virStorageSourceIsBlockLocal() and also S_ISBLK() the former can
be refined to just virStorageSourceIsLocalStorage().
Signed-off-by: NMichal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>

Again, one missed bit. This time without this commit there is no
/dev entry  in the namespace of the qemu process when doing disk
snapshots or block-copy.
Signed-off-by: NMichal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>

These functions do not need to see the whole virDomainDiskDef.
Moreover, they are going to be called from places where we don't
have access to the full disk definition. Sticking with
virStorageSource is more than enough.
Signed-off-by: NMichal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>

Since its introduction in 81df2150 this variable was never
used.
Signed-off-by: NMichal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>

There is no need for this. None of the namespace helpers uses it.
Historically it was used when calling secdriver APIs, but we
don't to that anymore.
Signed-off-by: NMichal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>

In order for memory locking to work, the hard limit on memory
locking (and usage) has to be set appropriately by the user.

The documentation mentions the requirement already: with this
patch, it's going to be enforced by runtime checks as well,
by forbidding a non-compliant guest from being defined as well
as edited and started.

Resolves: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1316774

When working with symlinks it is fairly easy to get into a loop.
Don't.
Signed-off-by: NMichal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>

Similarly to one of the previous commits, we need to deal
properly with symlinks in hotplug case too.
Signed-off-by: NMichal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>

When working with symlinks it is fairly easy to get into a loop.
Don't.
Signed-off-by: NMichal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>

Imagine you have a disk with the following source set up:

/dev/disk/by-uuid/$uuid (symlink to) -> /dev/sda

After cbc45525 the transitive end of the symlink chain is
created (/dev/sda), but we need to create any item in chain too.
Others might rely on that.
In this case, /dev/disk/by-uuid/$uuid comes from domain XML thus
it is this path that secdriver tries to relabel. Not the resolved
one.
Signed-off-by: NMichal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>

After previous commit this has become redundant step.
Also setting up devices in namespace and setting their label
later on are two different steps and should be not done at once.
Signed-off-by: NMichal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>

Not only we should set the MTU on the host end of the device but
also let qemu know what MTU did we set.
Signed-off-by: NMichal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>

So far we allow to set MTU for libvirt networks. However, not all
domain interfaces have to be plugged into a libvirt network and
even if they are, they might want to have a different MTU (e.g.
for testing purposes).
Signed-off-by: NMichal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>

We lacked of timestamp in tainting of guests log,
which bring troubles for finding guest issues:
such as whether a guest powerdown caused by qemu-monitor-command
or others issues inside guests.
If we had timestamp in tainting of guests log,
it would be helpful when checking guest's /var/log/messages.
Signed-off-by: NChen Hanxiao <chenhanxiao@gmail.com>

Based on work of Mehdi Abaakouk <sileht@sileht.net>.

When parsing vhost-user interface XML and no ifname is found we
can try to fill it in in post parse callback. The way this works
is we try to make up interface name from given socket path and
then ask openvswitch whether it knows the interface.
Signed-off-by: NMichal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>

https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1413922

While all the code that deals with qemu namespaces correctly
detects whether we are running as root (and turn into NO-OP for
qemu:///session) the actual unshare() call is not guarded with
such check. Therefore any attempt to start a domain under
qemu:///session shall fail as unshare() is reserved for root.

The fix consists of moving unshare() call (for which we have a
wrapper called virProcessSetupPrivateMountNS) into
qemuDomainBuildNamespace() where the proper check is performed.
Signed-off-by: NMichal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
Tested-by: NRichard W.M. Jones <rjones@redhat.com>

When creating new /dev/* for qemu, we do chown() and copy ACLs to
create the exact copy from the original /dev. I though that
copying SELinux labels is not necessary as SELinux will chose the
sane defaults. Surprisingly, it does not leaving namespace with
the following labels:

crw-rw-rw-. root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0     random
crw-------. root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0     rtc0
drwxrwxrwt. root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0     shm
crw-rw-rw-. root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0     urandom

As a result, domain is unable to start:

error: internal error: process exited while connecting to monitor: Error in GnuTLS initialization: Failed to acquire random data.
qemu-kvm: cannot initialize crypto: Unable to initialize GNUTLS library: Failed to acquire random data.

The solution is to copy the SELinux labels as well.
Reported-by: NAndrea Bolognani <abologna@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NMichal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>

So far the decision whether /dev/* entry is created in the qemu
namespace is really simple: does the path starts with "/dev/"?
This can be easily fooled by providing path like the following
(for any considered device like disk, rng, chardev, ..):

  /dev/../var/lib/libvirt/images/disk.qcow2

Therefore, before making the decision the path should be
canonicalized.
Signed-off-by: NMichal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>