1. 30 8月, 2017 1 次提交
    • D
      rpc: avoid ssh interpreting malicious hostname as arguments · e4cb8500
      Daniel P. Berrange 提交于
      Inspired by the recent GIT / Mercurial security flaws
      (http://blog.recurity-labs.com/2017-08-10/scm-vulns),
      consider someone/something manages to feed libvirt a bogus
      URI such as:
      
        virsh -c qemu+ssh://-oProxyCommand=gnome-calculator/system
      
      In this case, the hosname "-oProxyCommand=gnome-calculator"
      will get interpreted as an argument to ssh, not a hostname.
      Fortunately, due to the set of args we have following the
      hostname, SSH will then interpret our bit of shell script
      that runs 'nc' on the remote host as a cipher name, which is
      clearly invalid. This makes ssh exit during argv parsing and
      so it never tries to run gnome-calculator.
      
      We are lucky this time, but lets be more paranoid, by using
      '--' to explicitly tell SSH when it has finished seeing
      command line options. This forces it to interpret
      "-oProxyCommand=gnome-calculator" as a hostname, and thus
      see a fail from hostname lookup.
      Signed-off-by: NDaniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
      e4cb8500
  2. 29 8月, 2017 30 次提交
  3. 28 8月, 2017 7 次提交
  4. 27 8月, 2017 2 次提交