For a logged in user this a path like /dev/dri/renderD128 will have
default ownership root:video which won't work for the qemu:qemu user,
so we need to chown it.

We only do this when mount namespaces are enabled in the qemu driver,
so the chown'ing doesn't interfere with other users of the shared
render node path

https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1460804

The VIR_SECURITY_MANAGER_MOUNT_NAMESPACE flag informs the DAC driver
if mount namespaces are in use for the VM. Will be used for future
changes.

Wire it up in the qemu driver

When security drivers are active but confinement is not enabled,
there is no need to autogenerate <seclabel> elements when starting
a domain def that contains no <seclabel> elements. In fact,
autogenerating the elements can result in needless save/restore and
migration failures when the security driver is not active on the
restore/migration target.

This patch changes the virSecurityManagerGenLabel function in
src/security_manager.c to only autogenerate a <seclabel> element
if none is already defined for the domain *and* default
confinement is enabled. Otherwise the needless <seclabel>
autogeneration is skipped.

Resolves: https://bugzilla.opensuse.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1051017

Testing qemu-2.10-rc3 shows issues like:
  qemu-system-aarch64: -drive file=/home/ubuntu/vm-start-stop/vms/
  7936-0_CODE.fd,if=pflash,format=raw,unit=1: Failed to unlock byte 100

There is an apparmor deny due to qemu now locking those files:
 apparmor="DENIED" operation="file_lock" [...]
 name="/home/ubuntu/vm-start-stop/vms/7936-0_CODE.fd"
 name="/var/lib/uvtool/libvirt/images/kvmguest-artful-normal.qcow"
 [...] comm="qemu-system-aarch64" requested_mask="k" denied_mask="k"

The profile needs to allow locking for loader and nvram files via
the locking (k) rule.
Signed-off-by: NChristian Ehrhardt <christian.ehrhardt@canonical.com>

Testing qemu-2.10-rc2 shows issues like:
  qemu-system-x86_64: -drive file=/var/lib/uvtool/libvirt/images/kvmguest- \
  artful-normal.qcow,format=qcow2,if=none,id=drive-virtio-disk0:
  Failed to lock byte 100

It seems the following qemu commit changed the needs for the backing
image rules:

(qemu) commit 244a5668106297378391b768e7288eb157616f64
Author: Fam Zheng <famz@redhat.com>
    file-posix: Add image locking to perm operations

The block appears as:
 apparmor="DENIED" operation="file_lock" [...]
 name="/var/lib/uvtool/libvirt/images/kvmguest-artful-normal.qcow"
 [...] comm="qemu-system-x86" requested_mask="k" denied_mask="k"

With that qemu change in place the rules generated for the image
and backing files need the allowance to also lock (k) the files.

Disks are added via add_file_path and with this fix rules now get
that permission, but no other rules are changed, example:
  -  "/var/lib/uvtool/libvirt/images/kvmguest-artful-normal-a2.qcow" rw,
  +  "/var/lib/uvtool/libvirt/images/kvmguest-artful-normal-a2.qcow" rwk
Signed-off-by: NChristian Ehrhardt <christian.ehrhardt@canonical.com>

Signed-off-by: NPavel Hrdina <phrdina@redhat.com>

In commit 5e515b54 I've attempted to fix the inability to access
storage from the apparmor helper program by linking with the storage
driver. By linking with the .so the linker complains that it's not
portable. Fix this by loading the module dynamically as we are supposed
to do.
Reviewed-by: NDaniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>

The refactor to split up storage driver into modules broke the apparmor
helper program, since that did not initialize the storage driver
properly and thus detection of the backing chain could not work.

Register the storage driver backends explicitly. Unfortunately it's now
necessary to link with the full storage driver to satisfy dependencies
of the loadable modules.
Reviewed-by: NChristian Ehrhardt <christian.ehrhardt@canonical.com>
Reported-by: NChristian Ehrhardt <christian.ehrhardt@canonical.com>
Tested-by: NChristian Ehrhardt <christian.ehrhardt@canonical.com>

The helper methods for actually accessing the storage objects don't
really belong to the main storage driver implementation file. Split them
out.

Our commit e13e8808 was way too generic. Currently, virtlogd is
used only for chardevs type of file and nothing else. True, we
must not relabel the path in this case, but we have to in all
other cases. For instance, if you want to have a physical console
attached to your guest:

    <console type='dev'>
      <source path='/dev/ttyS0'/>
      <target type='virtio' port='1'/>
    </console>

Starting such domain fails because qemu doesn't have access to
/dev/ttyS0 because we haven't relabelled the path.
Signed-off-by: NMichal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NJohn Ferlan <jferlan@redhat.com>

In the case that virtlogd is used as stdio handler we pass to QEMU
only FD to a PIPE connected to virtlogd instead of the file itself.

Resolves: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1430988Signed-off-by: NPavel Hrdina <phrdina@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NMartin Kletzander <mkletzan@redhat.com>

Signed-off-by: NPavel Hrdina <phrdina@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NJohn Ferlan <jferlan@redhat.com>

Allow access to aarch64 UEFI images.
Signed-off-by: NChristian Ehrhardt <christian.ehrhardt@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: NStefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
Acked-by: NGuido Günther <agx@sigxcpu.org>

The split firmware and variables files introduced by
https://bugs.debian.org/764918 are in a different directory for
some reason. Let the virtual machine read both.
Signed-off-by: NChristian Ehrhardt <christian.ehrhardt@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: NStefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>

virDomainXMLOption gains driver specific callbacks for parsing and
formatting save cookies.
Signed-off-by: NJiri Denemark <jdenemar@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NPavel Hrdina <phrdina@redhat.com>

While checking for ABI stability, drivers might pose additional
checks that are not valid for general case. For instance, qemu
driver might check some memory backing attributes because of how
qemu works. But those attributes may work well in other drivers.
Signed-off-by: NMichal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>

If the first console is just a copy of the first serial device we
don't need to iterate over the same device twice in order to perform
actions like security labeling, cgroup configuring, etc.

Currently only security SELinux manager was aware of this fact.
Signed-off-by: NPavel Hrdina <phrdina@redhat.com>

Namely, this patch is about virMediatedDeviceGetIOMMUGroup{Dev,Num}
functions. There's no compelling reason why these functions should take
an object, on the contrary, having to create an object every time one
needs to query the IOMMU group number, discarding the object afterwards,
seems odd.
Signed-off-by: NErik Skultety <eskultet@redhat.com>

We prefer c89 style of comments.
Signed-off-by: NMichal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>

This patch updates all of our security driver to start labeling the
VFIO IOMMU devices under /dev/vfio/ as well.
Signed-off-by: NErik Skultety <eskultet@redhat.com>

A mediated device will be identified by a UUID (with 'model' now being
a mandatory <hostdev> attribute to represent the mediated device API) of
the user pre-created mediated device. We also need to make sure that if
user explicitly provides a guest address for a mdev device, the address
type will be matching the device API supported on that specific mediated
device and error out with an incorrect XML message.

The resulting device XML:
<devices>
  <hostdev mode='subsystem' type='mdev' model='vfio-pci'>
    <source>
      <address uuid='c2177883-f1bb-47f0-914d-32a22e3a8804'>
    </source>
  </hostdev>
</devices>
Signed-off-by: NErik Skultety <eskultet@redhat.com>

Signed-off-by: NMichal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>

These APIs will be used whenever we are hot (un-)plugging a
memdev.
Signed-off-by: NMichal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>

When domain is being started up, we ought to relabel the host
side of NVDIMM so qemu has access to it.
Signed-off-by: NMichal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>

When domain is being started up, we ought to relabel the host
side of NVDIMM so qemu has access to it.
Signed-off-by: NMichal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>

If the apparmor security driver is loaded/enabled and domain config
contains a <seclabel> element whose type attribute is not 'apparmor',
starting the domain fails when attempting to label resources such
as tap FDs.

Many of the apparmor driver entry points attempt to retrieve the
apparmor security label from the domain def, returning failure if
not found. Functions such as AppArmorSetFDLabel fail even though
domain config contains an explicit 'none' secuirty driver, e.g.

  <seclabel type='none' model='none'/>

Change the entry points to succeed if the domain config <seclabel>
is not apparmor. This matches the behavior of the selinux driver.

Like other callers of reload_profile, don't overwrite errors in
AppArmorSetSecurityHostdevLabelHelper.

The problem is in the way how the list item is created prior to
appending it to the transaction list - the @path argument is just a
shallow copy instead of deep copy of the hostdev device's path.
Unfortunately, the hostdev devices from which the @path is extracted, in
order to add them into the transaction list, are only temporary and
freed before the buildup of the qemu namespace, thus making the @path
attribute in the transaction list NULL, causing 'permission denied' or
'double free' or 'unknown cause' errors.

Resolves: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1413773Signed-off-by: NErik Skultety <eskultet@redhat.com>

The problem is in the way how the list item is created prior to
appending it to the transaction list - the @path attribute is just a
shallow copy instead of deep copy of the hostdev device's path.
Unfortunately, the hostdev devices from which the @path is extracted, in
order to add them into the transaction list, are only temporary and
freed before the buildup of the qemu namespace, thus making the @path
attribute in the transaction list NULL, causing 'permission denied' or
'double free' or 'unknown cause' errors.

Resolves: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1413773Signed-off-by: NErik Skultety <eskultet@redhat.com>

There are still some systems out there that have broken
setfilecon*() prototypes. Instead of taking 'const char *tcon' it
is taking 'char *tcon'. The function should just set the context,
not modify it.

We had been bitten with this problem before which resulted in
292d3f2d and subsequently b109c097. However, with one my latest
commits (4674fc6a) I've changed the type of @tcon variable to
'const char *' which results in build failure on the systems from
above.
Signed-off-by: NMichal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>

Signed-off-by: NMichal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>

Signed-off-by: NMichal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>

With our new qemu namespace code in place, the relabelling of
devices is done not as good is it could: a child process is
spawned, it enters the mount namespace of the qemu process and
then runs desired API of the security driver.

Problem with this approach is that internal state transition of
the security driver done in the child process is not reflected in
the parent process. While currently it wouldn't matter that much,
it is fairly easy to forget about that. We should take the extra
step now while this limitation is still fresh in our minds.

Three new APIs are introduced here:
  virSecurityManagerTransactionStart()
  virSecurityManagerTransactionCommit()
  virSecurityManagerTransactionAbort()

The Start() is going to be used to let security driver know that
we are starting a new transaction. During a transaction no
security labels are actually touched, but rather recorded and
only at Commit() phase they are actually updated. Should
something go wrong Abort() aborts the transaction freeing up all
memory allocated by transaction.
Signed-off-by: NMichal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>

The code at the very bottom of the DAC secdriver that calls
chown() should be fine with read-only data. If something needs to
be prepared it should have been done beforehand.
Signed-off-by: NMichal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>

It doesn't make much sense to have two different prefix for
functions within the same driver.
Signed-off-by: NMichal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>

Since its introduction in 2012 this internal API did nothing.
Moreover we have the same API that does exactly the same:
virSecurityManagerDomainSetPathLabel.
Signed-off-by: NMichal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>

When virt-aa-helper parses xml content it can fail on security labels.

It fails by requiring to parse active domain content on seclabels that
are not yet filled in.

Testcase with virt-aa-helper on a minimal xml:
 $ cat << EOF > /tmp/test.xml
<domain type='kvm'>
    <name>test-seclabel</name>
    <uuid>12345678-9abc-def1-2345-6789abcdef00</uuid>
    <memory unit='KiB'>1</memory>
    <os><type arch='x86_64'>hvm</type></os>
    <seclabel type='dynamic' model='apparmor' relabel='yes'/>
    <seclabel type='dynamic' model='dac' relabel='yes'/>
</domain>
EOF
 $ /usr/lib/libvirt/virt-aa-helper -d -r -p 0 \
   -u libvirt-12345678-9abc-def1-2345-6789abcdef00 < /tmp/test.xml

Current Result:
 virt-aa-helper: error: could not parse XML
 virt-aa-helper: error: could not get VM definition
Expected Result is a valid apparmor profile
Signed-off-by: NChristian Ehrhardt <christian.ehrhardt@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: NGuido Günther <agx@sigxcpu.org>

Ensure that the vhost-scsi wwpn information is passed to the
different security policies.
Signed-off-by: NEric Farman <farman@linux.vnet.ibm.com>

We already have a "scsi" hostdev subsys type, which refers to a single
LUN that is passed through to a guest.  But what of things where
multiple LUNs are passed through via a single SCSI HBA, such as with
the vhost-scsi target?  Create a new hostdev subsys type that will
carry this.
Signed-off-by: NEric Farman <farman@linux.vnet.ibm.com>

As was suggested in an earlier review comment[1], we can
catch some additional code points by cleaning up how we use the
hostdev subsystem type in some switch statements.

[1] End of https://www.redhat.com/archives/libvir-list/2016-September/msg00399.htmlSigned-off-by: NEric Farman <farman@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NJohn Ferlan <jferlan@redhat.com>