This API labels all sockets created until ClearSocketLabel is called in
a way that a vm can access them (i.e., they are labeled with svirt_t
based label in SELinux).

The APIs are designed to label a socket in a way that the libvirt daemon
itself is able to access it (i.e., in SELinux the label is virtd_t based
as opposed to svirt_* we use for labeling resources that need to be
accessed by a vm). The new name reflects this.

Repetitive patterns should be factored.  The sign of a good
factorization is a change that kills 5x more lines than it adds :)

* src/conf/domain_conf.c (virDomainDeviceDefParse)
(virDomainSnapshotDefParseString): Use new convenience macros.
* src/conf/storage_conf.c (virStoragePoolDefParseSourceString):
Likewise.
* src/cpu/cpu.c (cpuCompareXML, cpuBaselineXML): Likewise.
* src/esx/esx_vi.c (esxVI_Context_Execute): Likewise.
* src/qemu/qemu_migration.c (qemuMigrationCookieXMLParseStr):
Likewise.
* src/security/virt-aa-helper.c (caps_mockup): Likewise.
* src/test/test_driver.c (testOpenFromFile): Likewise.
* tests/cputest.c (cpuTestLoadXML, cpuTestLoadMultiXML):
Likewise.
* tools/virsh.c (cmdFreecell, makeCloneXML, cmdVNCDisplay)
(cmdTTYConsole, cmdDetachInterface, cmdDetachDisk)
(cmdSnapshotCreate, cmdSnapshotCreateAs, cmdSnapshotCurrent)
(cmdSnapshotList, cmdSnapshotParent): Likewise.

In preparation for a future patch adding new virFile APIs.

* src/util/files.h, src/util/files.c: Move...
* src/util/virfile.h, src/util/virfile.c: ...here, and rename
functions to virFile prefix.  Macro names are intentionally
left alone.
* *.c: All '#include "files.h"' uses changed.
* src/Makefile.am (UTIL_SOURCES): Reflect rename.
* cfg.mk (exclude_file_name_regexp--sc_prohibit_close): Likewise.
* src/libvirt_private.syms: Likewise.
* docs/hacking.html.in: Likewise.
* HACKING: Regenerate.

In the Ubuntu development release we recently got a new udev that
moves /var/run to /run, /var/lock to /run/lock and /dev/shm to /run/shm.
This change in udev requires updating the apparmor security driver in
libvirt[1].

Attached is a patch that:
 * adjusts src/security/virt-aa-helper.c to allow both
LOCALSTATEDIR/run/libvirt/**/%s.pid and /run/libvirt/**/%s.pid. While
the profile is not as precise, LOCALSTATEDIR/run/ is typically a symlink
to /run/ anyway, so there is no additional access (remember that
apparmor resolves symlinks, which is why this is still required even
if /var/run points to /run).
 * adjusts example/apparmor/libvirt-qemu paths for /dev/shm

[1]https://launchpad.net/bugs/810270

--
Jamie Strandboge             | http://www.canonical.com

The drivers were accepting domain configs without checking if those
were actually meant for them. For example the LXC driver happily
accepts configs with type QEMU.

Add a check for the expected domain types to the virDomainDefParse*
functions.

Commit 693eac38 was incomplete here.

When no <seclabel> is present in the XML, the virDomainSeclabelDef
struct is left as all zeros. Unfortunately, this means it gets setup
as type=dynamic, with relabel=no, which is an illegal combination.

Change the 'bool relabel' attribute in virDomainSeclabelDef to
the inverse 'bool norelabel' so that the default initialization
is sensible

* src/conf/domain_conf.c, src/conf/domain_conf.h,
  src/security/security_apparmor.c, src/security/security_selinux.c:
  Replace 'relabel' with 'norelabel'

Add a new attribute to the <seclabel> XML to allow resource
relabelling to be enabled with static label usage.

  <seclabel model='selinux' type='static' relabel='yes'>
    <label>system_u:system_r:svirt_t:s0:c392,c662</label>
  </seclabel>

* docs/schemas/domain.rng: Add relabel attribute
* src/conf/domain_conf.c, src/conf/domain_conf.h: Parse
  the 'relabel' attribute
* src/qemu/qemu_process.c: Unconditionally clear out the
  'imagelabel' attribute
* src/security/security_apparmor.c: Skip based on 'relabel'
  attribute instead of label type
* src/security/security_selinux.c: Skip based on 'relabel'
  attribute instead of label type and fill in <imagelabel>
  attribute if relabel is enabled.

Normally the dynamic labelling mode will always use a base
label of 'svirt_t' for VMs. Introduce a <baselabel> field
in the <seclabel> XML to allow this base label to be changed

eg

   <seclabel type='dynamic' model='selinux'>
     <baselabel>system_u:object_r:virt_t:s0</baselabel>
   </seclabel>

* docs/schemas/domain.rng: Add <baselabel>
* src/conf/domain_conf.c, src/conf/domain_conf.h: Parsing
  of base label
* src/qemu/qemu_process.c: Don't reset 'model' attribute if
  a base label is specified
* src/security/security_apparmor.c: Refuse to support base label
* src/security/security_selinux.c: Use 'baselabel' when generating
  label, if available

Add a new security driver method for labelling an FD with
the process label, rather than the image label

* src/libvirt_private.syms, src/security/security_apparmor.c,
  src/security/security_dac.c, src/security/security_driver.h,
  src/security/security_manager.c, src/security/security_manager.h,
  src/security/security_selinux.c, src/security/security_stack.c:
  Add virSecurityManagerSetProcessFDLabel & impl

The virSecurityManagerSetFDLabel method is used to label
file descriptors associated with disk images. There will
shortly be a need to label other file descriptors in a
different way. So the current name is ambiguous. Rename
the method to virSecurityManagerSetImageFDLabel to clarify
its purpose

* src/libvirt_private.syms,
  src/qemu/qemu_migration.c, src/qemu/qemu_process.c,
  src/security/security_apparmor.c, src/security/security_dac.c,
  src/security/security_driver.h, src/security/security_manager.c,
  src/security/security_manager.h, src/security/security_selinux.c,
  src/security/security_stack.c: s/FDLabel/ImageFDLabel/

Commit 12317957 introduced an incompatible
architectural change for the AppArmor security driver. Specifically,
virSecurityManagerSetAllLabel() is now called much later in
src/qemu/qemu_process.c:qemuProcessStart(). Previously, SetAllLabel() was
called immediately after GenLabel() such that after the dynamic label (profile
name) was generated, SetAllLabel() would be called to create and load the
AppArmor profile into the kernel before qemuProcessHook() was executed. With
12317957, qemuProcessHook() is now called
before SetAllLabel(), such that aa_change_profile() ends up being called
before the AppArmor profile is loaded into the kernel (via ProcessLabel() in
qemuProcessHook()).

This patch addresses the change by making GenLabel() load the AppArmor
profile into the kernel after the label (profile name) is generated.
SetAllLabel() is then adjusted to only reload_profile() and append stdin_fn to
the profile when it is specified. This also makes the AppArmor driver work
like its SELinux counterpart with regard to SetAllLabel() and stdin_fn.
Bug-Ubuntu: https://launchpad.net/bugs/801569

During a savevm operation, libvirt will now use fd migration if qemu
supports it. When the AppArmor driver is enabled, AppArmorSetFDLabel()
is used but since this function simply returns '0', the dynamic AppArmor
profile is not updated and AppArmor blocks access to the save file. This
patch implements AppArmorSetFDLabel() to get the pathname of the file by
resolving the fd symlink in /proc, and then gives that pathname to
reload_profile(), which fixes 'virsh save' when AppArmor is enabled.

Reference: https://launchpad.net/bugs/795800

Regression introduced in commit 02e86910.

* src/security/virt-aa-helper.c (includes): Reflect move of virRun.

This fixes:

  https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=702044
  https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=709454

Both of these complain of a failure to use an image file that resides
on a read-only NFS volume. The function in the DAC security driver
that chowns image files to the qemu user:group before using them
already has special cases to ignore failure of chown on read-only file
systems, and in a few other cases, but it hadn't been checking for
EINVAL, which is what is returned if the qemu user doesn't even exist
on the NFS server.

Since the explanation of EINVAL in the chown man page almost exactly
matches the log message already present for the case of EOPNOTSUPP,
I've just added EINVAL to that same conditional.

Regression introduced in commit d6623003 (v0.8.8) - using the
wrong sizeof operand meant that security manager private data
was overlaying the allowDiskFormatProbing member of struct
_virSecurityManager.  This reopens disk probing, which was
supposed to be prevented by the solution to CVE-2010-2238.

* src/security/security_manager.c
(virSecurityManagerGetPrivateData): Use correct offset.

Commit aaf20355 was incomplete here and
missed to remove some parts.

Untested

virt-aa-helper isn't even compile tested since I don't have the setup for
it.

v2:
    virt-aa-helper fixes from Eric

When setting up a FIFO for QEMU, it allows either a pair
of fifos used unidirectionally, or a single fifo used
bidirectionally. Look for the bidirectional fifo first
when labelling since that is more useful

* src/security/security_dac.c,
  src/security/security_selinux.c: Fix fifo handling

We already have virAsprintf, so picking a similar name helps for
seeing a similar purpose.  Furthermore, the prefix V before printf
generally implies 'va_list', even though this variant was '...', and
the old name got in the way of adding a new va_list version.

global rename performed with:

$ git grep -l virBufferVSprintf \
  | xargs -L1 sed -i 's/virBufferVSprintf/virBufferAsprintf/g'

then revert the changes in ChangeLog-old.

And from all related macros and functions.

It costs quite a few processor cycles to go through printf parsing
just to determine that we only meant to append.

* src/xen/xend_internal.c (xend_op_ext): Consolidate multiple
printfs into one.
* src/qemu/qemu_command.c (qemuBuildWatchdogDevStr)
(qemuBuildUSBInputDevStr, qemuBuildSoundDevStr)
(qemuBuildSoundCodecStr, qemuBuildVideoDevStr): Likewise.
(qemuBuildCpuArgStr, qemuBuildCommandLine): Prefer virBufferAdd
over virBufferVsprintf for trivial appends.
* src/phyp/phyp_driver.c (phypExec, phypUUIDTable_Push)
(phypUUIDTable_Pull): Likewise.
* src/conf/nwfilter_conf.c (macProtocolIDFormatter)
(arpOpcodeFormatter, formatIPProtocolID, printStringItems)
(virNWFilterPrintStateMatchFlags, virNWIPAddressFormat)
(virNWFilterDefFormat): Likewise.
* src/security/virt-aa-helper.c (main): Likewise.
* src/util/sexpr.c (sexpr2string): Likewise.
* src/xenxs/xen_sxpr.c (xenFormatSxprChr): Likewise.
* src/xenxs/xen_xm.c (xenFormatXMDisk): Likewise.

Even with -Wuninitialized (which is part of autobuild.sh
--enable-compile-warnings=error), gcc does NOT catch this
use of an uninitialized variable:

{
  if (cond)
    goto error;
  int a = 1;
error:
  printf("%d", a);
}

which prints 0 (supposing the stack started life wiped) if
cond was true.  Clang will catch it, but we don't use clang
as often.  Using gcc -Wjump-misses-init catches it, but also
gives false positives:

{
  if (cond)
    goto error;
  int a = 1;
  return a;
error:
  return 0;
}

Here, a was never used in the scope of the error block, so
declaring it after goto is technically fine (and clang agrees).
However, given that our HACKING already documents a preference
to C89 decl-before-statement, the false positive warning is
enough of a prod to comply with HACKING.

[Personally, I'd _really_ rather use C99 decl-after-statement
to minimize scope, but until gcc can efficiently and reliably
catch scoping and uninitialized usage bugs, I'll settle with
the compromise of enforcing a coding standard that happens to
reject false positives if it can also detect real bugs.]

* acinclude.m4 (LIBVIRT_COMPILE_WARNINGS): Add -Wjump-misses-init.
* src/util/util.c (__virExec): Adjust offenders.
* src/conf/domain_conf.c (virDomainTimerDefParseXML): Likewise.
* src/remote/remote_driver.c (doRemoteOpen): Likewise.
* src/phyp/phyp_driver.c (phypGetLparNAME, phypGetLparProfile)
(phypGetVIOSFreeSCSIAdapter, phypVolumeGetKey)
(phypGetStoragePoolDevice)
(phypVolumeGetPhysicalVolumeByStoragePool)
(phypVolumeGetPath): Likewise.
* src/vbox/vbox_tmpl.c (vboxNetworkUndefineDestroy)
(vboxNetworkCreate, vboxNetworkDumpXML)
(vboxNetworkDefineCreateXML): Likewise.
* src/xenapi/xenapi_driver.c (getCapsObject)
(xenapiDomainDumpXML): Likewise.
* src/xenapi/xenapi_utils.c (createVMRecordFromXml): Likewise.
* src/security/security_selinux.c (SELinuxGenNewContext):
Likewise.
* src/qemu/qemu_command.c (qemuBuildCommandLine): Likewise.
* src/qemu/qemu_hotplug.c (qemuDomainChangeEjectableMedia):
Likewise.
* src/qemu/qemu_process.c (qemuProcessWaitForMonitor): Likewise.
* src/qemu/qemu_monitor_text.c (qemuMonitorTextGetPtyPaths):
Likewise.
* src/qemu/qemu_driver.c (qemudDomainShutdown)
(qemudDomainBlockStats, qemudDomainMemoryPeek): Likewise.
* src/storage/storage_backend_iscsi.c
(virStorageBackendCreateIfaceIQN): Likewise.
* src/node_device/node_device_udev.c (udevProcessPCI): Likewise.

Child processes don't always reach _exit(); if they die from a
signal, then any messages should still be accurate.  Most users
either expect a 0 status (thankfully, if status==0, then
WIFEXITED(status) is true and WEXITSTATUS(status)==0 for all
known platforms) or were filtering on WIFEXITED before printing
a status, but a few were missing this check.  Additionally,
nwfilter_ebiptables_driver was making an assumption that works
on Linux (where WEXITSTATUS shifts and WTERMSIG just masks)
but fails on other platforms (where WEXITSTATUS just masks and
WTERMSIG shifts).

* src/util/command.h (virCommandTranslateStatus): New helper.
* src/libvirt_private.syms (command.h): Export it.
* src/util/command.c (virCommandTranslateStatus): New function.
(virCommandWait): Use it to also diagnose status from signals.
* src/security/security_apparmor.c (load_profile): Likewise.
* src/storage/storage_backend.c
(virStorageBackendQEMUImgBackingFormat): Likewise.
* src/util/util.c (virExecDaemonize, virRunWithHook)
(virFileOperation, virDirCreate): Likewise.
* daemon/remote.c (remoteDispatchAuthPolkit): Likewise.
* src/nwfilter/nwfilter_ebiptables_driver.c (ebiptablesExecCLI):
Likewise.

On cygwin:

  CC       libvirt_driver_security_la-security_dac.lo
security/security_dac.c: In function 'virSecurityDACSetProcessLabel':
security/security_dac.c:618: warning: format '%d' expects type 'int', but argument 7 has type 'uid_t' [-Wformat]

We've done this before (see src/util/util.c).

* src/security/security_dac.c (virSecurityDACSetProcessLabel): On
cygwin, uid_t is a 32-bit long.

virSecurityDAC{Set,Restore}ChardevCallback expect virSecurityManagerPtr,
but are passed virDomainObjPtr instead. This makes
virSecurityDACSetChardevLabel set a wrong uid/gid on chardevs. This
patch fixes this behaviour.
Signed-off-by: NSoren Hansen <soren@linux2go.dk>

Remove the <stdbool.h> header from all source files / headers
and just put it into internal.h

* src/internal.h: Add <stdbool.h>

Leak introduced in commit d6623003.

* src/qemu/qemu_driver.c (qemuSecurityInit): Avoid leak on failure.
* src/security/security_stack.c (virSecurityStackClose): Avoid
leaking component drivers.

Done mechanically with:
$ git grep -l '\bDEBUG0\? *(' | xargs -L1 sed -i 's/\bDEBUG0\? *(/VIR_&/'

followed by manual deletion of qemudDebug in daemon/libvirtd.c, along
with a single 'make syntax-check' fallout in the same file, and the
actual deletion in src/util/logging.h.

* src/util/logging.h (DEBUG, DEBUG0): Delete.
* daemon/libvirtd.h (qemudDebug): Likewise.
* global: Change remaining clients over to VIR_DEBUG counterpart.

* src/security/security_selinux.c
(SELinuxRestoreSecuritySmartcardCallback)
(SELinuxSetSecuritySmartcardCallback): New helper functions.
(SELinuxRestoreSecurityAllLabel, SELinuxSetSecurityAllLabel): Use
them.

A need was found to set the SELinux context label on an open fd (a
pipe, as a matter of fact). This patch adds a function to the security
driver API that will set the label on an open fd to secdef.label. For
all drivers other than the SELinux driver, it's a NOP. For the SElinux
driver, it calls fsetfilecon().

If the return is a failure, it only returns error up to the caller if
1) the desired label is different from the existing label, 2) the
destination fd is of a type that supports setting the selinux context,
and 3) selinux is in enforcing mode. Otherwise it will return
success. This follows the pattern of the existing function
SELinuxSetFilecon().

If the XML security model is NULL, it is assumed that the current
model will be used with dynamic labelling. The verify step is
meaningless and potentially crashes if dereferencing NULL

* src/security/security_manager.c: Skip NULL model on verify

This opens up the possibility of reusing the smaller ChrSourceDef
for both qemu monitor and a passthrough smartcard device.

* src/conf/domain_conf.h (_virDomainChrDef): Factor host
details...
(_virDomainChrSourceDef): ...into new struct.
(virDomainChrSourceDefFree): New prototype.
* src/conf/domain_conf.c (virDomainChrDefFree)
(virDomainChrDefParseXML, virDomainChrDefFormat): Split...
(virDomainChrSourceDefClear, virDomainChrSourceDefFree)
(virDomainChrSourceDefParseXML, virDomainChrSourceDefFormat):
...into new functions.
(virDomainChrDefParseTargetXML): Update clients to reflect type
split.
* src/vmx/vmx.c (virVMXParseSerial, virVMXParseParallel)
(virVMXFormatSerial, virVMXFormatParallel): Likewise.
* src/xen/xen_driver.c (xenUnifiedDomainOpenConsole): Likewise.
* src/xen/xend_internal.c (xenDaemonParseSxprChar)
(xenDaemonFormatSxprChr): Likewise.
* src/vbox/vbox_tmpl.c (vboxDomainDumpXML, vboxAttachSerial)
(vboxAttachParallel): Likewise.
* src/security/security_dac.c (virSecurityDACSetChardevLabel)
(virSecurityDACSetChardevCallback)
(virSecurityDACRestoreChardevLabel)
(virSecurityDACRestoreChardevCallback): Likewise.
* src/security/security_selinux.c (SELinuxSetSecurityChardevLabel)
(SELinuxSetSecurityChardevCallback)
(SELinuxRestoreSecurityChardevLabel)
(SELinuxSetSecurityChardevCallback): Likewise.
* src/security/virt-aa-helper.c (get_files): Likewise.
* src/lxc/lxc_driver.c (lxcVmStart, lxcDomainOpenConsole):
Likewise.
* src/uml/uml_conf.c (umlBuildCommandLineChr): Likewise.
* src/uml/uml_driver.c (umlIdentifyOneChrPTY, umlIdentifyChrPTY)
(umlDomainOpenConsole): Likewise.
* src/qemu/qemu_command.c (qemuBuildChrChardevStr)
(qemuBuildChrArgStr, qemuBuildCommandLine)
(qemuParseCommandLineChr): Likewise.
* src/qemu/qemu_domain.c (qemuDomainObjPrivateXMLFormat)
(qemuDomainObjPrivateXMLParse): Likewise.
* src/qemu/qemu_cgroup.c (qemuSetupChardevCgroup): Likewise.
* src/qemu/qemu_hotplug.c (qemuDomainAttachNetDevice): Likewise.
* src/qemu/qemu_driver.c (qemudFindCharDevicePTYsMonitor)
(qemudFindCharDevicePTYs, qemuPrepareChardevDevice)
(qemuPrepareMonitorChr, qemudShutdownVMDaemon)
(qemuDomainOpenConsole): Likewise.
* src/qemu/qemu_command.h (qemuBuildChrChardevStr)
(qemuBuildChrArgStr): Delete, now that they are static.
* src/libvirt_private.syms (domain_conf.h): New exports.
* cfg.mk (useless_free_options): Update list.
* tests/qemuxml2argvtest.c (testCompareXMLToArgvFiles): Update
tests.

The current security driver usage requires horrible code like

    if (driver->securityDriver &&
        driver->securityDriver->domainSetSecurityHostdevLabel &&
        driver->securityDriver->domainSetSecurityHostdevLabel(driver->securityDriver,
                                                              vm, hostdev) < 0)

This pair of checks for NULL clutters up the code, making the driver
calls 2 lines longer than they really need to be. The goal of the
patchset is to change the calling convention to simply

  if (virSecurityManagerSetHostdevLabel(driver->securityDriver,
                                        vm, hostdev) < 0)

The first check for 'driver->securityDriver' being NULL is removed
by introducing a 'no op' security driver that will always be present
if no real driver is enabled. This guarentees driver->securityDriver
!= NULL.

The second check for 'driver->securityDriver->domainSetSecurityHostdevLabel'
being non-NULL is hidden in a new abstraction called virSecurityManager.
This separates the driver callbacks, from main internal API. The addition
of a virSecurityManager object, that is separate from the virSecurityDriver
struct also allows for security drivers to carry state / configuration
information directly. Thus the DAC/Stack drivers from src/qemu which
used to pull config from 'struct qemud_driver' can now be moved into
the 'src/security' directory and store their config directly.

* src/qemu/qemu_conf.h, src/qemu/qemu_driver.c: Update to
  use new virSecurityManager APIs
* src/qemu/qemu_security_dac.c,  src/qemu/qemu_security_dac.h
  src/qemu/qemu_security_stacked.c, src/qemu/qemu_security_stacked.h:
  Move into src/security directory
* src/security/security_stack.c, src/security/security_stack.h,
  src/security/security_dac.c, src/security/security_dac.h: Generic
  versions of previous QEMU specific drivers
* src/security/security_apparmor.c, src/security/security_apparmor.h,
  src/security/security_driver.c, src/security/security_driver.h,
  src/security/security_selinux.c, src/security/security_selinux.h:
  Update to take virSecurityManagerPtr object as the first param
  in all callbacks
* src/security/security_nop.c, src/security/security_nop.h: Stub
  implementation of all security driver APIs.
* src/security/security_manager.h, src/security/security_manager.c:
  New internal API for invoking security drivers
* src/libvirt.c: Add missing debug for security APIs

Network disks are accessed by qemu directly, and have no
associated file on the host, so checking for file ownership etc.
is unnecessary.
Signed-off-by: NJosh Durgin <joshd@hq.newdream.net>

* configure.ac (with_selinux): Check for <selinux/label.h>.
* src/security/security_selinux.c (getContext): New function.
(SELinuxRestoreSecurityFileLabel): Use it to restore compilation
when using older libselinux.