The new name is virSecurityManagerDomainRestorePathLabel().
Signed-off-by: NMichal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NErik Skultety <eskultet@redhat.com>

After previous commit this function is used no more.
Signed-off-by: NMichal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NErik Skultety <eskultet@redhat.com>

This API allows drivers to separate out handling of @stdin_path
of virSecurityManagerSetAllLabel(). The thing is, the QEMU driver
uses transactions for virSecurityManagerSetAllLabel() which
relabels devices from inside of domain's namespace. This is what
we usually want. Except when resuming domain from a file. The
file is opened before any namespace is set up and the FD is
passed to QEMU to read the migration stream from. Because of
this, the file lives outside of the namespace and if it so
happens that the file is a block device (i.e. it lives under
/dev) its copy will be created in the namespace. But the FD that
is passed to QEMU points to the original living in the host and
not in the namespace. So relabeling the file inside the namespace
helps nothing.

But if we have a separate API for relabeling the restore file
then the QEMU driver can continue calling
virSecurityManagerSetAllLabel() with transactions enabled and
call this new API without transactions.

We already have an API for relabeling a single file
(virSecurityManagerDomainSetPathLabel()) but in case of SELinux
it uses @imagelabel (which allows RW access) and we want to use
@content_context (which allows RO access).
Signed-off-by: NMichal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NErik Skultety <eskultet@redhat.com>

Use G_GNUC_UNUSED from GLib instead of ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED.
Signed-off-by: NJán Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NMichal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>

In order to have multiple security drivers hidden under one
virSecurity* call, we have virSecurityStack driver which holds a
list of registered security drivers and for every virSecurity*
call it iterates over the list and calls corresponding callback
in real security drivers. For instance, for
virSecurityManagerSetAllLabel() it calls
domainSetSecurityAllLabel callback sequentially in NOP, DAC and
(possibly) SELinux or AppArmor drivers. This works just fine if
the callback from every driver returns success. Problem arises
when one of the drivers fails. For instance, aforementioned
SetAllLabel() succeeds for DAC but fails in SELinux in which
case all files that DAC relabelled are now owned by qemu:qemu (or
whomever runs qemu) and thus permissions are leaked. This is even
more visible with XATTRs which remain set for DAC.

The solution is to perform a rollback on failure, i.e. call
opposite action on drivers that succeeded.

I'm providing rollback only for set calls and intentionally
omitting restore calls for two reasons:

1) restore calls are less likely to fail (they merely remove
XATTRs and chown()/setfilecon() file - all of these operations
succeeded in set call),

2) we are not really interested in restore failures - in a very
few places we check for retval of a restore function we do so
only to print a warning.

Resolves: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1740024Signed-off-by: NMichal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NCole Robinson <crobinso@redhat.com>

In near future we will need to walk through the list of internal
drivers in reversed order. The simplest solution is to turn
singly linked list into a doubly linked list.
We will not need to start from the end really, so there's no tail
pointer kept.
Signed-off-by: NMichal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NCole Robinson <crobinso@redhat.com>

In upcoming commits, virSecurityManagerSetAllLabel() will perform
rollback in case of failure by calling
virSecurityManagerRestoreAllLabel(). But in order to do that, the
former needs to have @migrated argument so that it can be passed
to the latter.
Signed-off-by: NMichal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NCole Robinson <crobinso@redhat.com>

The purpose of this API is to allow caller move XATTRs (or remove
them) from one file to another. This will be needed when moving
top level of disk chain (either by introducing new HEAD or
removing it).
Signed-off-by: NMichal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NCole Robinson <crobinso@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NDaniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>

Security labeling of disks consists of labeling of the disk image
itself and it's backing chain. Modify
virSecurityManager[Set|Restore]ImageLabel to take a boolean flag that
will label the full chain rather than the top image itself.

This allows to delete/unify some parts of the code and will also
simplify callers in some cases.
Signed-off-by: NPeter Krempa <pkrempa@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NJohn Ferlan <jferlan@redhat.com>

When metadata locking is enabled that means the security commit
processing will be run in a fork similar to how namespaces use fork()'s
for processing. This is done to ensure libvirt can properly and
synchronously modify the metadata to store the original owner data.

Since fork()'s (e.g. virFork) have been seen as a performance bottleneck
being able to disable them allows the admin to choose whether the
performance 'hit' is worth the extra 'security' of being able to
remember the original owner of a lock.
Signed-off-by: NMichal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NJohn Ferlan <jferlan@redhat.com>

In this patch we label the swtpm process with SELinux labels. We give it the
same label as the QEMU process has. We label its state directory and files
as well. We restore the old security labels once the swtpm has terminated.

The file and process labels now look as follows:

Directory: /var/lib/libvirt/swtpm

[root@localhost swtpm]# ls -lZ
total 4
rwx------. 2 tss  tss  system_u:object_r:svirt_image_t:s0:c254,c932 4096 Apr  5 16:46 testvm

[root@localhost testvm]# ls -lZ
total 8
-rw-r--r--. 1 tss tss system_u:object_r:svirt_image_t:s0:c254,c932 3648 Apr  5 16:46 tpm-00.permall

The log in /var/log/swtpm/libvirt/qemu is labeled as follows:

-rw-r--r--. 1 tss tss system_u:object_r:svirt_image_t:s0:c254,c932 2237 Apr  5 16:46 vtpm.log

[root@localhost 485d0004-a48f-436a-8457-8a3b73e28567]# ps auxZ | grep swtpm | grep ctrl | grep -v grep
system_u:system_r:svirt_t:s0:c254,c932 tss 25664 0.0  0.0 28172  3892 ?        Ss   16:57   0:00 /usr/bin/swtpm socket --daemon --ctrl type=unixio,path=/var/run/libvirt/qemu/swtpm/testvm-swtpm.sock,mode=0660 --tpmstate dir=/var/lib/libvirt/swtpm/testvm/tpm1.2 --log file=/var/log/swtpm/libvirt/qemu/testvm-swtpm.log

[root@localhost 485d0004-a48f-436a-8457-8a3b73e28567]# ps auxZ | grep qemu | grep tpm | grep -v grep
system_u:system_r:svirt_t:s0:c254,c932 qemu 25669 99.0  0.0 3096704 48500 ?    Sl   16:57   3:28 /bin/qemu-system-x86_64 [..]
Signed-off-by: NStefan Berger <stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: NJohn Ferlan <jferlan@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NJán Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>

virSecurityManagerDomainSetPathLabel is used to make a path known
to the security modules, but today is used interchangably for
 - paths to files/dirs to be accessed directly
 - paths to a dir, but the access will actually be to files therein

Depending on the security module it is important to know which of
these types it will be.

The argument allowSubtree augments the call to the implementations of
DomainSetPathLabel that can - per security module - decide if extra
actions shall be taken.

For now dac/selinux handle this as before, but apparmor will make
use of it to add a wildcard to the path that was passed.
Signed-off-by: NChristian Ehrhardt <christian.ehrhardt@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: NMichal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>

SELinux and DAC drivers already have both functions but they were not
exported as public API of security manager.
Signed-off-by: NPavel Hrdina <phrdina@redhat.com>

Export the existing DAC and SELinux for separate use and introduce
functions for stack, nop and the security manager.

In the case that virtlogd is used as stdio handler we pass to QEMU
only FD to a PIPE connected to virtlogd instead of the file itself.

Resolves: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1430988Signed-off-by: NPavel Hrdina <phrdina@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NMartin Kletzander <mkletzan@redhat.com>

We prefer c89 style of comments.
Signed-off-by: NMichal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>

These APIs will be used whenever we are hot (un-)plugging a
memdev.
Signed-off-by: NMichal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>

With our new qemu namespace code in place, the relabelling of
devices is done not as good is it could: a child process is
spawned, it enters the mount namespace of the qemu process and
then runs desired API of the security driver.

Problem with this approach is that internal state transition of
the security driver done in the child process is not reflected in
the parent process. While currently it wouldn't matter that much,
it is fairly easy to forget about that. We should take the extra
step now while this limitation is still fresh in our minds.

Three new APIs are introduced here:
  virSecurityManagerTransactionStart()
  virSecurityManagerTransactionCommit()
  virSecurityManagerTransactionAbort()

The Start() is going to be used to let security driver know that
we are starting a new transaction. During a transaction no
security labels are actually touched, but rather recorded and
only at Commit() phase they are actually updated. Should
something go wrong Abort() aborts the transaction freeing up all
memory allocated by transaction.
Signed-off-by: NMichal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>

Since its introduction in 2012 this internal API did nothing.
Moreover we have the same API that does exactly the same:
virSecurityManagerDomainSetPathLabel.
Signed-off-by: NMichal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>

It already labels abritrary paths, so it's just the naming that was
wrong.
Signed-off-by: NMartin Kletzander <mkletzan@redhat.com>

Many of the functions follow the pattern:
virSecurity.*Security.*Label

Remove the second 'Security' from the names, it should be
obvious that the virSecurity* functions deal with security
labels even without it.

Signed-off-by: NMartin Kletzander <mkletzan@redhat.com>

Add security driver functions to label separate storage images using the
virStorageSource definition. This will help to avoid the need to do ugly
changes to the disk struct and use the source directly.

Some of the functions in the storage driver had their headers formatted
incorrectly.

I'm going to add functions that will deal with individual image files
rather than whole disks. Rename the security function to make room for
the new one.

I'm going to add functions that will deal with individual image files
rather than whole disks. Rename the security function to make room for
the new one.

Also remove one spurious ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED guarding the @migrated
argument.

Signed-off-by: NMartin Kletzander <mkletzan@redhat.com>

To make it easier to forbid future attempts at a confusing typedef
name ending in Ptr that isn't actually a pointer, insist that we
follow our preferred style of 'typedef foo *fooPtr'.

* cfg.mk (sc_forbid_const_pointer_typedef): Enforce consistent
style, to prevent issue fixed in previous storage patch.
* src/conf/capabilities.h (virCapsPtr): Fix offender.
* src/security/security_stack.c (virSecurityStackItemPtr):
Likewise.
* tests/qemucapabilitiestest.c (testQemuDataPtr): Likewise.
Signed-off-by: NEric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>

virSecurityManagerGetBaseLabel queries the default settings used by
a security model.
Signed-off-by: NGiuseppe Scrivano <gscrivan@redhat.com>

Attempts to start a domain with both SELinux and DAC security
modules loaded will deadlock; latent problem introduced in commit
fdb3bde3 and exposed in commit 29fe5d74.  Basically, when recursing
into the security manager for other driver's prefork, we have to
undo the asymmetric lock taken at the manager level.

Reported by Jiri Denemark, with diagnosis help from Dan Berrange.

* src/security/security_stack.c (virSecurityStackPreFork): Undo
extra lock grabbed during recursion.
Signed-off-by: NEric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>

A future patch wants the DAC security manager to be able to safely
get the supplemental group list for a given uid, but at the time
of a fork rather than during initialization so as to pick up on
live changes to the system's group database.  This patch adds the
framework, including the possibility of a pre-fork callback
failing.

For now, any driver that implements a prefork callback must be
robust against the possibility of being part of a security stack
where a later element in the chain fails prefork.  This means
that drivers cannot do any action that requires a call to postfork
for proper cleanup (no grabbing a mutex, for example).  If this
is too prohibitive in the future, we would have to switch to a
transactioning sequence, where each driver has (up to) 3 callbacks:
PreForkPrepare, PreForkCommit, and PreForkAbort, to either clean
up or commit changes made during prepare.

* src/security/security_driver.h (virSecurityDriverPreFork): New
callback.
* src/security/security_manager.h (virSecurityManagerPreFork):
Change signature.
* src/security/security_manager.c (virSecurityManagerPreFork):
Optionally call into driver, and allow returning failure.
* src/security/security_stack.c (virSecurityDriverStack):
Wrap the handler for the stack driver.
* src/qemu/qemu_process.c (qemuProcessStart): Adjust caller.
Signed-off-by: NEric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>

Convert the type of loop iterators named 'i', 'j', k',
'ii', 'jj', 'kk', to be 'size_t' instead of 'int' or
'unsigned int', also santizing 'ii', 'jj', 'kk' to use
the normal 'i', 'j', 'k' naming
Signed-off-by: NDaniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>

The existing virSecurityManagerSetProcessLabel() API is designed so
that it must be called after forking the child process, but before
exec'ing the child. Due to the way the virCommand API works, that
means it needs to be put in a "hook" function that virCommand is told
to call out to at that time.

Setting the child process label is a basic enough need when executing
any process that virCommand should have a method of doing that. But
virCommand must be told what label to set, and only the security
driver knows the answer to that question.

The new virSecurityManagerSet*Child*ProcessLabel() API is the way to
transfer the knowledge about what label to set from the security
driver to the virCommand object. It is given a virCommandPtr, and each
security driver calls the appropriate virCommand* API to tell
virCommand what to do between fork and exec.

1) in the case of the DAC security driver, it calls
virCommandSetUID/GID() to set a uid and gid that must be set for the
child process.

2) for the SELinux security driver, it calls
virCommandSetSELinuxLabel() to save a copy of the char* that will be
sent to setexeccon_raw() *after forking the child process*.

3) for the AppArmor security drivers, it calls
virCommandSetAppArmorProfile() to save a copy of the char* that will
be sent to aa_change_profile() *after forking the child process*.

With this new API in place, we will be able to remove
virSecurityManagerSetProcessLabel() from any virCommand pre-exec
hooks.

(Unfortunately, the LXC driver uses clone() rather than virCommand, so
it can't take advantage of this new security driver API, meaning that
we need to keep around the older virSecurityManagerSetProcessLabel(),
at least for now.)

To enable locking to be introduced to the security manager
objects later, turn virSecurityManager into a virObjectLockable
class
Signed-off-by: NDaniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>

When LXC labels USB devices during hotplug, it is running in
host context, so it needs to pass in a vroot path to the
container root.
Signed-off-by: NDaniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>

When a qemu domain is backed by huge pages, apparmor needs to grant the domain
rw access to files under the hugetlbfs mount point.  Add a hook, called in
qemu_process.c, which ends up adding the read-write access through
virt-aa-helper.  Qemu will be creating a randomly named file under the
mountpoint and unlinking it as soon as it has mmap()d it, therefore we
cannot predict the full pathname, but for the same reason it is generally
safe to provide access to $path/**.
Signed-off-by: NSerge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>