The virSecurityManagerSetProcessFDLabel method was introduced
after a mis-understanding from a conversation about SELinux
socket labelling. The virSecurityManagerSetSocketLabel method
should have been used for all such scenarios.

* src/security/security_apparmor.c, src/security/security_apparmor.c,
  src/security/security_driver.h, src/security/security_manager.c,
  src/security/security_manager.h, src/security/security_selinux.c,
  src/security/security_stack.c: Remove SetProcessFDLabel driver

This API labels all sockets created until ClearSocketLabel is called in
a way that a vm can access them (i.e., they are labeled with svirt_t
based label in SELinux).

The APIs are designed to label a socket in a way that the libvirt daemon
itself is able to access it (i.e., in SELinux the label is virtd_t based
as opposed to svirt_* we use for labeling resources that need to be
accessed by a vm). The new name reflects this.

Add a new security driver method for labelling an FD with
the process label, rather than the image label

* src/libvirt_private.syms, src/security/security_apparmor.c,
  src/security/security_dac.c, src/security/security_driver.h,
  src/security/security_manager.c, src/security/security_manager.h,
  src/security/security_selinux.c, src/security/security_stack.c:
  Add virSecurityManagerSetProcessFDLabel & impl

The virSecurityManagerSetFDLabel method is used to label
file descriptors associated with disk images. There will
shortly be a need to label other file descriptors in a
different way. So the current name is ambiguous. Rename
the method to virSecurityManagerSetImageFDLabel to clarify
its purpose

* src/libvirt_private.syms,
  src/qemu/qemu_migration.c, src/qemu/qemu_process.c,
  src/security/security_apparmor.c, src/security/security_dac.c,
  src/security/security_driver.h, src/security/security_manager.c,
  src/security/security_manager.h, src/security/security_selinux.c,
  src/security/security_stack.c: s/FDLabel/ImageFDLabel/

A need was found to set the SELinux context label on an open fd (a
pipe, as a matter of fact). This patch adds a function to the security
driver API that will set the label on an open fd to secdef.label. For
all drivers other than the SELinux driver, it's a NOP. For the SElinux
driver, it calls fsetfilecon().

If the return is a failure, it only returns error up to the caller if
1) the desired label is different from the existing label, 2) the
destination fd is of a type that supports setting the selinux context,
and 3) selinux is in enforcing mode. Otherwise it will return
success. This follows the pattern of the existing function
SELinuxSetFilecon().

The current security driver usage requires horrible code like

    if (driver->securityDriver &&
        driver->securityDriver->domainSetSecurityHostdevLabel &&
        driver->securityDriver->domainSetSecurityHostdevLabel(driver->securityDriver,
                                                              vm, hostdev) < 0)

This pair of checks for NULL clutters up the code, making the driver
calls 2 lines longer than they really need to be. The goal of the
patchset is to change the calling convention to simply

  if (virSecurityManagerSetHostdevLabel(driver->securityDriver,
                                        vm, hostdev) < 0)

The first check for 'driver->securityDriver' being NULL is removed
by introducing a 'no op' security driver that will always be present
if no real driver is enabled. This guarentees driver->securityDriver
!= NULL.

The second check for 'driver->securityDriver->domainSetSecurityHostdevLabel'
being non-NULL is hidden in a new abstraction called virSecurityManager.
This separates the driver callbacks, from main internal API. The addition
of a virSecurityManager object, that is separate from the virSecurityDriver
struct also allows for security drivers to carry state / configuration
information directly. Thus the DAC/Stack drivers from src/qemu which
used to pull config from 'struct qemud_driver' can now be moved into
the 'src/security' directory and store their config directly.

* src/qemu/qemu_conf.h, src/qemu/qemu_driver.c: Update to
  use new virSecurityManager APIs
* src/qemu/qemu_security_dac.c,  src/qemu/qemu_security_dac.h
  src/qemu/qemu_security_stacked.c, src/qemu/qemu_security_stacked.h:
  Move into src/security directory
* src/security/security_stack.c, src/security/security_stack.h,
  src/security/security_dac.c, src/security/security_dac.h: Generic
  versions of previous QEMU specific drivers
* src/security/security_apparmor.c, src/security/security_apparmor.h,
  src/security/security_driver.c, src/security/security_driver.h,
  src/security/security_selinux.c, src/security/security_selinux.h:
  Update to take virSecurityManagerPtr object as the first param
  in all callbacks
* src/security/security_nop.c, src/security/security_nop.h: Stub
  implementation of all security driver APIs.
* src/security/security_manager.h, src/security/security_manager.c:
  New internal API for invoking security drivers
* src/libvirt.c: Add missing debug for security APIs

Disk format probing is now disabled by default. A new config
option in /etc/qemu/qemu.conf will re-enable it for existing
deployments where this causes trouble

The implementation of security driver callbacks often needs
to access the security driver object. Currently only a handful
of callbacks include the driver object as a parameter. Later
patches require this is many more places.

* src/qemu/qemu_driver.c: Pass in the security driver object
  to all callbacks
* src/qemu/qemu_security_dac.c, src/qemu/qemu_security_stacked.c,
  src/security/security_apparmor.c, src/security/security_driver.h,
  src/security/security_selinux.c: Add a virSecurityDriverPtr
  param to all security callbacks

When SELinux is running in MLS mode, libvirtd will have a
different security level to the VMs. For libvirtd to be
able to connect to the monitor console, the client end of
the UNIX domain socket needs a different label. This adds
infrastructure to set the socket label via the security
driver framework

* src/qemu/qemu_driver.c: Call out to socket label APIs in
  security driver
* src/qemu/qemu_security_stacked.c: Wire up socket label
  drivers
* src/security/security_driver.h: Define security driver
  entry points for socket labelling
* src/security/security_selinux.c: Set socket label based on
  VM label

Adjust args to qemudStartVMDaemon() to also specify path to stdin_fd,
so this can be passed to the AppArmor driver via SetSecurityAllLabel().

This updates all calls to qemudStartVMDaemon() as well as setting up
the non-AppArmor security driver *SetSecurityAllLabel() declarations
for the above. This is required for the following
"apparmor-fix-save-restore" patch since AppArmor resolves the passed
file descriptor to the pathname given to open().

When QEMU runs with its disk on NFS, and as a non-root user, the
disk is chownd to that non-root user. When migration completes
the last step is shutting down the QEMU on the source host. THis
normally resets user/group/security label. This is bad when the
VM was just migrated because the file is still in use on the dest
host. It is thus neccessary to skip the reset step for any files
found to be on a shared filesystem

* src/libvirt_private.syms: Export virStorageFileIsSharedFS
* src/util/storage_file.c, src/util/storage_file.h: Add a new
  method virStorageFileIsSharedFS() to determine if a file is
  on a shared filesystem (NFS, GFS, OCFS2, etc)
* src/qemu/qemu_driver.c: Tell security driver not to reset
  disk labels on migration completion
* src/qemu/qemu_security_dac.c, src/qemu/qemu_security_stacked.c,
  src/security/security_selinux.c, src/security/security_driver.h,
  src/security/security_apparmor.c: Add ability to skip disk
  restore step for files on shared filesystems.

* global: patch created by running:
for f in $(git ls-files '*.[ch]') ; do
    cppi $f > $f.t && mv $f.t $f
done

Prior to this patch, there was an inconsistent mix between GNU and C99.

For consistency, and potential portability to other compilers, stick
with the C99 vararg macro syntax.

* src/conf/cpu_conf.c (virCPUReportError): Use C99 rather than GNU
  vararg macro syntax.
* src/conf/domain_conf.c (virDomainReportError): Likewise.
* src/conf/domain_event.c (eventReportError): Likewise.
* src/conf/interface_conf.c (virInterfaceReportError): Likewise.
* src/conf/network_conf.c (virNetworkReportError): Likewise.
* src/conf/node_device_conf.h (virNodeDeviceReportError): Likewise.
* src/conf/secret_conf.h (virSecretReportError): Likewise.
* src/conf/storage_conf.h (virStorageReportError): Likewise.
* src/esx/esx_device_monitor.c (ESX_ERROR): Use C99 rather than
  GNU vararg macro syntax.
* src/esx/esx_driver.c (ESX_ERROR): Likewise.
* src/esx/esx_interface_driver.c (ESX_ERROR): Likewise.
* src/esx/esx_network_driver.c (ESX_ERROR): Likewise.
* src/esx/esx_secret_driver.c (ESX_ERROR): Likewise.
* src/esx/esx_storage_driver.c (ESX_ERROR): Likewise.
* src/esx/esx_util.c (ESX_ERROR): Likewise.
* src/esx/esx_vi.c (ESX_VI_ERROR): Likewise.
* src/esx/esx_vi_methods.c (ESX_VI_ERROR): Likewise.
* src/esx/esx_vi_types.c (ESX_VI_ERROR): Likewise.
* src/esx/esx_vmx.c (ESX_ERROR): Likewise.
* src/util/hostusb.c (usbReportError): Use C99 rather than GNU
  vararg macro syntax.
* src/util/json.c (virJSONError): Likewise.
* src/util/macvtap.c (ReportError): Likewise.
* src/util/pci.c (pciReportError): Likewise.
* src/util/stats_linux.c (virStatsError): Likewise.
* src/util/util.c (virUtilError): Likewise.
* src/util/xml.c (virXMLError): Likewise.
* src/xen/proxy_internal.c (virProxyError): Use C99 rather than
  GNU vararg macro syntax.
* src/xen/sexpr.c (virSexprError): Likewise.
* src/xen/xen_driver.c (xenUnifiedError): Likewise.
* src/xen/xen_hypervisor.c (virXenError): Likewise.
* src/xen/xen_inotify.c (virXenInotifyError): Likewise.
* src/xen/xend_internal.c (virXendError): Likewise.
* src/xen/xm_internal.c (xenXMError): Likewise.
* src/xen/xs_internal.c (virXenStoreError): Likewise.
* src/cpu/cpu.h (virCPUReportError): Use C99 rather than GNU
  vararg macro syntax.
* src/datatypes.c (virLibConnError): Likewise.
* src/interface/netcf_driver.c (interfaceReportError): Likewise.
* src/libvirt.c (virLibStreamError): Likewise.
* src/lxc/lxc_conf.h (lxcError): Likewise.
* src/network/bridge_driver.c (networkReportError): Likewise.
* src/nodeinfo.c (nodeReportError): Likewise.
* src/opennebula/one_conf.h (oneError): Likewise.
* src/openvz/openvz_conf.h (openvzError): Likewise.
* src/phyp/phyp_driver.c (PHYP_ERROR): Likewise.
* src/qemu/qemu_conf.h (qemuReportError): Likewise.
* src/remote/remote_driver.c (errorf): Likewise.
* src/security/security_driver.h (virSecurityReportError): Likewise.
* src/test/test_driver.c (testError): Likewise.
* src/uml/uml_conf.h (umlReportError): Likewise.
* src/vbox/vbox_driver.c (vboxError): Likewise.
* src/vbox/vbox_tmpl.c (vboxError): Likewise.

The virRaiseError macro inside of virSecurityReportError expands to
virRaiseErrorFull and includes the __FILE__, __FUNCTION__ and __LINE__
information. But this three values are always the same for every call
to virSecurityReportError and do not reflect the actual error context.

Converting virSecurityReportError into a macro results in getting the
correct __FILE__, __FUNCTION__ and __LINE__ information.

The virConnectPtr is no longer required for error reporting since
that is recorded in a thread local. Remove use of virConnectPtr
from all APIs in security_driver.{h,c} and update all callers to
match

The current security driver architecture has the following
split of logic

 * domainGenSecurityLabel

    Allocate the unique label for the domain about to be started

 * domainGetSecurityLabel

    Retrieve the current live security label for a process

 * domainSetSecurityLabel

    Apply the previously allocated label to the current process
    Setup all disk image / device labelling

 * domainRestoreSecurityLabel

    Restore the original disk image / device labelling.
    Release the unique label for the domain

The 'domainSetSecurityLabel' method is special because it runs
in the context of the child process between the fork + exec.

This is require in order to set the process label. It is not
required in order to label disks/devices though. Having the
disk labelling code run in the child process limits what it
can do.

In particularly libvirtd would like to remember the current
disk image label, and only change shared image labels for the
first VM to start. This requires use & update of global state
in the libvirtd daemon, and thus cannot run in the child
process context.

The solution is to split domainSetSecurityLabel into two parts,
one applies process label, and the other handles disk image
labelling. At the same time domainRestoreSecurityLabel is
similarly split, just so that it matches the style. Thus the
previous 4 methods are replaced by the following 6 new methods

 * domainGenSecurityLabel

    Allocate the unique label for the domain about to be started
    No actual change here.

 * domainReleaseSecurityLabel

   Release the unique label for the domain

 * domainGetSecurityProcessLabel

   Retrieve the current live security label for a process
   Merely renamed for clarity.

 * domainSetSecurityProcessLabel

   Apply the previously allocated label to the current process

 * domainRestoreSecurityAllLabel

    Restore the original disk image / device labelling.

 * domainSetSecurityAllLabel

    Setup all disk image / device labelling

The SELinux and AppArmour drivers are then updated to comply with
this new spec. Notice that the AppArmour driver was actually a
little different. It was creating its profile for the disk image
and device labels in the 'domainGenSecurityLabel' method, where as
the SELinux driver did it in 'domainSetSecurityLabel'. With the
new method split, we can have consistency, with both drivers doing
that in the domainSetSecurityAllLabel method.

NB, the AppArmour changes here haven't been compiled so may not
build.

The QEMU driver is doing 90% of the calls to check for static vs
dynamic labelling. Except it is forgetting todo so in many places,
in particular hotplug is mistakenly assigning disk labels. Move
all this logic into the security drivers themselves, so the HV
drivers don't have to think about it.

* src/security/security_driver.h: Add virDomainObjPtr parameter
  to virSecurityDomainRestoreHostdevLabel and to
  virSecurityDomainRestoreSavedStateLabel
* src/security/security_selinux.c, src/security/security_apparmor.c:
  Add explicit checks for VIR_DOMAIN_SECLABEL_STATIC and skip all
  chcon() code in those cases
* src/qemu/qemu_driver.c: Remove all checks for VIR_DOMAIN_SECLABEL_STATIC
  or VIR_DOMAIN_SECLABEL_DYNAMIC. Add missing checks for possibly NULL
  driver entry points.

When running qemu:///system instance, libvirtd runs as root,
but QEMU may optionally be configured to run non-root. When
then saving a guest to a state file, the file is initially
created as root, and thus QEMU cannot write to it. It is also
missing labelling required to allow access via SELinux.

* src/qemu/qemu_driver.c: Set ownership on save image before
  running migrate command in virDomainSave impl. Call out to
  security driver to set save image labelling
* src/security/security_driver.h: Add driver APIs for setting
  and restoring saved state file labelling
* src/security/security_selinux.c: Implement saved state file
  labelling for SELinux

When James Morris originally submitted his sVirt patches (as seen in
libvirt 0.6.1), he did not require on disk labelling for
virSecurityDomainRestoreImageLabel. A later commit[2] changed this
behavior to assume on disk labelling, which halts implementations for
path-based MAC systems such as AppArmor and TOMOYO where
vm->def->seclabel is required to obtain the label.

* src/security/security_driver.h src/qemu/qemu_driver.c
  src/security/security_selinux.c: adds the 'virDomainObjPtr vm'
  argument back to *RestoreImageLabel

* src/Makefile.am, src/qemu/qemu_conf.h, src/qemu/qemu_driver.c,
  tests/seclabeltest.c: Adapt for changed paths
* src/security.c: Rename to src/security/security_driver.c
* src/security.h: Rename to src/security/security_driver.h
* src/security_selinux.c, src/security_selinux.h: Move to src/security/

* src/security.h: Driver API for relabelling host devices
* src/security_selinux.c: Implement relabelling of PCI and USB
  devices
* src/qemu_driver.c: Relabel USB/PCI devices before hotplug

GCC >= 4.4 assumes the 'printf' attribute refers to the native
runtime libraries format specifiers. Thanks to gnulib, libvirt
has GNU format specifiers everywhere.  This means we need to
use 'gnu_printf' with GCC >= 4.4 to get correct compiler
checking of printf format specifiers.

* HACKING: Document new rules for ATTRIBUTE_FMT_PRINTF
* autobuild.sh, mingw32-libvirt.spec.in: Disable OpenNebula
  driver on mingw32 builds
* qemud/dispatch.h, qemud/qemu.h, src/buf.h src/internal.h,
  src/logging.h, src/security.h, src/sexpr.h, src/util.h,
  src/virterror_internal.h, src/xend_internal.c: Change
  over to ATTRIBUTE_FMT_PRINTF.
* src/virsh.c: Disable 'cd' and 'pwd' commands on Win32
  since they don't compile
* src/threads-win32.c: Add missing return value check