Signed-off-by: NMartin Kletzander <mkletzan@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NJán Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>

We're freeing individual items in it but not the array itself.

==19200== 40 bytes in 1 blocks are definitely lost in loss record 847 of 1,059
==19200==    at 0x4C2D12F: realloc (vg_replace_malloc.c:785)
==19200==    by 0x52C5532: virReallocN (viralloc.c:245)
==19200==    by 0x52C5628: virExpandN (viralloc.c:294)
==19200==    by 0x52C58FC: virInsertElementsN (viralloc.c:436)
==19200==    by 0x542856B: virSecurityDACChownListAppend (security_dac.c:115)
==19200==    by 0x54286B4: virSecurityDACTransactionAppend (security_dac.c:167)
==19200==    by 0x542902F: virSecurityDACSetOwnershipInternal (security_dac.c:560)
==19200==    by 0x54295D6: virSecurityDACSetOwnership (security_dac.c:650)
==19200==    by 0x542AEE0: virSecurityDACSetInputLabel (security_dac.c:1472)
==19200==    by 0x542B61D: virSecurityDACSetAllLabel (security_dac.c:1693)
==19200==    by 0x542DD67: virSecurityManagerSetAllLabel (security_manager.c:869)
==19200==    by 0x54279C2: virSecurityStackSetAllLabel (security_stack.c:361)
Signed-off-by: NMichal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>

virSecurityManagerDomainSetPathLabel is used to make a path known
to the security modules, but today is used interchangably for
 - paths to files/dirs to be accessed directly
 - paths to a dir, but the access will actually be to files therein

Depending on the security module it is important to know which of
these types it will be.

The argument allowSubtree augments the call to the implementations of
DomainSetPathLabel that can - per security module - decide if extra
actions shall be taken.

For now dac/selinux handle this as before, but apparmor will make
use of it to add a wildcard to the path that was passed.
Signed-off-by: NChristian Ehrhardt <christian.ehrhardt@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: NMichal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>

SELinux and DAC drivers already have both functions but they were not
exported as public API of security manager.
Signed-off-by: NPavel Hrdina <phrdina@redhat.com>

Export the existing DAC and SELinux for separate use and introduce
functions for stack, nop and the security manager.

Until now we ignored user-provided backing chains and while detecting
the code inherited labels of the parent device. With user provided
chains we should keep this functionality, so label of the parent image
in the backing chain will be applied if an image-specific label is not
present.

Add helpers that will simplify checking if a backing file is valid or
whether it has backing store. The helper virStorageSourceIsBacking
returns true if the given virStorageSource is a valid backing store
member. virStorageSourceHasBacking returns true if the virStorageSource
has a backing store child.

Adding these functions creates a central points for further refactors.

For a logged in user this a path like /dev/dri/renderD128 will have
default ownership root:video which won't work for the qemu:qemu user,
so we need to chown it.

We only do this when mount namespaces are enabled in the qemu driver,
so the chown'ing doesn't interfere with other users of the shared
render node path

https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1460804

The VIR_SECURITY_MANAGER_MOUNT_NAMESPACE flag informs the DAC driver
if mount namespaces are in use for the VM. Will be used for future
changes.

Wire it up in the qemu driver

Our commit e13e8808 was way too generic. Currently, virtlogd is
used only for chardevs type of file and nothing else. True, we
must not relabel the path in this case, but we have to in all
other cases. For instance, if you want to have a physical console
attached to your guest:

    <console type='dev'>
      <source path='/dev/ttyS0'/>
      <target type='virtio' port='1'/>
    </console>

Starting such domain fails because qemu doesn't have access to
/dev/ttyS0 because we haven't relabelled the path.
Signed-off-by: NMichal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NJohn Ferlan <jferlan@redhat.com>

In the case that virtlogd is used as stdio handler we pass to QEMU
only FD to a PIPE connected to virtlogd instead of the file itself.

Resolves: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1430988Signed-off-by: NPavel Hrdina <phrdina@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NMartin Kletzander <mkletzan@redhat.com>

Signed-off-by: NPavel Hrdina <phrdina@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NJohn Ferlan <jferlan@redhat.com>

Namely, this patch is about virMediatedDeviceGetIOMMUGroup{Dev,Num}
functions. There's no compelling reason why these functions should take
an object, on the contrary, having to create an object every time one
needs to query the IOMMU group number, discarding the object afterwards,
seems odd.
Signed-off-by: NErik Skultety <eskultet@redhat.com>

This patch updates all of our security driver to start labeling the
VFIO IOMMU devices under /dev/vfio/ as well.
Signed-off-by: NErik Skultety <eskultet@redhat.com>

A mediated device will be identified by a UUID (with 'model' now being
a mandatory <hostdev> attribute to represent the mediated device API) of
the user pre-created mediated device. We also need to make sure that if
user explicitly provides a guest address for a mdev device, the address
type will be matching the device API supported on that specific mediated
device and error out with an incorrect XML message.

The resulting device XML:
<devices>
  <hostdev mode='subsystem' type='mdev' model='vfio-pci'>
    <source>
      <address uuid='c2177883-f1bb-47f0-914d-32a22e3a8804'>
    </source>
  </hostdev>
</devices>
Signed-off-by: NErik Skultety <eskultet@redhat.com>

Signed-off-by: NMichal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>

When domain is being started up, we ought to relabel the host
side of NVDIMM so qemu has access to it.
Signed-off-by: NMichal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>

The problem is in the way how the list item is created prior to
appending it to the transaction list - the @path attribute is just a
shallow copy instead of deep copy of the hostdev device's path.
Unfortunately, the hostdev devices from which the @path is extracted, in
order to add them into the transaction list, are only temporary and
freed before the buildup of the qemu namespace, thus making the @path
attribute in the transaction list NULL, causing 'permission denied' or
'double free' or 'unknown cause' errors.

Resolves: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1413773Signed-off-by: NErik Skultety <eskultet@redhat.com>

Signed-off-by: NMichal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>

The code at the very bottom of the DAC secdriver that calls
chown() should be fine with read-only data. If something needs to
be prepared it should have been done beforehand.
Signed-off-by: NMichal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>

Ensure that the vhost-scsi wwpn information is passed to the
different security policies.
Signed-off-by: NEric Farman <farman@linux.vnet.ibm.com>

We already have a "scsi" hostdev subsys type, which refers to a single
LUN that is passed through to a guest.  But what of things where
multiple LUNs are passed through via a single SCSI HBA, such as with
the vhost-scsi target?  Create a new hostdev subsys type that will
carry this.
Signed-off-by: NEric Farman <farman@linux.vnet.ibm.com>

Change the virDomainChrDef to use a pointer to 'source' and allocate
that pointer during virDomainChrDefNew.

This has tremendous "fallout" in the rest of the code which mainly
has to change source.$field to source->$field.
Signed-off-by: NJohn Ferlan <jferlan@redhat.com>

Add support for the slic_table to the security drivers.

It already labels abritrary paths, so it's just the naming that was
wrong.
Signed-off-by: NMartin Kletzander <mkletzan@redhat.com>

A device tree binary file specified by /domain/os/dtb element is a
read-only resource similar to kernel and initrd files. We shouldn't
restore its label when destroying a domain to avoid breaking other
domains configure with the same device tree.
Signed-off-by: NJiri Denemark <jdenemar@redhat.com>

Kernel/initrd files are essentially read-only shareable images and thus
should be handled in the same way. We already use the appropriate label
for kernel/initrd files when starting a domain, but when a domain gets
destroyed we would remove the labels which would make other running
domains using the same files very unhappy.

https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=921135Signed-off-by: NJiri Denemark <jdenemar@redhat.com>

Many of the functions follow the pattern:
virSecurity.*Security.*Label

Remove the second 'Security' from the names, it should be obvious
that the virSecurity* functions deal with security labels even
without it.

Use the customary check '< 0' instead of checking for non-zero.

No functional change.

Add functions for setting and restoring the label of input devices
to DAC and SELinux drivers.

https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1231114

Fixes several style issues and removes "DEF" (what is it supposed to
mean anyway?) from debug messages.
Signed-off-by: NJiri Denemark <jdenemar@redhat.com>

Even though the APIs are not implemented yet, they create a
skeleton that can be filled in later.
Signed-off-by: NMichal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>

This function should really be called only when we want to change
ownership of a file (or disk source). Lets switch to calling a
wrapper function which will eventually record the current owner
of the file and call virSecurityDACSetOwnershipInternal
subsequently.
Signed-off-by: NMichal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>

This is pure code adjustment. The structure is going to be needed
later as it will hold a reference that will be used to talk to
virtlockd. However, so far this is no functional change just code
preparation.
Signed-off-by: NMichal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>

This is pure code adjustment. The structure is going to be needed
later as it will hold a reference that will be used to talk to
virtlockd. However, so far this is no functional change just code
preparation.
Signed-off-by: NMichal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>

It's better if we stat() file that we are about to chown() at
first and check if there's something we need to change. Not that
it would make much difference, but for the upcoming patches we
need to be doing stat() anyway. Moreover, if we do things this
way, we can drop @chown_errno variable which will become
redundant.
Signed-off-by: NMichal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>

Correctly mark the places where we need to remember and recall
file ownership. We don't want to mislead any potential developer.
Signed-off-by: NMichal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>

Signed-off-by: NMartin Kletzander <mkletzan@redhat.com>

SELinux security driver already does that, but DAC driver somehow missed
the memo.  Let's fix it so it works the same way.
Signed-off-by: NMartin Kletzander <mkletzan@redhat.com>

Add missing ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED markers.