提交 14194f1d 编写于 作者: D Daniel P. Berrange

Fix some typos & remove unhelpful acronyms in QEMU docs

上级 690b4ad3
......@@ -147,13 +147,13 @@
<ul><li>
<a href="#securitydriver">Driver instances</a>
</li><li>
<a href="#securitydac">POSIX DAC users/groups</a>
<a href="#securitydac">POSIX users/groups</a>
</li><li>
<a href="#securitycap">Linux DAC capabilities</a>
<a href="#securitycap">Linux process capabilities</a>
</li><li>
<a href="#securityselinux">SELinux MAC basic confinement</a>
<a href="#securityselinux">SELinux basic confinement</a>
</li><li>
<a href="#securitysvirt">SELinux MAC sVirt confinement</a>
<a href="#securitysvirt">SELinux sVirt confinement</a>
</li><li>
<a href="#securityacl">Cgroups device ACLs</a>
</li></ul>
......@@ -242,11 +242,11 @@
elevated privileges.
</p>
<h3>
<a name="securitydac" id="securitydac">POSIX DAC users/groups</a>
<a name="securitydac" id="securitydac">POSIX users/groups</a>
</h3>
<p>
In the "session" instance, the POSIX DAC model restricts QEMU virtual
machines (and libvirtd in general) to only have access to resources
In the "session" instance, the POSIX users/groups model restricts QEMU
virtual machines (and libvirtd in general) to only have access to resources
with the same user/group ID as the client application. There is no
finer level of configuration possible for the "session" instances.
</p>
......@@ -271,7 +271,7 @@
run as non-root, there will be greater restrictions on what
host resources the QEMU process will be able to access. The
libvirtd daemon will attempt to manage permissions on resources
to minise the likelihood of unintentionale security denials,
to minimise the likelihood of unintentional security denials,
but the administrator / application developer must be aware of
some of the consequences / restrictions.
</p>
......@@ -290,9 +290,9 @@
</p>
</li><li>
<p>
When attaching PCI and USB devices to a QEMU guest,
When attaching USB and PCI devices to a QEMU guest,
QEMU will need to access files in <code>/dev/bus/usb</code>
and <code>/sys/bus/devices</code>. The libvirtd daemon
and <code>/sys/bus/pci/devices</code> respectively. The libvirtd daemon
will automatically set the ownership on specific devices
that are assigned to a guest at start time. There should
not be any need for administrator changes in this respect.
......@@ -313,7 +313,7 @@
<p>
The simplest option is the latter one, of just enabling
the 'execute/search' bit. For any directory to be used
for storing disk images, this can be achived by running
for storing disk images, this can be achieved by running
the following command on the directory itself, and any
parent directories
</p>
......@@ -328,7 +328,7 @@
</p>
</li></ul>
<h3>
<a name="securitycap" id="securitycap">Linux DAC capabilities</a>
<a name="securitycap" id="securitycap">Linux process capabilities</a>
</h3>
<p>
The libvirt QEMU driver has a build time option allowing it to use
......@@ -363,7 +363,7 @@
to changing the <code>/etc/libvirt/qemu.conf</code> settings.
</p>
<h3>
<a name="securityselinux" id="securityselinux">SELinux MAC basic confinement</a>
<a name="securityselinux" id="securityselinux">SELinux basic confinement</a>
</h3>
<p>
The basic SELinux protection for QEMU virtual machines is intended to
......@@ -393,7 +393,7 @@
SELinux boolean.
</p>
<h3>
<a name="securitysvirt" id="securitysvirt">SELinux MAC sVirt confinement</a>
<a name="securitysvirt" id="securitysvirt">SELinux sVirt confinement</a>
</h3>
<p>
The SELinux sVirt protection for QEMU virtual machines builds to the
......@@ -429,7 +429,7 @@
labelled to match, libvirtd will not attempt any relabelling.
</p>
<p>
If the sVirt security model is active, then the node capabilties
If the sVirt security model is active, then the node capabilities
XML will include its details. If a virtual machine is currently
protected by the security model, then the guest XML will include
its assigned labels. If enabled at compile time, the sVirt security
......
......@@ -85,11 +85,11 @@
elevated privileges.
</p>
<h3><a name="securitydac">POSIX DAC users/groups</a></h3>
<h3><a name="securitydac">POSIX users/groups</a></h3>
<p>
In the "session" instance, the POSIX DAC model restricts QEMU virtual
machines (and libvirtd in general) to only have access to resources
In the "session" instance, the POSIX users/groups model restricts QEMU
virtual machines (and libvirtd in general) to only have access to resources
with the same user/group ID as the client application. There is no
finer level of configuration possible for the "session" instances.
</p>
......@@ -116,7 +116,7 @@
run as non-root, there will be greater restrictions on what
host resources the QEMU process will be able to access. The
libvirtd daemon will attempt to manage permissions on resources
to minise the likelihood of unintentionale security denials,
to minimise the likelihood of unintentional security denials,
but the administrator / application developer must be aware of
some of the consequences / restrictions.
</p>
......@@ -138,9 +138,9 @@
</li>
<li>
<p>
When attaching PCI and USB devices to a QEMU guest,
When attaching USB and PCI devices to a QEMU guest,
QEMU will need to access files in <code>/dev/bus/usb</code>
and <code>/sys/bus/devices</code>. The libvirtd daemon
and <code>/sys/bus/pci/devices</code> respectively. The libvirtd daemon
will automatically set the ownership on specific devices
that are assigned to a guest at start time. There should
not be any need for administrator changes in this respect.
......@@ -162,7 +162,7 @@
<p>
The simplest option is the latter one, of just enabling
the 'execute/search' bit. For any directory to be used
for storing disk images, this can be achived by running
for storing disk images, this can be achieved by running
the following command on the directory itself, and any
parent directories
</p>
......@@ -178,7 +178,7 @@
</li>
</ul>
<h3><a name="securitycap">Linux DAC capabilities</a></h3>
<h3><a name="securitycap">Linux process capabilities</a></h3>
<p>
The libvirt QEMU driver has a build time option allowing it to use
......@@ -215,7 +215,7 @@
to changing the <code>/etc/libvirt/qemu.conf</code> settings.
</p>
<h3><a name="securityselinux">SELinux MAC basic confinement</a></h3>
<h3><a name="securityselinux">SELinux basic confinement</a></h3>
<p>
The basic SELinux protection for QEMU virtual machines is intended to
......@@ -246,7 +246,7 @@
SELinux boolean.
</p>
<h3><a name="securitysvirt">SELinux MAC sVirt confinement</a></h3>
<h3><a name="securitysvirt">SELinux sVirt confinement</a></h3>
<p>
The SELinux sVirt protection for QEMU virtual machines builds to the
......@@ -286,7 +286,7 @@
</p>
<p>
If the sVirt security model is active, then the node capabilties
If the sVirt security model is active, then the node capabilities
XML will include its details. If a virtual machine is currently
protected by the security model, then the guest XML will include
its assigned labels. If enabled at compile time, the sVirt security
......
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