1. 14 2月, 2020 1 次提交
  2. 12 2月, 2020 2 次提交
  3. 16 1月, 2020 4 次提交
  4. 10 1月, 2020 2 次提交
  5. 08 1月, 2020 3 次提交
  6. 04 1月, 2020 1 次提交
  7. 25 11月, 2019 2 次提交
  8. 09 11月, 2019 4 次提交
  9. 29 10月, 2019 2 次提交
  10. 22 10月, 2019 3 次提交
  11. 28 8月, 2019 5 次提交
  12. 14 8月, 2019 3 次提交
    • X
      RDMA/hns: bugfix for slab-out-of-bounds when loading hip08 driver · bf8c02f9
      Xi Wang 提交于
      kasan will report a BUG when run command 'insmod hns_roce_hw_v2.ko', the
      calltrace is as follows:
      
      ==================================================================
      BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in hns_roce_v2_init_eq_table+0x1324/0x1948
      [hns_roce_hw_v2]
      Read of size 8 at addr ffff8020e7a10608 by task insmod/256
      
      CPU: 0 PID: 256 Comm: insmod Tainted: G           O      5.2.0-rc4 #1
      Hardware name: Huawei D06 /D06, BIOS Hisilicon D06 UEFI RC0
      Call trace:
      dump_backtrace+0x0/0x1e8
      show_stack+0x14/0x20
      dump_stack+0xc4/0xfc
      print_address_description+0x60/0x270
      __kasan_report+0x164/0x1b8
      kasan_report+0xc/0x18
      __asan_load8+0x84/0xa8
      hns_roce_v2_init_eq_table+0x1324/0x1948 [hns_roce_hw_v2]
      hns_roce_init+0xf8/0xfe0 [hns_roce]
      __hns_roce_hw_v2_init_instance+0x284/0x330 [hns_roce_hw_v2]
      hns_roce_hw_v2_init_instance+0xd0/0x1b8 [hns_roce_hw_v2]
      hclge_init_roce_client_instance+0x180/0x310 [hclge]
      hclge_init_client_instance+0xcc/0x508 [hclge]
      hnae3_init_client_instance.part.3+0x3c/0x80 [hnae3]
      hnae3_register_client+0x134/0x1a8 [hnae3]
      hns_roce_hw_v2_init+0x14/0x10000 [hns_roce_hw_v2]
      do_one_initcall+0x9c/0x3e0
      do_init_module+0xd4/0x2d8
      load_module+0x3284/0x3690
      __se_sys_init_module+0x274/0x308
      __arm64_sys_init_module+0x40/0x50
      el0_svc_handler+0xbc/0x210
      el0_svc+0x8/0xc
      
      Allocated by task 256:
      __kasan_kmalloc.isra.0+0xd0/0x180
      kasan_kmalloc+0xc/0x18
      __kmalloc+0x16c/0x328
      hns_roce_v2_init_eq_table+0x764/0x1948 [hns_roce_hw_v2]
      hns_roce_init+0xf8/0xfe0 [hns_roce]
      __hns_roce_hw_v2_init_instance+0x284/0x330 [hns_roce_hw_v2]
      hns_roce_hw_v2_init_instance+0xd0/0x1b8 [hns_roce_hw_v2]
      hclge_init_roce_client_instance+0x180/0x310 [hclge]
      hclge_init_client_instance+0xcc/0x508 [hclge]
      hnae3_init_client_instance.part.3+0x3c/0x80 [hnae3]
      hnae3_register_client+0x134/0x1a8 [hnae3]
      hns_roce_hw_v2_init+0x14/0x10000 [hns_roce_hw_v2]
      do_one_initcall+0x9c/0x3e0
      do_init_module+0xd4/0x2d8
      load_module+0x3284/0x3690
      __se_sys_init_module+0x274/0x308
      __arm64_sys_init_module+0x40/0x50
      el0_svc_handler+0xbc/0x210
      el0_svc+0x8/0xc
      
      Freed by task 0:
      (stack is not available)
      
      The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8020e7a10600
      which belongs to the cache kmalloc-128 of size 128
      The buggy address is located 8 bytes inside of
      128-byte region [ffff8020e7a10600, ffff8020e7a10680)
      The buggy address belongs to the page:
      page:ffff7fe00839e840 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff802340020200 index:0x0
      flags: 0x5fffe00000000200(slab)
      raw: 5fffe00000000200 dead000000000100 dead000000000200 ffff802340020200
      raw: 0000000000000000 0000000081000100 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
      page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
      
      Memory state around the buggy address:
      ffff8020e7a10500: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
      ffff8020e7a10580: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
      >ffff8020e7a10600: 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
      ^
      ffff8020e7a10680: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
      ffff8020e7a10700: 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
      ==================================================================
      Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
      
      Fixes: a5073d60 ("RDMA/hns: Add eq support of hip08")
      Signed-off-by: NXi Wang <wangxi11@huawei.com>
      Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1565343666-73193-7-git-send-email-oulijun@huawei.comSigned-off-by: NDoug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
      bf8c02f9
    • Y
      RDMA/hns: Modify pi vlaue when cq overflows · d7e5ca88
      Yangyang Li 提交于
      When exiting "for loop", the actual value of pi will be
      increased by 1, which is compatible with the next calculation.
      But when pi is equal to "ci + hr_cq-> ib_cq.cqe", the "break"
      was called and the pi is actual value, it will lead one cqe
      still existing, so the "==" should be modify to ">".
      Signed-off-by: NYangyang Li <liyangyang20@huawei.com>
      Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1565343666-73193-5-git-send-email-oulijun@huawei.comSigned-off-by: NDoug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
      d7e5ca88
    • W
      RDMA/hns: Logic optimization of wc_flags · 0e1aa6f0
      Weihang Li 提交于
      We should set IB_WC_WITH_VLAN only when VLAN is enabled.
      In addition, move setting of IB_WC_WITH_SMAC below
      setting of wc->smac.
      Signed-off-by: NWeihang Li <liweihang@hisilicon.com>
      Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1565343666-73193-2-git-send-email-oulijun@huawei.comSigned-off-by: NDoug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
      0e1aa6f0
  13. 12 8月, 2019 8 次提交