net/bluetooth/smp.c:2650:9-16: WARNING: ERR_CAST can be used with tfm_aes

Use ERR_CAST inlined function instead of ERR_PTR(PTR_ERR(...))

Generated by: scripts/coccinelle/api/err_cast.cocci
Signed-off-by: NFengguang Wu <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>

The SMP over BR/EDR requests for cross-transport pairing should also
accepted when the debugfs setting force_lesc_support has been enabled.
Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: NJohan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>

Some gcc versions don't seem to be able to properly track the flow of
the smp_cmd_pairing_random() function and end up causing the following
types of (false-positive) warnings:

 smp.c:1995:6: warning: ‘nb’ may be used uninitialized in this function [-Wmaybe-uninitialized]
   err = smp_g2(smp->tfm_cmac, pkax, pkbx, na, nb, &passkey);
 smp.c:1995:6: warning: ‘na’ may be used uninitialized in this function [-Wmaybe-uninitialized]
   err = smp_g2(smp->tfm_cmac, pkax, pkbx, na, nb, &passkey);
       ^
 smp.c:1995:6: warning: ‘pkbx’ may be used uninitialized in this function [-Wmaybe-uninitialized]
   err = smp_g2(smp->tfm_cmac, pkax, pkbx, na, nb, &passkey);
       ^
 smp.c:1995:6: warning: ‘pkax’ may be used uninitialized in this function [-Wmaybe-uninitialized]
   err = smp_g2(smp->tfm_cmac, pkax, pkbx, na, nb, &passkey);

This patch fixes the issue by moving the pkax/pkbx and na/nb
initialization earlier in the function.
Signed-off-by: NJohan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>

The convention for checking for NULL pointers is !ptr and not
ptr == NULL. This patch fixes such an occurrence in smp.c.
Signed-off-by: NJohan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>

We need to keep debug keys around at least until the point that they are
used - otherwise e.g. slave role behavior wouldn't work as there'd be no
key to be looked up. The correct behavior should therefore be to return
any stored keys but when we clean up the SMP context to remove the key
from the hdev list if keeping debug keys around hasn't been requestsed.
Signed-off-by: NJohan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>

This patch organizes the various SMP crypto functions so that the LE SC
functions appear in one section and the legacy SMP functions in a
separate one.
Signed-off-by: NJohan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>

Several SMP functions take read-only data. This patch fixes the
declaration of these parameters to use the const specifier as
appropriate.
Signed-off-by: NJohan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>

The various inputs & outputs of the crypto functions as well as the
values of the ECDH keys can be considered security sensitive. They
should therefore not end up in dmesg by mistake. This patch introduces a
new SMP_DBG macro which requires explicit compilation with -DDEBUG to be
enabled. All crypto related data logs now use this macro instead of
BT_DBG.
Signed-off-by: NJohan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>

This patch adds basic OOB pairing support when we've received the remote
OOB data. This includes tracking the remote r value (in smp->rr) as well
as doing the appropriate f4() call when needed. Previously the OOB rand
would have been stored in smp->rrnd however these are actually two
independent values so we need separate variables for them. Na/Nb in the
spec maps to smp->prnd/rrnd and ra/rb maps to smp->rr with smp->pr to
come once local OOB data is supported.
Signed-off-by: NJohan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>

If we have OOB data available for the remote device in question we
should set the OOB flag appropriately in the SMP pairing request or
response.
Signed-off-by: NJohan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>

When Secure Connections-only mode is enabled we should reject any
pairing command that does not have Secure Connections set in the
authentication requirements. This patch adds the appropriate logic for
this to the command handlers of Pairing Request/Response and Security
Request.
Signed-off-by: NJohan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>

When doing SMP over BR/EDR some of the routines can be shared with the
LE functionality whereas others needs to be split into their own BR/EDR
specific branches. This patch implements the split of BR/EDR specific
SMP code from the LE-only code, making sure SMP over BR/EDR works as
specified.
Signed-off-by: NJohan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>

This patch adds the very basic code for creating and destroying SMP
L2CAP channels for BR/EDR connections.
Signed-off-by: NJohan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>

The HCI_USE_DEBUG_KEYS flag is intended to force our side to always use
debug keys for pairing. This means both BR/EDR SSP as well as SMP with
LE Secure Connections. This patch updates the SMP code to use the debug
keys instead of generating a random local key pair when the flag is set.
Signed-off-by: NJohan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>

Since we don not actively try to clear the keypress notification bit we
might get these PDUs. To avoid failing the pairing process add a simple
dummy handler for these for now.
Signed-off-by: NJohan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>

According to the LE SC specification the initiating device sends its
DHKey check first and the non-initiating devices sends its DHKey check
as a response to this. It's also important that the non-initiating
device doesn't send the response if it's still waiting for user input.
In order to synchronize all this a new flag is added.
Signed-off-by: NJohan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>

The passkey entry mechanism involves either both sides requesting the
user for a passkey, or one side requesting the passkey while the other
one displays it. The behavior as far as SMP PDUs are concerned are
considerably different from numeric comparison and therefore requires
several new functions to handle it.

In essence passkey entry involves both sides gradually committing to
each bit of the passkey which involves 20 rounds of pairing confirm and
pairing random PDUS being sent in both directions.

This patch adds a new smp->passkey_round variable to track the current
round of the passkey commitment and reuses the variables already present
in struct hci_conn for the passkey and entered key count.
Signed-off-by: NJohan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>

We need to set the correct Link Key type based on the properties of the
LE SC pairing that it was derived from. If debug keys were used the type
should be a debug key, and the authenticated vs unauthenticated
information should be set on what kind of security level was reached.
Signed-off-by: NJohan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>

If the just-works method was chosen we shouldn't send anything to user
space but simply proceed with sending the DHKey Check PDU. This patch
adds the necessary code for it.
Signed-off-by: NJohan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>

After generating the LTK we should set the correct type (normal SC or
debug) and authentication information for it.
Signed-off-by: NJohan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>

It is very unlikely, but to have a 100% guarantee of the generated key
type we need to reject any keys which happen to match the debug key.
Signed-off-by: NJohan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>

We need to be able to detect if the remote side used a debug key for the
pairing. This patch adds the debug key defines and sets a flag to
indicate that a debug key was used. The debug private key (debug_sk) is
also added in this patch but will only be used in a subsequent patch
when local debug key support is implemented.
Signed-off-by: NJohan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>

This patch adds code to select the authentication method for Secure
Connections based on the local and remote capabilities. A new
DSP_PASSKEY method is also added for displaying the passkey - something
that is not part of legacy SMP pairing.
Signed-off-by: NJohan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>

For Secure Connections we'll select the authentication method as soon as
we receive the public key, but only use it later (both when actually
triggering the method as well as when determining the quality of the
resulting LTK). Store the method therefore in the SMP context.
Signed-off-by: NJohan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>

As the last step of the LE SC pairing process it's time to generate and
distribute keys. The generation part is unique to LE SC and so this
patch adds a dedicated function for it. We also clear the distribution
bits for keys which are not distributed with LE SC, so that the code
shared with legacy SMP will not go ahead and try to distribute them.
Signed-off-by: NJohan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>

Once we receive the DHKey check PDU it's time to first verify that the
value is correct and then proceed with encrypting the link.
Signed-off-by: NJohan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>

With LE SC, once the user has responded to the numeric comparison it's
time to send DHKey check values in both directions. The DHKey check
value is generated using new smp_f5 and smp_f6 cryptographic functions.
The smp_f5 function is responsible for generating the LTK and the MacKey
values whereas the smp_f6 function takes the MacKey as input and
generates the DHKey Check value.
Signed-off-by: NJohan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>

After the Pairing Confirm and Random PDUs have been exchanged in LE SC
it's time to generate a numeric comparison value using a new smp_g2
cryptographic function (which also builds on AES-CMAC). This patch adds
the smp_g2 implementation and updates the Pairing Random PDU handler to
proceed with the value genration and user confirmation.
Signed-off-by: NJohan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>

When LE SC is being used we should always respond to it by sending our
local random number. This patch adds a convenience function for it which
also contains a check for the pre-requisite public key exchange
completion
Signed-off-by: NJohan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>

Once the public key exchange is complete the next step is for the
non-initiating device to send a SMP Pairing Confirm PDU to the
initiating device. This requires the use of a new smp_f4 confirm value
generation function which in turn builds on the AES-CMAC cryptographic
function.
Signed-off-by: NJohan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>

This patch adds a handler function for the LE SC SMP Public Key PDU.
When we receive the key we proceed with generating the shared DHKey
value from the remote public key and local private key.
Signed-off-by: NJohan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>

When the initial pairing request & response PDUs have been exchanged and
both have had the LE SC bit set the next step is to generate a ECDH
key pair and to send the public key to the remote side. This patch adds
basic support for generating the key pair and sending the public key
using the new Public Key SMP PDU. It is the initiating device that sends
the public key first and the non-initiating device responds by sending
its public key respectively (in a subsequent patch).
Signed-off-by: NJohan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>

Most of the LE Secure Connections SMP crypto functions build on top of
the AES-CMAC function. This patch adds access to AES-CMAC in the kernel
crypto subsystem by allocating a crypto_hash handle for it in a similar
way that we have one for AES-CBC.
Signed-off-by: NJohan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>

Depending on whether Secure Connections is enabled or not we may need to add
the link key generation bit to the key distribution. This patch does the
necessary modifications to the build_pairing_cmd() function.
Signed-off-by: NJohan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>

Now that hci_find_ltk_by_addr is the only LTK lookup function there's no
need to keep the long name anymore. This patch shortens the function
name to simply hci_find_ltk.
Signed-off-by: NJohan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>

This patch updates the functions which map the SMP authentication
request to a security level and vice-versa to take into account the
Secure Connections feature.
Signed-off-by: NJohan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>

This patch adds a new SMP flag for tracking whether Secure Connections
is in use and sets the flag when both remote and local side have elected
to use Secure Connections.
Signed-off-by: NJohan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>

If we haven't enabled SC support on our side we should use the same mask
for the authentication requirement as we were using before SC support
was added, otherwise we should use the extended mask for SC.
Signed-off-by: NJohan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>

Now that the SMP related key lists are converted to RCU there is nothing
in smp_cmd_sign_info() or smp_cmd_ident_addr_info() that would require
taking the hdev lock (including the smp_distribute_keys call). This
patch removes this unnecessary locking.
Signed-off-by: NJohan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>

This patch set converts the hdev->identity_resolving_keys list to use
RCU to eliminate the need to use hci_dev_lock/unlock.

An additional change that must be done is to remove use of
CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC for the hdev-specific AES crypto context. The reason is
that this context is used for matching RPAs and the loop that does the
matching is under the RCU read lock, i.e. is an atomic section which
cannot sleep.
Signed-off-by: NJohan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>