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  1. 27 10月, 2021 12 次提交
  3. 26 10月, 2021 1 次提交
  5. 07 9月, 2021 1 次提交
    • J
      btrfs: delay blkdev_put until after the device remove · 3fa421de
      由 Josef Bacik 提交于 
      When removing the device we call blkdev_put() on the device once we've
removed it, and because we have an EXCL open we need to take the
->open_mutex on the block device to clean it up.  Unfortunately during
device remove we are holding the sb writers lock, which results in the
following lockdep splat:

======================================================
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
5.14.0-rc2+ #407 Not tainted
------------------------------------------------------
losetup/11595 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff973ac35dd138 ((wq_completion)loop0){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: flush_workqueue+0x67/0x5e0

but task is already holding lock:
ffff973ac9812c68 (&lo->lo_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __loop_clr_fd+0x41/0x660 [loop]

which lock already depends on the new lock.

the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

-> #4 (&lo->lo_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}:
       __mutex_lock+0x7d/0x750
       lo_open+0x28/0x60 [loop]
       blkdev_get_whole+0x25/0xf0
       blkdev_get_by_dev.part.0+0x168/0x3c0
       blkdev_open+0xd2/0xe0
       do_dentry_open+0x161/0x390
       path_openat+0x3cc/0xa20
       do_filp_open+0x96/0x120
       do_sys_openat2+0x7b/0x130
       __x64_sys_openat+0x46/0x70
       do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90
       entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

-> #3 (&disk->open_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}:
       __mutex_lock+0x7d/0x750
       blkdev_put+0x3a/0x220
       btrfs_rm_device.cold+0x62/0xe5
       btrfs_ioctl+0x2a31/0x2e70
       __x64_sys_ioctl+0x80/0xb0
       do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90
       entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

-> #2 (sb_writers#12){.+.+}-{0:0}:
       lo_write_bvec+0xc2/0x240 [loop]
       loop_process_work+0x238/0xd00 [loop]
       process_one_work+0x26b/0x560
       worker_thread+0x55/0x3c0
       kthread+0x140/0x160
       ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30

-> #1 ((work_completion)(&lo->rootcg_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}:
       process_one_work+0x245/0x560
       worker_thread+0x55/0x3c0
       kthread+0x140/0x160
       ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30

-> #0 ((wq_completion)loop0){+.+.}-{0:0}:
       __lock_acquire+0x10ea/0x1d90
       lock_acquire+0xb5/0x2b0
       flush_workqueue+0x91/0x5e0
       drain_workqueue+0xa0/0x110
       destroy_workqueue+0x36/0x250
       __loop_clr_fd+0x9a/0x660 [loop]
       block_ioctl+0x3f/0x50
       __x64_sys_ioctl+0x80/0xb0
       do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90
       entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

other info that might help us debug this:

Chain exists of:
  (wq_completion)loop0 --> &disk->open_mutex --> &lo->lo_mutex

 Possible unsafe locking scenario:

       CPU0                    CPU1
       ----                    ----
  lock(&lo->lo_mutex);
                               lock(&disk->open_mutex);
                               lock(&lo->lo_mutex);
  lock((wq_completion)loop0);

 *** DEADLOCK ***

1 lock held by losetup/11595:
 #0: ffff973ac9812c68 (&lo->lo_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __loop_clr_fd+0x41/0x660 [loop]

stack backtrace:
CPU: 0 PID: 11595 Comm: losetup Not tainted 5.14.0-rc2+ #407
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.13.0-2.fc32 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
 dump_stack_lvl+0x57/0x72
 check_noncircular+0xcf/0xf0
 ? stack_trace_save+0x3b/0x50
 __lock_acquire+0x10ea/0x1d90
 lock_acquire+0xb5/0x2b0
 ? flush_workqueue+0x67/0x5e0
 ? lockdep_init_map_type+0x47/0x220
 flush_workqueue+0x91/0x5e0
 ? flush_workqueue+0x67/0x5e0
 ? verify_cpu+0xf0/0x100
 drain_workqueue+0xa0/0x110
 destroy_workqueue+0x36/0x250
 __loop_clr_fd+0x9a/0x660 [loop]
 ? blkdev_ioctl+0x8d/0x2a0
 block_ioctl+0x3f/0x50
 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x80/0xb0
 do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
RIP: 0033:0x7fc21255d4cb

So instead save the bdev and do the put once we've dropped the sb
writers lock in order to avoid the lockdep recursion.
Reviewed-by: NAnand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NJosef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: NDavid Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
      3fa421de
  7. 23 8月, 2021 13 次提交
    • C
      btrfs: allow idmapped INO_LOOKUP_USER ioctl · 6623d9a0
      由 Christian Brauner 提交于 
      The INO_LOOKUP_USER is an unprivileged version of the INO_LOOKUP ioctl
and has the following restrictions. The main difference between the two
is that INO_LOOKUP is filesystem wide operation wheres INO_LOOKUP_USER
is scoped beneath the file descriptor passed with the ioctl.
Specifically, INO_LOOKUP_USER must adhere to the following restrictions:

- The caller must be privileged over each inode of each path component
  for the path they are trying to lookup.

- The path for the subvolume the caller is trying to lookup must be reachable
  from the inode associated with the file descriptor passed with the ioctl.

The second condition makes it possible to scope the lookup of the path
to the mount identified by the file descriptor passed with the ioctl.
This allows us to enable this ioctl on idmapped mounts.

Specifically, this is possible because all child subvolumes of a parent
subvolume are reachable when the parent subvolume is mounted. So if the
user had access to open the parent subvolume or has been given the fd
then they can lookup the path if they had access to it provided they
were privileged over each path component.

Note, the INO_LOOKUP_USER ioctl allows a user to learn the path and name
of a subvolume even though they would otherwise be restricted from doing
so via regular VFS-based lookup.

So think about a parent subvolume with multiple child subvolumes.
Someone could mount he parent subvolume and restrict access to the child
subvolumes by overmounting them with empty directories. At this point
the user can't traverse the child subvolumes and they can't open files
in the child subvolumes.  However, they can still learn the path of
child subvolumes as long as they have access to the parent subvolume by
using the INO_LOOKUP_USER ioctl.

The underlying assumption here is that it's ok that the lookup ioctls
can't really take mounts into account other than the original mount the
fd belongs to during lookup. Since this assumption is baked into the
original INO_LOOKUP_USER ioctl we can extend it to idmapped mounts.
Reviewed-by: NJosef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: NChristian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Reviewed-by: NDavid Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
      6623d9a0
    • C
      btrfs: allow idmapped SUBVOL_SETFLAGS ioctl · 39e1674f
      由 Christian Brauner 提交于 
      Setting flags on subvolumes or snapshots are core features of btrfs. The
SUBVOL_SETFLAGS ioctl is especially important as it allows to make
subvolumes and snapshots read-only or read-write. Allow setting flags on
btrfs subvolumes and snapshots on idmapped mounts. This is a fairly
straightforward operation since all the permission checking helpers are
already capable of handling idmapped mounts. So we just need to pass
down the mount's userns.
Reviewed-by: NJosef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: NChristian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Reviewed-by: NDavid Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
      39e1674f
    • C
      btrfs: allow idmapped SET_RECEIVED_SUBVOL ioctls · e4fed17a
      由 Christian Brauner 提交于 
      The SET_RECEIVED_SUBVOL ioctls are used to set information about
a received subvolume. Make it possible to set information about a
received subvolume on idmapped mounts. This is a fairly straightforward
operation since all the permission checking helpers are already capable
of handling idmapped mounts. So we just need to pass down the mount's
userns.
Reviewed-by: NJosef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: NChristian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Reviewed-by: NDavid Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
      e4fed17a
    • C
      btrfs: relax restrictions for SNAP_DESTROY_V2 with subvolids · aabb34e7
      由 Christian Brauner 提交于 
      So far we prevented the deletion of subvolumes and snapshots using
subvolume ids possible with the BTRFS_SUBVOL_SPEC_BY_ID flag.

This restriction is necessary on idmapped mounts as this allows
filesystem wide subvolume and snapshot deletions and thus can escape the
scope of what's exposed under the mount identified by the fd passed with
the ioctl.

Deletion by subvolume id works by looking for an alias of the parent of
the subvolume or snapshot to be deleted. The parent alias can be
anywhere in the filesystem. However, as long as the alias of the parent
that is found is the same as the one identified by the file descriptor
passed through the ioctl we can allow the deletion.
Reviewed-by: NJosef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: NQu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NChristian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Reviewed-by: NDavid Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
      aabb34e7
    • C
      btrfs: allow idmapped SNAP_DESTROY ioctls · c4ed533b
      由 Christian Brauner 提交于 
      Destroying subvolumes and snapshots are important features of btrfs.
Both operations are available to unprivileged users if the filesystem
has been mounted with the "user_subvol_rm_allowed" mount option. Allow
subvolume and snapshot deletion on idmapped mounts. This is a fairly
straightforward operation since all the permission checking helpers are
already capable of handling idmapped mounts. So we just need to pass
down the mount's userns.

Subvolumes and snapshots can either be deleted by specifying their name
or - if BTRFS_IOC_SNAP_DESTROY_V2 is used - by their subvolume or
snapshot id if the BTRFS_SUBVOL_SPEC_BY_ID is set.

This feature is blocked on idmapped mounts as this allows filesystem
wide subvolume deletions and thus can escape the scope of what's exposed
under the mount identified by the fd passed with the ioctl.

This means that even the root or CAP_SYS_ADMIN capable user can't delete
a subvolume via BTRFS_SUBVOL_SPEC_BY_ID. This is intentional.

The root user is currently already subject to permission checks in
btrfs_may_delete() including whether the inode's i_uid/i_gid of the
directory the subvolume is located in have a mapping in the caller's
idmapping. For this to fail isn't currently possible since a btrfs
filesystem can't be mounted with a non-initial idmapping but it shows
that even the root user would fail to delete a subvolume if the relevant
inode isn't mapped in their idmapping. The idmapped mount case is the
same in principle.

This isn't a huge problem a root user wanting to delete arbitrary
subvolumes can just always create another (even detached) mount without
an idmapping attached.

In addition, we will allow BTRFS_SUBVOL_SPEC_BY_ID for cases where the
subvolume to delete is directly located under inode referenced by the fd
passed for the ioctl() in a follow-up commit.

Here is an example where a btrfs subvolume is deleted through a
subvolume mount that does not expose the subvolume to be delete but it
can still be deleted by using the subvolume id:

  /* Compile the following program as "delete_by_spec". */

  #define _GNU_SOURCE
  #include <fcntl.h>
  #include <inttypes.h>
  #include <linux/btrfs.h>
  #include <stdio.h>
  #include <stdlib.h>
  #include <sys/ioctl.h>
  #include <sys/stat.h>
  #include <sys/types.h>
  #include <unistd.h>

  static int rm_subvolume_by_id(int fd, uint64_t subvolid)
  {
	 struct btrfs_ioctl_vol_args_v2 args = {};
	 int ret;

	 args.flags = BTRFS_SUBVOL_SPEC_BY_ID;
	 args.subvolid = subvolid;

	 ret = ioctl(fd, BTRFS_IOC_SNAP_DESTROY_V2, &args);
	 if (ret < 0)
		 return -1;

	 return 0;
  }

  int main(int argc, char *argv[])
  {
	 int subvolid = 0;

	 if (argc < 3)
		 exit(1);

	 fprintf(stderr, "Opening %s\n", argv[1]);
	 int fd = open(argv[1], O_CLOEXEC | O_DIRECTORY);
	 if (fd < 0)
		 exit(2);

	 subvolid = atoi(argv[2]);

	 fprintf(stderr, "Deleting subvolume with subvolid %d\n", subvolid);
	 int ret = rm_subvolume_by_id(fd, subvolid);
	 if (ret < 0)
		 exit(3);

	 exit(0);
  }
  #include <stdio.h>"
  #include <stdlib.h>"
  #include <linux/btrfs.h"

  truncate -s 10G btrfs.img
  mkfs.btrfs btrfs.img
  export LOOPDEV=$(sudo losetup -f --show btrfs.img)
  mount ${LOOPDEV} /mnt
  sudo chown $(id -u):$(id -g) /mnt
  btrfs subvolume create /mnt/A
  btrfs subvolume create /mnt/B/C
  # Get subvolume id via:
  sudo btrfs subvolume show /mnt/A
  # Save subvolid
  SUBVOLID=<nr>
  sudo umount /mnt
  sudo mount ${LOOPDEV} -o subvol=B/C,user_subvol_rm_allowed /mnt
  ./delete_by_spec /mnt ${SUBVOLID}

With idmapped mounts this can potentially be used by users to delete
subvolumes/snapshots they would otherwise not have access to as the
idmapping would be applied to an inode that is not exposed in the mount
of the subvolume.

The fact that this is a filesystem wide operation suggests it might be a
good idea to expose this under a separate ioctl that clearly indicates
this. In essence, the file descriptor passed with the ioctl is merely
used to identify the filesystem on which to operate when
BTRFS_SUBVOL_SPEC_BY_ID is used.
Reviewed-by: NJosef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: NQu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NChristian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Reviewed-by: NDavid Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
      c4ed533b
    • C
      btrfs: allow idmapped SNAP_CREATE/SUBVOL_CREATE ioctls · 4d4340c9
      由 Christian Brauner 提交于 
      Creating subvolumes and snapshots is one of the core features of btrfs
and is even available to unprivileged users. Make it possible to use
subvolume and snapshot creation on idmapped mounts. This is a fairly
straightforward operation since all the permission checking helpers are
already capable of handling idmapped mounts. So we just need to pass
down the mount's userns.
Reviewed-by: NJosef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: NChristian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Reviewed-by: NDavid Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
      4d4340c9
    • C
      btrfs: check whether fsgid/fsuid are mapped during subvolume creation · 5474bf40
      由 Christian Brauner 提交于 
      When a new subvolume is created btrfs currently doesn't check whether
the fsgid/fsuid of the caller actually have a mapping in the user
namespace attached to the filesystem. The VFS always checks this to make
sure that the caller's fsgid/fsuid can be represented on-disk. This is
most relevant for filesystems that can be mounted inside user namespaces
but it is in general a good hardening measure to prevent unrepresentable
gid/uid from being written to disk.

Since we want to support idmapped mounts for btrfs ioctls to create
subvolumes in follow-up patches this becomes important since we want to
make sure the fsgid/fsuid of the caller as mapped according to the
idmapped mount can be represented on-disk. Simply add the missing
fsuidgid_has_mapping() line from the VFS may_create() version to
btrfs_may_create().
Reviewed-by: NJosef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: NChristian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Reviewed-by: NDavid Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
      5474bf40
    • G
      btrfs: allocate btrfs_ioctl_defrag_range_args on stack · c853a578
      由 Goldwyn Rodrigues 提交于 
      Instead of using kmalloc() to allocate btrfs_ioctl_defrag_range_args,
allocate btrfs_ioctl_defrag_range_args on stack, the size is reasonably
small and ioctls are called in process context.

sizeof(btrfs_ioctl_defrag_range_args) = 48
Reviewed-by: NAnand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NGoldwyn Rodrigues <rgoldwyn@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: NDavid Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
      c853a578
    • G
      btrfs: allocate btrfs_ioctl_quota_rescan_args on stack · 0afb603a
      由 Goldwyn Rodrigues 提交于 
      Instead of using kmalloc() to allocate btrfs_ioctl_quota_rescan_args,
allocate btrfs_ioctl_quota_rescan_args on stack, the size is reasonably
small and ioctls are called in process context.

sizeof(btrfs_ioctl_quota_rescan_args) = 64
Reviewed-by: NAnand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NGoldwyn Rodrigues <rgoldwyn@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: NDavid Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
      0afb603a
    • M
      btrfs: introduce btrfs_search_backwards function · 0ff40a91
      由 Marcos Paulo de Souza 提交于 
      It's a common practice to start a search using offset (u64)-1, which is
the u64 maximum value, meaning that we want the search_slot function to
be set in the last item with the same objectid and type.

Once we are in this position, it's a matter to start a search backwards
by calling btrfs_previous_item, which will check if we'll need to go to
a previous leaf and other necessary checks, only to be sure that we are
in last offset of the same object and type.

The new btrfs_search_backwards function does the all these steps when
necessary, and can be used to avoid code duplication.
Signed-off-by: NMarcos Paulo de Souza <mpdesouza@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: NDavid Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
      0ff40a91
    • B
      btrfs: initial fsverity support · 14605409
      由 Boris Burkov 提交于 
      Add support for fsverity in btrfs. To support the generic interface in
fs/verity, we add two new item types in the fs tree for inodes with
verity enabled. One stores the per-file verity descriptor and btrfs
verity item and the other stores the Merkle tree data itself.

Verity checking is done in end_page_read just before a page is marked
uptodate. This naturally handles a variety of edge cases like holes,
preallocated extents, and inline extents. Some care needs to be taken to
not try to verity pages past the end of the file, which are accessed by
the generic buffered file reading code under some circumstances like
reading to the end of the last page and trying to read again. Direct IO
on a verity file falls back to buffered reads.

Verity relies on PageChecked for the Merkle tree data itself to avoid
re-walking up shared paths in the tree. For this reason, we need to
cache the Merkle tree data. Since the file is immutable after verity is
turned on, we can cache it at an index past EOF.

Use the new inode ro_flags to store verity on the inode item, so that we
can enable verity on a file, then rollback to an older kernel and still
mount the file system and read the file. Since we can't safely write the
file anymore without ruining the invariants of the Merkle tree, we mark
a ro_compat flag on the file system when a file has verity enabled.
Acked-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Co-developed-by: NChris Mason <clm@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: NChris Mason <clm@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: NBoris Burkov <boris@bur.io>
Reviewed-by: NDavid Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
      14605409
    • B
      btrfs: add ro compat flags to inodes · 77eea05e
      由 Boris Burkov 提交于 
      Currently, inode flags are fully backwards incompatible in btrfs. If we
introduce a new inode flag, then tree-checker will detect it and fail.
This can even cause us to fail to mount entirely. To make it possible to
introduce new flags which can be read-only compatible, like VERITY, we
add new ro flags to btrfs without treating them quite so harshly in
tree-checker. A read-only file system can survive an unexpected flag,
and can be mounted.

As for the implementation, it unfortunately gets a little complicated.

The on-disk representation of the inode, btrfs_inode_item, has an __le64
for flags but the in-memory representation, btrfs_inode, uses a u32.
David Sterba had the nice idea that we could reclaim those wasted 32 bits
on disk and use them for the new ro_compat flags.

It turns out that the tree-checker code which checks for unknown flags
is broken, and ignores the upper 32 bits we are hoping to use. The issue
is that the flags use the literal 1 rather than 1ULL, so the flags are
signed ints, and one of them is specifically (1 << 31). As a result, the
mask which ORs the flags is a negative integer on machines where int is
32 bit twos complement. When tree-checker evaluates the expression:

  btrfs_inode_flags(leaf, iitem) & ~BTRFS_INODE_FLAG_MASK)

The mask is something like 0x80000abc, which gets promoted to u64 with
sign extension to 0xffffffff80000abc. Negating that 64 bit mask leaves
all the upper bits zeroed, and we can't detect unexpected flags.

This suggests that we can't use those bits after all. Luckily, we have
good reason to believe that they are zero anyway. Inode flags are
metadata, which is always checksummed, so any bit flips that would
introduce 1s would cause a checksum failure anyway (excluding the
improbable case of the checksum getting corrupted exactly badly).

Further, unless the 1 << 31 flag is used, the cast to u64 of the 32 bit
inode flag should preserve its value and not add leading zeroes
(at least for twos complement). The only place that flag
(BTRFS_INODE_ROOT_ITEM_INIT) is used is in a special inode embedded in
the root item, and indeed for that inode we see 0xffffffff80000000 as
the flags on disk. However, that inode is never seen by tree checker,
nor is it used in a context where verity might be meaningful.
Theoretically, a future ro flag might cause trouble on that inode, so we
should proactively clean up that mess before it does.

With the introduction of the new ro flags, keep two separate unsigned
masks and check them against the appropriate u32. Since we no longer run
afoul of sign extension, this also stops writing out 0xffffffff80000000
in root_item inodes going forward.
Signed-off-by: NBoris Burkov <boris@bur.io>
Reviewed-by: NDavid Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
      77eea05e
    • Q
      btrfs: allow read-write for 4K sectorsize on 64K page size systems · 95ea0486
      由 Qu Wenruo 提交于 
      Since now we support data and metadata read-write for subpage, remove
the RO requirement for subpage mount.

There are some extra limitations though:

- For now, subpage RW mount is still considered experimental
  Thus that mount warning will still be there.

- No compression support
  There are still quite some PAGE_SIZE hard coded and quite some call
  sites use extent_clear_unlock_delalloc() to unlock locked_page.
  This will screw up subpage helpers.

  Now for subpage RW mount, no matter what mount option or inode attr is
  set, all writes will not be compressed.  Although reading compressed
  data has no problem.

- No defrag for subpage case
  The defrag support for subpage case will come in later patches, which
  will also rework the defrag workflow.

- No inline extent will be created
  This is mostly due to the fact that filemap_fdatawrite_range() will
  trigger more write than the range specified.
  In fallocate calls, this behavior can make us to writeback which can
  be inlined, before we enlarge the i_size.

  This is a very special corner case, and even current btrfs check won't
  report error on such inline extent + regular extent.
  But considering how much effort has been put to prevent such inline +
  regular, I'd prefer to cut off inline extent completely until we have
  a good solution.
Signed-off-by: NQu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
      95ea0486
  9. 22 6月, 2021 1 次提交
  11. 21 6月, 2021 7 次提交
  13. 11 5月, 2021 1 次提交
    • R
      btrfs: handle transaction start error in btrfs_fileattr_set · 9b8a233b
      由 Ritesh Harjani 提交于 
      Add error handling in btrfs_fileattr_set in case of an error while
starting a transaction. This fixes btrfs/232 which otherwise used to
fail with below signature on Power.

  btrfs/232 [ 1119.474650] run fstests btrfs/232 at 2021-04-21 02:21:22
  <...>
  [ 1366.638585] BUG: Unable to handle kernel data access on read at 0xffffffffffffff86
  [ 1366.638768] Faulting instruction address: 0xc0000000009a5c88
  cpu 0x0: Vector: 380 (Data SLB Access) at [c000000014f177b0]
      pc: c0000000009a5c88: btrfs_update_root_times+0x58/0xc0
      lr: c0000000009a5c84: btrfs_update_root_times+0x54/0xc0
      <...>
      pid   = 24881, comm = fsstress
	   btrfs_update_inode+0xa0/0x140
	   btrfs_fileattr_set+0x5d0/0x6f0
	   vfs_fileattr_set+0x2a8/0x390
	   do_vfs_ioctl+0x1290/0x1ac0
	   sys_ioctl+0x6c/0x120
	   system_call_exception+0x3d4/0x410
	   system_call_common+0xec/0x278

Fixes: 97fc2977 ("btrfs: convert to fileattr")
Signed-off-by: NRitesh Harjani <riteshh@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: NDavid Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
      9b8a233b
  15. 29 4月, 2021 1 次提交
    • F
      btrfs: fix deadlock when cloning inline extents and using qgroups · f9baa501
      由 Filipe Manana 提交于 
      There are a few exceptional cases where cloning an inline extent needs to
copy the inline extent data into a page of the destination inode.

When this happens, we end up starting a transaction while having a dirty
page for the destination inode and while having the range locked in the
destination's inode iotree too. Because when reserving metadata space
for a transaction we may need to flush existing delalloc in case there is
not enough free space, we have a mechanism in place to prevent a deadlock,
which was introduced in commit 3d45f221 ("btrfs: fix deadlock when
cloning inline extent and low on free metadata space").

However when using qgroups, a transaction also reserves metadata qgroup
space, which can also result in flushing delalloc in case there is not
enough available space at the moment. When this happens we deadlock, since
flushing delalloc requires locking the file range in the inode's iotree
and the range was already locked at the very beginning of the clone
operation, before attempting to start the transaction.

When this issue happens, stack traces like the following are reported:

  [72747.556262] task:kworker/u81:9   state:D stack:    0 pid:  225 ppid:     2 flags:0x00004000
  [72747.556268] Workqueue: writeback wb_workfn (flush-btrfs-1142)
  [72747.556271] Call Trace:
  [72747.556273]  __schedule+0x296/0x760
  [72747.556277]  schedule+0x3c/0xa0
  [72747.556279]  io_schedule+0x12/0x40
  [72747.556284]  __lock_page+0x13c/0x280
  [72747.556287]  ? generic_file_readonly_mmap+0x70/0x70
  [72747.556325]  extent_write_cache_pages+0x22a/0x440 [btrfs]
  [72747.556331]  ? __set_page_dirty_nobuffers+0xe7/0x160
  [72747.556358]  ? set_extent_buffer_dirty+0x5e/0x80 [btrfs]
  [72747.556362]  ? update_group_capacity+0x25/0x210
  [72747.556366]  ? cpumask_next_and+0x1a/0x20
  [72747.556391]  extent_writepages+0x44/0xa0 [btrfs]
  [72747.556394]  do_writepages+0x41/0xd0
  [72747.556398]  __writeback_single_inode+0x39/0x2a0
  [72747.556403]  writeback_sb_inodes+0x1ea/0x440
  [72747.556407]  __writeback_inodes_wb+0x5f/0xc0
  [72747.556410]  wb_writeback+0x235/0x2b0
  [72747.556414]  ? get_nr_inodes+0x35/0x50
  [72747.556417]  wb_workfn+0x354/0x490
  [72747.556420]  ? newidle_balance+0x2c5/0x3e0
  [72747.556424]  process_one_work+0x1aa/0x340
  [72747.556426]  worker_thread+0x30/0x390
  [72747.556429]  ? create_worker+0x1a0/0x1a0
  [72747.556432]  kthread+0x116/0x130
  [72747.556435]  ? kthread_park+0x80/0x80
  [72747.556438]  ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30

  [72747.566958] Workqueue: btrfs-flush_delalloc btrfs_work_helper [btrfs]
  [72747.566961] Call Trace:
  [72747.566964]  __schedule+0x296/0x760
  [72747.566968]  ? finish_wait+0x80/0x80
  [72747.566970]  schedule+0x3c/0xa0
  [72747.566995]  wait_extent_bit.constprop.68+0x13b/0x1c0 [btrfs]
  [72747.566999]  ? finish_wait+0x80/0x80
  [72747.567024]  lock_extent_bits+0x37/0x90 [btrfs]
  [72747.567047]  btrfs_invalidatepage+0x299/0x2c0 [btrfs]
  [72747.567051]  ? find_get_pages_range_tag+0x2cd/0x380
  [72747.567076]  __extent_writepage+0x203/0x320 [btrfs]
  [72747.567102]  extent_write_cache_pages+0x2bb/0x440 [btrfs]
  [72747.567106]  ? update_load_avg+0x7e/0x5f0
  [72747.567109]  ? enqueue_entity+0xf4/0x6f0
  [72747.567134]  extent_writepages+0x44/0xa0 [btrfs]
  [72747.567137]  ? enqueue_task_fair+0x93/0x6f0
  [72747.567140]  do_writepages+0x41/0xd0
  [72747.567144]  __filemap_fdatawrite_range+0xc7/0x100
  [72747.567167]  btrfs_run_delalloc_work+0x17/0x40 [btrfs]
  [72747.567195]  btrfs_work_helper+0xc2/0x300 [btrfs]
  [72747.567200]  process_one_work+0x1aa/0x340
  [72747.567202]  worker_thread+0x30/0x390
  [72747.567205]  ? create_worker+0x1a0/0x1a0
  [72747.567208]  kthread+0x116/0x130
  [72747.567211]  ? kthread_park+0x80/0x80
  [72747.567214]  ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30

  [72747.569686] task:fsstress        state:D stack:    0 pid:841421 ppid:841417 flags:0x00000000
  [72747.569689] Call Trace:
  [72747.569691]  __schedule+0x296/0x760
  [72747.569694]  schedule+0x3c/0xa0
  [72747.569721]  try_flush_qgroup+0x95/0x140 [btrfs]
  [72747.569725]  ? finish_wait+0x80/0x80
  [72747.569753]  btrfs_qgroup_reserve_data+0x34/0x50 [btrfs]
  [72747.569781]  btrfs_check_data_free_space+0x5f/0xa0 [btrfs]
  [72747.569804]  btrfs_buffered_write+0x1f7/0x7f0 [btrfs]
  [72747.569810]  ? path_lookupat.isra.48+0x97/0x140
  [72747.569833]  btrfs_file_write_iter+0x81/0x410 [btrfs]
  [72747.569836]  ? __kmalloc+0x16a/0x2c0
  [72747.569839]  do_iter_readv_writev+0x160/0x1c0
  [72747.569843]  do_iter_write+0x80/0x1b0
  [72747.569847]  vfs_writev+0x84/0x140
  [72747.569869]  ? btrfs_file_llseek+0x38/0x270 [btrfs]
  [72747.569873]  do_writev+0x65/0x100
  [72747.569876]  do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
  [72747.569879]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

  [72747.569899] task:fsstress        state:D stack:    0 pid:841424 ppid:841417 flags:0x00004000
  [72747.569903] Call Trace:
  [72747.569906]  __schedule+0x296/0x760
  [72747.569909]  schedule+0x3c/0xa0
  [72747.569936]  try_flush_qgroup+0x95/0x140 [btrfs]
  [72747.569940]  ? finish_wait+0x80/0x80
  [72747.569967]  __btrfs_qgroup_reserve_meta+0x36/0x50 [btrfs]
  [72747.569989]  start_transaction+0x279/0x580 [btrfs]
  [72747.570014]  clone_copy_inline_extent+0x332/0x490 [btrfs]
  [72747.570041]  btrfs_clone+0x5b7/0x7a0 [btrfs]
  [72747.570068]  ? lock_extent_bits+0x64/0x90 [btrfs]
  [72747.570095]  btrfs_clone_files+0xfc/0x150 [btrfs]
  [72747.570122]  btrfs_remap_file_range+0x3d8/0x4a0 [btrfs]
  [72747.570126]  do_clone_file_range+0xed/0x200
  [72747.570131]  vfs_clone_file_range+0x37/0x110
  [72747.570134]  ioctl_file_clone+0x7d/0xb0
  [72747.570137]  do_vfs_ioctl+0x138/0x630
  [72747.570140]  __x64_sys_ioctl+0x62/0xc0
  [72747.570143]  do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
  [72747.570146]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

So fix this by skipping the flush of delalloc for an inode that is
flagged with BTRFS_INODE_NO_DELALLOC_FLUSH, meaning it is currently under
such a special case of cloning an inline extent, when flushing delalloc
during qgroup metadata reservation.

The special cases for cloning inline extents were added in kernel 5.7 by
by commit 05a5a762 ("Btrfs: implement full reflink support for
inline extents"), while having qgroup metadata space reservation flushing
delalloc when low on space was added in kernel 5.9 by commit
c53e9653 ("btrfs: qgroup: try to flush qgroup space when we get
-EDQUOT"). So use a "Fixes:" tag for the later commit to ease stable
kernel backports.
Reported-by: NWang Yugui <wangyugui@e16-tech.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/20210421083137.31E3.409509F4@e16-tech.com/
Fixes: c53e9653 ("btrfs: qgroup: try to flush qgroup space when we get -EDQUOT")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.9+
Reviewed-by: NQu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NFilipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: NDavid Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
      f9baa501
  17. 21 4月, 2021 1 次提交
    • F
      btrfs: fix metadata extent leak after failure to create subvolume · 67addf29
      由 Filipe Manana 提交于 
      When creating a subvolume we allocate an extent buffer for its root node
after starting a transaction. We setup a root item for the subvolume that
points to that extent buffer and then attempt to insert the root item into
the root tree - however if that fails, due to ENOMEM for example, we do
not free the extent buffer previously allocated and we do not abort the
transaction (as at that point we did nothing that can not be undone).

This means that we effectively do not return the metadata extent back to
the free space cache/tree and we leave a delayed reference for it which
causes a metadata extent item to be added to the extent tree, in the next
transaction commit, without having backreferences. When this happens
'btrfs check' reports the following:

  $ btrfs check /dev/sdi
  Opening filesystem to check...
  Checking filesystem on /dev/sdi
  UUID: dce2cb9d-025f-4b05-a4bf-cee0ad3785eb
  [1/7] checking root items
  [2/7] checking extents
  ref mismatch on [30425088 16384] extent item 1, found 0
  backref 30425088 root 256 not referenced back 0x564a91c23d70
  incorrect global backref count on 30425088 found 1 wanted 0
  backpointer mismatch on [30425088 16384]
  owner ref check failed [30425088 16384]
  ERROR: errors found in extent allocation tree or chunk allocation
  [3/7] checking free space cache
  [4/7] checking fs roots
  [5/7] checking only csums items (without verifying data)
  [6/7] checking root refs
  [7/7] checking quota groups skipped (not enabled on this FS)
  found 212992 bytes used, error(s) found
  total csum bytes: 0
  total tree bytes: 131072
  total fs tree bytes: 32768
  total extent tree bytes: 16384
  btree space waste bytes: 124669
  file data blocks allocated: 65536
   referenced 65536

So fix this by freeing the metadata extent if btrfs_insert_root() returns
an error.

CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Signed-off-by: NFilipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: NDavid Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
      67addf29
  19. 19 4月, 2021 2 次提交