- 25 9月, 2012 3 次提交
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由 Jeff Layton 提交于
Use the smb_send_rqst helper function to kmap each page in the array and update the hash for that chunk. Reviewed-by: NPavel Shilovsky <pshilovsky@samba.org> Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
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由 Jeff Layton 提交于
We need a way to represent a call to be sent on the wire that does not require having all of the page data kmapped. Behold the smb_rqst struct. This new struct represents an array of kvecs immediately followed by an array of pages. Convert the signing routines to use these structs under the hood and turn the existing functions for this into wrappers around that. For now, we're just changing these functions to take different args. Later, we'll teach them how to deal with arrays of pages. Reviewed-by: NPavel Shilovsky <pshilovsky@samba.org> Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
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由 Pavel Shilovsky 提交于
Use hmac-sha256 and rather than hmac-md5 that is used for CIFS/SMB. Signature field in SMB2 header is 16 bytes instead of 8 bytes. Automatically enable signing by client when requested by the server when signing ability is available to the client. Signed-off-by: NShirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: NSachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NPavel Shilovsky <piastryyy@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
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- 24 7月, 2012 2 次提交
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由 Jeff Layton 提交于
"smb2" makes me think of the SMB2.x protocol, which isn't at all what this function is for... Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
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由 Jeff Layton 提交于
Those macros add a newline on their own, so there's not any need to embed one in the message itself. Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
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- 19 1月, 2012 1 次提交
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由 Steve French 提交于
to reflect the unicode encoding used by CIFS protocol. Signed-off-by: NPavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru> Acked-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@samba.org> Reviewed-by: NShirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
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- 18 1月, 2012 1 次提交
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由 Jeff Layton 提交于
Currently, it's not very clear whether you're allowed to have a NULL vol->username or ses->user_name. Some places check for it and some don't. Make it clear that a NULL pointer is OK in these fields, and ensure that all the callers check for that. Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
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- 30 10月, 2011 1 次提交
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由 Shirish Pargaonkar 提交于
Re-posting a patch originally posted by Oskar Liljeblad after rebasing on 3.2. Modify cifs to assume that the supplied password is encoded according to iocharset. Before this patch passwords would be treated as raw 8-bit data, which made authentication with Unicode passwords impossible (at least passwords with characters > 0xFF). The previous code would as a side effect accept passwords encoded with ISO 8859-1, since Unicode < 0x100 basically is ISO 8859-1. Software which relies on that will no longer support password chars > 0x7F unless it also uses iocharset=iso8859-1. (mount.cifs does not care about the encoding so it will work as expected.) Signed-off-by: NOskar Liljeblad <oskar@osk.mine.nu> Signed-off-by: NShirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: NPavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru> Tested-by: NA <nimbus1_03087@yahoo.com> Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
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- 13 10月, 2011 2 次提交
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由 Jeff Layton 提交于
We have two versions of signature generating code. A vectorized and non-vectorized version. Eliminate a large chunk of cut-and-paste code by turning the non-vectorized version into a wrapper around the vectorized one. Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
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由 Jeff Layton 提交于
...it's more efficient since we know the length. Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
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- 20 9月, 2011 1 次提交
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由 Shirish Pargaonkar 提交于
Fix sec=ntlmv2/i authentication option during mount of Samba shares. cifs client was coding ntlmv2 response incorrectly. All that is needed in temp as specified in MS-NLMP seciton 3.3.2 "Define ComputeResponse(NegFlg, ResponseKeyNT, ResponseKeyLM, CHALLENGE_MESSAGE.ServerChallenge, ClientChallenge, Time, ServerName) as Set temp to ConcatenationOf(Responserversion, HiResponserversion, Z(6), Time, ClientChallenge, Z(4), ServerName, Z(4)" is MsvAvNbDomainName. For sec=ntlmsspi, build_av_pair is not used, a blob is plucked from type 2 response sent by the server to use in authentication. I tested sec=ntlmv2/i and sec=ntlmssp/i mount options against Samba (3.6) and Windows - XP, 2003 Server and 7. They all worked. Signed-off-by: NShirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: NSteve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
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- 01 8月, 2011 1 次提交
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由 Jeff Layton 提交于
Sniffing traffic on the wire shows that windows clients send a zeroed out signature field in a NEGOTIATE request, and send "BSRSPYL" in the signature field during SESSION_SETUP. Make the cifs client behave the same way. It doesn't seem to make much difference in any server that I've tested against, but it's probably best to follow windows behavior as closely as possible here. Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: NShirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: NSteve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
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- 26 7月, 2011 1 次提交
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由 Shirish Pargaonkar 提交于
Check return codes of crypto api calls and either log an error or log an error and return from the calling function with error. Signed-off-by: NShirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: NSteve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
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- 07 6月, 2011 1 次提交
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由 Jeff Layton 提交于
When signing is enabled, the first session that's established on a socket will cause a printk like this to pop: CIFS VFS: Unexpected SMB signature This is because the key exchange hasn't happened yet, so the signature field is bogus. Don't try to check the signature on the socket until the first session has been established. Also, eliminate the specific check for SMB_COM_NEGOTIATE since this check covers that case too. Cc: stable@kernel.org Cc: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NSteve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
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- 27 5月, 2011 1 次提交
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由 Steve French 提交于
secMode to sec_mode and cifsTconInfo to cifs_tcon and cifsSesInfo to cifs_ses Signed-off-by: NSteve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
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- 19 5月, 2011 2 次提交
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由 Steve French 提交于
There is one big endian field in the cifs protocol, the RFC1001 length, which cifs code (unlike in the smb2 code) had been handling as u32 until the last possible moment, when it was converted to be32 (its native form) before sending on the wire. To remove the last sparse endian warning, and to make this consistent with the smb2 implementation (which always treats the fields in their native size and endianness), convert all uses of smb_buf_length to be32. This version incorporates Christoph's comment about using be32_add_cpu, and fixes a typo in the second version of the patch. Signed-off-by: NSteve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: NPavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru> Signed-off-by: NSteve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
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由 Steve French 提交于
local cifs functions (repost) Using kernel crypto APIs for DES encryption during LM and NT hash generation instead of local functions within cifs. Source file smbdes.c is deleted sans four functions, one of which uses ecb des functionality provided by kernel crypto APIs. Remove function SMBOWFencrypt. Add return codes to various functions such as calc_lanman_hash, SMBencrypt, and SMBNTencrypt. Includes fix noticed by Dan Carpenter. Signed-off-by: NShirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> CC: Dan Carpenter <error27@gmail.com> Acked-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NSteve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
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- 12 4月, 2011 2 次提交
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由 Jeff Layton 提交于
While testing my patchset to fix asynchronous writes, I hit a bunch of signature problems when testing with signing on. The problem seems to be that signature checks on receive can be running at the same time as a process that is sending, or even that multiple receives can be checking signatures at the same time, clobbering the same data structures. While we're at it, clean up the comments over cifs_calculate_signature and add a note that the srv_mutex should be held when calling this function. This patch seems to fix the problems for me, but I'm not clear on whether it's the best approach. If it is, then this should probably go to stable too. Cc: stable@kernel.org Cc: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NSteve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
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由 Steve French 提交于
We artificially limited the user name to 32 bytes, but modern servers handle larger. Set the maximum length to a reasonable 256, and make the user name string dynamically allocated rather than a fixed size in session structure. Also clean up old checkpatch warning. Signed-off-by: NSteve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
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- 01 2月, 2011 1 次提交
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由 Shirish Pargaonkar 提交于
Missed one change as per earlier suggestion. Signed-off-by: NShirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NSteve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
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- 28 1月, 2011 1 次提交
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由 Shirish Pargaonkar 提交于
Replaced md4 hashing function local to cifs module with kernel crypto APIs. As a result, md4 hashing function and its supporting functions in file md4.c are not needed anymore. Cleaned up function declarations, removed forward function declarations, and removed a header file that is being deleted from being included. Verified that sec=ntlm/i, sec=ntlmv2/i, and sec=ntlmssp/i work correctly. Signed-off-by: NShirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NSteve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
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- 26 1月, 2011 1 次提交
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由 Steve French 提交于
Replace remaining use of md5 hash functions local to cifs module with kernel crypto APIs. Remove header and source file containing those local functions. Signed-off-by: NShirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NSteve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
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- 10 1月, 2011 1 次提交
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由 Jeff Layton 提交于
The server->sequence_number is already protected by the srv_mutex. The GlobalMid_lock is unneeded here. Reviewed-by: NShirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NSteve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
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- 29 10月, 2010 2 次提交
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由 Shirish Pargaonkar 提交于
Removed following fields from smb session structure cryptkey, ntlmv2_hash, tilen, tiblob and ntlmssp_auth structure is allocated dynamically only if the auth mech in NTLMSSP. response field within a session_key structure is used to initially store the target info (either plucked from type 2 challenge packet in case of NTLMSSP or fabricated in case of NTLMv2 without extended security) and then to store Message Authentication Key (mak) (session key + client response). Server challenge or cryptkey needed during a NTLMSSP authentication is now part of ntlmssp_auth structure which gets allocated and freed once authenticaiton process is done. Signed-off-by: NShirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: NSteve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
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由 Shirish Pargaonkar 提交于
Need to have cryptkey or server challenge in smb connection (struct TCP_Server_Info) for ntlm and ntlmv2 auth types for which cryptkey (Encryption Key) is supplied just once in Negotiate Protocol response during an smb connection setup for all the smb sessions over that smb connection. For ntlmssp, cryptkey or server challenge is provided for every smb session in type 2 packet of ntlmssp negotiation, the cryptkey provided during Negotiation Protocol response before smb connection does not count. Rename cryptKey to cryptkey and related changes. Signed-off-by: NShirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: NSteve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
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- 27 10月, 2010 4 次提交
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由 Shirish Pargaonkar 提交于
Minor cleanup - Fix spelling mistake, make meaningful (goto) label In function setup_ntlmv2_rsp(), do not return 0 and leak memory, let the tiblob get freed. For function find_domain_name(), pass already available nls table pointer instead of loading and unloading the table again in this function. For ntlmv2, the case sensitive password length is the length of the response, so subtract session key length (16 bytes) from the .len. Signed-off-by: NShirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: NSteve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
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由 Shirish Pargaonkar 提交于
Use kernel crypto sync hash apis insetead of cifs crypto functions. The calls typically corrospond one to one except that insead of key init, setkey is used. Use crypto apis to generate smb signagtures also. Use hmac-md5 to genereate ntlmv2 hash, ntlmv2 response, and HMAC (CR1 of ntlmv2 auth blob. User crypto apis to genereate signature and to verify signature. md5 hash is used to calculate signature. Use secondary key to calculate signature in case of ntlmssp. For ntlmv2 within ntlmssp, during signature calculation, only 16 bytes key (a nonce) stored within session key is used. during smb signature calculation. For ntlm and ntlmv2 without extended security, 16 bytes key as well as entire response (24 bytes in case of ntlm and variable length in case of ntlmv2) is used for smb signature calculation. For kerberos, there is no distinction between key and response. Acked-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NShirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: NSteve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
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由 Shirish Pargaonkar 提交于
Mark dependency on crypto modules in Kconfig. Defining per structures sdesc and cifs_secmech which are used to store crypto hash functions and contexts. They are stored per smb connection and used for all auth mechs to genereate hash values and signatures. Allocate crypto hashing functions, security descriptiors, and respective contexts when a smb/tcp connection is established. Release them when a tcp/smb connection is taken down. md5 and hmac-md5 are two crypto hashing functions that are used throught the life of an smb/tcp connection by various functions that calcualte signagure and ntlmv2 hash, HMAC etc. structure ntlmssp_auth is defined as per smb connection. ntlmssp_auth holds ciphertext which is genereated by rc4/arc4 encryption of secondary key, a nonce using ntlmv2 session key and sent in the session key field of the type 3 message sent by the client during ntlmssp negotiation/exchange A key is exchanged with the server if client indicates so in flags in type 1 messsage and server agrees in flag in type 2 message of ntlmssp negotiation. If both client and agree, a key sent by client in type 3 message of ntlmssp negotiation in the session key field. The key is a ciphertext generated off of secondary key, a nonce, using ntlmv2 hash via rc4/arc4. Signing works for ntlmssp in this patch. The sequence number within the server structure needs to be zero until session is established i.e. till type 3 packet of ntlmssp exchange of a to be very first smb session on that smb connection is sent. Acked-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NShirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: NSteve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
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由 Shirish Pargaonkar 提交于
Start calculating auth response within a session. Move/Add pertinet data structures like session key, server challenge and ntlmv2_hash in a session structure. We should do the calculations within a session before copying session key and response over to server data structures because a session setup can fail. Only after a very first smb session succeeds, it copy/make its session key, session key of smb connection. This key stays with the smb connection throughout its life. sequence_number within server is set to 0x2. The authentication Message Authentication Key (mak) which consists of session key followed by client response within structure session_key is now dynamic. Every authentication type allocates the key + response sized memory within its session structure and later either assigns or frees it once the client response is sent and if session's session key becomes connetion's session key. ntlm/ntlmi authentication functions are rearranged. A function named setup_ntlm_resp(), similar to setup_ntlmv2_resp(), replaces function cifs_calculate_session_key(). size of CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE is changed to 16, to reflect the byte size of the key it holds. Reviewed-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@samba.org> Signed-off-by: NShirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: NSteve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
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- 15 10月, 2010 1 次提交
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由 Shirish Pargaonkar 提交于
Start calculation auth response within a session. Move/Add pertinet data structures like session key, server challenge and ntlmv2_hash in a session structure. We should do the calculations within a session before copying session key and response over to server data structures because a session setup can fail. Only after a very first smb session succeeds, it copies/makes its session key, session key of smb connection. This key stays with the smb connection throughout its life. Signed-off-by: NShirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NSteve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
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- 12 10月, 2010 1 次提交
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由 Shirish Pargaonkar 提交于
CIFS ntlm authentication and signing - Build a proper av/ti pair blob for ntlmv2 without extended security authentication Build an av pair blob as part of ntlmv2 (without extended security) auth request. Include netbios and dns names for domain and server and a timestamp in the blob. Signed-off-by: NShirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@samba.org> Signed-off-by: NSteve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
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- 08 10月, 2010 1 次提交
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由 Jeff Layton 提交于
find_domain_name() uses load_nls_default which takes a module reference on the appropriate NLS module, but doesn't put it. Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Cc: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: NSteve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
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- 30 9月, 2010 2 次提交
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由 Shirish Pargaonkar 提交于
Attribue Value (AV) pairs or Target Info (TI) pairs are part of ntlmv2 authentication. Structure ntlmv2_resp had only definition for two av pairs. So removed it, and now allocation of av pairs is dynamic. For servers like Windows 7/2008, av pairs sent by server in challege packet (type 2 in the ntlmssp exchange/negotiation) can vary. Server sends them during ntlmssp negotiation. So when ntlmssp is used as an authentication mechanism, type 2 challenge packet from server has this information. Pluck it and use the entire blob for authenticaiton purpose. If user has not specified, extract (netbios) domain name from the av pairs which is used to calculate ntlmv2 hash. Servers like Windows 7 are particular about the AV pair blob. Servers like Windows 2003, are not very strict about the contents of av pair blob used during ntlmv2 authentication. So when security mechanism such as ntlmv2 is used (not ntlmv2 in ntlmssp), there is no negotiation and so genereate a minimal blob that gets used in ntlmv2 authentication as well as gets sent. Fields tilen and tilbob are session specific. AV pair values are defined. To calculate ntlmv2 response we need ti/av pair blob. For sec mech like ntlmssp, the blob is plucked from type 2 response from the server. From this blob, netbios name of the domain is retrieved, if user has not already provided, to be included in the Target String as part of ntlmv2 hash calculations. For sec mech like ntlmv2, create a minimal, two av pair blob. The allocated blob is freed in case of error. In case there is no error, this blob is used in calculating ntlmv2 response (in CalcNTLMv2_response) and is also copied on the response to the server, and then freed. The type 3 ntlmssp response is prepared on a buffer, 5 * sizeof of struct _AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE, an empirical value large enough to hold _AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE plus a blob with max possible 10 values as part of ntlmv2 response and lmv2 keys and domain, user, workstation names etc. Also, kerberos gets selected as a default mechanism if server supports it, over the other security mechanisms. Signed-off-by: NShirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: NSteve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
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由 Shirish Pargaonkar 提交于
Change name of variable mac_key to session key. The reason mac_key was changed to session key is, this structure does not hold message authentication code, it holds the session key (for ntlmv2, ntlmv1 etc.). mac is generated as a signature in cifs_calc* functions. Signed-off-by: NShirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: NSteve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
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- 09 9月, 2010 4 次提交
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由 Steve French 提交于
This function is not used, so remove the definition and declaration. Reviewed-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@samba.org> Signed-off-by: NShirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: NSteve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
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由 Steve French 提交于
This reverts commit 9fbc5908. The change to kernel crypto and fixes to ntlvm2 and ntlmssp series, introduced a regression. Deferring this patch series to 2.6.37 after Shirish fixes it. Signed-off-by: NSteve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> CC: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishp@us.ibm.com>
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由 Steve French 提交于
This reverts commit 3ec6bbcd. The change to kernel crypto and fixes to ntlvm2 and ntlmssp series, introduced a regression. Deferring this patch series to 2.6.37 after Shirish fixes it. Signed-off-by: NSteve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> CC: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishp@us.ibm.com>
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由 Steve French 提交于
This reverts commit 2d20ca83. The change to kernel crypto and fixes to ntlvm2 and ntlmssp series, introduced a regression. Deferring this patch series to 2.6.37 after Shirish fixes it. Signed-off-by: NSteve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> CC: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishp@us.ibm.com>
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- 25 8月, 2010 1 次提交
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Eliminiate sparse warning during usage of crypto_shash_* APIs error: bad constant expression Allocate memory for shash descriptors once, so that we do not kmalloc/kfree it for every signature generation (shash descriptor for md5 hash). From ed7538619817777decc44b5660b52268077b74f3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Date: Tue, 24 Aug 2010 11:47:43 -0500 Subject: [PATCH] eliminate sparse warnings during crypto_shash_* APis usage Signed-off-by: NShirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: NSteve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
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- 24 8月, 2010 1 次提交
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由 Shirish Pargaonkar 提交于
Signed-off-by: NShirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: NSteve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
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