When quota is on, it is expected that unused quota inodes have a
value of NULLFSINO. The changes to support a separate project quota
in 3.12 broken this rule for non-project quota inode enabled
filesystem, as the code now refuses to write the group quota inode
if neither group or project quotas are enabled. This regression was
introduced by commit d892d586 ("xfs: Start using pquotaino from the
superblock").

In this case, we should be writing NULLFSINO rather than nothing to
ensure that we leave the group quota inode in a valid state while
quotas are enabled.

Failure to do so doesn't cause a current kernel to break - the
separate project quota inodes introduced translation code to always
treat a zero inode as NULLFSINO. This was introduced by commit
01026297 ("xfs: Initialize all quota inodes to be NULLFSINO") with is
also in 3.12 but older kernels do not do this and hence taking a
filesystem back to an older kernel can result in quotas failing
initialisation at mount time. When that happens, we see this in
dmesg:

[ 1649.215390] XFS (sdb): Mounting Filesystem
[ 1649.316894] XFS (sdb): Failed to initialize disk quotas.
[ 1649.316902] XFS (sdb): Ending clean mount

By ensuring that we write NULLFSINO to quota inodes that aren't
active, we avoid this problem. We have to be really careful when
determining if the quota inodes are active or not, because we don't
want to write a NULLFSINO if the quota inodes are active and we
simply aren't updating them.
Signed-off-by: NDave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NBrian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NDave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>

We reject any filesystem that is mounted with this feature bit set,
so we don't need to check for it anywhere else. Remove the function
for checking if the feature bit is set and any code that uses it.
Signed-off-by: NDave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: NJie Liu <jeff.liu@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NDave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>

If the the V2 directory feature bit is not set in the superblock
feature mask the filesystem will fail the good version check.
Hence we don't need any other version checking on the dir2 feature
bit in the code as the filesystem will not mount without it set.
Remove the checking code.
Signed-off-by: NDave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: NDave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>

We have had this code in the kernel for over a year now and have
shaken all the known issues out of the code over the past few
releases. It's now time to remove the experimental warnings during
mount and fully support the new filesystem format in production
systems.

Remove the experimental warning, and add a version number to the
initial "mounting filesystem" message to tell use what type of
filesystem is being mounted. Also, remove the temporary inode
cluster size output at mount time now we know that this code works
fine.
Signed-off-by: NDave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NBrian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NDave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>

Modify all read & write verifiers to differentiate
between CRC errors and other inconsistencies.

This sets the appropriate error number on bp->b_error,
and then calls xfs_verifier_error() if something went
wrong.  That function will issue the appropriate message
to the user.
Signed-off-by: NEric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NBrian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NDave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>

Many/most callers of xfs_update_cksum() pass bp->b_addr and
BBTOB(bp->b_length) as the first 2 args.  Add a helper
which can just accept the bp and the crc offset, and work
it out on its own, for brevity.
Signed-off-by: NEric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NDave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NDave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>

Many/most callers of xfs_verify_cksum() pass bp->b_addr and
BBTOB(bp->b_length) as the first 2 args.  Add a helper
which can just accept the bp and the crc offset, and work
it out on its own, for brevity.
Signed-off-by: NEric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NDave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NDave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>

Some calls to crc functions used useful #defines,
others used awkward offsetof() constructs.

Switch them all to #define to make things a bit cleaner.
Signed-off-by: NEric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NDave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NDave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>

Today, if

xfs_sb_read_verify
  xfs_sb_verify
    xfs_mount_validate_sb

detects superblock corruption, it'll be extremely noisy, dumping
2 stacks, 2 hexdumps, etc.

This is because we call XFS_CORRUPTION_ERROR in xfs_mount_validate_sb
as well as in xfs_sb_read_verify.

Also, *any* errors in xfs_mount_validate_sb which are not corruption
per se; things like too-big-blocksize, bad version, bad magic, v1 dirs,
rw-incompat etc - things which do not return EFSCORRUPTED - will
still do the whole XFS_CORRUPTION_ERROR spew when xfs_sb_read_verify
sees any error at all.  And it suggests to the user that they
should run xfs_repair, even if the root cause of the mount failure
is a simple incompatibility.

I'll submit that the probably-not-corrupted errors don't warrant
this much noise, so this patch removes the warning for anything
other than EFSCORRUPTED returns, and replaces the lower-level
XFS_CORRUPTION_ERROR with an xfs_notice().
Signed-off-by: NEric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NDave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NDave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>

When xfs_readsb() does the very first read of the superblock,
it makes a guess at the length of the buffer, based on the
sector size of the underlying storage.  This may or may
not match the filesystem sector size in sb_sectsize, so
we can't i.e. do a CRC check on it; it might be too short.

In fact, mounting a filesystem with sb_sectsize larger
than the device sector size will cause a mount failure
if CRCs are enabled, because we are checksumming a length
which exceeds the buffer passed to it.

So always read twice; the first time we read with NULL
buffer ops to skip verification; then set the proper
read length, hook up the proper verifier, and give it
another go.

Once we are sure that we've got the right buffer length,
we can also use bp->b_length in the xfs_sb_read_verify,
rather than the less-trusted on-disk sectorsize for
secondary superblocks.  Before this we ran the risk of
passing junk to the crc32c routines, which didn't always
handle extreme values.
Signed-off-by: NEric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NDave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NDave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>

My earlier commit 10e6e65d deserves a layer or two of brown paper
bags.  The logic in that commit means that a CRC failure on the
primary superblock will *never* result in an error return.

Hopefully this fixes it, so that we always return the error
if it's a primary superblock, otherwise only if the filesystem
has CRCs enabled.
Signed-off-by: NEric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NMark Tinguely <tinguely@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: NBen Myers <bpm@sgi.com>

xfs_mount_validate_sb doesn't check sb_inopblock for sanity
(as does its xfs_repair counterpart, FWIW).

If it's out of bounds, we can go off the rails in i.e.
xfs_inode_buf_verify(), which uses sb_inopblock as a loop
limit when stepping through a metadata buffer.

The problem can be demonstrated easily by corrupting
sb_inopblock with xfs_db and trying to mount the result:

# mkfs.xfs -dfile,name=fsfile,size=1g
# xfs_db -x fsfile
xfs_db> sb 0
xfs_db> write inopblock 512
inopblock = 512
xfs_db> quit

# mount -o loop fsfile  mnt
and we blow up in xfs_inode_buf_verify().

With this patch, we get a (very noisy) corruption error,
and fail the mount as we should.
Signed-off-by: NEric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NJie Liu <jeff.liu@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: NBrian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NDave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>

Today, if xfs_sb_read_verify encounters a v4 superblock
with junk past v4 fields which includes data in sb_crc,
it will be treated as a failing checksum and a significant
corruption.

There are known prior bugs which leave junk at the end
of the V4 superblock; we don't need to actually fail the
verification in this case if other checks pan out ok.

So if this is a secondary superblock, and the primary
superblock doesn't indicate that this is a V5 filesystem,
don't treat this as an actual checksum failure.

We should probably check the garbage condition as
we do in xfs_repair, and possibly warn about it
or self-heal, but that's a different scope of work.

Stable folks: This can go back to v3.10, which is what
introduced the sb CRC checking that is tripped up by old,
stale, incorrect V4 superblocks w/ unzeroed bits.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NEric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NDave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
Reviewed-by: NMark Tinguely <tinguely@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: NBen Myers <bpm@sgi.com>

The kbuild test robot indicated that there were some new sparse
warnings in fs/xfs/xfs_dquot_buf.c. Actually, there were a lot more
that is wasn't warning about, so fix them all up.

Reported-by: kbuild test robot
Signed-off-by: NDave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NBen Myers <bpm@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: NBen Myers <bpm@sgi.com>

Currently the xfs_inode.h header has a dependency on the definition
of the BMAP btree records as the inode fork includes an array of
xfs_bmbt_rec_host_t objects in it's definition.

Move all the btree format definitions from xfs_btree.h,
xfs_bmap_btree.h, xfs_alloc_btree.h and xfs_ialloc_btree.h to
xfs_format.h to continue the process of centralising the on-disk
format definitions. With this done, the xfs inode definitions are no
longer dependent on btree header files.

The enables a massive culling of unnecessary includes, with close to
200 #include directives removed from the XFS kernel code base.
Signed-off-by: NDave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NBen Myers <bpm@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: NBen Myers <bpm@sgi.com>

xfs_trans.h has a dependency on xfs_log.h for a couple of
structures. Most code that does transactions doesn't need to know
anything about the log, but this dependency means that they have to
include xfs_log.h. Decouple the xfs_trans.h and xfs_log.h header
files and clean up the includes to be in dependency order.

In doing this, remove the direct include of xfs_trans_reserve.h from
xfs_trans.h so that we remove the dependency between xfs_trans.h and
xfs_mount.h. Hence the xfs_trans.h include can be moved to the
indicate the actual dependencies other header files have on it.

Note that these are kernel only header files, so this does not
translate to any userspace changes at all.
Signed-off-by: NDave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NBen Myers <bpm@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: NBen Myers <bpm@sgi.com>

The on-disk format definitions for the directory and attribute
structures are spread across 3 header files right now, only one of
which is dedicated to defining on-disk structures and their
manipulation (xfs_dir2_format.h). Pull all the format definitions
into a single header file - xfs_da_format.h - and switch all the
code over to point at that.
Signed-off-by: NDave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NBen Myers <bpm@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: NBen Myers <bpm@sgi.com>

If we get EWRONGFS due to probing of non-xfs filesystems,
there's no need to issue the scary corruption error and backtrace.
Signed-off-by: NEric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NMark Tinguely <tinguely@sgi.com>
Reviewed-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: NBen Myers <bpm@sgi.com>

__xfs_printk adds its own "\n".  Having it in the original string
leads to unintentional blank lines from these messages.

Most format strings have no newline, but a few do, leading to
i.e.:

[ 7347.119911] XFS (sdb2): Access to block zero in inode 132 start_block: 0 start_off: 0 blkcnt: 0 extent-state: 0 lastx: 1a05
[ 7347.119911] 
[ 7347.119919] XFS (sdb2): Access to block zero in inode 132 start_block: 0 start_off: 0 blkcnt: 0 extent-state: 0 lastx: 1a05
[ 7347.119919] 

Fix them all.
Signed-off-by: NEric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NMark Tinguely <tinguely@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: NBen Myers <bpm@sgi.com>

Signed-off-by: NZhi Yong Wu <wuzhy@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: NMark Tinguely <tinguely@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: NBen Myers <bpm@sgi.com>

xfs_mount.c is shared with userspace, but the only functions that
are shared are to do with physical superblock manipulations. This
means that less than 25% of the xfs_mount.c code is actually shared
with userspace. Move all the superblock functions to xfs_sb.c and
share that instead with libxfs.

Note that this will leave all the in-core transaction related
superblock counter modifications in xfs_mount.c as none of that is
shared with userspace. With a few more small changes, xfs_mount.h
won't need to be shared with userspace anymore, either.
Signed-off-by: NDave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NMark Tinguely <tinguely@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: NBen Myers <bpm@sgi.com>