Signed-off-by: NSachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NShirish Pargaonkar <spargaonkar@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>

Signed-off-by: NSachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NShirish Pargaonkar <spargaonkar@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>

In preparation for splitting CIFS_SessSetup() into smaller more
manageable chunks, we first add helper functions.

We then proceed to split out lanman auth out of CIFS_SessSetup()
Signed-off-by: NSachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NShirish Pargaonkar <spargaonkar@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>

This allows users to use LANMAN authentication on servers which support
unencapsulated authentication.

The patch fixes a regression where users using plaintext authentication
were no longer able to do so because of changed bought in by patch
3f618223

https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1011621Reported-by: NPanos Kavalagios <Panagiotis.Kavalagios@eurodyn.com>
Reviewed-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NSachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>

Currently, we try to ensure that we use vcnum of 0 on the first
established session on a connection and then try to use a different
vcnum on each session after that.

This is a little odd, since there's no real reason to use a different
vcnum for each SMB session. I can only assume there was some confusion
between SMB sessions and VCs. That's somewhat understandable since they
both get created during SESSION_SETUP, but the documentation indicates
that they are really orthogonal. The comment on max_vcs in particular
looks quite misguided. An SMB session is already uniquely identified
by the SMB UID value -- there's no need to again uniquely ID with a
VC.

Furthermore, a vcnum of 0 is a cue to the server that it should release
any resources that were previously held by the client. This sounds like
a good thing, until you consider that:

a) it totally ignores the fact that other programs on the box (e.g.
smbclient) might have connections established to the server. Using a
vcnum of 0 causes them to get kicked off.

b) it causes problems with NAT. If several clients are connected to the
same server via the same NAT'ed address, whenever one connects to the
server it kicks off all the others, which then reconnect and kick off
the first one...ad nauseum.

I don't see any reason to ignore the advice in "Implementing CIFS" which
has a comprehensive treatment of virtual circuits. In there, it states
"...and contrary to the specs the client should always use a VcNumber of
one, never zero."

Have the client just use a hardcoded vcnum of 1, and stop abusing the
special behavior of vcnum 0.
Reported-by: NSauron99@gmx.de <sauron99@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NVolker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>

Add a variable specific to NTLMSSP authentication to determine
whether to exchange keys during negotiation and authentication phases.

Since session key for smb1 is per smb connection, once a very first
sesion is established, there is no need for key exchange during
subsequent session setups. As a result, smb1 session setup code sets this
variable as false.

Since session key for smb2 and smb3 is per smb connection, we need to
exchange keys to generate session key for every sesion being established.
As a result, smb2/3 session setup code sets this variable as true.
Acked-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: NShirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>

Move the post (successful) session setup code to respective dialect routines.

For smb1, session key is per smb connection.
For smb2/smb3, session key is per smb session.

If client and server do not require signing, free session key for smb1/2/3.

If client and server require signing
  smb1 - Copy (kmemdup) session key for the first session to connection.
         Free session key of that and subsequent sessions on this connection.
  smb2 - For every session, keep the session key and free it when the
         session is being shutdown.
  smb3 - For every session, generate the smb3 signing key using the session key
         and then free the session key.

There are two unrelated line formatting changes as well.
Reviewed-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: NShirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>

The max string length definitions for user name, domain name, password,
and share name have been moved into their own header file in uapi so the
mount helper can use autoconf to define them instead of keeping the
kernel side and userland side definitions in sync manually.  The names
have also been standardized with a "CIFS" prefix and "LEN" suffix.
Signed-off-by: NScott Lovenberg <scott.lovenberg@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: NChen Gang <gang.chen@asianux.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>

For cifs_set_cifscreds() in "fs/cifs/connect.c", 'desc' buffer length
is 'CIFSCREDS_DESC_SIZE' (56 is less than 256), and 'ses->domainName'
length may be "255 + '\0'".

The related sprintf() may cause memory overflow, so need extend related
buffer enough to hold all things.

It is also necessary to be sure of 'ses->domainName' must be less than
256, and define the related macro instead of hard code number '256'.
Signed-off-by: NChen Gang <gang.chen@asianux.com>
Reviewed-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NShirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: NScott Lovenberg <scott.lovenberg@gmail.com>
CC: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>

Now that we track what sort of NEGOTIATE response was received, stop
mandating that every session on a socket use the same type of auth.

Push that decision out into the session setup code, and make the sectype
a per-session property. This should allow us to mix multiple sectypes on
a socket as long as they are compatible with the NEGOTIATE response.

With this too, we can now eliminate the ses->secFlg field since that
info is redundant and harder to work with than a securityEnum.
Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NPavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>

Currently, we determine this according to flags in the sec_mode, flags
in the global_secflags and via other methods. That makes the semantics
very hard to follow and there are corner cases where we don't handle
this correctly.

Add a new bool to the TCP_Server_Info that acts as a simple flag to tell
us whether signing is enabled on this connection or not, and fix up the
places that need to determine this to use that flag.

This is a bit weird for the SMB2 case, where signing is per-session.
SMB2 needs work in this area already though. The existing SMB2 code has
similar logic to what we're using here, so there should be no real
change in behavior. These changes should make it easier to implement
per-session signing in the future though.
Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NPavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>

This field is completely unused:

CIFS_SES_W9X is completely unused. CIFS_SES_LANMAN and CIFS_SES_OS2
are set but never checked. CIFS_SES_NT4 is checked, but never set.
Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NPavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>

These look pretty cargo-culty to me, but let's be certain. Leave
them in place for now. Pop a WARN if it ever does happen. Also,
move to a more standard idiom for setting the "server" pointer.
Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NPavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>

...rc is always set to 0.
Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NPavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>

It's not obvious from reading the macro names that these macros
are for debugging.  Convert the names to a single more typical
kernel style cifs_dbg macro.

	cERROR(1, ...)   -> cifs_dbg(VFS, ...)
	cFYI(1, ...)     -> cifs_dbg(FYI, ...)
	cFYI(DBG2, ...)  -> cifs_dbg(NOISY, ...)

Move the terminating format newline from the macro to the call site.

Add CONFIG_CIFS_DEBUG function cifs_vfs_err to emit the
"CIFS VFS: " prefix for VFS messages.

Size is reduced ~ 1% when CONFIG_CIFS_DEBUG is set (default y)

$ size fs/cifs/cifs.ko*
   text    data     bss     dec     hex filename
 265245	   2525	    132	 267902	  4167e	fs/cifs/cifs.ko.new
 268359    2525     132  271016   422a8 fs/cifs/cifs.ko.old

Other miscellaneous changes around these conversions:

o Miscellaneous typo fixes
o Add terminating \n's to almost all formats and remove them
  from the macros to be more kernel style like.  A few formats
  previously had defective \n's
o Remove unnecessary OOM messages as kmalloc() calls dump_stack
o Coalesce formats to make grep easier,
  added missing spaces when coalescing formats
o Use %s, __func__ instead of embedded function name
o Removed unnecessary "cifs: " prefixes
o Convert kzalloc with multiply to kcalloc
o Remove unused cifswarn macro
Signed-off-by: NJoe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>

This replaces calls to kmalloc followed by memcpy with a single call to
kmemdup. This was found via make coccicheck.
Signed-off-by: NSilviu-Mihai Popescu <silviupopescu1990@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>

Signed-off-by: NPavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>

Signed-off-by: NPavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>

Reviewed-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NPavel Shilovsky <pshilovsky@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>

Reviewed-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NPavel Shilovsky <pshilovsky@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>

Calling key_revoke here isn't ideal as further requests for the key will
end up returning -EKEYREVOKED until it gets purged from the cache. What we
really intend here is to force a new upcall on the next request_key.

Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>

For null user mounts, do not invoke string length function
during session setup.

Cc: <stable@kernel.org
Reported-and-Tested-by: NChris Clayton <chris2553@googlemail.com>
Acked-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NShirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>

We should check that we're not copying memory from beyond the end of the
blob.
Signed-off-by: NDan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>

to reflect the unicode encoding used by CIFS protocol.
Signed-off-by: NPavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru>
Acked-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: NShirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>

Re-posting a patch originally posted by Oskar Liljeblad after
rebasing on 3.2.

Modify cifs to assume that the supplied password is encoded according
to iocharset.  Before this patch passwords would be treated as
raw 8-bit data, which made authentication with Unicode passwords impossible
(at least passwords with characters > 0xFF).

The previous code would as a side effect accept passwords encoded with
ISO 8859-1, since Unicode < 0x100 basically is ISO 8859-1.  Software which
relies on that will no longer support password chars > 0x7F unless it also
uses iocharset=iso8859-1.  (mount.cifs does not care about the encoding so
it will work as expected.)
Signed-off-by: NOskar Liljeblad <oskar@osk.mine.nu>
Signed-off-by: NShirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: NPavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru>
Tested-by: NA <nimbus1_03087@yahoo.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>

server->maxBuf is the maximum SMB size (including header) that the
server can handle. CIFSMaxBufSize is the maximum amount of data (sans
header) that the client can handle. Currently maxBuf is being capped at
CIFSMaxBufSize + the max headers size, and the two values are used
somewhat interchangeably in the code.

This makes little sense as these two values are not related at all.
Separate them and make sure the code uses the right values in the right
places.
Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>

This reverts commit c4d3396b.

Problems discovered with readdir to Samba due to
not accounting for header size properly with this change

Currently, we mirror the same size back to the server that it sends us.
That makes little sense. Instead we should be sending the server the
maximum buffer size that we can handle -- CIFSMaxBufSize minus the
4 byte RFC1001 header.
Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>

When using NTLMSSP authentication mechanism, if server mandates
signing, keep the flags in type 3 messages of the NTLMSSP exchange
same as in type 1 messages (i.e. keep the indicated capabilities same).

Some of the servers such as Samba, expect the flags such as
Negotiate_Key_Exchange in type 3 message of NTLMSSP exchange as well.
Some servers like Windows do not.

https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=8212Signed-off-by: NShirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail>
Acked-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>

secMode to sec_mode
and
cifsTconInfo to cifs_tcon
and
cifsSesInfo to cifs_ses
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>

This is the same patch as originally posted, just with some merge
conflicts fixed up...

Currently, the ByteCount is usually converted to host-endian on receive.
This is confusing however, as we need to keep two sets of routines for
accessing it, and keep track of when to use each routine. Munging
received packets like this also limits when the signature can be
calulated.

Simplify the code by keeping the received ByteCount in little-endian
format. This allows us to eliminate a set of routines for accessing it
and we can now drop the *_le suffixes from the accessor functions since
that's now implied.

While we're at it, switch all of the places that read the ByteCount
directly to use the get_bcc inline which should also clean up some
unaligned accesses.
Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>

       There is one big endian field in the cifs protocol, the RFC1001
       length, which cifs code (unlike in the smb2 code) had been handling as
       u32 until the last possible moment, when it was converted to be32 (its
       native form) before sending on the wire.   To remove the last sparse
       endian warning, and to make this consistent with the smb2
       implementation  (which always treats the fields in their
       native size and endianness), convert all uses of smb_buf_length to
       be32.

       This version incorporates Christoph's comment about
       using be32_add_cpu, and fixes a typo in the second
       version of the patch.
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NPavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>

 local cifs functions (repost)

Using kernel crypto APIs for DES encryption during LM and NT hash generation
instead of local functions within cifs.
Source file smbdes.c is deleted sans four functions, one of which
uses ecb des functionality provided by kernel crypto APIs.

Remove function SMBOWFencrypt.

Add return codes to various functions such as calc_lanman_hash,
SMBencrypt, and SMBNTencrypt.  Includes fix noticed by Dan Carpenter.
Signed-off-by: NShirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
CC: Dan Carpenter <error27@gmail.com>
Acked-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>

It's possible that when we go to decode the string area in the
SESSION_SETUP response, that bytes_remaining will be 0. Decrementing it at
that point will mean that it can go "negative" and wrap. Check for a
bytes_remaining value of 0, and don't try to decode the string area if
that's the case.

Cc: stable@kernel.org
Reported-and-Acked-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>

The buffer length checks in this function depend on this value being a
signed data type, but 690c522f converted it to an unsigned type.

Also, eliminate a problem with the null termination check in the same
function. cifs_strndup_from_ucs handles that situation correctly
already, and the existing check could potentially lead to a buffer
overrun since it increments bleft without checking to see whether it
falls off the end of the buffer.

Cc: stable@kernel.org
Reported-and-Acked-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>

make modules C=2 M=fs/cifs CF=-D__CHECK_ENDIAN__

Found for example:

 CHECK   fs/cifs/cifssmb.c
fs/cifs/cifssmb.c:728:22: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different base types)
fs/cifs/cifssmb.c:728:22:    expected unsigned short [unsigned] [usertype] Tid
fs/cifs/cifssmb.c:728:22:    got restricted __le16 [usertype] <noident>
fs/cifs/cifssmb.c:1883:45: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different base types)
fs/cifs/cifssmb.c:1883:45:    expected long long [signed] [usertype] fl_start
fs/cifs/cifssmb.c:1883:45:    got restricted __le64 [usertype] start
fs/cifs/cifssmb.c:1884:54: warning: restricted __le64 degrades to integer
fs/cifs/cifssmb.c:1885:58: warning: restricted __le64 degrades to integer
fs/cifs/cifssmb.c:1886:43: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different base types)
fs/cifs/cifssmb.c:1886:43:    expected unsigned int [unsigned] fl_pid
fs/cifs/cifssmb.c:1886:43:    got restricted __le32 [usertype] pid

In checking new smb2 code for missing endian conversions, I noticed
some endian errors had crept in over the last few releases into the
cifs code (symlink, ntlmssp, posix lock, and also a less problematic warning
in fscache).  A followon patch will address a few smb2 endian
problems.
Reviewed-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>

We artificially limited the user name to 32 bytes, but modern servers handle
larger.  Set the maximum length to a reasonable 256, and make the user name
string dynamically allocated rather than a fixed size in session structure.
Also clean up old checkpatch warning.
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>

LANMAN response length was changed to 16 bytes instead of 24 bytes.
Revert it back to 24 bytes.
Signed-off-by: NShirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
CC: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>

It's possible that when we access the ByteCount that the alignment
will be off. Most CPUs deal with that transparently, but there's
usually some performance impact. Some CPUs raise an exception on
unaligned accesses.

Fix this by accessing the byte count using the get_unaligned and
put_unaligned inlined functions. While we're at it, fix the types
of some of the variables that end up getting returns from these
functions.
Acked-by: NPavel Shilovsky <piastryyy@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>

Since we don't time out individual requests anymore, remove the code
that we used to use for setting timeouts on different requests.
Reviewed-by: NPavel Shilovsky <piastryyy@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: NSuresh Jayaraman <sjayaraman@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>