1. 21 11月, 2019 3 次提交
  2. 13 11月, 2019 1 次提交
  3. 12 11月, 2019 1 次提交
    • C
      KVM: X86: Fix initialization of MSR lists · 7a5ee6ed
      Chenyi Qiang 提交于
      The three MSR lists(msrs_to_save[], emulated_msrs[] and
      msr_based_features[]) are global arrays of kvm.ko, which are
      adjusted (copy supported MSRs forward to override the unsupported MSRs)
      when insmod kvm-{intel,amd}.ko, but it doesn't reset these three arrays
      to their initial value when rmmod kvm-{intel,amd}.ko. Thus, at the next
      installation, kvm-{intel,amd}.ko will do operations on the modified
      arrays with some MSRs lost and some MSRs duplicated.
      
      So define three constant arrays to hold the initial MSR lists and
      initialize msrs_to_save[], emulated_msrs[] and msr_based_features[]
      based on the constant arrays.
      
      Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
      Reviewed-by: NXiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
      Signed-off-by: NChenyi Qiang <chenyi.qiang@intel.com>
      [Remove now useless conditionals. - Paolo]
      Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
      7a5ee6ed
  4. 05 11月, 2019 1 次提交
  5. 04 11月, 2019 1 次提交
    • P
      kvm: mmu: ITLB_MULTIHIT mitigation · b8e8c830
      Paolo Bonzini 提交于
      With some Intel processors, putting the same virtual address in the TLB
      as both a 4 KiB and 2 MiB page can confuse the instruction fetch unit
      and cause the processor to issue a machine check resulting in a CPU lockup.
      
      Unfortunately when EPT page tables use huge pages, it is possible for a
      malicious guest to cause this situation.
      
      Add a knob to mark huge pages as non-executable. When the nx_huge_pages
      parameter is enabled (and we are using EPT), all huge pages are marked as
      NX. If the guest attempts to execute in one of those pages, the page is
      broken down into 4K pages, which are then marked executable.
      
      This is not an issue for shadow paging (except nested EPT), because then
      the host is in control of TLB flushes and the problematic situation cannot
      happen.  With nested EPT, again the nested guest can cause problems shadow
      and direct EPT is treated in the same way.
      
      [ tglx: Fixup default to auto and massage wording a bit ]
      Originally-by: NJunaid Shahid <junaids@google.com>
      Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      b8e8c830
  6. 28 10月, 2019 1 次提交
  7. 23 10月, 2019 1 次提交
    • J
      KVM: nVMX: Don't leak L1 MMIO regions to L2 · 671ddc70
      Jim Mattson 提交于
      If the "virtualize APIC accesses" VM-execution control is set in the
      VMCS, the APIC virtualization hardware is triggered when a page walk
      in VMX non-root mode terminates at a PTE wherein the address of the 4k
      page frame matches the APIC-access address specified in the VMCS. On
      hardware, the APIC-access address may be any valid 4k-aligned physical
      address.
      
      KVM's nVMX implementation enforces the additional constraint that the
      APIC-access address specified in the vmcs12 must be backed by
      a "struct page" in L1. If not, L0 will simply clear the "virtualize
      APIC accesses" VM-execution control in the vmcs02.
      
      The problem with this approach is that the L1 guest has arranged the
      vmcs12 EPT tables--or shadow page tables, if the "enable EPT"
      VM-execution control is clear in the vmcs12--so that the L2 guest
      physical address(es)--or L2 guest linear address(es)--that reference
      the L2 APIC map to the APIC-access address specified in the
      vmcs12. Without the "virtualize APIC accesses" VM-execution control in
      the vmcs02, the APIC accesses in the L2 guest will directly access the
      APIC-access page in L1.
      
      When there is no mapping whatsoever for the APIC-access address in L1,
      the L2 VM just loses the intended APIC virtualization. However, when
      the APIC-access address is mapped to an MMIO region in L1, the L2
      guest gets direct access to the L1 MMIO device. For example, if the
      APIC-access address specified in the vmcs12 is 0xfee00000, then L2
      gets direct access to L1's APIC.
      
      Since this vmcs12 configuration is something that KVM cannot
      faithfully emulate, the appropriate response is to exit to userspace
      with KVM_INTERNAL_ERROR_EMULATION.
      
      Fixes: fe3ef05c ("KVM: nVMX: Prepare vmcs02 from vmcs01 and vmcs12")
      Reported-by: NDan Cross <dcross@google.com>
      Signed-off-by: NJim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
      Reviewed-by: NPeter Shier <pshier@google.com>
      Reviewed-by: NSean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
      Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
      671ddc70
  8. 22 10月, 2019 2 次提交
  9. 04 10月, 2019 1 次提交
  10. 03 10月, 2019 1 次提交
  11. 01 10月, 2019 1 次提交
  12. 26 9月, 2019 1 次提交
    • W
      KVM: X86: Fix userspace set invalid CR4 · 3ca94192
      Wanpeng Li 提交于
      Reported by syzkaller:
      
      	WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 6544 at /home/kernel/data/kvm/arch/x86/kvm//vmx/vmx.c:4689 handle_desc+0x37/0x40 [kvm_intel]
      	CPU: 0 PID: 6544 Comm: a.out Tainted: G           OE     5.3.0-rc4+ #4
      	RIP: 0010:handle_desc+0x37/0x40 [kvm_intel]
      	Call Trace:
      	 vmx_handle_exit+0xbe/0x6b0 [kvm_intel]
      	 vcpu_enter_guest+0x4dc/0x18d0 [kvm]
      	 kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x407/0x660 [kvm]
      	 kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x3ad/0x690 [kvm]
      	 do_vfs_ioctl+0xa2/0x690
      	 ksys_ioctl+0x6d/0x80
      	 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x1a/0x20
      	 do_syscall_64+0x74/0x720
      	 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
      
      When CR4.UMIP is set, guest should have UMIP cpuid flag. Current
      kvm set_sregs function doesn't have such check when userspace inputs
      sregs values. SECONDARY_EXEC_DESC is enabled on writes to CR4.UMIP
      in vmx_set_cr4 though guest doesn't have UMIP cpuid flag. The testcast
      triggers handle_desc warning when executing ltr instruction since
      guest architectural CR4 doesn't set UMIP. This patch fixes it by
      adding valid CR4 and CPUID combination checking in __set_sregs.
      
      syzkaller source: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.c?x=138efb99600000
      
      Reported-by: syzbot+0f1819555fbdce992df9@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
      Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
      Signed-off-by: NWanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>
      Reviewed-by: NSean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
      Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
      3ca94192
  13. 25 9月, 2019 1 次提交
  14. 24 9月, 2019 17 次提交
  15. 14 9月, 2019 1 次提交
  16. 12 9月, 2019 1 次提交
  17. 11 9月, 2019 5 次提交
    • J
      KVM: x86: always stop emulation on page fault · 8530a79c
      Jan Dakinevich 提交于
      inject_emulated_exception() returns true if and only if nested page
      fault happens. However, page fault can come from guest page tables
      walk, either nested or not nested. In both cases we should stop an
      attempt to read under RIP and give guest to step over its own page
      fault handler.
      
      This is also visible when an emulated instruction causes a #GP fault
      and the VMware backdoor is enabled.  To handle the VMware backdoor,
      KVM intercepts #GP faults; with only the next patch applied,
      x86_emulate_instruction() injects a #GP but returns EMULATE_FAIL
      instead of EMULATE_DONE.   EMULATE_FAIL causes handle_exception_nmi()
      (or gp_interception() for SVM) to re-inject the original #GP because it
      thinks emulation failed due to a non-VMware opcode.  This patch prevents
      the issue as x86_emulate_instruction() will return EMULATE_DONE after
      injecting the #GP.
      
      Fixes: 6ea6e843 ("KVM: x86: inject exceptions produced by x86_decode_insn")
      Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
      Cc: Denis Lunev <den@virtuozzo.com>
      Cc: Roman Kagan <rkagan@virtuozzo.com>
      Cc: Denis Plotnikov <dplotnikov@virtuozzo.com>
      Signed-off-by: NJan Dakinevich <jan.dakinevich@virtuozzo.com>
      Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
      8530a79c
    • S
      KVM: nVMX: add tracepoint for failed nested VM-Enter · 5497b955
      Sean Christopherson 提交于
      Debugging a failed VM-Enter is often like searching for a needle in a
      haystack, e.g. there are over 80 consistency checks that funnel into
      the "invalid control field" error code.  One way to expedite debug is
      to run the buggy code as an L1 guest under KVM (and pray that the
      failing check is detected by KVM).  However, extracting useful debug
      information out of L0 KVM requires attaching a debugger to KVM and/or
      modifying the source, e.g. to log which check is failing.
      
      Make life a little less painful for VMM developers and add a tracepoint
      for failed VM-Enter consistency checks.  Ideally the tracepoint would
      capture both what check failed and precisely why it failed, but logging
      why a checked failed is difficult to do in a generic tracepoint without
      resorting to invasive techniques, e.g. generating a custom string on
      failure.  That being said, for the vast majority of VM-Enter failures
      the most difficult step is figuring out exactly what to look at, e.g.
      figuring out which bit was incorrectly set in a control field is usually
      not too painful once the guilty field as been identified.
      
      To reach a happy medium between precision and ease of use, simply log
      the code that detected a failed check, using a macro to execute the
      check and log the trace event on failure.  This approach enables tracing
      arbitrary code, e.g. it's not limited to function calls or specific
      formats of checks, and the changes to the existing code are minimally
      invasive.  A macro with a two-character name is desirable as usage of
      the macro doesn't result in overly long lines or confusing alignment,
      while still retaining some amount of readability.  I.e. a one-character
      name is a little too terse, and a three-character name results in the
      contents being passed to the macro aligning with an indented line when
      the macro is used an in if-statement, e.g.:
      
              if (VCC(nested_vmx_check_long_line_one(...) &&
                      nested_vmx_check_long_line_two(...)))
                      return -EINVAL;
      
      And that is the story of how the CC(), a.k.a. Consistency Check, macro
      got its name.
      Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
      Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
      5497b955
    • S
      KVM: x86: Add kvm_emulate_{rd,wr}msr() to consolidate VXM/SVM code · 1edce0a9
      Sean Christopherson 提交于
      Move RDMSR and WRMSR emulation into common x86 code to consolidate
      nearly identical SVM and VMX code.
      
      Note, consolidating RDMSR introduces an extra indirect call, i.e.
      retpoline, due to reaching {svm,vmx}_get_msr() via kvm_x86_ops, but a
      guest kernel likely has bigger problems if increasing the latency of
      RDMSR VM-Exits by ~70 cycles has a measurable impact on overall VM
      performance.  E.g. the only recurring RDMSR VM-Exits (after booting) on
      my system running Linux 5.2 in the guest are for MSR_IA32_TSC_ADJUST via
      arch_cpu_idle_enter().
      
      No functional change intended.
      Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
      Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
      1edce0a9
    • S
      KVM: x86: Refactor up kvm_{g,s}et_msr() to simplify callers · f20935d8
      Sean Christopherson 提交于
      Refactor the top-level MSR accessors to take/return the index and value
      directly instead of requiring the caller to dump them into a msr_data
      struct.
      
      No functional change intended.
      Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
      Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
      f20935d8
    • P
      KVM: X86: Tune PLE Window tracepoint · 4f75bcc3
      Peter Xu 提交于
      The PLE window tracepoint triggers even if the window is not changed,
      and the wording can be a bit confusing too.  One example line:
      
        kvm_ple_window: vcpu 0: ple_window 4096 (shrink 4096)
      
      It easily let people think of "the window now is 4096 which is
      shrinked", but the truth is the value actually didn't change (4096).
      
      Let's only dump this message if the value really changed, and we make
      the message even simpler like:
      
        kvm_ple_window: vcpu 4 old 4096 new 8192 (growed)
      Signed-off-by: NPeter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
      Reviewed-by: NSean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
      Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
      4f75bcc3