driver inclusion
category: bugfix
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4W3OQ

----------------------------------------------------------------------

Currently, the memory of the queue's sqe is freed when
the driver is removed, not the put queue. Therefore, it is only
necessary to write back the data in the hardware cache to
memory before removing the driver.
Signed-off-by: NWeili Qian <qianweili@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NYang Shen <shenyang39@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NXiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

mainline inclusion
from mainline-v5.17-rc1
commit 696645d2
category: bugfix
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4W3OQ
CVE: NA

--------------------------------

If the hardware reports the 'CQ' overflow or 'CQE' error by the abnormal
interrupt, disable the queue and stop tasks send to hardware.
Signed-off-by: NWeili Qian <qianweili@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: NYang Shen <shenyang39@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NXiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

mainline inclusion
from mainline-v5.17-rc1
commit 95f0b6d5
category: bugfix
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4W3OQ
CVE: NA

--------------------------------

If the hardware reports the event queue overflow by the abnormal interrupt,
the driver needs to reset the function and re-enable the event queue
interrupt and abnormal interrupt.
Signed-off-by: NWeili Qian <qianweili@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: NYang Shen <shenyang39@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NXiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

mainline inclusion
from mainline-v5.17-rc1
commit a0a9486b
category: bugfix
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4W3OQ
CVE: NA

--------------------------------

The abnormal interrupt method needs to be changed, and the changed method
needs to be locked in order to maintain atomicity. Therefore,
replace request_irq() with request_threaded_irq().
Signed-off-by: NWeili Qian <qianweili@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: NYang Shen <shenyang39@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NXiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

mainline inclusion
from mainline-v5.17-rc1
commit 145dcedd
category: bugfix
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4W3OQ
CVE: NA

--------------------------------

After processing an interrupt event and the interrupt function is
enabled by writing the QM_DOORBELL_CMD_AEQ register, the hardware
may generate new interrupt events due to processing other user's task
when the subsequent interrupt events have not been processed. The new
interrupt event will disrupt the current normal processing flow and
cause other problems.

Therefore, the operation of writing the QM_DOORBELL_CMD_AEQ doorbell
register needs to be placed after all interrupt events processing
are completed.
Signed-off-by: NWeili Qian <qianweili@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: NYang Shen <shenyang39@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NXiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

mainline inclusion
from mainline-v5.17-rc1
commit 9ee401ea
category: bugfix
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4W3OQ
CVE: NA

--------------------------------

This patch does not change any code, just code movement. Preparing for
next patch.
Signed-off-by: NWeili Qian <qianweili@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: NYang Shen <shenyang39@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NXiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

mainline inclusion
from mainline-v5.17-rc1
commit f123e66d
category: bugfix
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4W3OQ
CVE: NA

--------------------------------

The internal memory of the device needs to be reset only when
the device is globally initialized. Other scenarios, such as
function reset, do not need to perform reset.
Signed-off-by: NWeili Qian <qianweili@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: NYang Shen <shenyang39@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NXiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

mainline inclusion
from mainline-v5.16-rc1
commit fc6c01f0
category: bugfix
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4W3EG
CVE: NA

--------------------------------

When remove the driver and executing the task occur at the same time,
the following deadlock will be triggered:

Chain exists of:
    sva_lock --> uacce_mutex --> &qm->qps_lock
    Possible unsafe locking scenario:
		CPU0                    CPU1
		----                    ----
	lock(&qm->qps_lock);
					lock(uacce_mutex);
					lock(&qm->qps_lock);
	lock(sva_lock);

And the lock 'qps_lock' is used to protect qp. Therefore, it's reasonable
cycle is to continue until the qp memory is released. So move the release
lock infront of 'uacce_remove'.
Signed-off-by: NYang Shen <shenyang39@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: NYang Shen <shenyang39@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NXiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

mainline inclusion
from mainline-crypto-master
commit e764d81d
category: bugfix
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4WC3O
CVE: NA

--------------------------------

Modify the print of information that might lead to user misunderstanding.
Currently only XTS mode need the fallback tfm when using 192bit key.
Others algs not need soft fallback tfm. So others algs can return
directly.
Signed-off-by: NKai Ye <yekai13@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: NYang Shen <shenyang39@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NXiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

mainline inclusion
from mainline-crypto-master
commit 0a2a464f
category: bugfix
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4W4WU
CVE: NA

--------------------------------

Due to the subreq pointer misuse the private context memory. The aead
soft crypto occasionally casues the OS panic as setting the 64K page.
Here is fix it.

Fixes: 6c46a329 ("crypto: hisilicon/sec - add fallback tfm...")
Signed-off-by: NKai Ye <yekai13@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: NYang Shen <shenyang39@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NXiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

hulk inclusion
category: bugfix
bugzilla: 185779, https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4WFIY
CVE: NA

-------------------------------------------------

1.In current process, all bio will set the BIO_THROTTLED flag
after __blk_throtl_bio().

2.If bio needs to be throttled, it will start the timer and
stop submit bio directly. Bio will submit in
blk_throtl_dispatch_work_fn() when the timer expires.But in
the current process, if bio is throttled. The BIO_THROTTLED
will be set to bio after timer start. If the bio has been
completed, it may cause use-after-free blow.

BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in blk_throtl_bio+0x12f0/0x2c70
Read of size 2 at addr ffff88801b8902d4 by task fio/26380

 dump_stack+0x9b/0xce
 print_address_description.constprop.6+0x3e/0x60
 kasan_report.cold.9+0x22/0x3a
 blk_throtl_bio+0x12f0/0x2c70
 submit_bio_checks+0x701/0x1550
 submit_bio_noacct+0x83/0xc80
 submit_bio+0xa7/0x330
 mpage_readahead+0x380/0x500
 read_pages+0x1c1/0xbf0
 page_cache_ra_unbounded+0x471/0x6f0
 do_page_cache_ra+0xda/0x110
 ondemand_readahead+0x442/0xae0
 page_cache_async_ra+0x210/0x300
 generic_file_buffered_read+0x4d9/0x2130
 generic_file_read_iter+0x315/0x490
 blkdev_read_iter+0x113/0x1b0
 aio_read+0x2ad/0x450
 io_submit_one+0xc8e/0x1d60
 __se_sys_io_submit+0x125/0x350
 do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x40
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

Allocated by task 26380:
 kasan_save_stack+0x19/0x40
 __kasan_kmalloc.constprop.2+0xc1/0xd0
 kmem_cache_alloc+0x146/0x440
 mempool_alloc+0x125/0x2f0
 bio_alloc_bioset+0x353/0x590
 mpage_alloc+0x3b/0x240
 do_mpage_readpage+0xddf/0x1ef0
 mpage_readahead+0x264/0x500
 read_pages+0x1c1/0xbf0
 page_cache_ra_unbounded+0x471/0x6f0
 do_page_cache_ra+0xda/0x110
 ondemand_readahead+0x442/0xae0
 page_cache_async_ra+0x210/0x300
 generic_file_buffered_read+0x4d9/0x2130
 generic_file_read_iter+0x315/0x490
 blkdev_read_iter+0x113/0x1b0
 aio_read+0x2ad/0x450
 io_submit_one+0xc8e/0x1d60
 __se_sys_io_submit+0x125/0x350
 do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x40
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

Freed by task 0:
 kasan_save_stack+0x19/0x40
 kasan_set_track+0x1c/0x30
 kasan_set_free_info+0x1b/0x30
 __kasan_slab_free+0x111/0x160
 kmem_cache_free+0x94/0x460
 mempool_free+0xd6/0x320
 bio_free+0xe0/0x130
 bio_put+0xab/0xe0
 bio_endio+0x3a6/0x5d0
 blk_update_request+0x590/0x1370
 scsi_end_request+0x7d/0x400
 scsi_io_completion+0x1aa/0xe50
 scsi_softirq_done+0x11b/0x240
 blk_mq_complete_request+0xd4/0x120
 scsi_mq_done+0xf0/0x200
 virtscsi_vq_done+0xbc/0x150
 vring_interrupt+0x179/0x390
 __handle_irq_event_percpu+0xf7/0x490
 handle_irq_event_percpu+0x7b/0x160
 handle_irq_event+0xcc/0x170
 handle_edge_irq+0x215/0xb20
 common_interrupt+0x60/0x120
 asm_common_interrupt+0x1e/0x40

Fix this by move BIO_THROTTLED set into the queue_lock.
Signed-off-by: NLaibin Qiu <qiulaibin@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NHou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

mainline inclusion
from mainline-v5.17-rc1
commit 37c8d480
category: bugfix
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4WT90
CVE: CVE-2021-4204

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=37c8d4807d1b8b521b30310dce97f6695dc2c2c6

--------------------------------

Add two tests, one which asserts that ring buffer memory can be passed to
other helpers for populating its entry area, and another one where verifier
rejects different type of memory passed to bpf_ringbuf_submit().
Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: NJohn Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Acked-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NPu Lehui <pulehui@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NKuohai Xu <xukuohai@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

mainline inclusion
from mainline-v5.17-rc1
commit 44bab87d
category: bugfix
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4WT90
CVE: CVE-2021-4204

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=44bab87d8ca6f0544a9f8fc97bdf33aa5b3c899e

--------------------------------

The second parameter of bpf_d_path() can only accept writable
memories. Rdonly_mem obtained from bpf_per_cpu_ptr() can not
be passed into bpf_d_path for modification. This patch adds
a selftest to verify this behavior.
Signed-off-by: NHao Luo <haoluo@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Acked-by: NYonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20220106205525.2116218-1-haoluo@google.comSigned-off-by: NPu Lehui <pulehui@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NKuohai Xu <xukuohai@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

mainline inclusion
from mainline-v5.17-rc1
commit 722e4db3
category: bugfix
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4WT90
CVE: CVE-2021-4204

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=722e4db3ae0d52b2e3801280afbe19cf2d188e91

--------------------------------

Assert that the verifier is rejecting invalid offsets on the ringbuf entries:

  # ./test_verifier | grep ring
  #947/u ringbuf: invalid reservation offset 1 OK
  #947/p ringbuf: invalid reservation offset 1 OK
  #948/u ringbuf: invalid reservation offset 2 OK
  #948/p ringbuf: invalid reservation offset 2 OK
Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: NJohn Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Acked-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NPu Lehui <pulehui@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NKuohai Xu <xukuohai@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

mainline inclusion
from mainline-v5.11-rc5
commit 4237e9f4
category: bugfix
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4WT90
CVE: CVE-2021-4204

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=4237e9f4a96228ccc8a7abe5e4b30834323cd353

--------------------------------

Add a test to check that the verifier is able to recognize spilling of
PTR_TO_MEM registers, by reserving a ringbuf buffer, forcing the spill
of a pointer holding the buffer address to the stack, filling it back
in from the stack and writing to the memory area pointed by it.

The patch was partially contributed by CyberArk Software, Inc.
Signed-off-by: NGilad Reti <gilad.reti@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: NYonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Acked-by: NKP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210113053810.13518-2-gilad.reti@gmail.comSigned-off-by: NPu Lehui <pulehui@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NKuohai Xu <xukuohai@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

mainline inclusion
from mainline-v5.17-rc1
commit a672b2e3
category: bugfix
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4WT90
CVE: CVE-2021-4204

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=a672b2e36a648afb04ad3bda93b6bda947a479a5

--------------------------------

The bpf_ringbuf_submit() and bpf_ringbuf_discard() have ARG_PTR_TO_ALLOC_MEM
in their bpf_func_proto definition as their first argument, and thus both expect
the result from a prior bpf_ringbuf_reserve() call which has a return type of
RET_PTR_TO_ALLOC_MEM_OR_NULL.

While the non-NULL memory from bpf_ringbuf_reserve() can be passed to other
helpers, the two sinks (bpf_ringbuf_submit(), bpf_ringbuf_discard()) right now
only enforce a register type of PTR_TO_MEM.

This can lead to potential type confusion since it would allow other PTR_TO_MEM
memory to be passed into the two sinks which did not come from bpf_ringbuf_reserve().

Add a new MEM_ALLOC composable type attribute for PTR_TO_MEM, and enforce that:

 - bpf_ringbuf_reserve() returns NULL or PTR_TO_MEM | MEM_ALLOC
 - bpf_ringbuf_submit() and bpf_ringbuf_discard() only take PTR_TO_MEM | MEM_ALLOC
   but not plain PTR_TO_MEM arguments via ARG_PTR_TO_ALLOC_MEM
 - however, other helpers might treat PTR_TO_MEM | MEM_ALLOC as plain PTR_TO_MEM
   to populate the memory area when they use ARG_PTR_TO_{UNINIT_,}MEM in their
   func proto description

Fixes: 457f4436 ("bpf: Implement BPF ring buffer and verifier support for it")
Reported-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: NJohn Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Acked-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NPu Lehui <pulehui@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NKuohai Xu <xukuohai@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

mainline inclusion
from mainline-v5.17-rc1
commit 64620e0a
category: bugfix
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4WT90
CVE: CVE-2021-4204

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=64620e0a1e712a778095bd35cbb277dc2259281f

--------------------------------

Both bpf_ringbuf_submit() and bpf_ringbuf_discard() have ARG_PTR_TO_ALLOC_MEM
in their bpf_func_proto definition as their first argument. They both expect
the result from a prior bpf_ringbuf_reserve() call which has a return type of
RET_PTR_TO_ALLOC_MEM_OR_NULL.

Meaning, after a NULL check in the code, the verifier will promote the register
type in the non-NULL branch to a PTR_TO_MEM and in the NULL branch to a known
zero scalar. Generally, pointer arithmetic on PTR_TO_MEM is allowed, so the
latter could have an offset.

The ARG_PTR_TO_ALLOC_MEM expects a PTR_TO_MEM register type. However, the non-
zero result from bpf_ringbuf_reserve() must be fed into either bpf_ringbuf_submit()
or bpf_ringbuf_discard() but with the original offset given it will then read
out the struct bpf_ringbuf_hdr mapping.

The verifier missed to enforce a zero offset, so that out of bounds access
can be triggered which could be used to escalate privileges if unprivileged
BPF was enabled (disabled by default in kernel).

Fixes: 457f4436 ("bpf: Implement BPF ring buffer and verifier support for it")
Reported-by: <tr3e.wang@gmail.com> (SecCoder Security Lab)
Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: NJohn Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Acked-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NPu Lehui <pulehui@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NKuohai Xu <xukuohai@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

mainline inclusion
from mainline-v5.17-rc1
commit 6788ab23
category: bugfix
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4WT90
CVE: CVE-2021-4204

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=6788ab23508bddb0a9d88e104284922cb2c22b77

--------------------------------

Right now the assertion on check_ptr_off_reg() is only enforced for register
types PTR_TO_CTX (and open coded also for PTR_TO_BTF_ID), however, this is
insufficient since many other PTR_TO_* register types such as PTR_TO_FUNC do
not handle/expect register offsets when passed to helper functions.

Given this can slip-through easily when adding new types, make this an explicit
allow-list and reject all other current and future types by default if this is
encountered.

Also, extend check_ptr_off_reg() to handle PTR_TO_BTF_ID as well instead of
duplicating it. For PTR_TO_BTF_ID, reg->off is used for BTF to match expected
BTF ids if struct offset is used. This part still needs to be allowed, but the
dynamic off from the tnum must be rejected.

Fixes: 69c087ba ("bpf: Add bpf_for_each_map_elem() helper")
Fixes: eaa6bcb7 ("bpf: Introduce bpf_per_cpu_ptr()")
Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: NJohn Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Acked-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NPu Lehui <pulehui@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NKuohai Xu <xukuohai@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

mainline inclusion
from mainline-v5.17-rc1
commit d400a6cf
category: bugfix
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4WT90
CVE: CVE-2021-4204

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=d400a6cf1c8a57cdf10f35220ead3284320d85ff

--------------------------------

Similar as with other pointer types where we use ldimm64, clear the register
content to zero first, and then populate the PTR_TO_FUNC type and subprogno
number. Currently this is not done, and leads to reuse of stale register
tracking data.

Given for special ldimm64 cases we always clear the register offset, make it
common for all cases, so it won't be forgotten in future.

Fixes: 69c087ba ("bpf: Add bpf_for_each_map_elem() helper")
Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: NJohn Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Acked-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NPu Lehui <pulehui@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NKuohai Xu <xukuohai@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

mainline inclusion
from mainline-v5.17-rc1
commit be80a1d3
category: bugfix
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4WT90
CVE: CVE-2021-4204

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=be80a1d3f9dbe5aee79a325964f7037fe2d92f30

--------------------------------

Generalize the check_ctx_reg() helper function into a more generic named one
so that it can be reused for other register types as well to check whether
their offset is non-zero. No functional change.
Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: NJohn Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Acked-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Conflicts:
	include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
	kernel/bpf/btf.c
Signed-off-by: NPu Lehui <pulehui@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NKuohai Xu <xukuohai@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

mainline inclusion
from mainline-v5.17-rc1
commit 9497c458
category: bugfix
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4WRPV
CVE: CVE-2022-0500

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=9497c458c10b049438ef6e6ddda898edbc3ec6a8

--------------------------------

This test verifies that a ksym of non-struct can not be directly
updated.
Signed-off-by: NHao Luo <haoluo@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: NAndrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20211217003152.48334-10-haoluo@google.com
Conflicts:
	tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/ksyms_btf.c
Signed-off-by: NPu Lehui <pulehui@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NKuohai Xu <xukuohai@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

mainline inclusion
from mainline-v5.17-rc1
commit 216e3cd2
category: bugfix
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4WRPV
CVE: CVE-2022-0500

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=216e3cd2f28dbbf1fe86848e0e29e6693b9f0a20

--------------------------------

Some helper functions may modify its arguments, for example,
bpf_d_path, bpf_get_stack etc. Previously, their argument types
were marked as ARG_PTR_TO_MEM, which is compatible with read-only
mem types, such as PTR_TO_RDONLY_BUF. Therefore it's legitimate,
but technically incorrect, to modify a read-only memory by passing
it into one of such helper functions.

This patch tags the bpf_args compatible with immutable memory with
MEM_RDONLY flag. The arguments that don't have this flag will be
only compatible with mutable memory types, preventing the helper
from modifying a read-only memory. The bpf_args that have
MEM_RDONLY are compatible with both mutable memory and immutable
memory.
Signed-off-by: NHao Luo <haoluo@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20211217003152.48334-9-haoluo@google.com
Conflicts:
	kernel/bpf/btf.c
	kernel/bpf/helpers.c
	kernel/bpf/syscall.c
	kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c
	net/core/filter.c
Signed-off-by: NPu Lehui <pulehui@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NKuohai Xu <xukuohai@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

mainline inclusion
from mainline-v5.17-rc1
commit 34d3a78c
category: bugfix
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4WRPV
CVE: CVE-2022-0500

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=34d3a78c681e8e7844b43d1a2f4671a04249c821

--------------------------------

Tag the return type of {per, this}_cpu_ptr with RDONLY_MEM. The
returned value of this pair of helpers is kernel object, which
can not be updated by bpf programs. Previously these two helpers
return PTR_OT_MEM for kernel objects of scalar type, which allows
one to directly modify the memory. Now with RDONLY_MEM tagging,
the verifier will reject programs that write into RDONLY_MEM.

Fixes: 63d9b80d ("bpf: Introducte bpf_this_cpu_ptr()")
Fixes: eaa6bcb7 ("bpf: Introduce bpf_per_cpu_ptr()")
Fixes: 4976b718 ("bpf: Introduce pseudo_btf_id")
Signed-off-by: NHao Luo <haoluo@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20211217003152.48334-8-haoluo@google.comSigned-off-by: NPu Lehui <pulehui@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NKuohai Xu <xukuohai@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

mainline inclusion
from mainline-v5.17-rc1
commit cf9f2f8d
category: bugfix
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4WRPV
CVE: CVE-2022-0500

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=cf9f2f8d62eca810afbd1ee6cc0800202b000e57

--------------------------------

Remove PTR_TO_MEM_OR_NULL and replace it with PTR_TO_MEM combined with
flag PTR_MAYBE_NULL.
Signed-off-by: NHao Luo <haoluo@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20211217003152.48334-7-haoluo@google.com
Conflicts:
	kernel/bpf/btf.c
	kernel/bpf/verifier.c
Signed-off-by: NPu Lehui <pulehui@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NKuohai Xu <xukuohai@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

mainline inclusion
from mainline-v5.17-rc1
commit 20b2aff4
category: bugfix
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4WRPV
CVE: CVE-2022-0500

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=20b2aff4bc15bda809f994761d5719827d66c0b4

--------------------------------

This patch introduce a flag MEM_RDONLY to tag a reg value
pointing to read-only memory. It makes the following changes:

1. PTR_TO_RDWR_BUF -> PTR_TO_BUF
2. PTR_TO_RDONLY_BUF -> PTR_TO_BUF | MEM_RDONLY
Signed-off-by: NHao Luo <haoluo@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20211217003152.48334-6-haoluo@google.com
Conflicts:
	kernel/bpf/verifier.c
Signed-off-by: NPu Lehui <pulehui@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NKuohai Xu <xukuohai@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

mainline inclusion
from mainline-v5.17-rc1
commit c25b2ae1
category: bugfix
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4WRPV
CVE: CVE-2022-0500

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=c25b2ae136039ffa820c26138ed4a5e5f3ab3841

--------------------------------

We have introduced a new type to make bpf_reg composable, by
allocating bits in the type to represent flags.

One of the flags is PTR_MAYBE_NULL which indicates a pointer
may be NULL. This patch switches the qualified reg_types to
use this flag. The reg_types changed in this patch include:

1. PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL
2. PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL
3. PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON_OR_NULL
4. PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK_OR_NULL
5. PTR_TO_BTF_ID_OR_NULL
6. PTR_TO_MEM_OR_NULL
7. PTR_TO_RDONLY_BUF_OR_NULL
8. PTR_TO_RDWR_BUF_OR_NULL
Signed-off-by: NHao Luo <haoluo@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211217003152.48334-5-haoluo@google.com
Conflicts:
	include/linux/bpf.h
	include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
	kernel/bpf/verifier.c
Signed-off-by: NPu Lehui <pulehui@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NKuohai Xu <xukuohai@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

mainline inclusion
from mainline-v5.17-rc1
commit 3c480732
category: bugfix
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4WRPV
CVE: CVE-2022-0500

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=3c4807322660d4290ac9062c034aed6b87243861

--------------------------------

We have introduced a new type to make bpf_ret composable, by
reserving high bits to represent flags.

One of the flag is PTR_MAYBE_NULL, which indicates a pointer
may be NULL. When applying this flag to ret_types, it means
the returned value could be a NULL pointer. This patch
switches the qualified arg_types to use this flag.
The ret_types changed in this patch include:

1. RET_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL
2. RET_PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL
3. RET_PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK_OR_NULL
4. RET_PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON_OR_NULL
5. RET_PTR_TO_ALLOC_MEM_OR_NULL
6. RET_PTR_TO_MEM_OR_BTF_ID_OR_NULL
7. RET_PTR_TO_BTF_ID_OR_NULL

This patch doesn't eliminate the use of these names, instead
it makes them aliases to 'RET_PTR_TO_XXX | PTR_MAYBE_NULL'.
Signed-off-by: NHao Luo <haoluo@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20211217003152.48334-4-haoluo@google.com
Conflicts:
	kernel/bpf/verifier.c
Signed-off-by: NPu Lehui <pulehui@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NKuohai Xu <xukuohai@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

mainline inclusion
from mainline-v5.17-rc1
commit 48946bd6
category: bugfix
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4WRPV
CVE: CVE-2022-0500

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=48946bd6a5d695c50b34546864b79c1f910a33c1

--------------------------------

We have introduced a new type to make bpf_arg composable, by
reserving high bits of bpf_arg to represent flags of a type.

One of the flags is PTR_MAYBE_NULL which indicates a pointer
may be NULL. When applying this flag to an arg_type, it means
the arg can take NULL pointer. This patch switches the
qualified arg_types to use this flag. The arg_types changed
in this patch include:

1. ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL
2. ARG_PTR_TO_MEM_OR_NULL
3. ARG_PTR_TO_CTX_OR_NULL
4. ARG_PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL
5. ARG_PTR_TO_ALLOC_MEM_OR_NULL
6. ARG_PTR_TO_STACK_OR_NULL

This patch does not eliminate the use of these arg_types, instead
it makes them an alias to the 'ARG_XXX | PTR_MAYBE_NULL'.
Signed-off-by: NHao Luo <haoluo@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20211217003152.48334-3-haoluo@google.com
Conflicts:
	include/linux/bpf.h
	kernel/bpf/verifier.c
Signed-off-by: NPu Lehui <pulehui@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NKuohai Xu <xukuohai@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

mainline inclusion
from mainline-v5.17-rc1
commit d639b9d1
category: bugfix
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4WRPV
CVE: CVE-2022-0500

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=d639b9d13a39cf15639cbe6e8b2c43eb60148a73

--------------------------------

There are some common properties shared between bpf reg, ret and arg
values. For instance, a value may be a NULL pointer, or a pointer to
a read-only memory. Previously, to express these properties, enumeration
was used. For example, in order to test whether a reg value can be NULL,
reg_type_may_be_null() simply enumerates all types that are possibly
NULL. The problem of this approach is that it's not scalable and causes
a lot of duplication. These properties can be combined, for example, a
type could be either MAYBE_NULL or RDONLY, or both.

This patch series rewrites the layout of reg_type, arg_type and
ret_type, so that common properties can be extracted and represented as
composable flag. For example, one can write

 ARG_PTR_TO_MEM | PTR_MAYBE_NULL

which is equivalent to the previous

 ARG_PTR_TO_MEM_OR_NULL

The type ARG_PTR_TO_MEM are called "base type" in this patch. Base
types can be extended with flags. A flag occupies the higher bits while
base types sits in the lower bits.

This patch in particular sets up a set of macro for this purpose. The
following patches will rewrite arg_types, ret_types and reg_types
respectively.
Signed-off-by: NHao Luo <haoluo@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20211217003152.48334-2-haoluo@google.com
Conflicts:
	include/linux/bpf.h
	include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
Signed-off-by: NPu Lehui <pulehui@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NKuohai Xu <xukuohai@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-v5.10.92
commit 35ab8c9085b0af847df7fac9571ccd26d9f0f513
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4WRPV

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=35ab8c9085b0af847df7fac9571ccd26d9f0f513

--------------------------------

[ no upstream commit given implicitly fixed through the larger refactoring
  in c25b2ae1 ]

While auditing some other code, I noticed missing checks inside the pointer
arithmetic simulation, more specifically, adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(). Several
*_OR_NULL types are not rejected whereas they are _required_ to be rejected
given the expectation is that they get promoted into a 'real' pointer type
for the success case, that is, after an explicit != NULL check.

One case which stands out and is accessible from unprivileged (iff enabled
given disabled by default) is BPF ring buffer. From crafting a PoC, the NULL
check can be bypassed through an offset, and its id marking will then lead
to promotion of mem_or_null to a mem type.

bpf_ringbuf_reserve() helper can trigger this case through passing of reserved
flags, for example.

  func#0 @0
  0: R1=ctx(id=0,off=0,imm=0) R10=fp0
  0: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = 0
  1: R1=ctx(id=0,off=0,imm=0) R10=fp0 fp-8_w=mmmmmmmm
  1: (18) r1 = 0x0
  3: R1_w=map_ptr(id=0,off=0,ks=0,vs=0,imm=0) R10=fp0 fp-8_w=mmmmmmmm
  3: (b7) r2 = 8
  4: R1_w=map_ptr(id=0,off=0,ks=0,vs=0,imm=0) R2_w=invP8 R10=fp0 fp-8_w=mmmmmmmm
  4: (b7) r3 = 0
  5: R1_w=map_ptr(id=0,off=0,ks=0,vs=0,imm=0) R2_w=invP8 R3_w=invP0 R10=fp0 fp-8_w=mmmmmmmm
  5: (85) call bpf_ringbuf_reserve#131
  6: R0_w=mem_or_null(id=2,ref_obj_id=2,off=0,imm=0) R10=fp0 fp-8_w=mmmmmmmm refs=2
  6: (bf) r6 = r0
  7: R0_w=mem_or_null(id=2,ref_obj_id=2,off=0,imm=0) R6_w=mem_or_null(id=2,ref_obj_id=2,off=0,imm=0) R10=fp0 fp-8_w=mmmmmmmm refs=2
  7: (07) r0 += 1
  8: R0_w=mem_or_null(id=2,ref_obj_id=2,off=1,imm=0) R6_w=mem_or_null(id=2,ref_obj_id=2,off=0,imm=0) R10=fp0 fp-8_w=mmmmmmmm refs=2
  8: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+4
   R0_w=mem(id=0,ref_obj_id=0,off=0,imm=0) R6_w=mem(id=0,ref_obj_id=2,off=0,imm=0) R10=fp0 fp-8_w=mmmmmmmm refs=2
  9: R0_w=mem(id=0,ref_obj_id=0,off=0,imm=0) R6_w=mem(id=0,ref_obj_id=2,off=0,imm=0) R10=fp0 fp-8_w=mmmmmmmm refs=2
  9: (62) *(u32 *)(r6 +0) = 0
   R0_w=mem(id=0,ref_obj_id=0,off=0,imm=0) R6_w=mem(id=0,ref_obj_id=2,off=0,imm=0) R10=fp0 fp-8_w=mmmmmmmm refs=2
  10: R0_w=mem(id=0,ref_obj_id=0,off=0,imm=0) R6_w=mem(id=0,ref_obj_id=2,off=0,imm=0) R10=fp0 fp-8_w=mmmmmmmm refs=2
  10: (bf) r1 = r6
  11: R0_w=mem(id=0,ref_obj_id=0,off=0,imm=0) R1_w=mem(id=0,ref_obj_id=2,off=0,imm=0) R6_w=mem(id=0,ref_obj_id=2,off=0,imm=0) R10=fp0 fp-8_w=mmmmmmmm refs=2
  11: (b7) r2 = 0
  12: R0_w=mem(id=0,ref_obj_id=0,off=0,imm=0) R1_w=mem(id=0,ref_obj_id=2,off=0,imm=0) R2_w=invP0 R6_w=mem(id=0,ref_obj_id=2,off=0,imm=0) R10=fp0 fp-8_w=mmmmmmmm refs=2
  12: (85) call bpf_ringbuf_submit#132
  13: R6=invP(id=0) R10=fp0 fp-8=mmmmmmmm
  13: (b7) r0 = 0
  14: R0_w=invP0 R6=invP(id=0) R10=fp0 fp-8=mmmmmmmm
  14: (95) exit

  from 8 to 13: safe
  processed 15 insns (limit 1000000) max_states_per_insn 0 total_states 1 peak_states 1 mark_read 0
  OK

All three commits, that is b121b341 ("bpf: Add PTR_TO_BTF_ID_OR_NULL support"),
457f4436 ("bpf: Implement BPF ring buffer and verifier support for it"), and the
afbf21dc ("bpf: Support readonly/readwrite buffers in verifier") suffer the same
cause and their *_OR_NULL type pendants must be rejected in adjust_ptr_min_max_vals().

Make the test more robust by reusing reg_type_may_be_null() helper such that we catch
all *_OR_NULL types we have today and in future.

Note that pointer arithmetic on PTR_TO_BTF_ID, PTR_TO_RDONLY_BUF, and PTR_TO_RDWR_BUF
is generally allowed.

Fixes: b121b341 ("bpf: Add PTR_TO_BTF_ID_OR_NULL support")
Fixes: 457f4436 ("bpf: Implement BPF ring buffer and verifier support for it")
Fixes: afbf21dc ("bpf: Support readonly/readwrite buffers in verifier")
Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NPu Lehui <pulehui@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NKuohai Xu <xukuohai@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

hulk inclusion
category: performance
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4S8DW

---------------------------

If pending_queues is increased once, it will only be decreased when
nr_active is zero, and that will lead to the under-utilization of
host tags because pending_queues is non-zero and the available
tags for the queue will be max(host tags / active_queues, 4)
instead of the needed tags of the queue.

Fix it by adding an expiration time for the increasement of pending_queues,
and decrease it when it expires, so pending_queues will be decreased
to zero if there is no tag allocation failure, and the available tags
for the queue will be the whole host tags.
Signed-off-by: NYu Kuai <yukuai3@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NHou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

hulk inclusion
category: performance
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4S8DW

---------------------------
Signed-off-by: NYu Kuai <yukuai3@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NHou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

hulk inclusion
category: performance
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4S8DW

---------------------------

When sharing a tag set, if most disks are issuing small amount of IO, and
only a few is issuing a large amount of IO. Current approach is to limit
the max amount of tags a disk can get equally to the average of total
tags. Thus the few heavy load disk can't get enough tags while many tags
are still free in the tag set.

We add 'pending_queues' in blk_mq_tag_set to count how many queues can't
get driver tag. Thus if this value is zero, there is no need to limit
the max number of available tags.

On the other hand, if a queue doesn't issue IO, the 'active_queues' will
not be decreased in a period of time(request timeout), thus a lot of tags
will not be available because max number of available tags is set to
max(total tags / active_queues, 4). Thus we decreased it when
'nr_active' is 0.

This functionality is enabled by default, to disable it, add
"blk_mq.unfair_dtag=0" to boot cmd.
Signed-off-by: NYu Kuai <yukuai3@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NHou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

hulk inclusion
category: bugfix
bugzilla: 185755, https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4WTCI
CVE:NA

Reference: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/8b6032c7-c971-d79b-4a41-271d3cc0efdd@huawei.com/T/#mb892b30098b759318fdad2831a51264a014bd4e2

--------------------------------

KASAN reports a use-after-free report when doing normal scsi-mq test

[69832.239032] ==================================================================
[69832.241810] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in bfq_dispatch_request+0x1045/0x44b0
[69832.243267] Read of size 8 at addr ffff88802622ba88 by task kworker/3:1H/155
[69832.244656]
[69832.245007] CPU: 3 PID: 155 Comm: kworker/3:1H Not tainted 5.10.0-10295-g576c6382529e #8
[69832.246626] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[69832.249069] Workqueue: kblockd blk_mq_run_work_fn
[69832.250022] Call Trace:
[69832.250541]  dump_stack+0x9b/0xce
[69832.251232]  ? bfq_dispatch_request+0x1045/0x44b0
[69832.252243]  print_address_description.constprop.6+0x3e/0x60
[69832.253381]  ? __cpuidle_text_end+0x5/0x5
[69832.254211]  ? vprintk_func+0x6b/0x120
[69832.254994]  ? bfq_dispatch_request+0x1045/0x44b0
[69832.255952]  ? bfq_dispatch_request+0x1045/0x44b0
[69832.256914]  kasan_report.cold.9+0x22/0x3a
[69832.257753]  ? bfq_dispatch_request+0x1045/0x44b0
[69832.258755]  check_memory_region+0x1c1/0x1e0
[69832.260248]  bfq_dispatch_request+0x1045/0x44b0
[69832.261181]  ? bfq_bfqq_expire+0x2440/0x2440
[69832.262032]  ? blk_mq_delay_run_hw_queues+0xf9/0x170
[69832.263022]  __blk_mq_do_dispatch_sched+0x52f/0x830
[69832.264011]  ? blk_mq_sched_request_inserted+0x100/0x100
[69832.265101]  __blk_mq_sched_dispatch_requests+0x398/0x4f0
[69832.266206]  ? blk_mq_do_dispatch_ctx+0x570/0x570
[69832.267147]  ? __switch_to+0x5f4/0xee0
[69832.267898]  blk_mq_sched_dispatch_requests+0xdf/0x140
[69832.268946]  __blk_mq_run_hw_queue+0xc0/0x270
[69832.269840]  blk_mq_run_work_fn+0x51/0x60
[69832.278170]  process_one_work+0x6d4/0xfe0
[69832.278984]  worker_thread+0x91/0xc80
[69832.279726]  ? __kthread_parkme+0xb0/0x110
[69832.280554]  ? process_one_work+0xfe0/0xfe0
[69832.281414]  kthread+0x32d/0x3f0
[69832.282082]  ? kthread_park+0x170/0x170
[69832.282849]  ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
[69832.283573]
[69832.283886] Allocated by task 7725:
[69832.284599]  kasan_save_stack+0x19/0x40
[69832.285385]  __kasan_kmalloc.constprop.2+0xc1/0xd0
[69832.286350]  kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x13f/0x460
[69832.287237]  bfq_get_queue+0x3d4/0x1140
[69832.287993]  bfq_get_bfqq_handle_split+0x103/0x510
[69832.289015]  bfq_init_rq+0x337/0x2d50
[69832.289749]  bfq_insert_requests+0x304/0x4e10
[69832.290634]  blk_mq_sched_insert_requests+0x13e/0x390
[69832.291629]  blk_mq_flush_plug_list+0x4b4/0x760
[69832.292538]  blk_flush_plug_list+0x2c5/0x480
[69832.293392]  io_schedule_prepare+0xb2/0xd0
[69832.294209]  io_schedule_timeout+0x13/0x80
[69832.295014]  wait_for_common_io.constprop.1+0x13c/0x270
[69832.296137]  submit_bio_wait+0x103/0x1a0
[69832.296932]  blkdev_issue_discard+0xe6/0x160
[69832.297794]  blk_ioctl_discard+0x219/0x290
[69832.298614]  blkdev_common_ioctl+0x50a/0x1750
[69832.304715]  blkdev_ioctl+0x470/0x600
[69832.305474]  block_ioctl+0xde/0x120
[69832.306232]  vfs_ioctl+0x6c/0xc0
[69832.306877]  __se_sys_ioctl+0x90/0xa0
[69832.307629]  do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x40
[69832.308362]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[69832.309382]
[69832.309701] Freed by task 155:
[69832.310328]  kasan_save_stack+0x19/0x40
[69832.311121]  kasan_set_track+0x1c/0x30
[69832.311868]  kasan_set_free_info+0x1b/0x30
[69832.312699]  __kasan_slab_free+0x111/0x160
[69832.313524]  kmem_cache_free+0x94/0x460
[69832.314367]  bfq_put_queue+0x582/0x940
[69832.315112]  __bfq_bfqd_reset_in_service+0x166/0x1d0
[69832.317275]  bfq_bfqq_expire+0xb27/0x2440
[69832.318084]  bfq_dispatch_request+0x697/0x44b0
[69832.318991]  __blk_mq_do_dispatch_sched+0x52f/0x830
[69832.319984]  __blk_mq_sched_dispatch_requests+0x398/0x4f0
[69832.321087]  blk_mq_sched_dispatch_requests+0xdf/0x140
[69832.322225]  __blk_mq_run_hw_queue+0xc0/0x270
[69832.323114]  blk_mq_run_work_fn+0x51/0x60
[69832.323942]  process_one_work+0x6d4/0xfe0
[69832.324772]  worker_thread+0x91/0xc80
[69832.325518]  kthread+0x32d/0x3f0
[69832.326205]  ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
[69832.326932]
[69832.338297] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88802622b968
[69832.338297]  which belongs to the cache bfq_queue of size 512
[69832.340766] The buggy address is located 288 bytes inside of
[69832.340766]  512-byte region [ffff88802622b968, ffff88802622bb68)
[69832.343091] The buggy address belongs to the page:
[69832.344097] page:ffffea0000988a00 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0xffff88802622a528 pfn:0x26228
[69832.346214] head:ffffea0000988a00 order:2 compound_mapcount:0 compound_pincount:0
[69832.347719] flags: 0x1fffff80010200(slab|head)
[69832.348625] raw: 001fffff80010200 ffffea0000dbac08 ffff888017a57650 ffff8880179fe840
[69832.354972] raw: ffff88802622a528 0000000000120008 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
[69832.356547] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
[69832.357652]
[69832.357970] Memory state around the buggy address:
[69832.358926]  ffff88802622b980: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[69832.360358]  ffff88802622ba00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[69832.361810] >ffff88802622ba80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[69832.363273]                       ^
[69832.363975]  ffff88802622bb00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc
[69832.375960]  ffff88802622bb80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[69832.377405] ==================================================================

In bfq_dispatch_requestfunction, it may have function call:

bfq_dispatch_request
	__bfq_dispatch_request
		bfq_select_queue
			bfq_bfqq_expire
				__bfq_bfqd_reset_in_service
					bfq_put_queue
						kmem_cache_free
In this function call, in_serv_queue has beed expired and meet the
conditions to free. In the function bfq_dispatch_request, the address
of in_serv_queue pointing to has been released. For getting the value
of idle_timer_disabled, it will get flags value from the address which
in_serv_queue pointing to, then the problem of use-after-free happens;

Fix the problem by check in_serv_queue == bfqd->in_service_queue, to
get the value of idle_timer_disabled if in_serve_queue is equel to
bfqd->in_service_queue. If the space of in_serv_queue pointing has
been released, this judge will aviod use-after-free problem.
And if in_serv_queue may be expired or finished, the idle_timer_disabled
will be false which would not give effects to bfq_update_dispatch_stats.
Reported-by: NHulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZhang Wensheng <zhangwensheng5@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NLaibin Qiu <qiulaibin@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NJason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

Offering: HULK
hulk inclusion
category: feature
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4WBFN

--------------------------------

Refer to following procedure:
  klp_init_object
    klp_init_object_loaded
      klp_find_object_symbol <-- 1. oops happened when old_name is NULL!!!
    klp_init_func  <-- 2. currently old_name is first time check here

This problem was introduced in commit 7834e94c ("livepatch/arm64:
Fix func size less than limit") which exchange order of 'klp_init_func'
and 'klp_init_object_loaded' then cause old_name being used before check.

We move these checks before 'klp_init_object_loaded' and add several
logs to tell why check failed.

Fixes: 7834e94c ("livepatch/arm64: Fix func size less than limit")
Signed-off-by: NZheng Yejian <zhengyejian1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NCheng Jian <cj.chengjian@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

hulk inclusion
category: feature
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4PM10
CVE: NA

--------------------------------
Signed-off-by: NTong Tiangen <tongtiangen@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NKefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NXie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

hulk inclusion
category: feature
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4PM10
CVE: NA

--------------------------------

During kernel copy_from_user processing, the kernel triggers a RAS
exception when reading pages. In this solution, we identify this
scenario in the kernel do_sea processing process, send SIGBUS signals
to the process that triggers copy_from_user and isolate memory pages,
preventing kernel panic.

At the same time, we use cmdline(uce_kernel_recovery) or proc
(/proc/sys/kernel/uce_kernel_recovery) to control this feature on/off.

Usage:
1. Each bit controls whether this feature is turned on in a scene,
    1 means turned on and 0 means turned off.
2. Bit2 represents copy_from_user scene, other bits are currently
    reserved.

eg: make copy_from_user scene open this feature:
1. echo 4 > /proc/sys/kernel/uce_kernel_recovery.
or
2. uce_kernel_recovery=4 add to cmdline.
Signed-off-by: NTong Tiangen <tongtiangen@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NKefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NXie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

hulk inclusion
category: bugfix
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4SK3S
CVE: NA

----------------------------------------------

Commit cc3d801f ("efi: Make efi_find_mirror() public") add
efi_find_mirror() defination into linux/efi.h, but forget to
drop this in arch/x86/include/asm/efi.h, kill it.

Fixes: cc3d801f ("efi: Make efi_find_mirror() public")
Signed-off-by: NMa Wupeng <mawupeng1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NKefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

hulk inclusion
category: bugfix
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4WKMY
CVE: NA

--------------------------------

cfs_bandwidth_usage_inc() need hold jump_label_mutex and
might sleep, so we can not call it in atomic context.
Fix this by moving cfs_bandwidth_usage_{inc,dec}() out of
rcu read critical section.
Signed-off-by: NZhang Qiao <zhangqiao22@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NChen Hui <judy.chenhui@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

virt inclusion
category: bugfix
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4WK5B
CVE: NA

------------------------------

When a newly created iommu_domain is not HWDBM capable, the vfio_iommu's
num_non_hwdbm_domains field should increase but failed to increase. This
fixes this bug.

Fixes: d2373c56 (vfio/iommu_type1: Add HWDBM status maintenance)
Signed-off-by: NKeqian Zhu <zhukeqian1@huawei.com>
Tested-by: NKunkun Jiang <jiangkunkun@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NKunkun Jiang <jiangkunkun@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NZenghui Yu <yuzenghui@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>