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  1. 08 8月, 2010 23 次提交
  3. 02 8月, 2010 1 次提交
  5. 31 7月, 2010 1 次提交
  7. 30 7月, 2010 2 次提交
    • D
      CRED: Fix __task_cred()'s lockdep check and banner comment · 8f92054e
      由 David Howells 提交于 
      Fix __task_cred()'s lockdep check by removing the following validation
condition:

	lockdep_tasklist_lock_is_held()

as commit_creds() does not take the tasklist_lock, and nor do most of the
functions that call it, so this check is pointless and it can prevent
detection of the RCU lock not being held if the tasklist_lock is held.

Instead, add the following validation condition:

	task->exit_state >= 0

to permit the access if the target task is dead and therefore unable to change
its own credentials.

Fix __task_cred()'s comment to:

 (1) discard the bit that says that the caller must prevent the target task
     from being deleted.  That shouldn't need saying.

 (2) Add a comment indicating the result of __task_cred() should not be passed
     directly to get_cred(), but rather than get_task_cred() should be used
     instead.

Also put a note into the documentation to enforce this point there too.
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NJiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      8f92054e
    • D
      CRED: Fix get_task_cred() and task_state() to not resurrect dead credentials · de09a977
      由 David Howells 提交于 
      It's possible for get_task_cred() as it currently stands to 'corrupt' a set of
credentials by incrementing their usage count after their replacement by the
task being accessed.

What happens is that get_task_cred() can race with commit_creds():

	TASK_1			TASK_2			RCU_CLEANER
	-->get_task_cred(TASK_2)
	rcu_read_lock()
	__cred = __task_cred(TASK_2)
				-->commit_creds()
				old_cred = TASK_2->real_cred
				TASK_2->real_cred = ...
				put_cred(old_cred)
				  call_rcu(old_cred)
		[__cred->usage == 0]
	get_cred(__cred)
		[__cred->usage == 1]
	rcu_read_unlock()
							-->put_cred_rcu()
							[__cred->usage == 1]
							panic()

However, since a tasks credentials are generally not changed very often, we can
reasonably make use of a loop involving reading the creds pointer and using
atomic_inc_not_zero() to attempt to increment it if it hasn't already hit zero.

If successful, we can safely return the credentials in the knowledge that, even
if the task we're accessing has released them, they haven't gone to the RCU
cleanup code.

We then change task_state() in procfs to use get_task_cred() rather than
calling get_cred() on the result of __task_cred(), as that suffers from the
same problem.

Without this change, a BUG_ON in __put_cred() or in put_cred_rcu() can be
tripped when it is noticed that the usage count is not zero as it ought to be,
for example:

kernel BUG at kernel/cred.c:168!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
last sysfs file: /sys/kernel/mm/ksm/run
CPU 0
Pid: 2436, comm: master Not tainted 2.6.33.3-85.fc13.x86_64 #1 0HR330/OptiPlex
745
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff81069881>]  [<ffffffff81069881>] __put_cred+0xc/0x45
RSP: 0018:ffff88019e7e9eb8  EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: ffff880161514480 RCX: 00000000ffffffff
RDX: 00000000ffffffff RSI: ffff880140c690c0 RDI: ffff880140c690c0
RBP: ffff88019e7e9eb8 R08: 00000000000000d0 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000040 R12: ffff880140c690c0
R13: ffff88019e77aea0 R14: 00007fff336b0a5c R15: 0000000000000001
FS:  00007f12f50d97c0(0000) GS:ffff880007400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f8f461bc000 CR3: 00000001b26ce000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Process master (pid: 2436, threadinfo ffff88019e7e8000, task ffff88019e77aea0)
Stack:
 ffff88019e7e9ec8 ffffffff810698cd ffff88019e7e9ef8 ffffffff81069b45
<0> ffff880161514180 ffff880161514480 ffff880161514180 0000000000000000
<0> ffff88019e7e9f28 ffffffff8106aace 0000000000000001 0000000000000246
Call Trace:
 [<ffffffff810698cd>] put_cred+0x13/0x15
 [<ffffffff81069b45>] commit_creds+0x16b/0x175
 [<ffffffff8106aace>] set_current_groups+0x47/0x4e
 [<ffffffff8106ac89>] sys_setgroups+0xf6/0x105
 [<ffffffff81009b02>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
Code: 48 8d 71 ff e8 7e 4e 15 00 85 c0 78 0b 8b 75 ec 48 89 df e8 ef 4a 15 00
48 83 c4 18 5b c9 c3 55 8b 07 8b 07 48 89 e5 85 c0 74 04 <0f> 0b eb fe 65 48 8b
04 25 00 cc 00 00 48 3b b8 58 04 00 00 75
RIP  [<ffffffff81069881>] __put_cred+0xc/0x45
 RSP <ffff88019e7e9eb8>
---[ end trace df391256a100ebdd ]---
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NJiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      de09a977
  9. 28 7月, 2010 1 次提交
  11. 25 7月, 2010 1 次提交
  13. 23 7月, 2010 1 次提交
    • H
      macvtap: Limit packet queue length · 8a35747a
      由 Herbert Xu 提交于 
      Mark Wagner reported OOM symptoms when sending UDP traffic over
a macvtap link to a kvm receiver.

This appears to be caused by the fact that macvtap packet queues
are unlimited in length.  This means that if the receiver can't
keep up with the rate of flow, then we will hit OOM. Of course
it gets worse if the OOM killer then decides to kill the receiver.

This patch imposes a cap on the packet queue length, in the same
way as the tuntap driver, using the device TX queue length.

Please note that macvtap currently has no way of giving congestion
notification, that means the software device TX queue cannot be
used and packets will always be dropped once the macvtap driver
queue fills up.

This shouldn't be a great problem for the scenario where macvtap
is used to feed a kvm receiver, as the traffic is most likely
external in origin so congestion notification can't be applied
anyway.

Of course, if anybody decides to complain about guest-to-guest
UDP packet loss down the track, then we may have to revisit this.

Incidentally, this patch also fixes a real memory leak when
macvtap_get_queue fails.

Chris Wright noticed that for this patch to work, we need a
non-zero TX queue length.  This patch includes his work to change
the default macvtap TX queue length to 500.
Reported-by: NMark Wagner <mwagner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Acked-by: NChris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Acked-by: NArnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      8a35747a
  15. 22 7月, 2010 1 次提交
  17. 21 7月, 2010 2 次提交
  19. 20 7月, 2010 1 次提交
  21. 19 7月, 2010 1 次提交
    • D
      mm: add context argument to shrinker callback · 7f8275d0
      由 Dave Chinner 提交于 
      The current shrinker implementation requires the registered callback
to have global state to work from. This makes it difficult to shrink
caches that are not global (e.g. per-filesystem caches). Pass the shrinker
structure to the callback so that users can embed the shrinker structure
in the context the shrinker needs to operate on and get back to it in the
callback via container_of().
Signed-off-by: NDave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
      7f8275d0
  23. 17 7月, 2010 1 次提交
    • B
      PCI: fall back to original BIOS BAR addresses · 58c84eda
      由 Bjorn Helgaas 提交于 
      If we fail to assign resources to a PCI BAR, this patch makes us try the
original address from BIOS rather than leaving it disabled.

Linux tries to make sure all PCI device BARs are inside the upstream
PCI host bridge or P2P bridge apertures, reassigning BARs if necessary.
Windows does similar reassignment.

Before this patch, if we could not move a BAR into an aperture, we left
the resource unassigned, i.e., at address zero.  Windows leaves such BARs
at the original BIOS addresses, and this patch makes Linux do the same.

This is a bit ugly because we disable the resource long before we try to
reassign it, so we have to keep track of the BIOS BAR address somewhere.
For lack of a better place, I put it in the struct pci_dev.

I think it would be cleaner to attempt the assignment immediately when the
claim fails, so we could easily remember the original address.  But we
currently claim motherboard resources in the middle, after attempting to
claim PCI resources and before assigning new PCI resources, and changing
that is a fairly big job.

Addresses https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=16263Reported-by: NAndrew <nitr0@seti.kr.ua>
Tested-by: NAndrew <nitr0@seti.kr.ua>
Signed-off-by: NBjorn Helgaas <bjorn.helgaas@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: NJesse Barnes <jbarnes@virtuousgeek.org>
      58c84eda
  25. 16 7月, 2010 1 次提交
    • J
      jbd2/ocfs2: Fix block checksumming when a buffer is used in several transactions · 13ceef09
      由 Jan Kara 提交于 
      OCFS2 uses t_commit trigger to compute and store checksum of the just
committed blocks. When a buffer has b_frozen_data, checksum is computed
for it instead of b_data but this can result in an old checksum being
written to the filesystem in the following scenario:

1) transaction1 is opened
2) handle1 is opened
3) journal_access(handle1, bh)
    - This sets jh->b_transaction to transaction1
4) modify(bh)
5) journal_dirty(handle1, bh)
6) handle1 is closed
7) start committing transaction1, opening transaction2
8) handle2 is opened
9) journal_access(handle2, bh)
    - This copies off b_frozen_data to make it safe for transaction1 to commit.
      jh->b_next_transaction is set to transaction2.
10) jbd2_journal_write_metadata() checksums b_frozen_data
11) the journal correctly writes b_frozen_data to the disk journal
12) handle2 is closed
    - There was no dirty call for the bh on handle2, so it is never queued for
      any more journal operation
13) Checkpointing finally happens, and it just spools the bh via normal buffer
writeback.  This will write b_data, which was never triggered on and thus
contains a wrong (old) checksum.

This patch fixes the problem by calling the trigger at the moment data is
frozen for journal commit - i.e., either when b_frozen_data is created by
do_get_write_access or just before we write a buffer to the log if
b_frozen_data does not exist. We also rename the trigger to t_frozen as
that better describes when it is called.
Signed-off-by: NJan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: NMark Fasheh <mfasheh@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NJoel Becker <joel.becker@oracle.com>
      13ceef09
  27. 14 7月, 2010 1 次提交
  29. 10 7月, 2010 1 次提交
  31. 07 7月, 2010 1 次提交
    • A
      VFS: introduce s_dirty accessors · 140236b4
      由 Artem Bityutskiy 提交于 
      This patch introduces 3 VFS accessors: 'sb_mark_dirty()',
'sb_mark_clean()', and 'sb_is_dirty()'. They simply
set 'sb->s_dirt' or test 'sb->s_dirt'. The plan is to make
every FS use these accessors later instead of manipulating
the 'sb->s_dirt' flag directly.

Ultimately, this change is a preparation for the periodic
superblock synchronization optimization which is about
preventing the "sync_supers" kernel thread from waking up
even if there is nothing to synchronize.

This patch does not do any functional change, just adds
accessor functions.
Signed-off-by: NArtem Bityutskiy <Artem.Bityutskiy@nokia.com>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      140236b4