- 09 1月, 2018 12 次提交
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由 Shanker Donthineni 提交于
Falkor is susceptible to branch predictor aliasing and can theoretically be attacked by malicious code. This patch implements a mitigation for these attacks, preventing any malicious entries from affecting other victim contexts. Signed-off-by: NShanker Donthineni <shankerd@codeaurora.org> [will: fix label name when !CONFIG_KVM and remove references to MIDR_FALKOR] Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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由 Will Deacon 提交于
Cortex-A57, A72, A73 and A75 are susceptible to branch predictor aliasing and can theoretically be attacked by malicious code. This patch implements a PSCI-based mitigation for these CPUs when available. The call into firmware will invalidate the branch predictor state, preventing any malicious entries from affecting other victim contexts. Co-developed-by: NMarc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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由 Will Deacon 提交于
Hook up MIDR values for the Cortex-A72 and Cortex-A75 CPUs, since they will soon need MIDR matches for hardening the branch predictor. Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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由 Marc Zyngier 提交于
For those CPUs that require PSCI to perform a BP invalidation, going all the way to the PSCI code for not much is a waste of precious cycles. Let's terminate that call as early as possible. Signed-off-by: NMarc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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由 Marc Zyngier 提交于
Now that we have per-CPU vectors, let's plug then in the KVM/arm64 code. Signed-off-by: NMarc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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由 Will Deacon 提交于
Aliasing attacks against CPU branch predictors can allow an attacker to redirect speculative control flow on some CPUs and potentially divulge information from one context to another. This patch adds initial skeleton code behind a new Kconfig option to enable implementation-specific mitigations against these attacks for CPUs that are affected. Co-developed-by: NMarc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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由 Marc Zyngier 提交于
We will soon need to invoke a CPU-specific function pointer after changing page tables, so move post_ttbr_update_workaround out into C code to make this possible. Signed-off-by: NMarc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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由 Will Deacon 提交于
Entry into recent versions of ARM Trusted Firmware will invalidate the CPU branch predictor state in order to protect against aliasing attacks. This patch exposes the PSCI "VERSION" function via psci_ops, so that it can be invoked outside of the PSCI driver where necessary. Acked-by: NLorenzo Pieralisi <lorenzo.pieralisi@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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由 Will Deacon 提交于
In order to invoke the CPU capability ->matches callback from the ->enable callback for applying local-CPU workarounds, we need a handle on the capability structure. This patch passes a pointer to the capability structure to the ->enable callback. Reviewed-by: NSuzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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由 Will Deacon 提交于
For non-KASLR kernels where the KPTI behaviour has not been overridden on the command line we can use ID_AA64PFR0_EL1.CSV3 to determine whether or not we should unmap the kernel whilst running at EL0. Reviewed-by: NSuzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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由 Will Deacon 提交于
Although CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0 does make KASLR more robust, it's actually more useful as a mitigation against speculation attacks that can leak arbitrary kernel data to userspace through speculation. Reword the Kconfig help message to reflect this, and make the option depend on EXPERT so that it is on by default for the majority of users. Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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由 Will Deacon 提交于
Speculation attacks against the entry trampoline can potentially resteer the speculative instruction stream through the indirect branch and into arbitrary gadgets within the kernel. This patch defends against these attacks by forcing a misprediction through the return stack: a dummy BL instruction loads an entry into the stack, so that the predicted program flow of the subsequent RET instruction is to a branch-to-self instruction which is finally resolved as a branch to the kernel vectors with speculation suppressed. Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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- 05 1月, 2018 2 次提交
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由 Dongjiu Geng 提交于
ARM v8.4 extensions add new neon instructions for performing a multiplication of each FP16 element of one vector with the corresponding FP16 element of a second vector, and to add or subtract this without an intermediate rounding to the corresponding FP32 element in a third vector. This patch detects this feature and let the userspace know about it via a HWCAP bit and MRS emulation. Cc: Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com> Reviewed-by: NSuzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NDongjiu Geng <gengdongjiu@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NDave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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由 Catalin Marinas 提交于
Under some uncommon timing conditions, a generation check and xchg(active_asids, A1) in check_and_switch_context() on P1 can race with an ASID roll-over on P2. If P2 has not seen the update to active_asids[P1], it can re-allocate A1 to a new task T2 on P2. P1 ends up waiting on the spinlock since the xchg() returned 0 while P2 can go through a second ASID roll-over with (T2,A1,G2) active on P2. This roll-over copies active_asids[P1] == A1,G1 into reserved_asids[P1] and active_asids[P2] == A1,G2 into reserved_asids[P2]. A subsequent scheduling of T1 on P1 and T2 on P2 would match reserved_asids and get their generation bumped to G3: P1 P2 -- -- TTBR0.BADDR = T0 TTBR0.ASID = A0 asid_generation = G1 check_and_switch_context(T1,A1,G1) generation match check_and_switch_context(T2,A0,G0) new_context() ASID roll-over asid_generation = G2 flush_context() active_asids[P1] = 0 asid_map[A1] = 0 reserved_asids[P1] = A0,G0 xchg(active_asids, A1) active_asids[P1] = A1,G1 xchg returns 0 spin_lock_irqsave() allocated ASID (T2,A1,G2) asid_map[A1] = 1 active_asids[P2] = A1,G2 ... check_and_switch_context(T3,A0,G0) new_context() ASID roll-over asid_generation = G3 flush_context() active_asids[P1] = 0 asid_map[A1] = 1 reserved_asids[P1] = A1,G1 reserved_asids[P2] = A1,G2 allocated ASID (T3,A2,G3) asid_map[A2] = 1 active_asids[P2] = A2,G3 new_context() check_update_reserved_asid(A1,G1) matches reserved_asid[P1] reserved_asid[P1] = A1,G3 updated T1 ASID to (T1,A1,G3) check_and_switch_context(T2,A1,G2) new_context() check_and_switch_context(A1,G2) matches reserved_asids[P2] reserved_asids[P2] = A1,G3 updated T2 ASID to (T2,A1,G3) At this point, we have two tasks, T1 and T2 both using ASID A1 with the latest generation G3. Any of them is allowed to be scheduled on the other CPU leading to two different tasks with the same ASID on the same CPU. This patch changes the xchg to cmpxchg so that the active_asids is only updated if non-zero to avoid a race with an ASID roll-over on a different CPU. The ASID allocation algorithm has been formally verified using the TLA+ model checker (see https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/cmarinas/kernel-tla.git/tree/asidalloc.tla for the spec). Reviewed-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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- 02 1月, 2018 3 次提交
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由 Jason A. Donenfeld 提交于
This is entirely cosmetic, but somehow it was missed when sending differing versions of this patch. This just makes the file a bit more uniform. Signed-off-by: NJason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Signed-off-by: NCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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由 Prashanth Prakash 提交于
CPU_PM_CPU_IDLE_ENTER_RETENTION skips calling cpu_pm_enter() and cpu_pm_exit(). By not calling cpu_pm functions in idle entry/exit paths we can reduce the latency involved in entering and exiting the low power idle state. On ARM64 based Qualcomm server platform we measured below overhead for calling cpu_pm_enter and cpu_pm_exit for retention states. workload: stress --hdd #CPUs --hdd-bytes 32M -t 30 Average overhead of cpu_pm_enter - 1.2us Average overhead of cpu_pm_exit - 3.1us Acked-by: NSudeep Holla <sudeep.holla@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NPrashanth Prakash <pprakash@codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by: NCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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由 Prashanth Prakash 提交于
If a CPU is entering a low power idle state where it doesn't lose any context, then there is no need to call cpu_pm_enter()/cpu_pm_exit(). Add a new macro(CPU_PM_CPU_IDLE_ENTER_RETENTION) to be used by cpuidle drivers when they are entering retention state. By not calling cpu_pm_enter and cpu_pm_exit we reduce the latency involved in entering and exiting the retention idle states. CPU_PM_CPU_IDLE_ENTER_RETENTION assumes that no state is lost and hence CPU PM notifiers will not be called. We may need a broader change if we need to support partial retention states effeciently. On ARM64 based Qualcomm Server Platform we measured below overhead for for calling cpu_pm_enter and cpu_pm_exit for retention states. workload: stress --hdd #CPUs --hdd-bytes 32M -t 30 Average overhead of cpu_pm_enter - 1.2us Average overhead of cpu_pm_exit - 3.1us Acked-by: NRafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Acked-by: NSudeep Holla <sudeep.holla@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NPrashanth Prakash <pprakash@codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by: NCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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- 23 12月, 2017 9 次提交
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由 Catalin Marinas 提交于
* for-next/52-bit-pa: arm64: enable 52-bit physical address support arm64: allow ID map to be extended to 52 bits arm64: handle 52-bit physical addresses in page table entries arm64: don't open code page table entry creation arm64: head.S: handle 52-bit PAs in PTEs in early page table setup arm64: handle 52-bit addresses in TTBR arm64: limit PA size to supported range arm64: add kconfig symbol to configure physical address size
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由 Kristina Martsenko 提交于
Now that 52-bit physical address support is in place, add the kconfig symbol to enable it. As described in ARMv8.2, the larger addresses are only supported with the 64k granule. Also ensure that PAN is configured (or TTBR0 PAN is not), as explained in an earlier patch in this series. Tested-by: NSuzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com> Reviewed-by: NSuzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com> Acked-by: NMarc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Tested-by: NBob Picco <bob.picco@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: NBob Picco <bob.picco@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: NKristina Martsenko <kristina.martsenko@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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由 Kristina Martsenko 提交于
Currently, when using VA_BITS < 48, if the ID map text happens to be placed in physical memory above VA_BITS, we increase the VA size (up to 48) and create a new table level, in order to map in the ID map text. This is okay because the system always supports 48 bits of VA. This patch extends the code such that if the system supports 52 bits of VA, and the ID map text is placed that high up, then we increase the VA size accordingly, up to 52. One difference from the current implementation is that so far the condition of VA_BITS < 48 has meant that the top level table is always "full", with the maximum number of entries, and an extra table level is always needed. Now, when VA_BITS = 48 (and using 64k pages), the top level table is not full, and we simply need to increase the number of entries in it, instead of creating a new table level. Tested-by: NSuzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com> Reviewed-by: NSuzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com> Reviewed-by: NMarc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Tested-by: NBob Picco <bob.picco@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: NBob Picco <bob.picco@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: NKristina Martsenko <kristina.martsenko@arm.com> [catalin.marinas@arm.com: reduce arguments to __create_hyp_mappings()] [catalin.marinas@arm.com: reworked/renamed __cpu_uses_extended_idmap_level()] Signed-off-by: NCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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由 Kristina Martsenko 提交于
The top 4 bits of a 52-bit physical address are positioned at bits 12..15 of a page table entry. Introduce macros to convert between a physical address and its placement in a table entry, and change all macros/functions that access PTEs to use them. Reviewed-by: NMarc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Tested-by: NSuzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com> Reviewed-by: NSuzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com> Tested-by: NBob Picco <bob.picco@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: NBob Picco <bob.picco@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: NKristina Martsenko <kristina.martsenko@arm.com> [catalin.marinas@arm.com: some long lines wrapped] Signed-off-by: NCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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由 Kristina Martsenko 提交于
Instead of open coding the generation of page table entries, use the macros/functions that exist for this - pfn_p*d and p*d_populate. Most code in the kernel already uses these macros, this patch tries to fix up the few places that don't. This is useful for the next patch in this series, which needs to change the page table entry logic, and it's better to have that logic in one place. The KVM extended ID map is special, since we're creating a level above CONFIG_PGTABLE_LEVELS and the required function isn't available. Leave it as is and add a comment to explain it. (The normal kernel ID map code doesn't need this change because its page tables are created in assembly (__create_page_tables)). Tested-by: NSuzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com> Reviewed-by: NSuzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com> Reviewed-by: NMarc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Tested-by: NBob Picco <bob.picco@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: NBob Picco <bob.picco@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: NKristina Martsenko <kristina.martsenko@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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由 Kristina Martsenko 提交于
The top 4 bits of a 52-bit physical address are positioned at bits 12..15 in page table entries. Introduce a macro to move the bits there, and change the early ID map and swapper table setup code to use it. Tested-by: NSuzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com> Reviewed-by: NSuzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com> Reviewed-by: NMarc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Tested-by: NBob Picco <bob.picco@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: NBob Picco <bob.picco@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: NKristina Martsenko <kristina.martsenko@arm.com> [catalin.marinas@arm.com: additional comments for clarification] Signed-off-by: NCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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由 Kristina Martsenko 提交于
The top 4 bits of a 52-bit physical address are positioned at bits 2..5 in the TTBR registers. Introduce a couple of macros to move the bits there, and change all TTBR writers to use them. Leave TTBR0 PAN code unchanged, to avoid complicating it. A system with 52-bit PA will have PAN anyway (because it's ARMv8.1 or later), and a system without 52-bit PA can only use up to 48-bit PAs. A later patch in this series will add a kconfig dependency to ensure PAN is configured. In addition, when using 52-bit PA there is a special alignment requirement on the top-level table. We don't currently have any VA_BITS configuration that would violate the requirement, but one could be added in the future, so add a compile-time BUG_ON to check for it. Tested-by: NSuzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com> Reviewed-by: NSuzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com> Reviewed-by: NMarc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Tested-by: NBob Picco <bob.picco@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: NBob Picco <bob.picco@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: NKristina Martsenko <kristina.martsenko@arm.com> [catalin.marinas@arm.com: added TTBR_BADD_MASK_52 comment] Signed-off-by: NCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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由 Kristina Martsenko 提交于
We currently copy the physical address size from ID_AA64MMFR0_EL1.PARange directly into TCR.(I)PS. This will not work for 4k and 16k granule kernels on systems that support 52-bit physical addresses, since 52-bit addresses are only permitted with the 64k granule. To fix this, fall back to 48 bits when configuring the PA size when the kernel does not support 52-bit PAs. When it does, fall back to 52, to avoid similar problems in the future if the PA size is ever increased above 52. Tested-by: NSuzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com> Reviewed-by: NSuzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com> Reviewed-by: NMarc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Tested-by: NBob Picco <bob.picco@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: NBob Picco <bob.picco@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: NKristina Martsenko <kristina.martsenko@arm.com> [catalin.marinas@arm.com: tcr_set_pa_size macro renamed to tcr_compute_pa_size] [catalin.marinas@arm.com: comments added to tcr_compute_pa_size] [catalin.marinas@arm.com: definitions added for TCR_*PS_SHIFT] Signed-off-by: NCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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由 Kristina Martsenko 提交于
ARMv8.2 introduces support for 52-bit physical addresses. To prepare for supporting this, add a new kconfig symbol to configure the physical address space size. The symbols will be used in subsequent patches. Currently the only choice is 48, a later patch will add the option of 52 once the required code is in place. Tested-by: NSuzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com> Reviewed-by: NSuzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com> Tested-by: NBob Picco <bob.picco@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: NBob Picco <bob.picco@oracle.com> Acked-by: NMarc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NKristina Martsenko <kristina.martsenko@arm.com> [catalin.marinas@arm.com: folded minor patches into this one] Signed-off-by: NCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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- 12 12月, 2017 1 次提交
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arm64/linux由 Catalin Marinas 提交于
Support for unmapping the kernel when running in userspace (aka "KAISER"). * 'kpti' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arm64/linux: arm64: kaslr: Put kernel vectors address in separate data page arm64: mm: Introduce TTBR_ASID_MASK for getting at the ASID in the TTBR perf: arm_spe: Fail device probe when arm64_kernel_unmapped_at_el0() arm64: Kconfig: Add CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0 arm64: entry: Add fake CPU feature for unmapping the kernel at EL0 arm64: tls: Avoid unconditional zeroing of tpidrro_el0 for native tasks arm64: erratum: Work around Falkor erratum #E1003 in trampoline code arm64: entry: Hook up entry trampoline to exception vectors arm64: entry: Explicitly pass exception level to kernel_ventry macro arm64: mm: Map entry trampoline into trampoline and kernel page tables arm64: entry: Add exception trampoline page for exceptions from EL0 arm64: mm: Invalidate both kernel and user ASIDs when performing TLBI arm64: mm: Add arm64_kernel_unmapped_at_el0 helper arm64: mm: Allocate ASIDs in pairs arm64: mm: Fix and re-enable ARM64_SW_TTBR0_PAN arm64: mm: Rename post_ttbr0_update_workaround arm64: mm: Remove pre_ttbr0_update_workaround for Falkor erratum #E1003 arm64: mm: Move ASID from TTBR0 to TTBR1 arm64: mm: Temporarily disable ARM64_SW_TTBR0_PAN arm64: mm: Use non-global mappings for kernel space
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- 11 12月, 2017 13 次提交
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由 Will Deacon 提交于
The literal pool entry for identifying the vectors base is the only piece of information in the trampoline page that identifies the true location of the kernel. This patch moves it into a page-aligned region of the .rodata section and maps this adjacent to the trampoline text via an additional fixmap entry, which protects against any accidental leakage of the trampoline contents. Suggested-by: NArd Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Tested-by: NLaura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> Tested-by: NShanker Donthineni <shankerd@codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
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由 Will Deacon 提交于
There are now a handful of open-coded masks to extract the ASID from a TTBR value, so introduce a TTBR_ASID_MASK and use that instead. Suggested-by: NMark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Reviewed-by: NMark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Tested-by: NLaura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> Tested-by: NShanker Donthineni <shankerd@codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
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由 Will Deacon 提交于
When running with the kernel unmapped whilst at EL0, the virtually-addressed SPE buffer is also unmapped, which can lead to buffer faults if userspace profiling is enabled and potentially also when writing back kernel samples unless an expensive drain operation is performed on exception return. For now, fail the SPE driver probe when arm64_kernel_unmapped_at_el0(). Reviewed-by: NMark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Tested-by: NLaura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> Tested-by: NShanker Donthineni <shankerd@codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
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由 Will Deacon 提交于
Add a Kconfig entry to control use of the entry trampoline, which allows us to unmap the kernel whilst running in userspace and improve the robustness of KASLR. Reviewed-by: NMark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Tested-by: NLaura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> Tested-by: NShanker Donthineni <shankerd@codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
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由 Will Deacon 提交于
Allow explicit disabling of the entry trampoline on the kernel command line (kpti=off) by adding a fake CPU feature (ARM64_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0) that can be used to toggle the alternative sequences in our entry code and avoid use of the trampoline altogether if desired. This also allows us to make use of a static key in arm64_kernel_unmapped_at_el0(). Reviewed-by: NMark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Tested-by: NLaura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> Tested-by: NShanker Donthineni <shankerd@codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
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由 Will Deacon 提交于
When unmapping the kernel at EL0, we use tpidrro_el0 as a scratch register during exception entry from native tasks and subsequently zero it in the kernel_ventry macro. We can therefore avoid zeroing tpidrro_el0 in the context-switch path for native tasks using the entry trampoline. Reviewed-by: NMark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Tested-by: NLaura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> Tested-by: NShanker Donthineni <shankerd@codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
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由 Will Deacon 提交于
We rely on an atomic swizzling of TTBR1 when transitioning from the entry trampoline to the kernel proper on an exception. We can't rely on this atomicity in the face of Falkor erratum #E1003, so on affected cores we can issue a TLB invalidation to invalidate the walk cache prior to jumping into the kernel. There is still the possibility of a TLB conflict here due to conflicting walk cache entries prior to the invalidation, but this doesn't appear to be the case on these CPUs in practice. Reviewed-by: NMark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Tested-by: NLaura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> Tested-by: NShanker Donthineni <shankerd@codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
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由 Will Deacon 提交于
Hook up the entry trampoline to our exception vectors so that all exceptions from and returns to EL0 go via the trampoline, which swizzles the vector base register accordingly. Transitioning to and from the kernel clobbers x30, so we use tpidrro_el0 and far_el1 as scratch registers for native tasks. Reviewed-by: NMark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Tested-by: NLaura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> Tested-by: NShanker Donthineni <shankerd@codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
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由 Will Deacon 提交于
We will need to treat exceptions from EL0 differently in kernel_ventry, so rework the macro to take the exception level as an argument and construct the branch target using that. Reviewed-by: NMark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Tested-by: NLaura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> Tested-by: NShanker Donthineni <shankerd@codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
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由 Will Deacon 提交于
The exception entry trampoline needs to be mapped at the same virtual address in both the trampoline page table (which maps nothing else) and also the kernel page table, so that we can swizzle TTBR1_EL1 on exceptions from and return to EL0. This patch maps the trampoline at a fixed virtual address in the fixmap area of the kernel virtual address space, which allows the kernel proper to be randomized with respect to the trampoline when KASLR is enabled. Reviewed-by: NMark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Tested-by: NLaura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> Tested-by: NShanker Donthineni <shankerd@codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
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由 Will Deacon 提交于
To allow unmapping of the kernel whilst running at EL0, we need to point the exception vectors at an entry trampoline that can map/unmap the kernel on entry/exit respectively. This patch adds the trampoline page, although it is not yet plugged into the vector table and is therefore unused. Reviewed-by: NMark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Tested-by: NLaura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> Tested-by: NShanker Donthineni <shankerd@codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
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由 Will Deacon 提交于
Since an mm has both a kernel and a user ASID, we need to ensure that broadcast TLB maintenance targets both address spaces so that things like CoW continue to work with the uaccess primitives in the kernel. Reviewed-by: NMark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Tested-by: NLaura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> Tested-by: NShanker Donthineni <shankerd@codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
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由 Will Deacon 提交于
In order for code such as TLB invalidation to operate efficiently when the decision to map the kernel at EL0 is determined at runtime, this patch introduces a helper function, arm64_kernel_unmapped_at_el0, to determine whether or not the kernel is mapped whilst running in userspace. Currently, this just reports the value of CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0, but will later be hooked up to a fake CPU capability using a static key. Reviewed-by: NMark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Tested-by: NLaura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> Tested-by: NShanker Donthineni <shankerd@codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
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