hulk inclusion
category: feature
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I59Q07
CVE: NA

--------------------------------

Simple DMA test client. Say N unless you're debugging a DMA Device driver.
It doesn't need to be compiled into the vmlinux, change it to m.
Signed-off-by: NChao Liu <liuchao173@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NKai Liu <kai.liu@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-v5.10.103
commit bae7fc6f0dc66d8a80316c09ed7ee286f33cd731
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I56NE7

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=bae7fc6f0dc66d8a80316c09ed7ee286f33cd731

--------------------------------

When eagerly switching PKRU in switch_fpu_finish() it checks that
current is not a kernel thread as kernel threads will never use PKRU.
It's possible that this_cpu_read_stable() on current_task
(ie. get_current()) is returning an old cached value. To resolve this
reference next_p directly rather than relying on current.

As written it's possible when switching from a kernel thread to a
userspace thread to observe a cached PF_KTHREAD flag and never restore
the PKRU. And as a result this issue only occurs when switching
from a kernel thread to a userspace thread, switching from a non kernel
thread works perfectly fine because all that is considered in that
situation are the flags from some other non kernel task and the next fpu
is passed in to switch_fpu_finish().

This behavior only exists between 5.2 and 5.13 when it was fixed by a
rewrite decoupling PKRU from xstate, in:
  commit 95443698 ("x86/fpu: Remove PKRU handling from switch_fpu_finish()")

Unfortunately backporting the fix from 5.13 is probably not realistic as
it's part of a 60+ patch series which rewrites most of the PKRU handling.

Fixes: 0cecca9d ("x86/fpu: Eager switch PKRU state")
Signed-off-by: NBrian Geffon <bgeffon@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NWillis Kung <williskung@google.com>
Tested-by: NWillis Kung <williskung@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v5.4.x
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v5.10.x
Acked-by: NDave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NYu Liao <liaoyu15@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NWei Li <liwei391@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-v5.10.103
commit 72fdfc75d4217b32363cc80def3de2cb3fef3f02
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I56NE7

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=72fdfc75d4217b32363cc80def3de2cb3fef3f02

--------------------------------

commit 6f3c1fc5 upstream.

In current async pagefault logic, when a page is ready, KVM relies on
kvm_arch_can_dequeue_async_page_present() to determine whether to deliver
a READY event to the Guest. This function test token value of struct
kvm_vcpu_pv_apf_data, which must be reset to zero by Guest kernel when a
READY event is finished by Guest. If value is zero meaning that a READY
event is done, so the KVM can deliver another.
But the kvm_arch_setup_async_pf() may produce a valid token with zero
value, which is confused with previous mention and may lead the loss of
this READY event.

This bug may cause task blocked forever in Guest:
 INFO: task stress:7532 blocked for more than 1254 seconds.
       Not tainted 5.10.0 #16
 "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
 task:stress          state:D stack:    0 pid: 7532 ppid:  1409
 flags:0x00000080
 Call Trace:
  __schedule+0x1e7/0x650
  schedule+0x46/0xb0
  kvm_async_pf_task_wait_schedule+0xad/0xe0
  ? exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x60/0x70
  __kvm_handle_async_pf+0x4f/0xb0
  ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x8/0x30
  exc_page_fault+0x6f/0x110
  ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x8/0x30
  asm_exc_page_fault+0x1e/0x30
 RIP: 0033:0x402d00
 RSP: 002b:00007ffd31912500 EFLAGS: 00010206
 RAX: 0000000000071000 RBX: ffffffffffffffff RCX: 00000000021a32b0
 RDX: 000000000007d011 RSI: 000000000007d000 RDI: 00000000021262b0
 RBP: 00000000021262b0 R08: 0000000000000003 R09: 0000000000000086
 R10: 00000000000000eb R11: 00007fefbdf2baa0 R12: 0000000000000000
 R13: 0000000000000002 R14: 000000000007d000 R15: 0000000000001000
Signed-off-by: NLiang Zhang <zhangliang5@huawei.com>
Message-Id: <20220222031239.1076682-1-zhangliang5@huawei.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NYu Liao <liaoyu15@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NWei Li <liwei391@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

mainline inclusion
from mainline-v5.18-rc1
commit 930ab34d
category: feature
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I50ABL

--------------------------------

This patch adds AVX assembly accelerated implementation of SM3 secure
hash algorithm. From the benchmark data, compared to pure software
implementation sm3-generic, the performance increase is up to 38%.

The main algorithm implementation based on SM3 AES/BMI2 accelerated
work by libgcrypt at:
https://gnupg.org/software/libgcrypt/index.html

Benchmark on Intel i5-6200U 2.30GHz, performance data of two
implementations, pure software sm3-generic and sm3-avx acceleration.
The data comes from the 326 mode and 422 mode of tcrypt. The abscissas
are different lengths of per update. The data is tabulated and the
unit is Mb/s:

update-size |     16      64     256    1024    2048    4096    8192
------------+-------------------------------------------------------
sm3-generic | 105.97  129.60  182.12  189.62  188.06  193.66  194.88
sm3-avx     | 119.87  163.05  244.44  260.92  257.60  264.87  265.88
Signed-off-by: NTianjia Zhang <tianjia.zhang@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: NGUO Zihua <guozihua@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NWang Weiyang <wangweiyang2@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NXiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-v5.10.102
commit fb00319afb72be8f7b2661b91293f005af00d775
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I567K6

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=fb00319afb72be8f7b2661b91293f005af00d775

--------------------------------

[ Upstream commit 710c4765 ]

AMD's event select is 3 nybbles, with the high nybble in bits 35:32 of
a PerfEvtSeln MSR. Don't mask off the high nybble when configuring a
RAW perf event.

Fixes: ca724305 ("KVM: x86/vPMU: Implement AMD vPMU code for KVM")
Signed-off-by: NJim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220203014813.2130559-2-jmattson@google.com>
Reviewed-by: NDavid Dunn <daviddunn@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NYu Liao <liaoyu15@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NWei Li <liwei391@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-v5.10.102
commit 0ee4bb8ce8b8279a2fa811efccc9422d0b6d9bff
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I567K6

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=0ee4bb8ce8b8279a2fa811efccc9422d0b6d9bff

--------------------------------

[ Upstream commit b8bfee85 ]

AMD's event select is 3 nybbles, with the high nybble in bits 35:32 of
a PerfEvtSeln MSR. Don't drop the high nybble when setting up the
config field of a perf_event_attr structure for a call to
perf_event_create_kernel_counter().

Fixes: ca724305 ("KVM: x86/vPMU: Implement AMD vPMU code for KVM")
Reported-by: NStephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NJim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220203014813.2130559-1-jmattson@google.com>
Reviewed-by: NDavid Dunn <daviddunn@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NYu Liao <liaoyu15@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NWei Li <liwei391@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-v5.10.102
commit 99cd2a043760e4fcf06fe3c67e9885a2d64c986d
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I567K6

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=99cd2a043760e4fcf06fe3c67e9885a2d64c986d

--------------------------------

[ Upstream commit 7c174f30 ]

The find_arch_event() returns a "unsigned int" value,
which is used by the pmc_reprogram_counter() to
program a PERF_TYPE_HARDWARE type perf_event.

The returned value is actually the kernel defined generic
perf_hw_id, let's rename it to pmc_perf_hw_id() with simpler
incoming parameters for better self-explanation.
Signed-off-by: NLike Xu <likexu@tencent.com>
Message-Id: <20211130074221.93635-3-likexu@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NYu Liao <liaoyu15@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NWei Li <liwei391@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-v5.10.102
commit 9dcedbe943be8c93722c1ed68b59001b28b0d889
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I567K6

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=9dcedbe943be8c93722c1ed68b59001b28b0d889

--------------------------------

commit 55467fcd upstream.

Always signal that emulation is possible for !SEV guests regardless of
whether or not the CPU provided a valid instruction byte stream.  KVM can
read all guest state (memory and registers) for !SEV guests, i.e. can
fetch the code stream from memory even if the CPU failed to do so because
of the SMAP errata.

Fixes: 05d5a486 ("KVM: SVM: Workaround errata#1096 (insn_len maybe zero on SMAP violation)")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: NLiam Merwick <liam.merwick@oracle.com>
Message-Id: <20220120010719.711476-2-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
[jwang: adjust context for kernel 5.10.101]
Signed-off-by: NJack Wang <jinpu.wang@ionos.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NYu Liao <liaoyu15@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NWei Li <liwei391@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-v5.10.102
commit 3c958dbcba1862050db73a5340b02d52fa9cc917
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I567K6

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=3c958dbcba1862050db73a5340b02d52fa9cc917

--------------------------------

[ Upstream commit e25a8d95 ]

This started out with me noticing that "dom0_max_vcpus=<N>" with <N>
larger than the number of physical CPUs reported through ACPI tables
would not bring up the "excess" vCPU-s. Addressing this is the primary
purpose of the change; CPU maps handling is being tidied only as far as
is necessary for the change here (with the effect of also avoiding the
setting up of too much per-CPU infrastructure, i.e. for CPUs which can
never come online).

Noticing that xen_fill_possible_map() is called way too early, whereas
xen_filter_cpu_maps() is called too late (after per-CPU areas were
already set up), and further observing that each of the functions serves
only one of Dom0 or DomU, it looked like it was better to simplify this.
Use the .get_smp_config hook instead, uniformly for Dom0 and DomU.
xen_fill_possible_map() can be dropped altogether, while
xen_filter_cpu_maps() is re-purposed but not otherwise changed.
Signed-off-by: NJan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: NBoris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/2dbd5f0a-9859-ca2d-085e-a02f7166c610@suse.comSigned-off-by: NJuergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NYu Liao <liaoyu15@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NWei Li <liwei391@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-v5.10.102
commit fe383750d40d43d74ffc63f2d695c6f7b9901ff3
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I567K6

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=fe383750d40d43d74ffc63f2d695c6f7b9901ff3

--------------------------------

commit dd4589ee upstream.

Remove a WARN on an "AVIC IPI invalid target" exit, the WARN is trivial
to trigger from guest as it will fail on any destination APIC ID that
doesn't exist from the guest's perspective.

Don't bother recording anything in the kernel log, the common tracepoint
for kvm_avic_incomplete_ipi() is sufficient for debugging.

This reverts commit 37ef0c44.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220204214205.3306634-2-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NYu Liao <liaoyu15@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NWei Li <liwei391@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-v5.10.101
commit 3aa5c8657292e05e6dfa8fe2316951001dab7e3a
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5669Z

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=3aa5c8657292e05e6dfa8fe2316951001dab7e3a

--------------------------------

[ Upstream commit b9bed78e ]

Set vmcs.GUEST_PENDING_DBG_EXCEPTIONS.BS, a.k.a. the pending single-step
breakpoint flag, when re-injecting a #DB with RFLAGS.TF=1, and STI or
MOVSS blocking is active.  Setting the flag is necessary to make VM-Entry
consistency checks happy, as VMX has an invariant that if RFLAGS.TF is
set and STI/MOVSS blocking is true, then the previous instruction must
have been STI or MOV/POP, and therefore a single-step #DB must be pending
since the RFLAGS.TF cannot have been set by the previous instruction,
i.e. the one instruction delay after setting RFLAGS.TF must have already
expired.

Normally, the CPU sets vmcs.GUEST_PENDING_DBG_EXCEPTIONS.BS appropriately
when recording guest state as part of a VM-Exit, but #DB VM-Exits
intentionally do not treat the #DB as "guest state" as interception of
the #DB effectively makes the #DB host-owned, thus KVM needs to manually
set PENDING_DBG.BS when forwarding/re-injecting the #DB to the guest.

Note, although this bug can be triggered by guest userspace, doing so
requires IOPL=3, and guest userspace running with IOPL=3 has full access
to all I/O ports (from the guest's perspective) and can crash/reboot the
guest any number of ways.  IOPL=3 is required because STI blocking kicks
in if and only if RFLAGS.IF is toggled 0=>1, and if CPL>IOPL, STI either
takes a #GP or modifies RFLAGS.VIF, not RFLAGS.IF.

MOVSS blocking can be initiated by userspace, but can be coincident with
a #DB if and only if DR7.GD=1 (General Detect enabled) and a MOV DR is
executed in the MOVSS shadow.  MOV DR #GPs at CPL>0, thus MOVSS blocking
is problematic only for CPL0 (and only if the guest is crazy enough to
access a DR in a MOVSS shadow).  All other sources of #DBs are either
suppressed by MOVSS blocking (single-step, code fetch, data, and I/O),
are mutually exclusive with MOVSS blocking (T-bit task switch), or are
already handled by KVM (ICEBP, a.k.a. INT1).

This bug was originally found by running tests[1] created for XSA-308[2].
Note that Xen's userspace test emits ICEBP in the MOVSS shadow, which is
presumably why the Xen bug was deemed to be an exploitable DOS from guest
userspace.  KVM already handles ICEBP by skipping the ICEBP instruction
and thus clears MOVSS blocking as a side effect of its "emulation".

[1] http://xenbits.xenproject.org/docs/xtf/xsa-308_2main_8c_source.html
[2] https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-308.htmlReported-by: NDavid Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Reported-by: NAlexander Graf <graf@amazon.de>
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220120000624.655815-1-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NYu Liao <liaoyu15@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NWei Li <liwei391@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-v5.10.101
commit bd39fe29bbbba8ad84605f6ded5c570b24f6cf8b
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5669Z

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=bd39fe29bbbba8ad84605f6ded5c570b24f6cf8b

--------------------------------

[ Upstream commit cdf85e0c ]

Inject a #GP instead of synthesizing triple fault to try to avoid killing
the guest if emulation of an SEV guest fails due to encountering the SMAP
erratum.  The injected #GP may still be fatal to the guest, e.g. if the
userspace process is providing critical functionality, but KVM should
make every attempt to keep the guest alive.
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: NLiam Merwick <liam.merwick@oracle.com>
Message-Id: <20220120010719.711476-10-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NYu Liao <liaoyu15@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NWei Li <liwei391@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-v5.10.101
commit 9efad4cb03658b62514d8f8992525b2912272b7b
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5669Z

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=9efad4cb03658b62514d8f8992525b2912272b7b

--------------------------------

[ Upstream commit f80ae0ef ]

Similar to MSR_IA32_VMX_EXIT_CTLS/MSR_IA32_VMX_TRUE_EXIT_CTLS,
MSR_IA32_VMX_ENTRY_CTLS/MSR_IA32_VMX_TRUE_ENTRY_CTLS pair,
MSR_IA32_VMX_TRUE_PINBASED_CTLS needs to be filtered the same way
MSR_IA32_VMX_PINBASED_CTLS is currently filtered as guests may solely rely
on 'true' MSR data.

Note, none of the currently existing Windows/Hyper-V versions are known
to stumble upon the unfiltered MSR_IA32_VMX_TRUE_PINBASED_CTLS, the change
is aimed at making the filtering future proof.
Signed-off-by: NVitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20220112170134.1904308-2-vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NYu Liao <liaoyu15@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NWei Li <liwei391@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-v5.10.101
commit db58a3d978b4c22472125e5e2e4aa554e5330757
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5669Z

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=db58a3d978b4c22472125e5e2e4aa554e5330757

--------------------------------

[ Upstream commit 7a601e2c ]

Enlightened VMCS v1 doesn't have VMX_PREEMPTION_TIMER_VALUE field,
PIN_BASED_VMX_PREEMPTION_TIMER is also filtered out already so it makes
sense to filter out VM_EXIT_SAVE_VMX_PREEMPTION_TIMER too.

Note, none of the currently existing Windows/Hyper-V versions are known
to enable 'save VMX-preemption timer value' when eVMCS is in use, the
change is aimed at making the filtering future proof.
Signed-off-by: NVitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20220112170134.1904308-3-vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NYu Liao <liaoyu15@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NWei Li <liwei391@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-v5.10.101
commit 0d6b9d15ecb48be86d668af52030200469f21b8e
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5669Z

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=0d6b9d15ecb48be86d668af52030200469f21b8e

--------------------------------

[ Upstream commit 8c16dc04 ]

Some hypervisors support Arch LBR, but without the LBR XSAVE support.
The current Arch LBR init code prints a warning when the xsave size (0) is
unexpected. Avoid printing the warning for the "no LBR XSAVE" case.
Signed-off-by: NAndi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211215204029.150686-1-ak@linux.intel.comSigned-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NYu Liao <liaoyu15@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NWei Li <liwei391@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-v5.10.99
commit dd274cf85269a24a60282ae21268cf3bf83514e3
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I55O7H

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=dd274cf85269a24a60282ae21268cf3bf83514e3

--------------------------------

commit a01994f5 upstream.

Kyle reported that rr[0] has started to malfunction on Comet Lake and
later CPUs due to EFI starting to make use of CPL3 [1] and the PMU
event filtering not distinguishing between regular CPL3 and SMM CPL3.

Since this is a privilege violation, default disable SMM visibility
where possible.

Administrators wanting to observe SMM cycles can easily change this
using the sysfs attribute while regular users don't have access to
this file.

[0] https://rr-project.org/

[1] See the Intel white paper "Trustworthy SMM on the Intel vPro Platform"
at https://bugzilla.kernel.org/attachment.cgi?id=300300, particularly the
end of page 5.
Reported-by: NKyle Huey <me@kylehuey.com>
Suggested-by: NAndrew Cooper <Andrew.Cooper3@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/YfKChjX61OW4CkYm@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.netSigned-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NYu Liao <liaoyu15@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NWei Li <liwei391@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-v5.10.99
commit 456f041e035913fcedb275aff6f8a71dfebcd394
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I55O7H

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=456f041e035913fcedb275aff6f8a71dfebcd394

--------------------------------

commit 1d909345 upstream.

Add a check for !buf->single before calling pt_buffer_region_size in a
place where a missing check can cause a kernel crash.

Fixes a bug introduced by commit 67063847 ("perf/x86/intel/pt:
Opportunistically use single range output mode"), which added a
support for PT single-range output mode. Since that commit if a PT
stop filter range is hit while tracing, the kernel will crash because
of a null pointer dereference in pt_handle_status due to calling
pt_buffer_region_size without a ToPA configured.

The commit which introduced single-range mode guarded almost all uses of
the ToPA buffer variables with checks of the buf->single variable, but
missed the case where tracing was stopped by the PT hardware, which
happens when execution hits a configured stop filter.

Tested that hitting a stop filter while PT recording successfully
records a trace with this patch but crashes without this patch.

Fixes: 67063847 ("perf/x86/intel/pt: Opportunistically use single range output mode")
Signed-off-by: NTristan Hume <tristan@thume.ca>
Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: NAdrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220127220806.73664-1-tristan@thume.caSigned-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NYu Liao <liaoyu15@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NWei Li <liwei391@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

hulk inclusion
category: feature
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I52611
CVE: NA
Signed-off-by: NGuan Jing <guanjing6@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NChen Hui <judy.chenhui@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

hulk inclusion
category: feature
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I53WZ9

--------------------------------
Signed-off-by: NZheng Yejian <zhengyejian1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NKuohai Xu <xukuohai@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

hulk inclusion
category: feature
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I53WZ9

--------------------------------

Currently when unpatch a function, we check whether 'func_stack' has only
one item then delete it:
  > if (list_is_singular(&func_node->func_stack)) {
  > 	list_del_rcu(&func->stack_node);
  > 	......
  > } else {
  > 	list_del_rcu(&func->stack_node);
  > 	next_func = list_first_or_null_rcu(&func_node->func_stack);
  > 	......
  > }

We can optimize it as delete first then check whether 'func_stack' is
empty or not.
Suggested-by: NXu Kuohai <xukuohai@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Yejian <zhengyejian1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NKuohai Xu <xukuohai@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-v5.10.97
commit 46f919c6bdc564528a96971060576b4024f68a49
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I55O0O

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=46f919c6bdc564528a96971060576b4024f68a49

--------------------------------

commit e464121f upstream.

Missed adding the Icelake-D CPU to the list. It uses the same MSRs
to control and read the inventory number as all the other models.

Fixes: dc6b025d ("x86/mce: Add Xeon Icelake to list of CPUs that support PPIN")
Reported-by: NAilin Xu <ailin.xu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NTony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220121174743.1875294-2-tony.luck@intel.comSigned-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NYu Liao <liaoyu15@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NWei Li <liwei391@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-v5.10.97
commit fbdbf6743f777729aadd00c4444234770f8dd042
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I55O0O

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=fbdbf6743f777729aadd00c4444234770f8dd042

--------------------------------

commit a331f5fd upstream.

New CPU model, same MSRs to control and read the inventory number.
Signed-off-by: NTony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210319173919.291428-1-tony.luck@intel.comSigned-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NYu Liao <liaoyu15@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NWei Li <liwei391@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-v5.10.97
commit 080dbe7e9b86a0392d8dffc00d9971792afc121f
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I55O0O

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=080dbe7e9b86a0392d8dffc00d9971792afc121f

--------------------------------

commit f7e57078 upstream.

Forcibly leave nested virtualization operation if userspace toggles SMM
state via KVM_SET_VCPU_EVENTS or KVM_SYNC_X86_EVENTS.  If userspace
forces the vCPU out of SMM while it's post-VMXON and then injects an SMI,
vmx_enter_smm() will overwrite vmx->nested.smm.vmxon and end up with both
vmxon=false and smm.vmxon=false, but all other nVMX state allocated.

Don't attempt to gracefully handle the transition as (a) most transitions
are nonsencial, e.g. forcing SMM while L2 is running, (b) there isn't
sufficient information to handle all transitions, e.g. SVM wants access
to the SMRAM save state, and (c) KVM_SET_VCPU_EVENTS must precede
KVM_SET_NESTED_STATE during state restore as the latter disallows putting
the vCPU into L2 if SMM is active, and disallows tagging the vCPU as
being post-VMXON in SMM if SMM is not active.

Abuse of KVM_SET_VCPU_EVENTS manifests as a WARN and memory leak in nVMX
due to failure to free vmcs01's shadow VMCS, but the bug goes far beyond
just a memory leak, e.g. toggling SMM on while L2 is active puts the vCPU
in an architecturally impossible state.

  WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 3606 at free_loaded_vmcs arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:2665 [inline]
  WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 3606 at free_loaded_vmcs+0x158/0x1a0 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:2656
  Modules linked in:
  CPU: 1 PID: 3606 Comm: syz-executor725 Not tainted 5.17.0-rc1-syzkaller #0
  Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
  RIP: 0010:free_loaded_vmcs arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:2665 [inline]
  RIP: 0010:free_loaded_vmcs+0x158/0x1a0 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:2656
  Code: <0f> 0b eb b3 e8 8f 4d 9f 00 e9 f7 fe ff ff 48 89 df e8 92 4d 9f 00
  Call Trace:
   <TASK>
   kvm_arch_vcpu_destroy+0x72/0x2f0 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:11123
   kvm_vcpu_destroy arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:441 [inline]
   kvm_destroy_vcpus+0x11f/0x290 arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:460
   kvm_free_vcpus arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:11564 [inline]
   kvm_arch_destroy_vm+0x2e8/0x470 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:11676
   kvm_destroy_vm arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:1217 [inline]
   kvm_put_kvm+0x4fa/0xb00 arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:1250
   kvm_vm_release+0x3f/0x50 arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:1273
   __fput+0x286/0x9f0 fs/file_table.c:311
   task_work_run+0xdd/0x1a0 kernel/task_work.c:164
   exit_task_work include/linux/task_work.h:32 [inline]
   do_exit+0xb29/0x2a30 kernel/exit.c:806
   do_group_exit+0xd2/0x2f0 kernel/exit.c:935
   get_signal+0x4b0/0x28c0 kernel/signal.c:2862
   arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x2a9/0x1c40 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:868
   handle_signal_work kernel/entry/common.c:148 [inline]
   exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:172 [inline]
   exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x17d/0x290 kernel/entry/common.c:207
   __syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:289 [inline]
   syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x19/0x60 kernel/entry/common.c:300
   do_syscall_64+0x42/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:86
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
   </TASK>

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: syzbot+8112db3ab20e70d50c31@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220125220358.2091737-1-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Backported-by: NTadeusz Struk <tadeusz.struk@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NYu Liao <liaoyu15@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NWei Li <liwei391@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-v5.10.96
commit 08f090bb9b6951a510437ef26ad78ffb3ee17142
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I55NWB

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=08f090bb9b6951a510437ef26ad78ffb3ee17142

--------------------------------

commit 1f52b0ab upstream.

Changes to the AMD Thresholding sysfs code prevents sysfs writes from
updating the underlying registers once CPU init is completed, i.e.
"threshold_banks" is set.

Allow the registers to be updated if the thresholding interface is
already initialized or if in the init path. Use the "set_lvt_off" value
to indicate if running in the init path, since this value is only set
during init.

Fixes: a037f3ca ("x86/mce/amd: Make threshold bank setting hotplug robust")
Signed-off-by: NYazen Ghannam <yazen.ghannam@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220117161328.19148-1-yazen.ghannam@amd.comSigned-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NYu Liao <liaoyu15@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NWei Li <liwei391@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-v5.10.96
commit e92cac1dd803aca5bc326ec22bdcd4f56855d7ce
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I55NWB

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=e92cac1dd803aca5bc326ec22bdcd4f56855d7ce

--------------------------------

commit 4c282e51 upstream.

Do a runtime CPUID update for a vCPU if MSR_IA32_XSS is written, as the
size in bytes of the XSAVE area is affected by the states enabled in XSS.

Fixes: 20300099 ("kvm: vmx: add MSR logic for XSAVES")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NLike Xu <likexu@tencent.com>
[sean: split out as a separate patch, adjust Fixes tag]
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220126172226.2298529-3-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NYu Liao <liaoyu15@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NWei Li <liwei391@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-v5.10.96
commit 7a32d17fb73a607dcb0797cdd6edbccd76fa059a
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I55NWB

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=7a32d17fb73a607dcb0797cdd6edbccd76fa059a

--------------------------------

commit 96fd2e89 upstream.

The user recently report a perf issue in the ICX platform, when test by
perf event “uncore_imc_x/cas_count_write”,the write bandwidth is always
very small (only 0.38MB/s), it is caused by the wrong "umask" for the
"cas_count_write" event. When double-checking, find "cas_count_read"
also is wrong.

The public document for ICX uncore:

3rd Gen Intel® Xeon® Processor Scalable Family, Codename Ice Lake,Uncore
Performance Monitoring Reference Manual, Revision 1.00, May 2021

On 2.4.7, it defines Unit Masks for CAS_COUNT:
RD b00001111
WR b00110000

So corrected both "cas_count_read" and "cas_count_write" for ICX.

Old settings:
 hswep_uncore_imc_events
	INTEL_UNCORE_EVENT_DESC(cas_count_read,  "event=0x04,umask=0x03")
	INTEL_UNCORE_EVENT_DESC(cas_count_write, "event=0x04,umask=0x0c")

New settings:
 snr_uncore_imc_events
	INTEL_UNCORE_EVENT_DESC(cas_count_read,  "event=0x04,umask=0x0f")
	INTEL_UNCORE_EVENT_DESC(cas_count_write, "event=0x04,umask=0x30")

Fixes: 2b3b76b5 ("perf/x86/intel/uncore: Add Ice Lake server uncore support")
Signed-off-by: NZhengjun Xing <zhengjun.xing@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: NAdrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: NKan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211223144826.841267-1-zhengjun.xing@linux.intel.comSigned-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NYu Liao <liaoyu15@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NWei Li <liwei391@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-v5.10.96
commit a2c8e1d9e41b7d916257653d3bbe36418c4e7b88
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I55NWB

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=a2c8e1d9e41b7d916257653d3bbe36418c4e7b88

--------------------------------

commit 31c25585 upstream.

Revert a completely broken check on an "invalid" RIP in SVM's workaround
for the DecodeAssists SMAP errata.  kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_memslot() obviously
expects a gfn, i.e. operates in the guest physical address space, whereas
RIP is a virtual (not even linear) address.  The "fix" worked for the
problematic KVM selftest because the test identity mapped RIP.

Fully revert the hack instead of trying to translate RIP to a GPA, as the
non-SEV case is now handled earlier, and KVM cannot access guest page
tables to translate RIP.

This reverts commit e72436bc.

Fixes: e72436bc ("KVM: SVM: avoid infinite loop on NPF from bad address")
Reported-by: NLiam Merwick <liam.merwick@oracle.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: NLiam Merwick <liam.merwick@oracle.com>
Message-Id: <20220120010719.711476-3-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NYu Liao <liaoyu15@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NWei Li <liwei391@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-v5.10.95
commit a447d7f786ec925d1c23f6509255f43ffc2ddffe
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I55EDV

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=a447d7f786ec925d1c23f6509255f43ffc2ddffe

--------------------------------

commit 7c8a4742 upstream.

When the TDP MMU is write-protection GFNs for page table protection (as
opposed to for dirty logging, or due to the HVA not being writable), it
checks if the SPTE is already write-protected and if so skips modifying
the SPTE and the TLB flush.

This behavior is incorrect because it fails to check if the SPTE
is write-protected for page table protection, i.e. fails to check
that MMU-writable is '0'.  If the SPTE was write-protected for dirty
logging but not page table protection, the SPTE could locklessly be made
writable, and vCPUs could still be running with writable mappings cached
in their TLB.

Fix this by only skipping setting the SPTE if the SPTE is already
write-protected *and* MMU-writable is already clear.  Technically,
checking only MMU-writable would suffice; a SPTE cannot be writable
without MMU-writable being set.  But check both to be paranoid and
because it arguably yields more readable code.

Fixes: 46044f72 ("kvm: x86/mmu: Support write protection for nesting in tdp MMU")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NDavid Matlack <dmatlack@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220113233020.3986005-2-dmatlack@google.com>
Reviewed-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NYu Liao <liaoyu15@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NWei Li <liwei391@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

hulk inclusion
category: bugfix
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I531X9

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=cacc6c30e3eb7c452132ee5b273e248d2f263323

--------------------------------

This reverts commit 270507d8.
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>
Acked-by: NXie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>

virt inclusion
category: bugfix
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I53PTV?from=project-issue
CVE: NA

-----------------------------------------------------

Since the reset function is in kvm_intel module instead of kvm
module, the attribute weak function in kvm_main.c could not be found, which
would cause st_max in X86 never be refreshed.
The solution is to define the reset function in x86.c under the kvm module.
Signed-off-by: Nliangtian <liangtian13@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NKeqian Zhu <zhukeqian1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-v5.10.105
commit d04937ae94903087279e4a016b7741cdee59d521
category: bugfix
bugzilla: 186453 https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I50WBM
CVE: CVE-2022-0001

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=d04937ae9490

--------------------------------

commit 0de05d05 upstream.

The commit

   44a3918c ("x86/speculation: Include unprivileged eBPF status in Spectre v2 mitigation reporting")

added a warning for the "eIBRS + unprivileged eBPF" combination, which
has been shown to be vulnerable against Spectre v2 BHB-based attacks.

However, there's no warning about the "eIBRS + LFENCE retpoline +
unprivileged eBPF" combo. The LFENCE adds more protection by shortening
the speculation window after a mispredicted branch. That makes an attack
significantly more difficult, even with unprivileged eBPF. So at least
for now the logic doesn't warn about that combination.

But if you then add SMT into the mix, the SMT attack angle weakens the
effectiveness of the LFENCE considerably.

So extend the "eIBRS + unprivileged eBPF" warning to also include the
"eIBRS + LFENCE + unprivileged eBPF + SMT" case.

  [ bp: Massage commit message. ]
Suggested-by: NAlyssa Milburn <alyssa.milburn@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NChen Jiahao <chenjiahao16@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NLiao Chang <liaochang1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-v5.10.105
commit cc9e3e55bde71b2fac1494f503d5ffc560c7fb8d
category: bugfix
bugzilla: 186453 https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I50WBM
CVE: CVE-2022-0001

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=cc9e3e55bde7

--------------------------------

commit eafd987d upstream.

With:

  f8a66d60 ("x86,bugs: Unconditionally allow spectre_v2=retpoline,amd")

it became possible to enable the LFENCE "retpoline" on Intel. However,
Intel doesn't recommend it, as it has some weaknesses compared to
retpoline.

Now AMD doesn't recommend it either.

It can still be left available as a cmdline option. It's faster than
retpoline but is weaker in certain scenarios -- particularly SMT, but
even non-SMT may be vulnerable in some cases.

So just unconditionally warn if the user requests it on the cmdline.

  [ bp: Massage commit message. ]
Signed-off-by: NJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NChen Jiahao <chenjiahao16@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NLiao Chang <liaochang1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-v5.10.105
commit 2fdf67a1d215574c31b1a716f80fa0fdccd401d7
category: bugfix
bugzilla: 186453 https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I50WBM
CVE: CVE-2022-0001

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=2fdf67a1d215

--------------------------------

commit 244d00b5 upstream.

AMD retpoline may be susceptible to speculation. The speculation
execution window for an incorrect indirect branch prediction using
LFENCE/JMP sequence may potentially be large enough to allow
exploitation using Spectre V2.

By default, don't use retpoline,lfence on AMD.  Instead, use the
generic retpoline.
Signed-off-by: NKim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NChen Jiahao <chenjiahao16@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NLiao Chang <liaochang1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-v5.10.105
commit afc2d635b5e18e2b33116d8e121ee149882e33eb
category: bugfix
bugzilla: 186453 https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I50WBM
CVE: CVE-2022-0001

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=afc2d635b5e1

--------------------------------

commit 44a3918c upstream.

With unprivileged eBPF enabled, eIBRS (without retpoline) is vulnerable
to Spectre v2 BHB-based attacks.

When both are enabled, print a warning message and report it in the
'spectre_v2' sysfs vulnerabilities file.
Signed-off-by: NJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
[fllinden@amazon.com: backported to 5.10]
Signed-off-by: NFrank van der Linden <fllinden@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NChen Jiahao <chenjiahao16@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NLiao Chang <liaochang1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-v5.10.105
commit a6a119d647ad1f73067d3cffb43104df3f920bcc
category: bugfix
bugzilla: 186453 https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I50WBM
CVE: CVE-2022-0001

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=a6a119d647ad

--------------------------------

commit 1e19da85 upstream.

Thanks to the chaps at VUsec it is now clear that eIBRS is not
sufficient, therefore allow enabling of retpolines along with eIBRS.

Add spectre_v2=eibrs, spectre_v2=eibrs,lfence and
spectre_v2=eibrs,retpoline options to explicitly pick your preferred
means of mitigation.

Since there's new mitigations there's also user visible changes in
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v2 to reflect these
new mitigations.

  [ bp: Massage commit message, trim error messages,
    do more precise eIBRS mode checking. ]
Co-developed-by: NJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: NPatrick Colp <patrick.colp@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NChen Jiahao <chenjiahao16@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NLiao Chang <liaochang1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-v5.10.105
commit f38774bb6e231d647d40ceeb8ddf9082eabde667
category: bugfix
bugzilla: 186453 https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I50WBM
CVE: CVE-2022-0001

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=f38774bb6e23

--------------------------------

commit d45476d9 upstream.

The RETPOLINE_AMD name is unfortunate since it isn't necessarily
AMD only, in fact Hygon also uses it. Furthermore it will likely be
sufficient for some Intel processors. Therefore rename the thing to
RETPOLINE_LFENCE to better describe what it is.

Add the spectre_v2=retpoline,lfence option as an alias to
spectre_v2=retpoline,amd to preserve existing setups. However, the output
of /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v2 will be changed.

  [ bp: Fix typos, massage. ]
Co-developed-by: NJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
[fllinden@amazon.com: backported to 5.10]
Signed-off-by: NFrank van der Linden <fllinden@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NChen Jiahao <chenjiahao16@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NLiao Chang <liaochang1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-v5.10.105
commit 206cfe2dac3ed79bcd1c759f05400593a5f55488
category: bugfix
bugzilla: 186453 https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I50WBM
CVE: CVE-2022-0001

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=206cfe2dac3e

--------------------------------

commit f8a66d60 upstream.

Currently Linux prevents usage of retpoline,amd on !AMD hardware, this
is unfriendly and gets in the way of testing. Remove this restriction.
Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: NJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Tested-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211026120310.487348118@infradead.orgSigned-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NChen Jiahao <chenjiahao16@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NLiao Chang <liaochang1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-v5.10.94
commit d240b08d8ac4e85909f2d90e573688131e8f9284
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I531X9

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=d240b08d8ac4e85909f2d90e573688131e8f9284

--------------------------------

[ Upstream commit b6aa86cf ]

Most distro kernels have this option enabled, to improve debug output.

Lockdep also selects it.

Enable this in the defconfig kernel as well, to make it more
representative of what people are using on x86.
Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/YdTn7gssoMVDMgMw@gmail.comSigned-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

 Conflicts:
	arch/x86/configs/i386_defconfig
	arch/x86/configs/x86_64_defconfig
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NWei Li <liwei391@huawei.com>
Acked-by: NXie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-v5.10.94
commit 756a7188b277f10b807e6e7321ccf8b929cc6e4a
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I531X9

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=756a7188b277f10b807e6e7321ccf8b929cc6e4a

--------------------------------

[ Upstream commit 077b7320 ]

The function names init_registers() and restore_registers() are used
in several net/ethernet/ and gpu/drm/ drivers for other purposes (not
calls to UML functions), so rename them.

This fixes multiple build errors.
Signed-off-by: NRandy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Cc: Jeff Dike <jdike@addtoit.com>
Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Cc: Anton Ivanov <anton.ivanov@cambridgegreys.com>
Cc: linux-um@lists.infradead.org
Signed-off-by: NRichard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>
Acked-by: NXie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-v5.10.94
commit 8c72de32ff134f48115591b9ea2bb03c1bbd3804
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I531X9

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=8c72de32ff134f48115591b9ea2bb03c1bbd3804

--------------------------------

[ Upstream commit db6c996d ]

Fixes

  vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: do_machine_check()+0x681: call to mce_read_aux() leaves .noinstr.text section
Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211208111343.8130-10-bp@alien8.deSigned-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>
Acked-by: NXie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>