Add a new mount option 'nocopyfrom' that will prevent the usage of the
RADOS 'copy-from' operation in cephfs.  This could be useful, for example,
for an administrator to temporarily mitigate any possible bugs in the
'copy-from' implementation.

Currently, only copy_file_range uses this RADOS operation.  Setting this
mount option will result in this syscall reverting to the default VFS
implementation, i.e. to perform the copies locally instead of doing remote
object copies.
Signed-off-by: NLuis Henriques <lhenriques@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: N"Yan, Zheng" <zyan@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NIlya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>

This commit implements support for the copy_file_range syscall in cephfs.
It is implemented using the RADOS 'copy-from' operation, which allows to
do a remote object copy, without the need to download/upload data from/to
the OSDs.

Some manual copy may however be required if the source/destination file
offsets aren't object aligned or if the copy length is smaller than the
object size.
Signed-off-by: NLuis Henriques <lhenriques@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: N"Yan, Zheng" <zyan@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NIlya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>

ceph_try_get_caps currently calls try_get_cap_refs with the nonblock
parameter always set to 'true'.  This change adds a new parameter that
allows to set it's value.  This will be useful for a follow-up patch that
will need to get two sets of capabilities for two different inodes without
risking a deadlock.
Signed-off-by: NLuis Henriques <lhenriques@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: N"Yan, Zheng" <zyan@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NIlya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>

Currently message data items are allocated with ceph_msg_data_create()
in setup_request_data() inside send_request().  send_request() has never
been allowed to fail, so each allocation is followed by a BUG_ON:

  data = ceph_msg_data_create(...);
  BUG_ON(!data);

It's been this way since support for multiple message data items was
added in commit 6644ed7b ("libceph: make message data be a pointer")
in 3.10.

There is no reason to delay the allocation of message data items until
the last possible moment and we certainly don't need a linked list of
them as they are only ever appended to the end and never erased.  Make
ceph_msg_new2() take max_data_items and adapt the rest of the code.
Reported-by: NJerry Lee <leisurelysw24@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NIlya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>

The current requirement is that ceph_osdc_alloc_messages() should be
called after oid and oloc are known.  In preparation for preallocating
message data items, move ceph_osdc_alloc_messages() further down, so
that it is called when OSD op codes are known.
Signed-off-by: NIlya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>

Two OSD op slots are allocated, but only one is ever used.
Signed-off-by: NIlya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>

__cap_delay_requeue could be invoked through ceph_check_caps when there
exists caps that needs to be sent and are delayed by "i_hold_caps_min"
or "i_hold_caps_max". If __cap_delay_requeue sets timeout unconditionally,
there could be a chance that some "wanted" caps can not be release for a
long since their timeouts are reset every time they get delayed.

Fixes: http://tracker.ceph.com/issues/36369Signed-off-by: NXuehan Xu <xuxuehan@360.cn>
Reviewed-by: N"Yan, Zheng" <zyan@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NIlya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>

Because send_mds_reconnect() wants to send a message with a pagelist
and pass the ownership to the messenger, ceph_msg_data_add_pagelist()
consumes a ref which is then put in ceph_msg_data_destroy().  This
makes managing pagelists in the OSD client (where they are wrapped in
ceph_osd_data) unnecessarily hard because the handoff only happens in
ceph_osdc_start_request() instead of when the pagelist is passed to
ceph_osd_data_pagelist_init().  I counted several memory leaks on
various error paths.

Fix up ceph_msg_data_add_pagelist() and carry a pagelist ref in
ceph_osd_data.
Signed-off-by: NIlya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>

struct ceph_pagelist cannot be embedded into anything else because it
has its own refcount.  Merge allocation and initialization together.
Signed-off-by: NIlya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>

Current implementation of cephfs fallocate isn't correct as it doesn't
really reserve the space in the cluster, which means that a subsequent
call to a write may actually fail due to lack of space.  In fact, it is
currently possible to fallocate an amount space that is larger than the
free space in the cluster.  It has behaved this way since the initial
commit ad7a60de ("ceph: punch hole support").

Since there's no easy solution to fix this at the moment, this patch
simply removes support for all fallocate operations but
FALLOC_FL_PUNCH_HOLE (which implies FALLOC_FL_KEEP_SIZE).

Link: https://tracker.ceph.com/issues/36317Signed-off-by: NLuis Henriques <lhenriques@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: N"Yan, Zheng" <zyan@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NIlya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>

Avoid allocating memory for the entire user request: striped_read()
does a synchronous OSD request per object, so it doesn't need more than
object size worth of pages at a time.

[ Preserve the comment, changelog. ]
Signed-off-by: N"Yan, Zheng" <zyan@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NIlya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>

d_lookup()/d_alloc() require parent inode locked. Parent inode is
not locked if request is aborted.
Signed-off-by: N"Yan, Zheng" <zyan@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NIlya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>

Signed-off-by: N"Yan, Zheng" <zyan@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NIlya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>

This reverts commit 8b8f53af.

splice_dentry() is used by three places. For two places, req->r_dentry
is passed to splice_dentry(). In the case of error, req->r_dentry does
not get updated. So splice_dentry() should not drop reference.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.18+
Signed-off-by: N"Yan, Zheng" <zyan@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NIlya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>

Do the snap check first in ceph_set_acl(), so we can avoid
unnecessary operations when the inode has snap.
Signed-off-by: NChengguang Xu <cgxu519@gmx.com>
Reviewed-by: N"Yan, Zheng" <zyan@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NIlya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>

__cap_delay_requeue() only requeue inode which does not
have CEPH_I_FLUSH flag, so avoid reset cap hold timeout
for that inode.
Signed-off-by: NChengguang Xu <cgxu519@gmx.com>
Reviewed-by: N"Yan, Zheng" <zyan@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NIlya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>

fscache_set_key() can incur an out-of-bounds read, reported by KASAN:

 BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in fscache_alloc_cookie+0x5b3/0x680 [fscache]
 Read of size 4 at addr ffff88084ff056d4 by task mount.nfs/32615

and also reported by syzbot at https://lkml.org/lkml/2018/7/8/236

  BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in fscache_set_key fs/fscache/cookie.c:120 [inline]
  BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in fscache_alloc_cookie+0x7a9/0x880 fs/fscache/cookie.c:171
  Read of size 4 at addr ffff8801d3cc8bb4 by task syz-executor907/4466

This happens for any index_key_len which is not divisible by 4 and is
larger than the size of the inline key, because the code allocates exactly
index_key_len for the key buffer, but the hashing loop is stepping through
it 4 bytes (u32) at a time in the buf[] array.

Fix this by calculating how many u32 buffers we'll need by using
DIV_ROUND_UP, and then using kcalloc() to allocate a precleared allocation
buffer to hold the index_key, then using that same count as the hashing
index limit.

Fixes: ec0328e4 ("fscache: Maintain a catalogue of allocated cookies")
Reported-by: syzbot+a95b989b2dde8e806af8@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: NEric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

The inline key in struct rxrpc_cookie is insufficiently initialized,
zeroing only 3 of the 4 slots, therefore an index_key_len between 13 and 15
bytes will end up hashing uninitialized memory because the memcpy only
partially fills the last buf[] element.

Fix this by clearing fscache_cookie objects on allocation rather than using
the slab constructor to initialise them.  We're going to pretty much fill
in the entire struct anyway, so bringing it into our dcache writably
shouldn't incur much overhead.

This removes the need to do clearance in fscache_set_key() (where we aren't
doing it correctly anyway).

Also, we don't need to set cookie->key_len in fscache_set_key() as we
already did it in the only caller, so remove that.

Fixes: ec0328e4 ("fscache: Maintain a catalogue of allocated cookies")
Reported-by: syzbot+a95b989b2dde8e806af8@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: NEric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

the victim might've been rmdir'ed just before the lock_rename();
unlike the normal callers, we do not look the source up after the
parents are locked - we know it beforehand and just recheck that it's
still the child of what used to be its parent.  Unfortunately,
the check is too weak - we don't spot a dead directory since its
->d_parent is unchanged, dentry is positive, etc.  So we sail all
the way to ->rename(), with hosting filesystems _not_ expecting
to be asked renaming an rmdir'ed subdirectory.

The fix is easy, fortunately - the lock on parent is sufficient for
making IS_DEADDIR() on child safe.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 9ae326a6 (CacheFiles: A cache that backs onto a mounted filesystem)
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

The recent patch to fix the afs_server struct leak didn't actually fix the
bug, but rather fixed some of the symptoms.  The problem is that an
asynchronous call that holds a resource pointed to by call->reply[0] will
find the pointer cleared in the call destructor, thereby preventing the
resource from being cleaned up.

In the case of the server record leak, the afs_fs_get_capabilities()
function in devel code sets up a call with reply[0] pointing at the server
record that should be altered when the result is obtained, but this was
being cleared before the destructor was called, so the put in the
destructor does nothing and the record is leaked.

Commit f014ffb0 removed the additional ref obtained by
afs_install_server(), but the removal of this ref is actually used by the
garbage collector to mark a server record as being defunct after the record
has expired through lack of use.

The offending clearance of call->reply[0] upon completion in
afs_process_async_call() has been there from the origin of the code, but
none of the asynchronous calls actually use that pointer currently, so it
should be safe to remove (note that synchronous calls don't involve this
function).

Fix this by the following means:

 (1) Revert commit f014ffb0.

 (2) Remove the clearance of reply[0] from afs_process_async_call().

Without this, afs_manage_servers() will suffer an assertion failure if it
sees a server record that didn't get used because the usage count is not 1.

Fixes: f014ffb0 ("afs: Fix afs_server struct leak")
Fixes: 08e0e7c8 ("[AF_RXRPC]: Make the in-kernel AFS filesystem use AF_RXRPC.")
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

ubifs_assert() is not WARN_ON(), so we have to invert
the checks.
Randy faced this warning with UBIFS being a module, since
most users use UBIFS as builtin because UBIFS is the rootfs
nobody noticed so far. :-(
Including me.
Reported-by: NRandy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Fixes: 54169ddd ("ubifs: Turn two ubifs_assert() into a WARN_ON()")
Signed-off-by: NRichard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

On non-preempt kernels this loop can take a long time (more than 50 ticks)
processing through entries.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181010172623.57033-1-khazhy@google.comSigned-off-by: NKhazhismel Kumykov <khazhy@google.com>
Acked-by: NOGAWA Hirofumi <hirofumi@mail.parknet.co.jp>
Reviewed-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

Fix the following compile warning:

fs/ocfs2/dlmglue.c:99:30: warning: ‘lockdep_keys’ defined but not used [-Wunused-variable]
 static struct lock_class_key lockdep_keys[OCFS2_NUM_LOCK_TYPES];

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1536938148-32110-1-git-send-email-zhongjiang@huawei.comSigned-off-by: Nzhong jiang <zhongjiang@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

Fix a leak of afs_server structs.  The routine that installs them in the
various lookup lists and trees gets a ref on leaving the function, whether
it added the server or a server already exists.  It shouldn't increment
the refcount if it added the server.

The effect of this that "rmmod kafs" will hang waiting for the leaked
server to become unused.

Fixes: d2ddc776 ("afs: Overhaul volume and server record caching and fileserver rotation")
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

It turns out that the fix in commit 6636c3cc56 is bad; the assertion
that the iomap code no longer creates buffer heads is incorrect for
filesystems that set the IOMAP_F_BUFFER_HEAD flag.

Instead, what's happening is that gfs2_iomap_begin_write treats all
files that have the jdata flag set as journaled files, which is
incorrect as long as those files are inline ("stuffed").  We're handling
stuffed files directly via the page cache, which is why we ended up with
pages without buffer heads in gfs2_page_add_databufs.

Fix this by handling stuffed journaled files correctly in
gfs2_iomap_begin_write.

This reverts commit 6636c3cc5690c11631e6366cf9a28fb99c8b25bb.
Signed-off-by: NAndreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>

Access to the list of cells by /proc/net/afs/cells has a couple of
problems:

 (1) It should be checking against SEQ_START_TOKEN for the keying the
     header line.

 (2) It's only holding the RCU read lock, so it can't just walk over the
     list without following the proper RCU methods.

Fix these by using an hlist instead of an ordinary list and using the
appropriate accessor functions to follow it with RCU.

Since the code that adds a cell to the list must also necessarily change,
sort the list on insertion whilst we're at it.

Fixes: 989782dc ("afs: Overhaul cell database management")
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

Commit 64bc06bb broke buffered writes to journaled files (chattr
+j): we'll try to journal the buffer heads of the page being written to
in gfs2_iomap_journaled_page_done.  However, the iomap code no longer
creates buffer heads, so we'll BUG() in gfs2_page_add_databufs.  Fix
that by creating buffer heads ourself when needed.
Signed-off-by: NAndreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>

In the presence of multi-order entries the typical
pagevec_lookup_entries() pattern may loop forever:

	while (index < end && pagevec_lookup_entries(&pvec, mapping, index,
				min(end - index, (pgoff_t)PAGEVEC_SIZE),
				indices)) {
		...
		for (i = 0; i < pagevec_count(&pvec); i++) {
			index = indices[i];
			...
		}
		index++; /* BUG */
	}

The loop updates 'index' for each index found and then increments to the
next possible page to continue the lookup. However, if the last entry in
the pagevec is multi-order then the next possible page index is more
than 1 page away. Fix this locally for the filesystem-dax case by
checking for dax-multi-order entries. Going forward new users of
multi-order entries need to be similarly careful, or we need a generic
way to report the page increment in the radix iterator.

Fixes: 5fac7408 ("mm, fs, dax: handle layout changes to pinned dax...")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Ross Zwisler <zwisler@kernel.org>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: NJan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: NDan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>

When reflinking sub-file ranges, a data corruption can occur when
the source file range includes a partial EOF block. This shares the
unknown data beyond EOF into the second file at a position inside
EOF, exposing stale data in the second file.

XFS only supports whole block sharing, but we still need to
support whole file reflink correctly.  Hence if the reflink
request includes the last block of the souce file, only proceed with
the reflink operation if it lands at or past the destination file's
current EOF. If it lands within the destination file EOF, reject the
entire request with -EINVAL and make the caller go the hard way.

This avoids the data corruption vector, but also avoids disruption
of returning EINVAL to userspace for the common case of whole file
cloning.
Signed-off-by: NDave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NDarrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NDave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>

A deduplication data corruption is Exposed by fstests generic/505 on
XFS. It is caused by extending the block match range to include the
partial EOF block, but then allowing unknown data beyond EOF to be
considered a "match" to data in the destination file because the
comparison is only made to the end of the source file. This corrupts
the destination file when the source extent is shared with it.

XFS only supports whole block dedupe, but we still need to appear to
support whole file dedupe correctly.  Hence if the dedupe request
includes the last block of the souce file, don't include it in the
actual XFS dedupe operation. If the rest of the range dedupes
successfully, then report the partial last block as deduped, too, so
that userspace sees it as a successful dedupe rather than return
EINVAL because we can't dedupe unaligned blocks.
Signed-off-by: NDave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NDarrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NDave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>

In dlm_init_lockres() we access and modify res->tracking and
dlm->tracking_list without holding dlm->track_lock.  This can cause list
corruptions and can end up in kernel panic.

Fix this by locking res->tracking and dlm->tracking_list with
dlm->track_lock instead of dlm->spinlock.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1529951192-4686-1-git-send-email-ashish.samant@oracle.comSigned-off-by: NAshish Samant <ashish.samant@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: NChangwei Ge <ge.changwei@h3c.com>
Acked-by: NJoseph Qi <jiangqi903@gmail.com>
Acked-by: NJun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Changwei Ge <ge.changwei@h3c.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

Currently, you can use /proc/self/task/*/stack to cause a stack walk on
a task you control while it is running on another CPU.  That means that
the stack can change under the stack walker.  The stack walker does
have guards against going completely off the rails and into random
kernel memory, but it can interpret random data from your kernel stack
as instruction pointers and stack pointers.  This can cause exposure of
kernel stack contents to userspace.

Restrict the ability to inspect kernel stacks of arbitrary tasks to root
in order to prevent a local attacker from exploiting racy stack unwinding
to leak kernel task stack contents.  See the added comment for a longer
rationale.

There don't seem to be any users of this userspace API that can't
gracefully bail out if reading from the file fails.  Therefore, I believe
that this change is unlikely to break things.  In the case that this patch
does end up needing a revert, the next-best solution might be to fake a
single-entry stack based on wchan.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180927153316.200286-1-jannh@google.com
Fixes: 2ec220e2 ("proc: add /proc/*/stack")
Signed-off-by: NJann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Acked-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Ken Chen <kenchen@google.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

ocfs2_duplicate_clusters_by_page() may crash if one of the extent's pages
is dirty.  When a page has not been written back, it is still in dirty
state.  If ocfs2_duplicate_clusters_by_page() is called against the dirty
page, the crash happens.

To fix this bug, we can just unlock the page and wait until the page until
its not dirty.

The following is the backtrace:

kernel BUG at /root/code/ocfs2/refcounttree.c:2961!
[exception RIP: ocfs2_duplicate_clusters_by_page+822]
__ocfs2_move_extent+0x80/0x450 [ocfs2]
? __ocfs2_claim_clusters+0x130/0x250 [ocfs2]
ocfs2_defrag_extent+0x5b8/0x5e0 [ocfs2]
__ocfs2_move_extents_range+0x2a4/0x470 [ocfs2]
ocfs2_move_extents+0x180/0x3b0 [ocfs2]
? ocfs2_wait_for_recovery+0x13/0x70 [ocfs2]
ocfs2_ioctl_move_extents+0x133/0x2d0 [ocfs2]
ocfs2_ioctl+0x253/0x640 [ocfs2]
do_vfs_ioctl+0x90/0x5f0
SyS_ioctl+0x74/0x80
do_syscall_64+0x74/0x140
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x3d/0xa2

Once we find the page is dirty, we do not wait until it's clean, rather we
use write_one_page() to write it back

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180829074740.9438-1-lchen@suse.com
[lchen@suse.com: update comments]
  Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180830075041.14879-1-lchen@suse.com
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
Signed-off-by: NLarry Chen <lchen@suse.com>
Acked-by: NChangwei Ge <ge.changwei@h3c.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Joseph Qi <jiangqi903@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

Before cloning into a file, update the ctime and remove sensitive
attributes like suid, just like we'd do for a regular file write.
Signed-off-by: NDarrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: NDave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NDave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>

When we're reflinking between two files and the destination file range
is well beyond the destination file's EOF marker, zero any posteof
speculative preallocations in the destination file so that we don't
expose stale disk contents.  The previous strategy of trying to clear
the preallocations does not work if the destination file has the
PREALLOC flag set.

Uncovered by shared/010.
Reported-by: NZorro Lang <zlang@redhat.com>
Bugzilla-id: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=201259Signed-off-by: NDarrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: NDave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NDave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>

Refactor all the reflink preparation steps into a separate helper
that we'll use to land all the upcoming fixes for insufficient input
checks.

This rework also moves the invalidation of the destination range to
the prep function so that it is done before the range is remapped.
This ensures that nobody can access the data in range being remapped
until the remap is complete.

[dgc: fix xfs_reflink_remap_prep() return value and caller check to
handle vfs_clone_file_prep_inodes() returning 0 to mean "nothing to
do". ]

[dgc: make sure length changed by vfs_clone_file_prep_inodes() gets
propagated back to XFS code that does the remapping. ]
Signed-off-by: NDarrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: NDave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NDave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>

Format has a typo: it was meant to be "%.*s", not "%*s".  But at some point
callers grew nonprintable values as well, so use "%*pE" instead with a
maximized length.
Reported-by: NAmir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NMiklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Fixes: 3a1e819b ("ovl: store file handle of lower inode on copy up")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.12

KASAN detected slab-out-of-bounds access in printk from overlayfs,
because string format used %*s instead of %.*s.

> BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in string+0x298/0x2d0 lib/vsprintf.c:604
> Read of size 1 at addr ffff8801c36c66ba by task syz-executor2/27811
>
> CPU: 0 PID: 27811 Comm: syz-executor2 Not tainted 4.19.0-rc5+ #36
...
>  printk+0xa7/0xcf kernel/printk/printk.c:1996
>  ovl_lookup_index.cold.15+0xe8/0x1f8 fs/overlayfs/namei.c:689

Reported-by: syzbot+376cea2b0ef340db3dd4@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: NAmir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NMiklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Fixes: 359f392c ("ovl: lookup index entry for copy up origin")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.13

Fixes problem (discovered by Aurelien) introduced by recent commit:
commit b24df3e3
("cifs: update receive_encrypted_standard to handle compounded responses")

which broke the ability to respond to some lease breaks
(lease breaks being ignored is a problem since can block
server response for duration of the lease break timeout).
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: NRonnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NPavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>

For compounded PDUs we whould only wake the waiting thread for the
very last PDU of the compound.
We do this so that we are guaranteed that the demultiplex_thread will
not process or access any of those MIDs any more once the send/recv
thread starts processing.

Else there is a race where at the end of the send/recv processing we
will try to delete all the mids of the compound. If the multiplex
thread still has other mids to process at this point for this compound
this can lead to an oops.

Needed to fix recent commit:
commit 730928c8
("cifs: update smb2_queryfs() to use compounding")
Signed-off-by: NRonnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: NPavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>