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  1. 15 2月, 2013 2 次提交
  3. 14 2月, 2013 1 次提交
    • J
      x86/xen: don't assume %ds is usable in xen_iret for 32-bit PVOPS. · 13d2b4d1
      由 Jan Beulich 提交于 
      This fixes CVE-2013-0228 / XSA-42

Drew Jones while working on CVE-2013-0190 found that that unprivileged guest user
in 32bit PV guest can use to crash the > guest with the panic like this:

-------------
general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP
last sysfs file: /sys/devices/vbd-51712/block/xvda/dev
Modules linked in: sunrpc ipt_REJECT nf_conntrack_ipv4 nf_defrag_ipv4
iptable_filter ip_tables ip6t_REJECT nf_conntrack_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv6
xt_state nf_conntrack ip6table_filter ip6_tables ipv6 xen_netfront ext4
mbcache jbd2 xen_blkfront dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod [last
unloaded: scsi_wait_scan]

Pid: 1250, comm: r Not tainted 2.6.32-356.el6.i686 #1
EIP: 0061:[<c0407462>] EFLAGS: 00010086 CPU: 0
EIP is at xen_iret+0x12/0x2b
EAX: eb8d0000 EBX: 00000001 ECX: 08049860 EDX: 00000010
ESI: 00000000 EDI: 003d0f00 EBP: b77f8388 ESP: eb8d1fe0
 DS: 0000 ES: 007b FS: 0000 GS: 00e0 SS: 0069
Process r (pid: 1250, ti=eb8d0000 task=c2953550 task.ti=eb8d0000)
Stack:
 00000000 0027f416 00000073 00000206 b77f8364 0000007b 00000000 00000000
Call Trace:
Code: c3 8b 44 24 18 81 4c 24 38 00 02 00 00 8d 64 24 30 e9 03 00 00 00
8d 76 00 f7 44 24 08 00 00 02 80 75 33 50 b8 00 e0 ff ff 21 e0 <8b> 40
10 8b 04 85 a0 f6 ab c0 8b 80 0c b0 b3 c0 f6 44 24 0d 02
EIP: [<c0407462>] xen_iret+0x12/0x2b SS:ESP 0069:eb8d1fe0
general protection fault: 0000 [#2]
---[ end trace ab0d29a492dcd330 ]---
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
Pid: 1250, comm: r Tainted: G      D    ---------------
2.6.32-356.el6.i686 #1
Call Trace:
 [<c08476df>] ? panic+0x6e/0x122
 [<c084b63c>] ? oops_end+0xbc/0xd0
 [<c084b260>] ? do_general_protection+0x0/0x210
 [<c084a9b7>] ? error_code+0x73/
-------------

Petr says: "
 I've analysed the bug and I think that xen_iret() cannot cope with
 mangled DS, in this case zeroed out (null selector/descriptor) by either
 xen_failsafe_callback() or RESTORE_REGS because the corresponding LDT
 entry was invalidated by the reproducer. "

Jan took a look at the preliminary patch and came up a fix that solves
this problem:

"This code gets called after all registers other than those handled by
IRET got already restored, hence a null selector in %ds or a non-null
one that got loaded from a code or read-only data descriptor would
cause a kernel mode fault (with the potential of crashing the kernel
as a whole, if panic_on_oops is set)."

The way to fix this is to realize that the we can only relay on the
registers that IRET restores. The two that are guaranteed are the
%cs and %ss as they are always fixed GDT selectors. Also they are
inaccessible from user mode - so they cannot be altered. This is
the approach taken in this patch.

Another alternative option suggested by Jan would be to relay on
the subtle realization that using the %ebp or %esp relative references uses
the %ss segment.  In which case we could switch from using %eax to %ebp and
would not need the %ss over-rides. That would also require one extra
instruction to compensate for the one place where the register is used
as scaled index. However Andrew pointed out that is too subtle and if
further work was to be done in this code-path it could escape folks attention
and lead to accidents.
Reviewed-by: NPetr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Reported-by: NPetr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NAndrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: NJan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NKonrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
      13d2b4d1
  5. 17 1月, 2013 1 次提交
    • A
      xen: Fix stack corruption in xen_failsafe_callback for 32bit PVOPS guests. · 9174adbe
      由 Andrew Cooper 提交于 
      This fixes CVE-2013-0190 / XSA-40

There has been an error on the xen_failsafe_callback path for failed
iret, which causes the stack pointer to be wrong when entering the
iret_exc error path.  This can result in the kernel crashing.

In the classic kernel case, the relevant code looked a little like:

        popl %eax      # Error code from hypervisor
        jz 5f
        addl $16,%esp
        jmp iret_exc   # Hypervisor said iret fault
5:      addl $16,%esp
                       # Hypervisor said segment selector fault

Here, there are two identical addls on either option of a branch which
appears to have been optimised by hoisting it above the jz, and
converting it to an lea, which leaves the flags register unaffected.

In the PVOPS case, the code looks like:

        popl_cfi %eax         # Error from the hypervisor
        lea 16(%esp),%esp     # Add $16 before choosing fault path
        CFI_ADJUST_CFA_OFFSET -16
        jz 5f
        addl $16,%esp         # Incorrectly adjust %esp again
        jmp iret_exc

It is possible unprivileged userspace applications to cause this
behaviour, for example by loading an LDT code selector, then changing
the code selector to be not-present.  At this point, there is a race
condition where it is possible for the hypervisor to return back to
userspace from an interrupt, fault on its own iret, and inject a
failsafe_callback into the kernel.

This bug has been present since the introduction of Xen PVOPS support
in commit 5ead97c8 (xen: Core Xen implementation), in 2.6.23.
Signed-off-by: NFrediano Ziglio <frediano.ziglio@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NKonrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
      9174adbe
  7. 16 1月, 2013 1 次提交
  9. 18 12月, 2012 2 次提交
  11. 01 12月, 2012 2 次提交
  13. 29 11月, 2012 5 次提交
  15. 28 11月, 2012 1 次提交
    • H
      x86-32: Unbreak booting on some 486 clones · 6662c34f
      由 H. Peter Anvin 提交于 
      There appear to have been some 486 clones, including the "enhanced"
version of Am486, which have CPUID but not CR4.  These 486 clones had
only the FPU flag, if any, unlike the Intel 486s with CPUID, which
also had VME and therefore needed CR4.

Therefore, look at the basic CPUID flags and require at least one bit
other than bit 0 before we modify CR4.

Thanks to Christian Ludloff of sandpile.org for confirming this as a
problem.
Signed-off-by: NH. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
      6662c34f
  17. 27 11月, 2012 2 次提交
  19. 21 11月, 2012 6 次提交
  21. 17 11月, 2012 1 次提交
    • T
      KVM: x86: Fix invalid secondary exec controls in vmx_cpuid_update() · 29282fde
      由 Takashi Iwai 提交于 
      The commit [ad756a16: KVM: VMX: Implement PCID/INVPCID for guests with
EPT] introduced the unconditional access to SECONDARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL,
and this triggers kernel warnings like below on old CPUs:

    vmwrite error: reg 401e value a0568000 (err 12)
    Pid: 13649, comm: qemu-kvm Not tainted 3.7.0-rc4-test2+ #154
    Call Trace:
     [<ffffffffa0558d86>] vmwrite_error+0x27/0x29 [kvm_intel]
     [<ffffffffa054e8cb>] vmcs_writel+0x1b/0x20 [kvm_intel]
     [<ffffffffa054f114>] vmx_cpuid_update+0x74/0x170 [kvm_intel]
     [<ffffffffa03629b6>] kvm_vcpu_ioctl_set_cpuid2+0x76/0x90 [kvm]
     [<ffffffffa0341c67>] kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl+0xc37/0xed0 [kvm]
     [<ffffffff81143f7c>] ? __vunmap+0x9c/0x110
     [<ffffffffa0551489>] ? vmx_vcpu_load+0x39/0x1a0 [kvm_intel]
     [<ffffffffa0340ee2>] ? kvm_arch_vcpu_load+0x52/0x1a0 [kvm]
     [<ffffffffa032dcd4>] ? vcpu_load+0x74/0xd0 [kvm]
     [<ffffffffa032deb0>] kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x110/0x5e0 [kvm]
     [<ffffffffa032e93d>] ? kvm_dev_ioctl+0x4d/0x4a0 [kvm]
     [<ffffffff8117dc6f>] do_vfs_ioctl+0x8f/0x530
     [<ffffffff81139d76>] ? remove_vma+0x56/0x60
     [<ffffffff8113b708>] ? do_munmap+0x328/0x400
     [<ffffffff81187c8c>] ? fget_light+0x4c/0x100
     [<ffffffff8117e1a1>] sys_ioctl+0x91/0xb0
     [<ffffffff815a942d>] system_call_fastpath+0x1a/0x1f

This patch adds a check for the availability of secondary exec
control to avoid these warnings.

Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [v3.6+]
Signed-off-by: NTakashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: NMarcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
      29282fde
  23. 15 11月, 2012 1 次提交
  25. 13 11月, 2012 1 次提交
    • P
      KVM: x86: invalid opcode oops on SET_SREGS with OSXSAVE bit set (CVE-2012-4461) · 6d1068b3
      由 Petr Matousek 提交于 
      On hosts without the XSAVE support unprivileged local user can trigger
oops similar to the one below by setting X86_CR4_OSXSAVE bit in guest
cr4 register using KVM_SET_SREGS ioctl and later issuing KVM_RUN
ioctl.

invalid opcode: 0000 [#2] SMP
Modules linked in: tun ip6table_filter ip6_tables ebtable_nat ebtables
...
Pid: 24935, comm: zoog_kvm_monito Tainted: G      D      3.2.0-3-686-pae
EIP: 0060:[<f8b9550c>] EFLAGS: 00210246 CPU: 0
EIP is at kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x92a/0xd13 [kvm]
EAX: 00000001 EBX: 000f387e ECX: 00000000 EDX: 00000000
ESI: 00000000 EDI: 00000000 EBP: ef5a0060 ESP: d7c63e70
 DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 00e0 SS: 0068
Process zoog_kvm_monito (pid: 24935, ti=d7c62000 task=ed84a0c0
task.ti=d7c62000)
Stack:
 00000001 f70a1200 f8b940a9 ef5a0060 00000000 00200202 f8769009 00000000
 ef5a0060 000f387e eda5c020 8722f9c8 00015bae 00000000 ed84a0c0 ed84a0c0
 c12bf02d 0000ae80 ef7f8740 fffffffb f359b740 ef5a0060 f8b85dc1 0000ae80
Call Trace:
 [<f8b940a9>] ? kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_set_sregs+0x2fe/0x308 [kvm]
...
 [<c12bfb44>] ? syscall_call+0x7/0xb
Code: 89 e8 e8 14 ee ff ff ba 00 00 04 00 89 e8 e8 98 48 ff ff 85 c0 74
1e 83 7d 48 00 75 18 8b 85 08 07 00 00 31 c9 8b 95 0c 07 00 00 <0f> 01
d1 c7 45 48 01 00 00 00 c7 45 1c 01 00 00 00 0f ae f0 89
EIP: [<f8b9550c>] kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x92a/0xd13 [kvm] SS:ESP
0068:d7c63e70

QEMU first retrieves the supported features via KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID
and then sets them later. So guest's X86_FEATURE_XSAVE should be masked
out on hosts without X86_FEATURE_XSAVE, making kvm_set_cr4 with
X86_CR4_OSXSAVE fail. Userspaces that allow specifying guest cpuid with
X86_FEATURE_XSAVE even on hosts that do not support it, might be
susceptible to this attack from inside the guest as well.

Allow setting X86_CR4_OSXSAVE bit only if host has XSAVE support.
Signed-off-by: NPetr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NMarcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
      6d1068b3
  27. 08 11月, 2012 1 次提交
  29. 04 11月, 2012 1 次提交
    • J
      xen/hypercall: fix hypercall fallback code for very old hypervisors · cf47a83f
      由 Jan Beulich 提交于 
      While copying the argument structures in HYPERVISOR_event_channel_op()
and HYPERVISOR_physdev_op() into the local variable is sufficiently
safe even if the actual structure is smaller than the container one,
copying back eventual output values the same way isn't: This may
collide with on-stack variables (particularly "rc") which may change
between the first and second memcpy() (i.e. the second memcpy() could
discard that change).

Move the fallback code into out-of-line functions, and handle all of
the operations known by this old a hypervisor individually: Some don't
require copying back anything at all, and for the rest use the
individual argument structures' sizes rather than the container's.
Reported-by: NDan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NJan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
[v2: Reduce #define/#undef usage in HYPERVISOR_physdev_op_compat().]
[v3: Fix compile errors when modules use said hypercalls]
[v4: Add xen_ prefix to the HYPERCALL_..]
[v5: Alter the name and only EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL one of them]
Signed-off-by: NKonrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
      cf47a83f
  31. 02 11月, 2012 1 次提交
    • O
      xen PVonHVM: use E820_Reserved area for shared_info · 9d02b43d
      由 Olaf Hering 提交于 
      This is a respin of 00e37bdb
("xen PVonHVM: move shared_info to MMIO before kexec").

Currently kexec in a PVonHVM guest fails with a triple fault because the
new kernel overwrites the shared info page. The exact failure depends on
the size of the kernel image. This patch moves the pfn from RAM into an
E820 reserved memory area.

The pfn containing the shared_info is located somewhere in RAM. This will
cause trouble if the current kernel is doing a kexec boot into a new
kernel. The new kernel (and its startup code) can not know where the pfn
is, so it can not reserve the page. The hypervisor will continue to update
the pfn, and as a result memory corruption occours in the new kernel.

The toolstack marks the memory area FC000000-FFFFFFFF as reserved in the
E820 map. Within that range newer toolstacks (4.3+) will keep 1MB
starting from FE700000 as reserved for guest use. Older Xen4 toolstacks
will usually not allocate areas up to FE700000, so FE700000 is expected
to work also with older toolstacks.

In Xen3 there is no reserved area at a fixed location. If the guest is
started on such old hosts the shared_info page will be placed in RAM. As
a result kexec can not be used.
Signed-off-by: NOlaf Hering <olaf@aepfle.de>
Signed-off-by: NKonrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
      9d02b43d
  33. 01 11月, 2012 3 次提交
    • X
      KVM: x86: fix vcpu->mmio_fragments overflow · 87da7e66
      由 Xiao Guangrong 提交于 
      After commit b3356bf0 (KVM: emulator: optimize "rep ins" handling),
the pieces of io data can be collected and write them to the guest memory
or MMIO together

Unfortunately, kvm splits the mmio access into 8 bytes and store them to
vcpu->mmio_fragments. If the guest uses "rep ins" to move large data, it
will cause vcpu->mmio_fragments overflow

The bug can be exposed by isapc (-M isapc):

[23154.818733] general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
[ ......]
[23154.858083] Call Trace:
[23154.859874]  [<ffffffffa04f0e17>] kvm_get_cr8+0x1d/0x28 [kvm]
[23154.861677]  [<ffffffffa04fa6d4>] kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0xcda/0xe45 [kvm]
[23154.863604]  [<ffffffffa04f5a1a>] ? kvm_arch_vcpu_load+0x17b/0x180 [kvm]

Actually, we can use one mmio_fragment to store a large mmio access then
split it when we pass the mmio-exit-info to userspace. After that, we only
need two entries to store mmio info for the cross-mmio pages access
Signed-off-by: NXiao Guangrong <xiaoguangrong@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NMarcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
      87da7e66
    • A
      x86, amd: Disable way access filter on Piledriver CPUs · 2bbf0a14
      由 Andre Przywara 提交于 
      The Way Access Filter in recent AMD CPUs may hurt the performance of
some workloads, caused by aliasing issues in the L1 cache.
This patch disables it on the affected CPUs.

The issue is similar to that one of last year:
http://lkml.indiana.edu/hypermail/linux/kernel/1107.3/00041.html
This new patch does not replace the old one, we just need another
quirk for newer CPUs.

The performance penalty without the patch depends on the
circumstances, but is a bit less than the last year's 3%.

The workloads affected would be those that access code from the same
physical page under different virtual addresses, so different
processes using the same libraries with ASLR or multiple instances of
PIE-binaries. The code needs to be accessed simultaneously from both
cores of the same compute unit.

More details can be found here:
http://developer.amd.com/Assets/SharedL1InstructionCacheonAMD15hCPU.pdf

CPUs affected are anything with the core known as Piledriver.
That includes the new parts of the AMD A-Series (aka Trinity) and the
just released new CPUs of the FX-Series (aka Vishera).
The model numbering is a bit odd here: FX CPUs have model 2,
A-Series has model 10h, with possible extensions to 1Fh. Hence the
range of model ids.
Signed-off-by: NAndre Przywara <osp@andrep.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1351700450-9277-1-git-send-email-osp@andrep.deSigned-off-by: NH. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
      2bbf0a14
    • K
      xen/mmu: Use Xen specific TLB flush instead of the generic one. · 95a7d768
      由 Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk 提交于 
      As Mukesh explained it, the MMUEXT_TLB_FLUSH_ALL allows the
hypervisor to do a TLB flush on all active vCPUs. If instead
we were using the generic one (which ends up being xen_flush_tlb)
we end up making the MMUEXT_TLB_FLUSH_LOCAL hypercall. But
before we make that hypercall the kernel will IPI all of the
vCPUs (even those that were asleep from the hypervisor
perspective). The end result is that we needlessly wake them
up and do a TLB flush when we can just let the hypervisor
do it correctly.

This patch gives around 50% speed improvement when migrating
idle guest's from one host to another.

Oracle-bug: 14630170

CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Tested-by: NJingjie Jiang <jingjie.jiang@oracle.com>
Suggested-by: NMukesh Rathor <mukesh.rathor@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NKonrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
      95a7d768
  35. 31 10月, 2012 1 次提交
    • T
      x86/mce: Do not change worker's running cpu in cmci_rediscover(). · 85b97637
      由 Tang Chen 提交于 
      cmci_rediscover() used set_cpus_allowed_ptr() to change the current process's
running cpu, and migrate itself to the dest cpu. But worker processes are not
allowed to be migrated. If current is a worker, the worker will be migrated to
another cpu, but the corresponding  worker_pool is still on the original cpu.

In this case, the following BUG_ON in try_to_wake_up_local() will be triggered:
BUG_ON(rq != this_rq());

This will cause the kernel panic. The call trace is like the following:

[ 6155.451107] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 6155.452019] kernel BUG at kernel/sched/core.c:1654!
......
[ 6155.452019] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff810add15>]  [<ffffffff810add15>] try_to_wake_up_local+0x115/0x130
......
[ 6155.452019] Call Trace:
[ 6155.452019]  [<ffffffff8166fc14>] __schedule+0x764/0x880
[ 6155.452019]  [<ffffffff81670059>] schedule+0x29/0x70
[ 6155.452019]  [<ffffffff8166de65>] schedule_timeout+0x235/0x2d0
[ 6155.452019]  [<ffffffff810db57d>] ? mark_held_locks+0x8d/0x140
[ 6155.452019]  [<ffffffff810dd463>] ? __lock_release+0x133/0x1a0
[ 6155.452019]  [<ffffffff81671c50>] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x30/0x50
[ 6155.452019]  [<ffffffff810db8f5>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x105/0x190
[ 6155.452019]  [<ffffffff8166fefb>] wait_for_common+0x12b/0x180
[ 6155.452019]  [<ffffffff810b0b30>] ? try_to_wake_up+0x2f0/0x2f0
[ 6155.452019]  [<ffffffff8167002d>] wait_for_completion+0x1d/0x20
[ 6155.452019]  [<ffffffff8110008a>] stop_one_cpu+0x8a/0xc0
[ 6155.452019]  [<ffffffff810abd40>] ? __migrate_task+0x1a0/0x1a0
[ 6155.452019]  [<ffffffff810a6ab8>] ? complete+0x28/0x60
[ 6155.452019]  [<ffffffff810b0fd8>] set_cpus_allowed_ptr+0x128/0x130
[ 6155.452019]  [<ffffffff81036785>] cmci_rediscover+0xf5/0x140
[ 6155.452019]  [<ffffffff816643c0>] mce_cpu_callback+0x18d/0x19d
[ 6155.452019]  [<ffffffff81676187>] notifier_call_chain+0x67/0x150
[ 6155.452019]  [<ffffffff810a03de>] __raw_notifier_call_chain+0xe/0x10
[ 6155.452019]  [<ffffffff81070470>] __cpu_notify+0x20/0x40
[ 6155.452019]  [<ffffffff810704a5>] cpu_notify_nofail+0x15/0x30
[ 6155.452019]  [<ffffffff81655182>] _cpu_down+0x262/0x2e0
[ 6155.452019]  [<ffffffff81655236>] cpu_down+0x36/0x50
[ 6155.452019]  [<ffffffff813d3eaa>] acpi_processor_remove+0x50/0x11e
[ 6155.452019]  [<ffffffff813a6978>] acpi_device_remove+0x90/0xb2
[ 6155.452019]  [<ffffffff8143cbec>] __device_release_driver+0x7c/0xf0
[ 6155.452019]  [<ffffffff8143cd6f>] device_release_driver+0x2f/0x50
[ 6155.452019]  [<ffffffff813a7870>] acpi_bus_remove+0x32/0x6d
[ 6155.452019]  [<ffffffff813a7932>] acpi_bus_trim+0x87/0xee
[ 6155.452019]  [<ffffffff813a7a21>] acpi_bus_hot_remove_device+0x88/0x16b
[ 6155.452019]  [<ffffffff813a33ee>] acpi_os_execute_deferred+0x27/0x34
[ 6155.452019]  [<ffffffff81090589>] process_one_work+0x219/0x680
[ 6155.452019]  [<ffffffff81090528>] ? process_one_work+0x1b8/0x680
[ 6155.452019]  [<ffffffff813a33c7>] ? acpi_os_wait_events_complete+0x23/0x23
[ 6155.452019]  [<ffffffff810923be>] worker_thread+0x12e/0x320
[ 6155.452019]  [<ffffffff81092290>] ? manage_workers+0x110/0x110
[ 6155.452019]  [<ffffffff81098396>] kthread+0xc6/0xd0
[ 6155.452019]  [<ffffffff8167c4c4>] kernel_thread_helper+0x4/0x10
[ 6155.452019]  [<ffffffff81671f30>] ? retint_restore_args+0x13/0x13
[ 6155.452019]  [<ffffffff810982d0>] ? __init_kthread_worker+0x70/0x70
[ 6155.452019]  [<ffffffff8167c4c0>] ? gs_change+0x13/0x13

This patch removes the set_cpus_allowed_ptr() call, and put the cmci rediscover
jobs onto all the other cpus using system_wq. This could bring some delay for
the jobs.
Signed-off-by: NTang Chen <tangchen@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: NMiao Xie <miaox@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: NTony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
      85b97637
  37. 30 10月, 2012 6 次提交
  39. 28 10月, 2012 1 次提交