- 23 12月, 2020 22 次提交
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由 Andrey Konovalov 提交于
The reason cache merging is disabled with KASAN is because KASAN puts its metadata right after the allocated object. When the merged caches have slightly different sizes, the metadata ends up in different places, which KASAN doesn't support. It might be possible to adjust the metadata allocation algorithm and make it friendly to the cache merging code. Instead this change takes a simpler approach and allows merging caches when no metadata is present. Which is the case for hardware tag-based KASAN with kasan.mode=prod. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/37497e940bfd4b32c0a93a702a9ae4cf061d5392.1606162397.git.andreyknvl@google.com Link: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/id/Ia114847dfb2244f297d2cb82d592bf6a07455dbaCo-developed-by: NVincenzo Frascino <Vincenzo.Frascino@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NVincenzo Frascino <Vincenzo.Frascino@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NAndrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Reviewed-by: NDmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: NMarco Elver <elver@google.com> Tested-by: NVincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com> Cc: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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由 Andrey Konovalov 提交于
KASAN marks caches that are sanitized with the SLAB_KASAN cache flag. Currently if the metadata that is appended after the object (stores e.g. stack trace ids) doesn't fit into KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE (can only happen with SLAB, see the comment in the patch), KASAN turns off sanitization completely. With this change sanitization of the object data is always enabled. However the metadata is only stored when it fits. Instead of checking for SLAB_KASAN flag accross the code to find out whether the metadata is there, use cache->kasan_info.alloc/free_meta_offset. As 0 can be a valid value for free_meta_offset, introduce KASAN_NO_FREE_META as an indicator that the free metadata is missing. Without this change all sanitized KASAN objects would be put into quarantine with generic KASAN. With this change, only the objects that have metadata (i.e. when it fits) are put into quarantine, the rest is freed right away. Along the way rework __kasan_cache_create() and add claryfying comments. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/aee34b87a5e4afe586c2ac6a0b32db8dc4dcc2dc.1606162397.git.andreyknvl@google.com Link: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/id/Icd947e2bea054cb5cfbdc6cf6652227d97032dcbCo-developed-by: NVincenzo Frascino <Vincenzo.Frascino@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NVincenzo Frascino <Vincenzo.Frascino@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NAndrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Reviewed-by: NMarco Elver <elver@google.com> Tested-by: NVincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com> Cc: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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由 Andrey Konovalov 提交于
Currently it says that the memory gets poisoned by page_alloc code. Clarify this by mentioning the specific callback that poisons the memory. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1c8380fe0332a3bcc720fe29f1e0bef2e2974416.1606162397.git.andreyknvl@google.com Link: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/id/I1334dffb69b87d7986fab88a1a039cc3ea764725Signed-off-by: NAndrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Reviewed-by: NDmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: NMarco Elver <elver@google.com> Tested-by: NVincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com> Cc: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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由 Andrey Konovalov 提交于
set_tag() already ignores the tag for the generic mode, so just call it as is. Add a check for the generic mode to assign_tag(), and simplify its call in ____kasan_kmalloc(). Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/121eeab245f98555862b289d2ba9269c868fbbcf.1606162397.git.andreyknvl@google.com Link: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/id/I18905ca78fb4a3d60e1a34a4ca00247272480438Signed-off-by: NAndrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Reviewed-by: NDmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: NMarco Elver <elver@google.com> Tested-by: NVincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com> Cc: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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由 Andrey Konovalov 提交于
For hardware tag-based mode kasan_poison_memory() already rounds up the size. Do the same for software modes and remove round_up() from the common code. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/47b232474f1f89dc072aeda0fa58daa6efade377.1606162397.git.andreyknvl@google.com Link: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/id/Ib397128fac6eba874008662b4964d65352db4aa4Signed-off-by: NAndrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Reviewed-by: NDmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: NMarco Elver <elver@google.com> Tested-by: NVincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com> Cc: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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由 Andrey Konovalov 提交于
Rename kasan_poison_kfree() to kasan_slab_free_mempool() as it better reflects what this annotation does. Also add a comment that explains the PageSlab() check. No functional changes. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/141675fb493555e984c5dca555e9d9f768c7bbaa.1606162397.git.andreyknvl@google.com Link: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/id/I5026f87364e556b506ef1baee725144bb04b8810Signed-off-by: NAndrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Reviewed-by: NMarco Elver <elver@google.com> Tested-by: NVincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com> Cc: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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由 Andrey Konovalov 提交于
Declare the kasan_enabled static key in include/linux/kasan.h and in include/linux/mm.h and check it in all kasan annotations. This allows to avoid any slowdown caused by function calls when kasan_enabled is disabled. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/9f90e3c0aa840dbb4833367c2335193299f69023.1606162397.git.andreyknvl@google.com Link: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/id/I2589451d3c96c97abbcbf714baabe6161c6f153eCo-developed-by: NVincenzo Frascino <Vincenzo.Frascino@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NVincenzo Frascino <Vincenzo.Frascino@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NAndrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Reviewed-by: NMarco Elver <elver@google.com> Reviewed-by: NDmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Tested-by: NVincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com> Cc: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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由 Andrey Konovalov 提交于
Hardware tag-based KASAN mode is intended to eventually be used in production as a security mitigation. Therefore there's a need for finer control over KASAN features and for an existence of a kill switch. This change adds a few boot parameters for hardware tag-based KASAN that allow to disable or otherwise control particular KASAN features. The features that can be controlled are: 1. Whether KASAN is enabled at all. 2. Whether KASAN collects and saves alloc/free stacks. 3. Whether KASAN panics on a detected bug or not. With this change a new boot parameter kasan.mode allows to choose one of three main modes: - kasan.mode=off - KASAN is disabled, no tag checks are performed - kasan.mode=prod - only essential production features are enabled - kasan.mode=full - all KASAN features are enabled The chosen mode provides default control values for the features mentioned above. However it's also possible to override the default values by providing: - kasan.stacktrace=off/on - enable alloc/free stack collection (default: on for mode=full, otherwise off) - kasan.fault=report/panic - only report tag fault or also panic (default: report) If kasan.mode parameter is not provided, it defaults to full when CONFIG_DEBUG_KERNEL is enabled, and to prod otherwise. It is essential that switching between these modes doesn't require rebuilding the kernel with different configs, as this is required by the Android GKI (Generic Kernel Image) initiative [1]. [1] https://source.android.com/devices/architecture/kernel/generic-kernel-image [andreyknvl@google.com: don't use read-only static keys] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/f2ded589eba1597f7360a972226083de9afd86e2.1607537948.git.andreyknvl@google.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/cb093613879d8d8841173f090133eddeb4c35f1f.1606162397.git.andreyknvl@google.com Link: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/id/If7d37003875b2ed3e0935702c8015c223d6416a4Signed-off-by: NAndrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Reviewed-by: NMarco Elver <elver@google.com> Reviewed-by: NDmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Tested-by: NVincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com> Cc: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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由 Andrey Konovalov 提交于
Using kasan_reset_tag() currently results in a function call. As it's called quite often from the allocator code, this leads to a noticeable slowdown. Move it to include/linux/kasan.h and turn it into a static inline function. Also remove the now unneeded reset_tag() internal KASAN macro and use kasan_reset_tag() instead. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/6940383a3a9dfb416134d338d8fac97a9ebb8686.1606162397.git.andreyknvl@google.com Link: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/id/I4d2061acfe91d480a75df00b07c22d8494ef14b5Signed-off-by: NAndrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Reviewed-by: NMarco Elver <elver@google.com> Reviewed-by: NDmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Tested-by: NVincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com> Cc: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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由 Andrey Konovalov 提交于
There's no need for __kasan_unpoison_stack() helper, as it's only currently used in a single place. Removing it also removes unneeded arithmetic. No functional changes. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/93e78948704a42ea92f6248ff8a725613d721161.1606162397.git.andreyknvl@google.com Link: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/id/Ie5ba549d445292fe629b4a96735e4034957bcc50Signed-off-by: NAndrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Reviewed-by: NDmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: NMarco Elver <elver@google.com> Tested-by: NVincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com> Cc: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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由 Andrey Konovalov 提交于
There's a config option CONFIG_KASAN_STACK that has to be enabled for KASAN to use stack instrumentation and perform validity checks for stack variables. There's no need to unpoison stack when CONFIG_KASAN_STACK is not enabled. Only call kasan_unpoison_task_stack[_below]() when CONFIG_KASAN_STACK is enabled. Note, that CONFIG_KASAN_STACK is an option that is currently always defined when CONFIG_KASAN is enabled, and therefore has to be tested with #if instead of #ifdef. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/d09dd3f8abb388da397fd11598c5edeaa83fe559.1606162397.git.andreyknvl@google.com Link: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/id/If8a891e9fe01ea543e00b576852685afec0887e3Signed-off-by: NAndrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Reviewed-by: NMarco Elver <elver@google.com> Acked-by: NCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Reviewed-by: NDmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Tested-by: NVincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com> Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com> Cc: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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由 Andrey Konovalov 提交于
Add set_alloc_info() helper and move kasan_set_track() into it. This will simplify the code for one of the upcoming changes. No functional changes. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/b2393e8f1e311a70fc3aaa2196461b6acdee7d21.1606162397.git.andreyknvl@google.com Link: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/id/I0316193cbb4ecc9b87b7c2eee0dd79f8ec908c1aSigned-off-by: NAndrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Reviewed-by: NDmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: NMarco Elver <elver@google.com> Tested-by: NVincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com> Cc: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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由 Andrey Konovalov 提交于
Rename get_alloc_info() and get_free_info() to kasan_get_alloc_meta() and kasan_get_free_meta() to better reflect what those do and avoid confusion with kasan_set_free_info(). No functional changes. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/27b7c036b754af15a2839e945f6d8bfce32b4c2f.1606162397.git.andreyknvl@google.com Link: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/id/Ib6e4ba61c8b12112b403d3479a9799ac8fff8de1Signed-off-by: NAndrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Reviewed-by: NDmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: NMarco Elver <elver@google.com> Tested-by: NVincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com> Cc: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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由 Andrey Konovalov 提交于
Patch series "kasan: boot parameters for hardware tag-based mode", v4. === Overview Hardware tag-based KASAN mode [1] is intended to eventually be used in production as a security mitigation. Therefore there's a need for finer control over KASAN features and for an existence of a kill switch. This patchset adds a few boot parameters for hardware tag-based KASAN that allow to disable or otherwise control particular KASAN features, as well as provides some initial optimizations for running KASAN in production. There's another planned patchset what will further optimize hardware tag-based KASAN, provide proper benchmarking and tests, and will fully enable tag-based KASAN for production use. Hardware tag-based KASAN relies on arm64 Memory Tagging Extension (MTE) [2] to perform memory and pointer tagging. Please see [3] and [4] for detailed analysis of how MTE helps to fight memory safety problems. The features that can be controlled are: 1. Whether KASAN is enabled at all. 2. Whether KASAN collects and saves alloc/free stacks. 3. Whether KASAN panics on a detected bug or not. The patch titled "kasan: add and integrate kasan boot parameters" of this series adds a few new boot parameters. kasan.mode allows to choose one of three main modes: - kasan.mode=off - KASAN is disabled, no tag checks are performed - kasan.mode=prod - only essential production features are enabled - kasan.mode=full - all KASAN features are enabled The chosen mode provides default control values for the features mentioned above. However it's also possible to override the default values by providing: - kasan.stacktrace=off/on - enable stacks collection (default: on for mode=full, otherwise off) - kasan.fault=report/panic - only report tag fault or also panic (default: report) If kasan.mode parameter is not provided, it defaults to full when CONFIG_DEBUG_KERNEL is enabled, and to prod otherwise. It is essential that switching between these modes doesn't require rebuilding the kernel with different configs, as this is required by the Android GKI (Generic Kernel Image) initiative. === Benchmarks For now I've only performed a few simple benchmarks such as measuring kernel boot time and slab memory usage after boot. There's an upcoming patchset which will optimize KASAN further and include more detailed benchmarking results. The benchmarks were performed in QEMU and the results below exclude the slowdown caused by QEMU memory tagging emulation (as it's different from the slowdown that will be introduced by hardware and is therefore irrelevant). KASAN_HW_TAGS=y + kasan.mode=off introduces no performance or memory impact compared to KASAN_HW_TAGS=n. kasan.mode=prod (manually excluding tagging) introduces 3% of performance and no memory impact (except memory used by hardware to store tags) compared to kasan.mode=off. kasan.mode=full has about 40% performance and 30% memory impact over kasan.mode=prod. Both come from alloc/free stack collection. === Notes This patchset is available here: https://github.com/xairy/linux/tree/up-boot-mte-v4 This patchset is based on v11 of "kasan: add hardware tag-based mode for arm64" patchset [1]. For testing in QEMU hardware tag-based KASAN requires: 1. QEMU built from master [6] (use "-machine virt,mte=on -cpu max" arguments to run). 2. GCC version 10. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-arm-kernel/cover.1606161801.git.andreyknvl@google.com/T/#t [2] https://community.arm.com/developer/ip-products/processors/b/processors-ip-blog/posts/enhancing-memory-safety [3] https://arxiv.org/pdf/1802.09517.pdf [4] https://github.com/microsoft/MSRC-Security-Research/blob/master/papers/2020/Security%20analysis%20of%20memory%20tagging.pdf [5] https://source.android.com/devices/architecture/kernel/generic-kernel-image [6] https://github.com/qemu/qemu === Tags Tested-by: NVincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> This patch (of 19): Move get_free_info() call into quarantine_put() to simplify the call site. No functional changes. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/cover.1606162397.git.andreyknvl@google.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/312d0a3ef92cc6dc4fa5452cbc1714f9393ca239.1606162397.git.andreyknvl@google.com Link: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/id/Iab0f04e7ebf8d83247024b7190c67c3c34c7940fSigned-off-by: NAndrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Reviewed-by: NDmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: NMarco Elver <elver@google.com> Tested-by: NVincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com> Cc: Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com> Cc: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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由 Andrey Konovalov 提交于
Provide implementation of KASAN functions required for the hardware tag-based mode. Those include core functions for memory and pointer tagging (tags_hw.c) and bug reporting (report_tags_hw.c). Also adapt common KASAN code to support the new mode. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/cfd0fbede579a6b66755c98c88c108e54f9c56bf.1606161801.git.andreyknvl@google.comSigned-off-by: NAndrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Signed-off-by: NVincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Acked-by: NCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Reviewed-by: NAlexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Tested-by: NVincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com> Cc: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com> Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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由 Andrey Konovalov 提交于
This is a preparatory commit for the upcoming addition of a new hardware tag-based (MTE-based) KASAN mode. Hardware tag-based KASAN won't use kasan_depth. Only define and use it when one of the software KASAN modes are enabled. No functional changes for software modes. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/e16f15aeda90bc7fb4dfc2e243a14b74cc5c8219.1606161801.git.andreyknvl@google.comSigned-off-by: NAndrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Signed-off-by: NVincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Reviewed-by: NCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Reviewed-by: NAlexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Tested-by: NVincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com> Cc: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com> Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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由 Andrey Konovalov 提交于
This is a preparatory commit for the upcoming addition of a new hardware tag-based (MTE-based) KASAN mode. For software KASAN modes the check is based on the value in the shadow memory. Hardware tag-based KASAN won't be using shadow, so hide the implementation of the check in check_invalid_free(). Also simplify the code for software tag-based mode. No functional changes for software modes. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/d01534a4b977f97d87515dc590e6348e1406de81.1606161801.git.andreyknvl@google.comSigned-off-by: NAndrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Signed-off-by: NVincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Reviewed-by: NMarco Elver <elver@google.com> Reviewed-by: NAlexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Tested-by: NVincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com> Cc: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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由 Andrey Konovalov 提交于
This is a preparatory commit for the upcoming addition of a new hardware tag-based (MTE-based) KASAN mode. The new mode won't be using shadow memory. Move all shadow-related code to shadow.c, which is only enabled for software KASAN modes that use shadow memory. No functional changes for software modes. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/17d95cfa7d5cf9c4fcd9bf415f2a8dea911668df.1606161801.git.andreyknvl@google.comSigned-off-by: NAndrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Signed-off-by: NVincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Reviewed-by: NMarco Elver <elver@google.com> Reviewed-by: NAlexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Tested-by: NVincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com> Cc: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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由 Andrey Konovalov 提交于
This is a preparatory commit for the upcoming addition of a new hardware tag-based (MTE-based) KASAN mode. The new mode won't be using shadow memory, but will still use the concept of memory granules. Each memory granule maps to a single metadata entry: 8 bytes per one shadow byte for generic mode, 16 bytes per one shadow byte for software tag-based mode, and 16 bytes per one allocation tag for hardware tag-based mode. Rename KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE to KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE, and KASAN_SHADOW_MASK to KASAN_GRANULE_MASK. Also use MASK when used as a mask, otherwise use SIZE. No functional changes. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/939b5754e47f528a6e6a6f28ffc5815d8d128033.1606161801.git.andreyknvl@google.comSigned-off-by: NAndrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Signed-off-by: NVincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Reviewed-by: NMarco Elver <elver@google.com> Reviewed-by: NAlexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Tested-by: NVincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com> Cc: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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由 Andrey Konovalov 提交于
This is a preparatory commit for the upcoming addition of a new hardware tag-based (MTE-based) KASAN mode. The new mode won't be using shadow memory. Rename external annotation kasan_unpoison_shadow() to kasan_unpoison_range(), and introduce internal functions (un)poison_range() (without kasan_ prefix). Co-developed-by: NMarco Elver <elver@google.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/fccdcaa13dc6b2211bf363d6c6d499279a54fe3a.1606161801.git.andreyknvl@google.comSigned-off-by: NMarco Elver <elver@google.com> Signed-off-by: NAndrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Signed-off-by: NVincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Reviewed-by: NAlexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Tested-by: NVincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com> Cc: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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由 Andrey Konovalov 提交于
This is a preparatory commit for the upcoming addition of a new hardware tag-based (MTE-based) KASAN mode. Group all vmalloc-related function declarations in include/linux/kasan.h, and their implementations in mm/kasan/common.c. No functional changes. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/80a6fdd29b039962843bd6cf22ce2643a7c8904e.1606161801.git.andreyknvl@google.comSigned-off-by: NAndrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Signed-off-by: NVincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Reviewed-by: NMarco Elver <elver@google.com> Reviewed-by: NAlexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Tested-by: NVincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com> Cc: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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由 Andrey Konovalov 提交于
Patch series "kasan: add hardware tag-based mode for arm64", v11. This patchset adds a new hardware tag-based mode to KASAN [1]. The new mode is similar to the existing software tag-based KASAN, but relies on arm64 Memory Tagging Extension (MTE) [2] to perform memory and pointer tagging (instead of shadow memory and compiler instrumentation). This patchset is co-developed and tested by Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>. This patchset is available here: https://github.com/xairy/linux/tree/up-kasan-mte-v11 For testing in QEMU hardware tag-based KASAN requires: 1. QEMU built from master [4] (use "-machine virt,mte=on -cpu max" arguments to run). 2. GCC version 10. [1] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/dev-tools/kasan.html [2] https://community.arm.com/developer/ip-products/processors/b/processors-ip-blog/posts/enhancing-memory-safety [3] git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arm64/linux for-next/mte [4] https://github.com/qemu/qemu ====== Overview The underlying ideas of the approach used by hardware tag-based KASAN are: 1. By relying on the Top Byte Ignore (TBI) arm64 CPU feature, pointer tags are stored in the top byte of each kernel pointer. 2. With the Memory Tagging Extension (MTE) arm64 CPU feature, memory tags for kernel memory allocations are stored in a dedicated memory not accessible via normal instuctions. 3. On each memory allocation, a random tag is generated, embedded it into the returned pointer, and the corresponding memory is tagged with the same tag value. 4. With MTE the CPU performs a check on each memory access to make sure that the pointer tag matches the memory tag. 5. On a tag mismatch the CPU generates a tag fault, and a KASAN report is printed. Same as other KASAN modes, hardware tag-based KASAN is intended as a debugging feature at this point. ====== Rationale There are two main reasons for this new hardware tag-based mode: 1. Previously implemented software tag-based KASAN is being successfully used on dogfood testing devices due to its low memory overhead (as initially planned). The new hardware mode keeps the same low memory overhead, and is expected to have significantly lower performance impact, due to the tag checks being performed by the hardware. Therefore the new mode can be used as a better alternative in dogfood testing for hardware that supports MTE. 2. The new mode lays the groundwork for the planned in-kernel MTE-based memory corruption mitigation to be used in production. ====== Technical details Considering the implementation perspective, hardware tag-based KASAN is almost identical to the software mode. The key difference is using MTE for assigning and checking tags. Compared to the software mode, the hardware mode uses 4 bits per tag, as dictated by MTE. Pointer tags are stored in bits [56:60), the top 4 bits have the normal value 0xF. Having less distict tags increases the probablity of false negatives (from ~1/256 to ~1/16) in certain cases. Only synchronous exceptions are set up and used by hardware tag-based KASAN. ====== Benchmarks Note: all measurements have been performed with software emulation of Memory Tagging Extension, performance numbers for hardware tag-based KASAN on the actual hardware are expected to be better. Boot time [1]: * 2.8 sec for clean kernel * 5.7 sec for hardware tag-based KASAN * 11.8 sec for software tag-based KASAN * 11.6 sec for generic KASAN Slab memory usage after boot [2]: * 7.0 kb for clean kernel * 9.7 kb for hardware tag-based KASAN * 9.7 kb for software tag-based KASAN * 41.3 kb for generic KASAN Measurements have been performed with: * defconfig-based configs * Manually built QEMU master * QEMU arguments: -machine virt,mte=on -cpu max * CONFIG_KASAN_STACK_ENABLE disabled * CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled * clang-10 as the compiler and gcc-10 as the assembler [1] Time before the ext4 driver is initialized. [2] Measured as `cat /proc/meminfo | grep Slab`. ====== Notes The cover letter for software tag-based KASAN patchset can be found here: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=0116523cfffa62aeb5aa3b85ce7419f3dae0c1b8 ===== Tags Tested-by: NVincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> This patch (of 41): Don't mention "GNU General Public License version 2" text explicitly, as it's already covered by the SPDX-License-Identifier. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/cover.1606161801.git.andreyknvl@google.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/6ea9f5f4aa9dbbffa0d0c0a780b37699a4531034.1606161801.git.andreyknvl@google.comSigned-off-by: NAndrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Signed-off-by: NVincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Reviewed-by: NMarco Elver <elver@google.com> Reviewed-by: NAlexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Tested-by: NVincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com> Cc: Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com> Cc: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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- 08 8月, 2020 3 次提交
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由 Vincenzo Frascino 提交于
kasan_unpoison_stack_above_sp_to() is defined in kasan code but never used. The function was introduced as part of the commit: commit 9f7d416c ("kprobes: Unpoison stack in jprobe_return() for KASAN") ... where it was necessary because x86's jprobe_return() would leave stale shadow on the stack, and was an oddity in that regard. Since then, jprobes were removed entirely, and as of commit: commit 80006dbe ("kprobes/x86: Remove jprobe implementation") ... there have been no callers of this function. Remove the declaration and the implementation. Signed-off-by: NVincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Reviewed-by: NMark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Reviewed-by: NAndrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200706143505.23299-1-vincenzo.frascino@arm.comSigned-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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由 Walter Wu 提交于
Move free track from kasan_alloc_meta to kasan_free_meta in order to make struct kasan_alloc_meta and kasan_free_meta size are both 16 bytes. It is a good size because it is the minimal redzone size and a good number of alignment. For free track, we make some modifications as shown below: 1) Remove the free_track from struct kasan_alloc_meta. 2) Add the free_track into struct kasan_free_meta. 3) Add a macro KASAN_KMALLOC_FREETRACK in order to check whether it can print free stack in KASAN report. [1]https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=198437 [walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com: build fix] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200710162440.23887-1-walter-zh.wu@mediatek.comSuggested-by: NDmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Co-developed-by: NDmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Signed-off-by: NWalter Wu <walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Tested-by: NDmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: NDmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: NAndrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Joel Fernandes <joel@joelfernandes.org> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org> Cc: Lai Jiangshan <jiangshanlai@gmail.com> Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com> Cc: Matthias Brugger <matthias.bgg@gmail.com> Cc: "Paul E . McKenney" <paulmck@kernel.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200601051022.1230-1-walter-zh.wu@mediatek.comSigned-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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由 Walter Wu 提交于
Patch series "kasan: memorize and print call_rcu stack", v8. This patchset improves KASAN reports by making them to have call_rcu() call stack information. It is useful for programmers to solve use-after-free or double-free memory issue. The KASAN report was as follows(cleaned up slightly): BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in kasan_rcu_reclaim+0x58/0x60 Freed by task 0: kasan_save_stack+0x24/0x50 kasan_set_track+0x24/0x38 kasan_set_free_info+0x18/0x20 __kasan_slab_free+0x10c/0x170 kasan_slab_free+0x10/0x18 kfree+0x98/0x270 kasan_rcu_reclaim+0x1c/0x60 Last call_rcu(): kasan_save_stack+0x24/0x50 kasan_record_aux_stack+0xbc/0xd0 call_rcu+0x8c/0x580 kasan_rcu_uaf+0xf4/0xf8 Generic KASAN will record the last two call_rcu() call stacks and print up to 2 call_rcu() call stacks in KASAN report. it is only suitable for generic KASAN. This feature considers the size of struct kasan_alloc_meta and kasan_free_meta, we try to optimize the structure layout and size, lets it get better memory consumption. [1]https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=198437 [2]https://groups.google.com/forum/#!searchin/kasan-dev/better$20stack$20traces$20for$20rcu%7Csort:date/kasan-dev/KQsjT_88hDE/7rNUZprRBgAJ This patch (of 4): This feature will record the last two call_rcu() call stacks and prints up to 2 call_rcu() call stacks in KASAN report. When call_rcu() is called, we store the call_rcu() call stack into slub alloc meta-data, so that the KASAN report can print rcu stack. [1]https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=198437 [2]https://groups.google.com/forum/#!searchin/kasan-dev/better$20stack$20traces$20for$20rcu%7Csort:date/kasan-dev/KQsjT_88hDE/7rNUZprRBgAJ [walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com: build fix] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200710162401.23816-1-walter-zh.wu@mediatek.comSuggested-by: NDmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Signed-off-by: NWalter Wu <walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Tested-by: NDmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: NDmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: NAndrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Acked-by: NPaul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org> Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com> Cc: Lai Jiangshan <jiangshanlai@gmail.com> Cc: Joel Fernandes <joel@joelfernandes.org> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Matthias Brugger <matthias.bgg@gmail.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200710162123.23713-1-walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200601050847.1096-1-walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200601050927.1153-1-walter-zh.wu@mediatek.comSigned-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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- 03 6月, 2020 1 次提交
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由 Andrey Konovalov 提交于
The kasan_report() functions belongs to report.c, as it's a common functions that does error reporting. Reported-by: NLeon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: NAndrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Tested-by: NLeon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/78a81fde6eeda9db72a7fd55fbc33173a515e4b1.1589297433.git.andreyknvl@google.comSigned-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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- 08 4月, 2020 1 次提交
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由 Alexander Potapenko 提交于
filter_irq_stacks() can be used by other tools (e.g. KMSAN), so it needs to be moved to a common location. lib/stackdepot.c seems a good place, as filter_irq_stacks() is usually applied to the output of stack_trace_save(). This patch has been previously mailed as part of KMSAN RFC patch series. [glider@google.co: nds32: linker script: add SOFTIRQENTRY_TEXT\ Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200311121002.241430-1-glider@google.com [glider@google.com: add IRQENTRY_TEXT and SOFTIRQENTRY_TEXT to linker script] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200311121124.243352-1-glider@google.comSigned-off-by: NAlexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200220141916.55455-3-glider@google.comSigned-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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- 03 4月, 2020 1 次提交
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由 Walter Wu 提交于
Patch series "fix the missing underflow in memory operation function", v4. The patchset helps to produce a KASAN report when size is negative in memory operation functions. It is helpful for programmer to solve an undefined behavior issue. Patch 1 based on Dmitry's review and suggestion, patch 2 is a test in order to verify the patch 1. [1]https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199341 [2]https://lore.kernel.org/linux-arm-kernel/20190927034338.15813-1-walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com/ This patch (of 2): KASAN missed detecting size is a negative number in memset(), memcpy(), and memmove(), it will cause out-of-bounds bug. So needs to be detected by KASAN. If size is a negative number, then it has a reason to be defined as out-of-bounds bug type. Casting negative numbers to size_t would indeed turn up as a large size_t and its value will be larger than ULONG_MAX/2, so that this can qualify as out-of-bounds. KASAN report is shown below: BUG: KASAN: out-of-bounds in kmalloc_memmove_invalid_size+0x70/0xa0 Read of size 18446744073709551608 at addr ffffff8069660904 by task cat/72 CPU: 2 PID: 72 Comm: cat Not tainted 5.4.0-rc1-next-20191004ajb-00001-gdb8af2f372b2-dirty #1 Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) Call trace: dump_backtrace+0x0/0x288 show_stack+0x14/0x20 dump_stack+0x10c/0x164 print_address_description.isra.9+0x68/0x378 __kasan_report+0x164/0x1a0 kasan_report+0xc/0x18 check_memory_region+0x174/0x1d0 memmove+0x34/0x88 kmalloc_memmove_invalid_size+0x70/0xa0 [1] https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199341 [cai@lca.pw: fix -Wdeclaration-after-statement warn] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1583509030-27939-1-git-send-email-cai@lca.pw [peterz@infradead.org: fix objtool warning] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200305095436.GV2596@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.netReported-by: Nkernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> Reported-by: NDmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Suggested-by: NDmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Signed-off-by: NWalter Wu <walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com> Signed-off-by: NQian Cai <cai@lca.pw> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Reviewed-by: NDmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: NAndrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191112065302.7015-1-walter-zh.wu@mediatek.comSigned-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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- 23 1月, 2020 1 次提交
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由 Nick Hu 提交于
If archs don't have memmove then the C implementation from lib/string.c is used, and then it's instrumented by compiler. So there is no need to add KASAN's memmove to manual checks. Signed-off-by: NNick Hu <nickhu@andestech.com> Acked-by: NDmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Acked-by: NAndrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Signed-off-by: NPalmer Dabbelt <palmerdabbelt@google.com>
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- 18 12月, 2019 2 次提交
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由 Daniel Axtens 提交于
kasan_release_vmalloc uses apply_to_page_range to release vmalloc shadow. Unfortunately, apply_to_page_range can allocate memory to fill in page table entries, which is not what we want. Also, kasan_release_vmalloc is called under free_vmap_area_lock, so if apply_to_page_range does allocate memory, we get a sleep in atomic bug: BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at mm/page_alloc.c:4681 in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, non_block: 0, pid: 15087, name: Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x199/0x216 lib/dump_stack.c:118 ___might_sleep.cold.97+0x1f5/0x238 kernel/sched/core.c:6800 __might_sleep+0x95/0x190 kernel/sched/core.c:6753 prepare_alloc_pages mm/page_alloc.c:4681 [inline] __alloc_pages_nodemask+0x3cd/0x890 mm/page_alloc.c:4730 alloc_pages_current+0x10c/0x210 mm/mempolicy.c:2211 alloc_pages include/linux/gfp.h:532 [inline] __get_free_pages+0xc/0x40 mm/page_alloc.c:4786 __pte_alloc_one_kernel include/asm-generic/pgalloc.h:21 [inline] pte_alloc_one_kernel include/asm-generic/pgalloc.h:33 [inline] __pte_alloc_kernel+0x1d/0x200 mm/memory.c:459 apply_to_pte_range mm/memory.c:2031 [inline] apply_to_pmd_range mm/memory.c:2068 [inline] apply_to_pud_range mm/memory.c:2088 [inline] apply_to_p4d_range mm/memory.c:2108 [inline] apply_to_page_range+0x77d/0xa00 mm/memory.c:2133 kasan_release_vmalloc+0xa7/0xc0 mm/kasan/common.c:970 __purge_vmap_area_lazy+0xcbb/0x1f30 mm/vmalloc.c:1313 try_purge_vmap_area_lazy mm/vmalloc.c:1332 [inline] free_vmap_area_noflush+0x2ca/0x390 mm/vmalloc.c:1368 free_unmap_vmap_area mm/vmalloc.c:1381 [inline] remove_vm_area+0x1cc/0x230 mm/vmalloc.c:2209 vm_remove_mappings mm/vmalloc.c:2236 [inline] __vunmap+0x223/0xa20 mm/vmalloc.c:2299 __vfree+0x3f/0xd0 mm/vmalloc.c:2356 __vmalloc_area_node mm/vmalloc.c:2507 [inline] __vmalloc_node_range+0x5d5/0x810 mm/vmalloc.c:2547 __vmalloc_node mm/vmalloc.c:2607 [inline] __vmalloc_node_flags mm/vmalloc.c:2621 [inline] vzalloc+0x6f/0x80 mm/vmalloc.c:2666 alloc_one_pg_vec_page net/packet/af_packet.c:4233 [inline] alloc_pg_vec net/packet/af_packet.c:4258 [inline] packet_set_ring+0xbc0/0x1b50 net/packet/af_packet.c:4342 packet_setsockopt+0xed7/0x2d90 net/packet/af_packet.c:3695 __sys_setsockopt+0x29b/0x4d0 net/socket.c:2117 __do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2133 [inline] __se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2130 [inline] __x64_sys_setsockopt+0xbe/0x150 net/socket.c:2130 do_syscall_64+0xfa/0x780 arch/x86/entry/common.c:294 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe Switch to using the apply_to_existing_page_range() helper instead, which won't allocate memory. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: s/apply_to_existing_pages/apply_to_existing_page_range/] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191205140407.1874-2-dja@axtens.net Fixes: 3c5c3cfb ("kasan: support backing vmalloc space with real shadow memory") Signed-off-by: NDaniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> Reported-by: NDmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: NAndrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw> Cc: Uladzislau Rezki (Sony) <urezki@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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由 Andrey Ryabinin 提交于
With CONFIG_KASAN_VMALLOC=y any use of memory obtained via vm_map_ram() will crash because there is no shadow backing that memory. Instead of sprinkling additional kasan_populate_vmalloc() calls all over the vmalloc code, move it into alloc_vmap_area(). This will fix vm_map_ram() and simplify the code a bit. [aryabinin@virtuozzo.com: v2] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191205095942.1761-1-aryabinin@virtuozzo.comLink: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191204204534.32202-1-aryabinin@virtuozzo.com Fixes: 3c5c3cfb ("kasan: support backing vmalloc space with real shadow memory") Signed-off-by: NAndrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Reported-by: NDmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: NUladzislau Rezki (Sony) <urezki@gmail.com> Cc: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> Cc: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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- 05 12月, 2019 1 次提交
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由 zhong jiang 提交于
I hit the following compile error in arch/x86/ mm/kasan/common.c: In function kasan_populate_vmalloc: mm/kasan/common.c:797:2: error: implicit declaration of function flush_cache_vmap; did you mean flush_rcu_work? [-Werror=implicit-function-declaration] flush_cache_vmap(shadow_start, shadow_end); ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ flush_rcu_work cc1: some warnings being treated as errors Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1575363013-43761-1-git-send-email-zhongjiang@huawei.com Fixes: 3c5c3cfb ("kasan: support backing vmalloc space with real shadow memory") Signed-off-by: Nzhong jiang <zhongjiang@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Reviewed-by: NDaniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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- 02 12月, 2019 1 次提交
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由 Daniel Axtens 提交于
Patch series "kasan: support backing vmalloc space with real shadow memory", v11. Currently, vmalloc space is backed by the early shadow page. This means that kasan is incompatible with VMAP_STACK. This series provides a mechanism to back vmalloc space with real, dynamically allocated memory. I have only wired up x86, because that's the only currently supported arch I can work with easily, but it's very easy to wire up other architectures, and it appears that there is some work-in-progress code to do this on arm64 and s390. This has been discussed before in the context of VMAP_STACK: - https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=202009 - https://lkml.org/lkml/2018/7/22/198 - https://lkml.org/lkml/2019/7/19/822 In terms of implementation details: Most mappings in vmalloc space are small, requiring less than a full page of shadow space. Allocating a full shadow page per mapping would therefore be wasteful. Furthermore, to ensure that different mappings use different shadow pages, mappings would have to be aligned to KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE * PAGE_SIZE. Instead, share backing space across multiple mappings. Allocate a backing page when a mapping in vmalloc space uses a particular page of the shadow region. This page can be shared by other vmalloc mappings later on. We hook in to the vmap infrastructure to lazily clean up unused shadow memory. Testing with test_vmalloc.sh on an x86 VM with 2 vCPUs shows that: - Turning on KASAN, inline instrumentation, without vmalloc, introuduces a 4.1x-4.2x slowdown in vmalloc operations. - Turning this on introduces the following slowdowns over KASAN: * ~1.76x slower single-threaded (test_vmalloc.sh performance) * ~2.18x slower when both cpus are performing operations simultaneously (test_vmalloc.sh sequential_test_order=1) This is unfortunate but given that this is a debug feature only, not the end of the world. The benchmarks are also a stress-test for the vmalloc subsystem: they're not indicative of an overall 2x slowdown! This patch (of 4): Hook into vmalloc and vmap, and dynamically allocate real shadow memory to back the mappings. Most mappings in vmalloc space are small, requiring less than a full page of shadow space. Allocating a full shadow page per mapping would therefore be wasteful. Furthermore, to ensure that different mappings use different shadow pages, mappings would have to be aligned to KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE * PAGE_SIZE. Instead, share backing space across multiple mappings. Allocate a backing page when a mapping in vmalloc space uses a particular page of the shadow region. This page can be shared by other vmalloc mappings later on. We hook in to the vmap infrastructure to lazily clean up unused shadow memory. To avoid the difficulties around swapping mappings around, this code expects that the part of the shadow region that covers the vmalloc space will not be covered by the early shadow page, but will be left unmapped. This will require changes in arch-specific code. This allows KASAN with VMAP_STACK, and may be helpful for architectures that do not have a separate module space (e.g. powerpc64, which I am currently working on). It also allows relaxing the module alignment back to PAGE_SIZE. Testing with test_vmalloc.sh on an x86 VM with 2 vCPUs shows that: - Turning on KASAN, inline instrumentation, without vmalloc, introuduces a 4.1x-4.2x slowdown in vmalloc operations. - Turning this on introduces the following slowdowns over KASAN: * ~1.76x slower single-threaded (test_vmalloc.sh performance) * ~2.18x slower when both cpus are performing operations simultaneously (test_vmalloc.sh sequential_test_order=3D1) This is unfortunate but given that this is a debug feature only, not the end of the world. The full benchmark results are: Performance No KASAN KASAN original x baseline KASAN vmalloc x baseline x KASAN fix_size_alloc_test 662004 11404956 17.23 19144610 28.92 1.68 full_fit_alloc_test 710950 12029752 16.92 13184651 18.55 1.10 long_busy_list_alloc_test 9431875 43990172 4.66 82970178 8.80 1.89 random_size_alloc_test 5033626 23061762 4.58 47158834 9.37 2.04 fix_align_alloc_test 1252514 15276910 12.20 31266116 24.96 2.05 random_size_align_alloc_te 1648501 14578321 8.84 25560052 15.51 1.75 align_shift_alloc_test 147 830 5.65 5692 38.72 6.86 pcpu_alloc_test 80732 125520 1.55 140864 1.74 1.12 Total Cycles 119240774314 763211341128 6.40 1390338696894 11.66 1.82 Sequential, 2 cpus No KASAN KASAN original x baseline KASAN vmalloc x baseline x KASAN fix_size_alloc_test 1423150 14276550 10.03 27733022 19.49 1.94 full_fit_alloc_test 1754219 14722640 8.39 15030786 8.57 1.02 long_busy_list_alloc_test 11451858 52154973 4.55 107016027 9.34 2.05 random_size_alloc_test 5989020 26735276 4.46 68885923 11.50 2.58 fix_align_alloc_test 2050976 20166900 9.83 50491675 24.62 2.50 random_size_align_alloc_te 2858229 17971700 6.29 38730225 13.55 2.16 align_shift_alloc_test 405 6428 15.87 26253 64.82 4.08 pcpu_alloc_test 127183 151464 1.19 216263 1.70 1.43 Total Cycles 54181269392 308723699764 5.70 650772566394 12.01 2.11 fix_size_alloc_test 1420404 14289308 10.06 27790035 19.56 1.94 full_fit_alloc_test 1736145 14806234 8.53 15274301 8.80 1.03 long_busy_list_alloc_test 11404638 52270785 4.58 107550254 9.43 2.06 random_size_alloc_test 6017006 26650625 4.43 68696127 11.42 2.58 fix_align_alloc_test 2045504 20280985 9.91 50414862 24.65 2.49 random_size_align_alloc_te 2845338 17931018 6.30 38510276 13.53 2.15 align_shift_alloc_test 472 3760 7.97 9656 20.46 2.57 pcpu_alloc_test 118643 132732 1.12 146504 1.23 1.10 Total Cycles 54040011688 309102805492 5.72 651325675652 12.05 2.11 [dja@axtens.net: fixups] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191120052719.7201-1-dja@axtens.net Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3D202009 Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191031093909.9228-2-dja@axtens.net Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> [shadow rework] Signed-off-by: NDaniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> Co-developed-by: NMark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Acked-by: NVasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: NAndrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr> Cc: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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- 25 9月, 2019 3 次提交
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由 Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) 提交于
Replace 1 << compound_order(page) with compound_nr(page). Minor improvements in readability. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190721104612.19120-4-willy@infradead.orgSigned-off-by: NMatthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org> Reviewed-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Reviewed-by: NIra Weiny <ira.weiny@intel.com> Acked-by: NKirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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由 Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) 提交于
Patch series "Make working with compound pages easier", v2. These three patches add three helpers and convert the appropriate places to use them. This patch (of 3): It's unnecessarily hard to find out the size of a potentially huge page. Replace 'PAGE_SIZE << compound_order(page)' with page_size(page). Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190721104612.19120-2-willy@infradead.orgSigned-off-by: NMatthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org> Acked-by: NMichal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Reviewed-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Reviewed-by: NIra Weiny <ira.weiny@intel.com> Acked-by: NKirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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由 Walter Wu 提交于
Add memory corruption identification at bug report for software tag-based mode. The report shows whether it is "use-after-free" or "out-of-bound" error instead of "invalid-access" error. This will make it easier for programmers to see the memory corruption problem. We extend the slab to store five old free pointer tag and free backtrace, we can check if the tagged address is in the slab record and make a good guess if the object is more like "use-after-free" or "out-of-bound". therefore every slab memory corruption can be identified whether it's "use-after-free" or "out-of-bound". [aryabinin@virtuozzo.com: simplify & clenup code] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/3318f9d7-a760-3cc8-b700-f06108ae745f@virtuozzo.com] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190821180332.11450-1-aryabinin@virtuozzo.comSigned-off-by: NWalter Wu <walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com> Signed-off-by: NAndrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Acked-by: NAndrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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- 25 8月, 2019 1 次提交
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由 Andrey Ryabinin 提交于
The code like this: ptr = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL); page = virt_to_page(ptr); offset = offset_in_page(ptr); kfree(page_address(page) + offset); may produce false-positive invalid-free reports on the kernel with CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS=y. In the example above we lose the original tag assigned to 'ptr', so kfree() gets the pointer with 0xFF tag. In kfree() we check that 0xFF tag is different from the tag in shadow hence print false report. Instead of just comparing tags, do the following: 1) Check that shadow doesn't contain KASAN_TAG_INVALID. Otherwise it's double-free and it doesn't matter what tag the pointer have. 2) If pointer tag is different from 0xFF, make sure that tag in the shadow is the same as in the pointer. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190819172540.19581-1-aryabinin@virtuozzo.com Fixes: 7f94ffbc ("kasan: add hooks implementation for tag-based mode") Signed-off-by: NAndrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Reported-by: NWalter Wu <walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com> Reported-by: NMark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Reviewed-by: NAndrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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- 13 7月, 2019 2 次提交
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由 Marco Elver 提交于
This changes {,__}kasan_check_{read,write} functions to return a boolean denoting if the access was valid or not. [sfr@canb.auug.org.au: include types.h for "bool"] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190705184949.13cdd021@canb.auug.org.au Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190626142014.141844-3-elver@google.comSigned-off-by: NMarco Elver <elver@google.com> Signed-off-by: NStephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Reviewed-by: NAndrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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由 Marco Elver 提交于
Patch series "mm/kasan: Add object validation in ksize()", v3. This patch (of 5): This introduces __kasan_check_{read,write}. __kasan_check functions may be used from anywhere, even compilation units that disable instrumentation selectively. This change eliminates the need for the __KASAN_INTERNAL definition. [elver@google.com: v5] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190708170706.174189-2-elver@google.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190626142014.141844-2-elver@google.comSigned-off-by: NMarco Elver <elver@google.com> Acked-by: NMark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Reviewed-by: NAndrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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- 02 6月, 2019 1 次提交
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由 Nathan Chancellor 提交于
When building with -Wuninitialized and CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS unset, Clang warns: mm/kasan/common.c:484:40: warning: variable 'tag' is uninitialized when used here [-Wuninitialized] kasan_unpoison_shadow(set_tag(object, tag), size); ^~~ set_tag ignores tag in this configuration but clang doesn't realize it at this point in its pipeline, as it points to arch_kasan_set_tag as being the point where it is used, which will later be expanded to (void *)(object) without a use of tag. Initialize tag to 0xff, as it removes this warning and doesn't change the meaning of the code. Link: https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/465 Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190502163057.6603-1-natechancellor@gmail.com Fixes: 7f94ffbc ("kasan: add hooks implementation for tag-based mode") Signed-off-by: NNathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: NAndrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Reviewed-by: NAndrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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