The lockdown module is intended to allow for kernels to be locked down
early in boot - sufficiently early that we don't have the ability to
kmalloc() yet. Add support for early initialisation of some LSMs, and
then add them to the list of names when we do full initialisation later.
Early LSMs are initialised in link order and cannot be overridden via
boot parameters, and cannot make use of kmalloc() (since the allocator
isn't initialised yet).

(Fixed by Stephen Rothwell to include a stub to fix builds when
!CONFIG_SECURITY)
Signed-off-by: NMatthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Acked-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Fix for name mismatch and omitted colons in the
security_list_options documentation.
Signed-off-by: NDenis Efremov <efremov@ispras.ru>
Acked-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>

The shm_* hooks were changed in the commit
"shm/security: Pass kern_ipc_perm not shmid_kernel into the
shm security hooks" (7191adff). The type of the argument
shp was changed from shmid_kernel to kern_ipc_perm. This patch
updates the documentation for the hooks accordingly.
Signed-off-by: NDenis Efremov <efremov@ispras.ru>
Acked-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>

The sem_* hooks were changed in the commit
"sem/security: Pass kern_ipc_perm not sem_array into the
sem security hooks" (aefad959). The type of the argument
sma was changed from sem_array to kern_ipc_perm. This patch
updates the documentation for the hooks accordingly.
Signed-off-by: NDenis Efremov <efremov@ispras.ru>
Acked-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>

The msg_queue_* hooks were changed in the commit
"msg/security: Pass kern_ipc_perm not msg_queue into the msg_queue
security hooks" (d8c6e854). The type of the argument msq was changed
from msq_queue to kern_ipc_perm. This patch updates the documentation
for the hooks accordingly.
Signed-off-by: NDenis Efremov <efremov@ispras.ru>
Acked-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>

This patch updates the documentation for the audit_* hooks
to use the same arguments names as in the hook's declarations.
Signed-off-by: NDenis Efremov <efremov@ispras.ru>
Acked-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>

The path_chmod hook was changed in the commit
"switch security_path_chmod() to struct path *" (cdcf116d).
The argument @mnt was removed from the hook, @dentry was changed
to @path. This patch updates the documentation accordingly.
Signed-off-by: NDenis Efremov <efremov@ispras.ru>
Acked-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>

The socket_getpeersec_dgram hook was changed in the commit
"[AF_UNIX]: Kernel memory leak fix for af_unix datagram
getpeersec patch" (dc49c1f9). The arguments @secdata
and @seclen were changed to @sock and @secid. This patch
updates the documentation accordingly.
Signed-off-by: NDenis Efremov <efremov@ispras.ru>
Acked-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>

The task_setscheduler hook was changed in the commit
"security: remove unused parameter from security_task_setscheduler()"
(b0ae1981). The arguments @policy, @lp were removed from the hook.
This patch updates the documentation accordingly.
Signed-off-by: NDenis Efremov <efremov@ispras.ru>
Acked-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>

This patch slightly fixes the documentation for the
socket_post_create hook. The documentation states that
i_security field is accessible through inode field of socket
structure (i.e., 'sock->inode->i_security'). There is no inode
field in the socket structure. The i_security field is accessible
through SOCK_INODE macro. The patch updates the documentation
to reflect this.
Signed-off-by: NDenis Efremov <efremov@ispras.ru>
Acked-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>

The syslog hook was changed in the commit
"capabilities/syslog: open code cap_syslog logic to
fix build failure" (12b3052c). The argument @from_file
was removed from the hook. This patch updates the
documentation for the syslog hook accordingly.
Signed-off-by: NDenis Efremov <efremov@ispras.ru>
Acked-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>

The @type argument of the sb_copy_data hook was removed
in the commit "LSM/SELinux: Interfaces to allow FS to control
mount options" (e0007529). This commit removes the description
of the @type argument from the LSM documentation.
Signed-off-by: NDenis Efremov <efremov@ispras.ru>
Acked-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>

Apparently without it it is incorrect syntax and causes a warning about
undocumented struct field.

Fixes: b230d5ab ("LSM: add new hook for kernfs node initialization")
Reported-by: Nkbuild test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NOndrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>

This patch introduces a new security hook that is intended for
initializing the security data for newly created kernfs nodes, which
provide a way of storing a non-default security context, but need to
operate independently from mounts (and therefore may not have an
associated inode at the moment of creation).

The main motivation is to allow kernfs nodes to inherit the context of
the parent under SELinux, similar to the behavior of
security_inode_init_security(). Other LSMs may implement their own logic
for handling the creation of new nodes.

This patch also adds helper functions to <linux/kernfs.h> for
getting/setting security xattrs of a kernfs node so that LSMs hooks are
able to do their job. Other important attributes should be accessible
direcly in the kernfs_node fields (in case there is need for more, then
new helpers should be added to kernfs.h along with the patch that needs
them).
Signed-off-by: NOndrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
[PM: more manual merge fixes]
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>

Add a move_mount() system call that will move a mount from one place to
another and, in the next commit, allow to attach an unattached mount tree.

The new system call looks like the following:

	int move_mount(int from_dfd, const char *from_path,
		       int to_dfd, const char *to_path,
		       unsigned int flags);
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

new primitive: vfs_dup_fs_context().  Comes with fs_context
method (->dup()) for copying the filesystem-specific parts
of fs_context, along with LSM one (->fs_context_dup()) for
doing the same to LSM parts.

[needs better commit message, and change of Author:, anyway]
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Add LSM hooks for use by the new mount API and filesystem context code.
This includes:

 (1) Hooks to handle allocation, duplication and freeing of the security
     record attached to a filesystem context.

 (2) A hook to snoop source specifications.  There may be multiple of these
     if the filesystem supports it.  They will to be local files/devices if
     fs_context::source_is_dev is true and will be something else, possibly
     remote server specifications, if false.

 (3) A hook to snoop superblock configuration options in key[=val] form.
     If the LSM decides it wants to handle it, it can suppress the option
     being passed to the filesystem.  Note that 'val' may include commas
     and binary data with the fsopen patch.

 (4) A hook to perform validation and allocation after the configuration
     has been done but before the superblock is allocated and set up.

 (5) A hook to transfer the security from the context to a newly created
     superblock.

 (6) A hook to rule on whether a path point can be used as a mountpoint.

These are intended to replace:

	security_sb_copy_data
	security_sb_kern_mount
	security_sb_mount
	security_sb_set_mnt_opts
	security_sb_clone_mnt_opts
	security_sb_parse_opts_str

[AV -- some of the methods being replaced are already gone, some of the
methods are not added for the lack of need]
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

The audit_rule_match() struct audit_context *actx parameter is not used
by any in-tree consumers (selinux, apparmour, integrity, smack).

The audit context is an internal audit structure that should only be
accessed by audit accessor functions.

It was part of commit 03d37d25 ("LSM/Audit: Introduce generic
Audit LSM hooks") but appears to have never been used.

Remove it.

Please see the github issue
https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/107Signed-off-by: NRichard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
[PM: fixed the referenced commit title]
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>

Since current->cred == current->real_cred when ordered_lsm_init()
is called, and lsm_early_cred()/lsm_early_task() need to be called
between the amount of required bytes is determined and module specific
initialization function is called, we can move these calls from
individual modules to ordered_lsm_init().
Signed-off-by: NTetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Acked-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>

This patch provides a general mechanism for passing flags to the
security_capable LSM hook. It replaces the specific 'audit' flag that is
used to tell security_capable whether it should log an audit message for
the given capability check. The reason for generalizing this flag
passing is so we can add an additional flag that signifies whether
security_capable is being called by a setid syscall (which is needed by
the proposed SafeSetID LSM).
Signed-off-by: NMicah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>

Move management of the kern_ipc_perm->security and
msg_msg->security blobs out of the individual security
modules and into the security infrastructure. Instead
of allocating the blobs from within the modules the modules
tell the infrastructure how much space is required, and
the space is allocated there.
Signed-off-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
[kees: adjusted for ordered init series]
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

Move management of the task_struct->security blob out
of the individual security modules and into the security
infrastructure. Instead of allocating the blobs from within
the modules the modules tell the infrastructure how much
space is required, and the space is allocated there.
The only user of this blob is AppArmor. The AppArmor use
is abstracted to avoid future conflict.
Signed-off-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
[kees: adjusted for ordered init series]
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

Move management of the inode->i_security blob out
of the individual security modules and into the security
infrastructure. Instead of allocating the blobs from within
the modules the modules tell the infrastructure how much
space is required, and the space is allocated there.
Signed-off-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
[kees: adjusted for ordered init series]
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

Move management of the file->f_security blob out of the
individual security modules and into the infrastructure.
The modules no longer allocate or free the data, instead
they tell the infrastructure how much space they require.
Signed-off-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
[kees: adjusted for ordered init series]
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

Move management of the cred security blob out of the
security modules and into the security infrastructre.
Instead of allocating and freeing space the security
modules tell the infrastructure how much space they
require.
Signed-off-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
[kees: adjusted for ordered init series]
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

This converts capabilities to use the new LSM_ORDER_FIRST position.
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>

In preparation for distinguishing the "capability" LSM from other LSMs, it
must be ordered first. This introduces LSM_ORDER_MUTABLE for the general
LSMs and LSM_ORDER_FIRST for capability. In the future LSM_ORDER_LAST
for could be added for anything that must run last (e.g. Landlock may
use this).
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

This converts Yama from being a direct "minor" LSM into an ordered LSM.
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>

This converts LoadPin from being a direct "minor" LSM into an ordered LSM.
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>

In order to both support old "security=" Legacy Major LSM selection, and
handling real exclusivity, this creates LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE and updates
the selection logic to handle them.
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>

Until now, any LSM without an enable storage variable was considered
enabled. This inverts the logic and sets defaults to true only if the
LSM gets added to the ordered initialization list. (And an exception
continues for the major LSMs until they are integrated into the ordered
initialization in a later patch.)
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

As a prerequisite to adjusting LSM selection logic in the future, this
moves the selection logic up out of the individual major LSMs, making
their init functions only run when actually enabled. This considers all
LSMs enabled by default unless they specified an external "enable"
variable.
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: NJohn Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>

In preparation for lifting the "is this LSM enabled?" logic out of the
individual LSMs, pass in any special enabled state tracking (as needed
for SELinux, AppArmor, and LoadPin). This should be an "int" to include
handling any future cases where "enabled" is exposed via sysctl which
has no "bool" type.
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: NJohn Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>

This adds a flag for the current "major" LSMs to distinguish them when
we have a universal method for ordering all LSMs. It's called "legacy"
since the distinction of "major" will go away in the blob-sharing world.
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: NJohn Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>

Adding options to growing mnt_opts.  NFS kludge with passing
context= down into non-text-options mount switched to it, and
with that the last use of ->sb_parse_opts_str() is gone.
Reviewed-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Keep void * instead, allocate on demand (in parse_str_opts, at the
moment).  Eventually both selinux and smack will be better off
with private structures with several strings in those, rather than
this "counter and two pointers to dynamically allocated arrays"
ugliness.  This commit allows to do that at leisure, without
disrupting anything outside of given module.

Changes:
	* instead of struct security_mnt_opt use an opaque pointer
initialized to NULL.
	* security_sb_eat_lsm_opts(), security_sb_parse_opts_str() and
security_free_mnt_opts() take it as var argument (i.e. as void **);
call sites are unchanged.
	* security_sb_set_mnt_opts() and security_sb_remount() take
it by value (i.e. as void *).
	* new method: ->sb_free_mnt_opts().  Takes void *, does
whatever freeing that needs to be done.
	* ->sb_set_mnt_opts() and ->sb_remount() might get NULL as
mnt_opts argument, meaning "empty".
Reviewed-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Kill ->sb_copy_data() - it's used only in combination with immediately
following ->sb_parse_opts_str().  Turn that combination into a new
method.

This is just a mechanical move - cleanups will be the next step.
Reviewed-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

... leaving the "is it kernel-internal" logics in the caller.
Reviewed-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

This paves the way for retaining the LSM options from a common filesystem
mount context during a mount parameter parsing phase to be instituted prior
to actual mount/reconfiguration actions.
Reviewed-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

This paves the way for retaining the LSM options from a common filesystem
mount context during a mount parameter parsing phase to be instituted prior
to actual mount/reconfiguration actions.
Reviewed-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>