smack_parse_opts_str() calls kfree(opts->mnt_opts) when kcalloc() for
opts->mnt_opts_flags failed. But it should not have called it because
security_free_mnt_opts() will call kfree(opts->mnt_opts).
Signed-off-by: NTetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
fixes: 3bf2789c ("smack: allow mount opts setting over filesystems with binary mount data")
Cc: Vivek Trivedi <t.vivek@samsung.com>
Cc: Amit Sahrawat <a.sahrawat@samsung.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>

Mark all of the registration hooks as __ro_after_init (via the
__lsm_ro_after_init macro).
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Acked-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

With previous changes every location that tests for
LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP also tests for LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE making the
LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP redundant, so remove it.
Signed-off-by: N"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>

I am still tired of having to find indirect ways to determine
what security modules are active on a system. I have added
/sys/kernel/security/lsm, which contains a comma separated
list of the active security modules. No more groping around
in /proc/filesystems or other clever hacks.

Unchanged from previous versions except for being updated
to the latest security next branch.
Signed-off-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: NJohn Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: NPaul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Acked-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>

As reported by yangshukui, a permission denial from security_task_wait()
can lead to a soft lockup in zap_pid_ns_processes() since it only expects
sys_wait4() to return 0 or -ECHILD. Further, security_task_wait() can
in general lead to zombies; in the absence of some way to automatically
reparent a child process upon a denial, the hook is not useful.  Remove
the security hook and its implementations in SELinux and Smack.  Smack
already removed its check from its hook.
Reported-by: Nyangshukui <yangshukui@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: NOleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>

The access to fd from anon_inode is always failed because there is
no set xattr operations. So this patch fixes to ignore private
inode including anon_inode for file functions.

It was only ignored for smack_file_receive() to share dma-buf fd,
but dma-buf has other functions like ioctl and mmap.

Reference: https://lkml.org/lkml/2015/4/17/16Signed-off-by: NSeung-Woo Kim <sw0312.kim@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>

Since 4b936885 (v2.6.32) all inodes on sockfs and pipefs are disconnected.
It caused filesystem specific code in smack_d_instantiate to be skipped,
because all inodes on those pseudo filesystems were treated as root inodes.
As a result all sockfs inodes had the Smack label set to floor.

In most cases access checks for sockets use socket_smack data so the inode
label is not important. But there are special cases that were broken.
One example would be calling fcntl with F_SETOWN command on a socket fd.

Now smack_d_instantiate expects all pipefs and sockfs inodes to be
disconnected and has the logic in appropriate place.
Signed-off-by: NRafal Krypa <r.krypa@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>

smack_file_open() is first checking the capability of calling subject,
this check will skip the SMACK logging for success case. Use smk_tskacc()
for proper logging and SMACK access check.
Signed-off-by: NHimanshu Shukla <himanshu.sh@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>

In smack_from_secattr function,"smack_known_list" is being traversed
using list_for_each_entry macro, although it is a rcu protected
structure. So it should be traversed using "list_for_each_entry_rcu"
macro to fetch the rcu protected entry.
Signed-off-by: NVishal Goel <vishal.goel@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: NHimanshu Shukla <himanshu.sh@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>

There is race condition issue while freeing the i_security blob in SMACK
module. There is existing condition where i_security can be freed while
inode_permission is called from path lookup on second CPU. There has been
observed the page fault with such condition. VFS code and Selinux module
takes care of this condition by freeing the inode and i_security field
using RCU via call_rcu(). But in SMACK directly the i_secuirty blob is
being freed. Use call_rcu() to fix this race condition issue.
Signed-off-by: NHimanshu Shukla <himanshu.sh@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: NVishal Goel <vishal.goel@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>

smk_copy_rules() and smk_copy_relabel() are initializing list_head though
they have been initialized already in new_task_smack() function. Delete
repeated initialization.
Signed-off-by: NHimanshu Shukla <himanshu.sh@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>

Fix the issue of wrong SMACK label (SMACK64IPIN) update when a second bind
call is made to same IP address & port, but with different SMACK label
(SMACK64IPIN) by second instance of server. In this case server returns
with "Bind:Address already in use" error but before returning, SMACK label
is updated in SMACK port-label mapping list inside smack_socket_bind() hook

To fix this issue a new check has been added in smk_ipv6_port_label()
function before updating the existing port entry. It checks whether the
socket for matching port entry is closed or not. If it is closed then it
means port is not bound and it is safe to update the existing port entry
else return if port is still getting used. For checking whether socket is
closed or not, one more field "smk_can_reuse" has been added in the
"smk_port_label" structure. This field will be set to '1' in
"smack_sk_free_security()" function which is called to free the socket
security blob when the socket is being closed. In this function, port entry
is searched in the SMACK port-label mapping list for the closing socket.
If entry is found then "smk_can_reuse" field is set to '1'.Initially
"smk_can_reuse" field is set to '0' in smk_ipv6_port_label() function after
creating a new entry in the list which indicates that socket is in use.
Signed-off-by: NVishal Goel <vishal.goel@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: NHimanshu Shukla <himanshu.sh@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>

Permission denied error comes when 2 IPv6 servers are running and client
tries to connect one of them. Scenario is that both servers are using same
IP and port but different protocols(Udp and tcp). They are using different
SMACK64IPIN labels.Tcp server is using "test" and udp server is using
"test-in". When we try to run tcp client with SMACK64IPOUT label as "test",
then connection denied error comes. It should not happen since both tcp
server and client labels are same.This happens because there is no check
for protocol in smk_ipv6_port_label() function while searching for the
earlier port entry. It checks whether there is an existing port entry on
the basis of port only. So it updates the earlier port entry in the list.
Due to which smack label gets changed for earlier entry in the
"smk_ipv6_port_list" list and permission denied error comes.

Now a check is added for socket type also.Now if 2 processes use same
port  but different protocols (tcp or udp), then 2 different port entries
will be  added in the list. Similarly while checking smack access in
smk_ipv6_port_check() function,  port entry is searched on the basis of
both port and protocol.
Signed-off-by: NVishal Goel <vishal.goel@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: NHimanshu Shukla <Himanshu.sh@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>

Add the rcu synchronization mechanism for accessing smk_ipv6_port_list
in smack IPv6 hooks. Access to the port list is vulnerable to a race
condition issue,it does not apply proper synchronization methods while
working on critical section. It is possible that when one thread is
reading the list, at the same time another thread is modifying the
same port list, which can cause the major problems.

To ensure proper synchronization between two threads, rcu mechanism
has been applied while accessing and modifying the port list. RCU will
also not affect the performance, as there are more accesses than
modification where RCU is most effective synchronization mechanism.
Signed-off-by: NVishal Goel <vishal.goel@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: NHimanshu Shukla <himanshu.sh@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>

Processes can only alter their own security attributes via
/proc/pid/attr nodes.  This is presently enforced by each individual
security module and is also imposed by the Linux credentials
implementation, which only allows a task to alter its own credentials.
Move the check enforcing this restriction from the individual
security modules to proc_pid_attr_write() before calling the security hook,
and drop the unnecessary task argument to the security hook since it can
only ever be the current task.
Signed-off-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: NJohn Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>

Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

The invalid Smack label ("") and the Huh ("?") Smack label
serve the same purpose and having both is unnecessary.
While pulling out the invalid label it became clear that
the use of smack_from_secid() was inconsistent, so that
is repaired. The setting of inode labels to the invalid
label could never happen in a functional system, has
never been observed in the wild and is not what you'd
really want for a failure behavior in any case. That is
removed.
Signed-off-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>

Since smack_parse_opts_str() is calling match_strdup() which uses
GFP_KERNEL, it is safe to use GFP_KERNEL from kcalloc() which is
called by smack_parse_opts_str().
Signed-off-by: NTetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Acked-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>

The check for a deleted entry in the list of IPv6 host
addresses was being performed in the wrong place, leading
to most peculiar results in some cases. This puts the
check into the right place.
Signed-off-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>

Memory leak in smack_cred_prepare()function.
smack_cred_prepare() hook returns error if there is error in allocating
memory in smk_copy_rules() or smk_copy_relabel() function.
If smack_cred_prepare() function returns error then the calling
function should call smack_cred_free() function for cleanup.
In smack_cred_free() function first credential is  extracted and
then all rules are deleted. In smack_cred_prepare() function security
field is assigned in the end when all function return success. But this
function may return before and memory will not be freed.
Signed-off-by: NHimanshu Shukla <himanshu.sh@samsung.com>
Acked-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>

Smack prohibits processes from using the star ("*") and web ("@") labels.
Checks have been added in other functions. In smack_setprocattr()
hook, only check for web ("@") label has been added and restricted
from applying web ("@") label.
Check for star ("*") label should also be added in smack_setprocattr()
hook. Return error should be "-EINVAL" not "-EPERM" as permission
is there for setting label but not the label value as star ("*") or
web ("@").
Signed-off-by: NHimanshu Shukla <himanshu.sh@samsung.com>
Acked-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>

In smack_set_mnt_opts()first the SMACK mount options are being
parsed and later it is being checked whether the user calling
mount has CAP_MAC_ADMIN capability.
This sequence of operationis will allow unauthorized user to add
SMACK labels in label list and may cause denial of security attack
by adding many labels by allocating kernel memory by unauthorized user.
Superblock smack flag is also being set as initialized though function
may return with EPERM error.
First check the capability of calling user then set the SMACK attributes
and smk_flags.
Signed-off-by: NHimanshu Shukla <himanshu.sh@samsung.com>
Acked-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>

Assign smack_known_web label for kernel thread's socket

Creating struct sock by sk_alloc function in various kernel subsystems
like bluetooth doesn't call smack_socket_post_create(). In such case,
received sock label is the floor('_') label and makes access deny.
Signed-off-by: Njooseong lee <jooseong.lee@samsung.com>
Acked-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>

Right now, various places in the kernel check for the existence of
getxattr, setxattr, and removexattr inode operations and directly call
those operations.  Switch to helper functions and test for the IOP_XATTR
flag instead.
Signed-off-by: NAndreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NJames Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Under a strict subject/object security policy delivering a
signal or delivering network IPC could be considered either
a write or an append operation. The original choice to make
both write operations leads to an issue where IPC delivery
is desired under policy, but delivery of signals is not.
This patch provides the option of making signal delivery
an append operation, allowing Smack rules that deny signal
delivery while allowing IPC. This was requested for Tizen.
Signed-off-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>

This makes it possible to route the error to the appropriate
labelling engine.  CALIPSO is far less verbose than CIPSO
when encountering a bogus packet, so there is no need for a
CALIPSO error handler.
Signed-off-by: NHuw Davies <huw@codeweavers.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>

The SMACK64, SMACK64EXEC, and SMACK64MMAP labels are all handled
differently in untrusted mounts. This is confusing and
potentically problematic. Change this to handle them all the same
way that SMACK64 is currently handled; that is, read the label
from disk and check it at use time. For SMACK64 and SMACK64MMAP
access is denied if the label does not match smk_root. To be
consistent with suid, a SMACK64EXEC label which does not match
smk_root will still allow execution of the file but will not run
with the label supplied in the xattr.
Signed-off-by: NSeth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Acked-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: NEric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>

Security labels from unprivileged mounts cannot be trusted.
Ideally for these mounts we would assign the objects in the
filesystem the same label as the inode for the backing device
passed to mount. Unfortunately it's currently impossible to
determine which inode this is from the LSM mount hooks, so we
settle for the label of the process doing the mount.

This label is assigned to s_root, and also to smk_default to
ensure that new inodes receive this label. The transmute property
is also set on s_root to make this behavior more explicit, even
though it is technically not necessary.

If a filesystem has existing security labels, access to inodes is
permitted if the label is the same as smk_root, otherwise access
is denied. The SMACK64EXEC xattr is completely ignored.

Explicit setting of security labels continues to require
CAP_MAC_ADMIN in init_user_ns.

Altogether, this ensures that filesystem objects are not
accessible to subjects which cannot already access the backing
store, that MAC is not violated for any objects in the fileystem
which are already labeled, and that a user cannot use an
unprivileged mount to gain elevated MAC privileges.

sysfs, tmpfs, and ramfs are already mountable from user
namespaces and support security labels. We can't rule out the
possibility that these filesystems may already be used in mounts
from user namespaces with security lables set from the init
namespace, so failing to trust lables in these filesystems may
introduce regressions. It is safe to trust labels from these
filesystems, since the unprivileged user does not control the
backing store and thus cannot supply security labels, so an
explicit exception is made to trust labels from these
filesystems.
Signed-off-by: NSeth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Acked-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: NEric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>

Kill with signal number 0 is commonly used for checking PID existence.
Smack treated such cases like any other kills, although no signal is
actually delivered when sig == 0.

Checking permissions when sig == 0 didn't prevent an unprivileged caller
from learning whether PID exists or not. When it existed, kernel returned
EPERM, when it didn't - ESRCH. The only effect of policy check in such
case is noise in audit logs.

This change lets Smack silently ignore kill() invocations with sig == 0.
Signed-off-by: NRafal Krypa <r.krypa@samsung.com>
Acked-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>

smack ->d_instantiate() uses ->setxattr(), so to be able to call it before
we'd hashed the new dentry and attached it to inode, we need ->setxattr()
instances getting the inode as an explicit argument rather than obtaining
it from dentry.

Similar change for ->getxattr() had been done in commit ce23e640.  Unlike
->getxattr() (which is used by both selinux and smack instances of
->d_instantiate()) ->setxattr() is used only by smack one and unfortunately
it got missed back then.
Reported-by: NSeung-Woo Kim <sw0312.kim@samsung.com>
Tested-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

... and neither can ever be NULL
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Before this commit, removing the access property of
a file, aka, the extended attribute security.SMACK64
was not effictive until the cache had been cleaned.

This patch fixes that problem.
Signed-off-by: NJosé Bollo <jobol@nonadev.net>
Acked-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>

Prior to the 4.2 kernel there no no harm in providing
a security module hook that does nothing, as the default
hook would get called if the module did not supply one.
With the list based infrastructure an empty hook adds
overhead. This patch removes the three Smack hooks that
don't actually do anything.
Signed-off-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>

It looks like smack and yama weren't aware that the ptrace mode
can have flags ORed into it - PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT until now, but
only for /proc/$pid/stat, and with the PTRACE_MODE_*CREDS patch,
all modes have flags ORed into them.
Signed-off-by: NJann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Acked-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Make the inode argument of the inode_getsecid hook non-const so that we
can use it to revalidate invalid security labels.
Signed-off-by: NAndreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>

Make the inode argument of the inode_getsecurity hook non-const so that
we can use it to revalidate invalid security labels.
Signed-off-by: NAndreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>

Smack security handler for sendmsg() syscall
is vulnerable to type confusion issue what
can allow to privilege escalation into root
or cause denial of service.

A malicious attacker can create socket of one
type for example AF_UNIX and pass is into
sendmsg() function ensuring that this is
AF_INET socket.

Remedy
Do not trust user supplied data.
Proposed fix below.
Signed-off-by: NRoman Kubiak <r.kubiak@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: NMateusz Fruba <m.fruba@samsung.com>
Acked-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>

Add a nfs_listxattr operation.  Move the call to security_inode_listsecurity
from list operation of the "security.*" xattr handler to nfs_listxattr.
Signed-off-by: NAndreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
Cc: Anna Schumaker <anna.schumaker@netapp.com>
Cc: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

The existing file receive hook checks for access on
the file inode even for UDS. This is not right, as
the inode is not used by Smack to make access checks
for sockets. This change checks for an appropriate
access relationship between the receiving (current)
process and the socket. If the process can't write
to the socket's send label or the socket's receive
label can't write to the process fail.

This will allow the legitimate cases, where the
socket sender and socket receiver can freely communicate.
Only strangly set socket labels should cause a problem.
Signed-off-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>