1. 04 10月, 2019 4 次提交
  2. 30 8月, 2019 1 次提交
  3. 26 7月, 2019 3 次提交
  4. 06 6月, 2019 1 次提交
    • N
      crypto: xxhash - Implement xxhash support · 67882e76
      Nikolay Borisov 提交于
      xxhash is currently implemented as a self-contained module in /lib.
      This patch enables that module to be used as part of the generic kernel
      crypto framework. It adds a simple wrapper to the 64bit version.
      
      I've also added test vectors (with help from Nick Terrell). The upstream
      xxhash code is tested by running hashing operation on random 222 byte
      data with seed values of 0 and a prime number. The upstream test
      suite can be found at https://github.com/Cyan4973/xxHash/blob/cf46e0c/xxhsum.c#L664
      
      Essentially hashing is run on data of length 0,1,14,222 with the
      aforementioned seed values 0 and prime 2654435761. The particular random
      222 byte string was provided to me by Nick Terrell by reading
      /dev/random and the checksums were calculated by the upstream xxsum
      utility with the following bash script:
      
      dd if=/dev/random of=TEST_VECTOR bs=1 count=222
      
      for a in 0 1; do
      	for l in 0 1 14 222; do
      		for s in 0 2654435761; do
      			echo algo $a length $l seed $s;
      			head -c $l TEST_VECTOR | ~/projects/kernel/xxHash/xxhsum -H$a -s$s
      		done
      	done
      done
      
      This produces output as follows:
      
      algo 0 length 0 seed 0
      02cc5d05  stdin
      algo 0 length 0 seed 2654435761
      02cc5d05  stdin
      algo 0 length 1 seed 0
      25201171  stdin
      algo 0 length 1 seed 2654435761
      25201171  stdin
      algo 0 length 14 seed 0
      c1d95975  stdin
      algo 0 length 14 seed 2654435761
      c1d95975  stdin
      algo 0 length 222 seed 0
      b38662a6  stdin
      algo 0 length 222 seed 2654435761
      b38662a6  stdin
      algo 1 length 0 seed 0
      ef46db3751d8e999  stdin
      algo 1 length 0 seed 2654435761
      ac75fda2929b17ef  stdin
      algo 1 length 1 seed 0
      27c3f04c2881203a  stdin
      algo 1 length 1 seed 2654435761
      4a15ed26415dfe4d  stdin
      algo 1 length 14 seed 0
      3d33dc700231dfad  stdin
      algo 1 length 14 seed 2654435761
      ea5f7ddef9a64f80  stdin
      algo 1 length 222 seed 0
      5f3d3c08ec2bef34  stdin
      algo 1 length 222 seed 2654435761
      6a9df59664c7ed62  stdin
      
      algo 1 is xx64 variant, algo 0 is the 32 bit variant which is currently
      not hooked up.
      Signed-off-by: NNikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com>
      Reviewed-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
      Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
      67882e76
  5. 31 5月, 2019 1 次提交
  6. 30 5月, 2019 1 次提交
  7. 18 4月, 2019 4 次提交
    • E
      crypto: testmgr - fuzz skciphers against their generic implementation · d435e10e
      Eric Biggers 提交于
      When the extra crypto self-tests are enabled, test each skcipher
      algorithm against its generic implementation when one is available.
      This involves: checking the algorithm properties for consistency, then
      randomly generating test vectors using the generic implementation and
      running them against the implementation under test.  Both good and bad
      inputs are tested.
      
      This has already detected a bug in the skcipher_walk API, a bug in the
      LRW template, and an inconsistency in the cts implementations.
      Signed-off-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
      Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
      d435e10e
    • E
      crypto: testmgr - expand ability to test for errors · 5283a8ee
      Eric Biggers 提交于
      Update testmgr to support testing for specific errors from setkey() and
      digest() for hashes; setkey() and encrypt()/decrypt() for skciphers and
      ciphers; and setkey(), setauthsize(), and encrypt()/decrypt() for AEADs.
      This is useful because algorithms usually restrict the lengths or format
      of the message, key, and/or authentication tag in some way.  And bad
      inputs should be tested too, not just good inputs.
      
      As part of this change, remove the ambiguously-named 'fail' flag and
      replace it with 'setkey_error = -EINVAL' for the only test vector that
      used it -- the DES weak key test vector.  Note that this tightens the
      test to require -EINVAL rather than any error code, but AFAICS this
      won't cause any test failure.
      
      Other than that, these new fields aren't set on any test vectors yet.
      Later patches will do so.
      Signed-off-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
      Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
      5283a8ee
    • V
      crypto: ecrdsa - add EC-RDSA test vectors to testmgr · 32fbdbd3
      Vitaly Chikunov 提交于
      Add testmgr test vectors for EC-RDSA algorithm for every of five
      supported parameters (curves). Because there are no officially published
      test vectors for the curves, the vectors are generated by gost-engine.
      Signed-off-by: NVitaly Chikunov <vt@altlinux.org>
      Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
      32fbdbd3
    • V
      X.509: parse public key parameters from x509 for akcipher · f1774cb8
      Vitaly Chikunov 提交于
      Some public key algorithms (like EC-DSA) keep in parameters field
      important data such as digest and curve OIDs (possibly more for
      different EC-DSA variants). Thus, just setting a public key (as
      for RSA) is not enough.
      
      Append parameters into the key stream for akcipher_set_{pub,priv}_key.
      Appended data is: (u32) algo OID, (u32) parameters length, parameters
      data.
      
      This does not affect current akcipher API nor RSA ciphers (they could
      ignore it). Idea of appending parameters to the key stream is by Herbert
      Xu.
      
      Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
      Cc: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
      Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
      Signed-off-by: NVitaly Chikunov <vt@altlinux.org>
      Reviewed-by: NDenis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
      Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
      f1774cb8
  8. 08 4月, 2019 1 次提交
    • E
      crypto: x86/poly1305 - fix overflow during partial reduction · 678cce40
      Eric Biggers 提交于
      The x86_64 implementation of Poly1305 produces the wrong result on some
      inputs because poly1305_4block_avx2() incorrectly assumes that when
      partially reducing the accumulator, the bits carried from limb 'd4' to
      limb 'h0' fit in a 32-bit integer.  This is true for poly1305-generic
      which processes only one block at a time.  However, it's not true for
      the AVX2 implementation, which processes 4 blocks at a time and
      therefore can produce intermediate limbs about 4x larger.
      
      Fix it by making the relevant calculations use 64-bit arithmetic rather
      than 32-bit.  Note that most of the carries already used 64-bit
      arithmetic, but the d4 -> h0 carry was different for some reason.
      
      To be safe I also made the same change to the corresponding SSE2 code,
      though that only operates on 1 or 2 blocks at a time.  I don't think
      it's really needed for poly1305_block_sse2(), but it doesn't hurt
      because it's already x86_64 code.  It *might* be needed for
      poly1305_2block_sse2(), but overflows aren't easy to reproduce there.
      
      This bug was originally detected by my patches that improve testmgr to
      fuzz algorithms against their generic implementation.  But also add a
      test vector which reproduces it directly (in the AVX2 case).
      
      Fixes: b1ccc8f4 ("crypto: poly1305 - Add a four block AVX2 variant for x86_64")
      Fixes: c70f4abe ("crypto: poly1305 - Add a SSE2 SIMD variant for x86_64")
      Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.3+
      Cc: Martin Willi <martin@strongswan.org>
      Cc: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
      Signed-off-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
      Reviewed-by: NMartin Willi <martin@strongswan.org>
      Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
      678cce40
  9. 22 2月, 2019 6 次提交
  10. 08 2月, 2019 3 次提交
    • E
      crypto: testmgr - convert hash testing to use testvec_configs · 4cc2dcf9
      Eric Biggers 提交于
      Convert alg_test_hash() to use the new test framework, adding a list of
      testvec_configs to test by default.  When the extra self-tests are
      enabled, randomly generated testvec_configs are tested as well.
      
      This improves hash test coverage mainly because now all algorithms have
      a variety of data layouts tested, whereas before each algorithm was
      responsible for declaring its own chunked test cases which were often
      missing or provided poor test coverage.  The new code also tests both
      the MAY_SLEEP and !MAY_SLEEP cases and buffers that cross pages.
      
      This already found bugs in the hash walk code and in the arm32 and arm64
      implementations of crct10dif.
      
      I removed the hash chunked test vectors that were the same as
      non-chunked ones, but left the ones that were unique.
      Signed-off-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
      Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
      4cc2dcf9
    • E
      crypto: testmgr - convert aead testing to use testvec_configs · ed96804f
      Eric Biggers 提交于
      Convert alg_test_aead() to use the new test framework, using the same
      list of testvec_configs that skcipher testing uses.
      
      This significantly improves AEAD test coverage mainly because previously
      there was only very limited test coverage of the possible data layouts.
      Now the data layouts to test are listed in one place for all algorithms
      and optionally are also randomly generated.  In fact, only one AEAD
      algorithm (AES-GCM) even had a chunked test case before.
      
      This already found bugs in all the AEGIS and MORUS implementations, the
      x86 AES-GCM implementation, and the arm64 AES-CCM implementation.
      
      I removed the AEAD chunked test vectors that were the same as
      non-chunked ones, but left the ones that were unique.
      
      Note: the rewritten test code allocates an aead_request just once per
      algorithm rather than once per encryption/decryption, but some AEAD
      algorithms incorrectly change the tfm pointer in the request.  It's
      nontrivial to fix these, so to move forward I'm temporarily working
      around it by resetting the tfm pointer.  But they'll need to be fixed.
      Signed-off-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
      Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
      ed96804f
    • E
      crypto: testmgr - convert skcipher testing to use testvec_configs · 4e7babba
      Eric Biggers 提交于
      Convert alg_test_skcipher() to use the new test framework, adding a list
      of testvec_configs to test by default.  When the extra self-tests are
      enabled, randomly generated testvec_configs are tested as well.
      
      This improves skcipher test coverage mainly because now all algorithms
      have a variety of data layouts tested, whereas before each algorithm was
      responsible for declaring its own chunked test cases which were often
      missing or provided poor test coverage.  The new code also tests both
      the MAY_SLEEP and !MAY_SLEEP cases, different IV alignments, and buffers
      that cross pages.
      
      This has already found a bug in the arm64 ctr-aes-neonbs algorithm.
      It would have easily found many past bugs.
      
      I removed the skcipher chunked test vectors that were the same as
      non-chunked ones, but left the ones that were unique.
      Signed-off-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
      Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
      4e7babba
  11. 25 1月, 2019 1 次提交
    • E
      crypto: clarify name of WEAK_KEY request flag · 231baecd
      Eric Biggers 提交于
      CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_WEAK_KEY confuses newcomers to the crypto API because it
      sounds like it is requesting a weak key.  Actually, it is requesting
      that weak keys be forbidden (for algorithms that have the notion of
      "weak keys"; currently only DES and XTS do).
      
      Also it is only one letter away from CRYPTO_TFM_RES_WEAK_KEY, with which
      it can be easily confused.  (This in fact happened in the UX500 driver,
      though just in some debugging messages.)
      
      Therefore, make the intent clear by renaming it to
      CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_FORBID_WEAK_KEYS.
      Signed-off-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
      Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
      231baecd
  12. 18 1月, 2019 4 次提交
    • E
      crypto: testmgr - unify the AEAD encryption and decryption test vectors · a0d608ee
      Eric Biggers 提交于
      Currently testmgr has separate encryption and decryption test vectors
      for AEADs.  That's massively redundant, since usually the decryption
      tests are identical to the encryption tests, just with the input/result
      swapped.  And for some algorithms it was forgotten to add decryption
      test vectors, so for them currently only encryption is being tested.
      
      Therefore, eliminate the redundancy by removing the AEAD decryption test
      vectors and updating testmgr to test both AEAD encryption and decryption
      using what used to be the encryption test vectors.  Naming is adjusted
      accordingly: each aead_testvec now has a 'ptext' (plaintext), 'plen'
      (plaintext length), 'ctext' (ciphertext), and 'clen' (ciphertext length)
      instead of an 'input', 'ilen', 'result', and 'rlen'.  "Ciphertext" here
      refers to the full ciphertext, including the authentication tag.
      
      For now the scatterlist divisions are just given for the plaintext
      length, not also the ciphertext length.  For decryption, the last
      scatterlist element is just extended by the authentication tag length.
      
      In total, this removes over 5000 lines from testmgr.h, with no reduction
      in test coverage since prior patches already copied the few unique
      decryption test vectors into the encryption test vectors.
      
      The testmgr.h portion of this patch was automatically generated using
      the following awk script, except that I also manually updated the
      definition of 'struct aead_testvec' and fixed the location of the
      comment describing the AEGIS-128 test vectors.
      
          BEGIN { OTHER = 0; ENCVEC = 1; DECVEC = 2; DECVEC_TAIL = 3; mode = OTHER }
      
          /^static const struct aead_testvec.*_enc_/ { sub("_enc", ""); mode = ENCVEC }
          /^static const struct aead_testvec.*_dec_/ { mode = DECVEC }
          mode == ENCVEC {
              sub(/\.input[[:space:]]*=/,     ".ptext\t=")
              sub(/\.result[[:space:]]*=/,    ".ctext\t=")
              sub(/\.ilen[[:space:]]*=/,      ".plen\t=")
              sub(/\.rlen[[:space:]]*=/,      ".clen\t=")
              print
          }
          mode == DECVEC_TAIL && /[^[:space:]]/ { mode = OTHER }
          mode == OTHER                         { print }
          mode == ENCVEC && /^};/               { mode = OTHER }
          mode == DECVEC && /^};/               { mode = DECVEC_TAIL }
      
      Note that git's default diff algorithm gets confused by the testmgr.h
      portion of this patch, and reports too many lines added and removed.
      It's better viewed with 'git diff --minimal' (or 'git show --minimal'),
      which reports "2 files changed, 1235 insertions(+), 6491 deletions(-)".
      Signed-off-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
      Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
      a0d608ee
    • E
      crypto: testmgr - add rfc4543(gcm(aes)) decryption test to encryption tests · d7250b41
      Eric Biggers 提交于
      One "rfc4543(gcm(aes))" decryption test vector doesn't exactly match any of the
      encryption test vectors with input and result swapped.  In preparation
      for removing the AEAD decryption test vectors and testing AEAD
      decryption using the encryption test vectors, add this to the encryption
      test vectors, so we don't lose any test coverage.
      Signed-off-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
      Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
      d7250b41
    • E
      crypto: testmgr - add gcm(aes) decryption tests to encryption tests · f38e8885
      Eric Biggers 提交于
      Some "gcm(aes)" decryption test vectors don't exactly match any of the
      encryption test vectors with input and result swapped.  In preparation
      for removing the AEAD decryption test vectors and testing AEAD
      decryption using the encryption test vectors, add these to the
      encryption test vectors, so we don't lose any test coverage.
      
      In the case of the chunked test vector, I truncated the last scatterlist
      element to the end of the plaintext.
      Signed-off-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
      Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
      f38e8885
    • E
      crypto: testmgr - add ccm(aes) decryption tests to encryption tests · de845da9
      Eric Biggers 提交于
      Some "ccm(aes)" decryption test vectors don't exactly match any of the
      encryption test vectors with input and result swapped.  In preparation
      for removing the AEAD decryption test vectors and testing AEAD
      decryption using the encryption test vectors, add these to the
      encryption test vectors, so we don't lose any test coverage.
      Signed-off-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
      Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
      de845da9
  13. 11 1月, 2019 2 次提交
    • E
      crypto: ofb - fix handling partial blocks and make thread-safe · b3e3e2db
      Eric Biggers 提交于
      Fix multiple bugs in the OFB implementation:
      
      1. It stored the per-request state 'cnt' in the tfm context, which can be
         used by multiple threads concurrently (e.g. via AF_ALG).
      2. It didn't support messages not a multiple of the block cipher size,
         despite being a stream cipher.
      3. It didn't set cra_blocksize to 1 to indicate it is a stream cipher.
      
      To fix these, set the 'chunksize' property to the cipher block size to
      guarantee that when walking through the scatterlist, a partial block can
      only occur at the end.  Then change the implementation to XOR a block at
      a time at first, then XOR the partial block at the end if needed.  This
      is the same way CTR and CFB are implemented.  As a bonus, this also
      improves performance in most cases over the current approach.
      
      Fixes: e497c518 ("crypto: ofb - add output feedback mode")
      Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.20+
      Cc: Gilad Ben-Yossef <gilad@benyossef.com>
      Signed-off-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
      Reviewed-by: NGilad Ben-Yossef <gilad@benyossef.com>
      Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
      b3e3e2db
    • E
      crypto: cfb - add missing 'chunksize' property · 394a9e04
      Eric Biggers 提交于
      Like some other block cipher mode implementations, the CFB
      implementation assumes that while walking through the scatterlist, a
      partial block does not occur until the end.  But the walk is incorrectly
      being done with a blocksize of 1, as 'cra_blocksize' is set to 1 (since
      CFB is a stream cipher) but no 'chunksize' is set.  This bug causes
      incorrect encryption/decryption for some scatterlist layouts.
      
      Fix it by setting the 'chunksize'.  Also extend the CFB test vectors to
      cover this bug as well as cases where the message length is not a
      multiple of the block size.
      
      Fixes: a7d85e06 ("crypto: cfb - add support for Cipher FeedBack mode")
      Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.17+
      Cc: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
      Signed-off-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
      Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
      394a9e04
  14. 13 12月, 2018 2 次提交
  15. 20 11月, 2018 4 次提交
    • E
      crypto: adiantum - add Adiantum support · 059c2a4d
      Eric Biggers 提交于
      Add support for the Adiantum encryption mode.  Adiantum was designed by
      Paul Crowley and is specified by our paper:
      
          Adiantum: length-preserving encryption for entry-level processors
          (https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/720.pdf)
      
      See our paper for full details; this patch only provides an overview.
      
      Adiantum is a tweakable, length-preserving encryption mode designed for
      fast and secure disk encryption, especially on CPUs without dedicated
      crypto instructions.  Adiantum encrypts each sector using the XChaCha12
      stream cipher, two passes of an ε-almost-∆-universal (εA∆U) hash
      function, and an invocation of the AES-256 block cipher on a single
      16-byte block.  On CPUs without AES instructions, Adiantum is much
      faster than AES-XTS; for example, on ARM Cortex-A7, on 4096-byte sectors
      Adiantum encryption is about 4 times faster than AES-256-XTS encryption,
      and decryption about 5 times faster.
      
      Adiantum is a specialization of the more general HBSH construction.  Our
      earlier proposal, HPolyC, was also a HBSH specialization, but it used a
      different εA∆U hash function, one based on Poly1305 only.  Adiantum's
      εA∆U hash function, which is based primarily on the "NH" hash function
      like that used in UMAC (RFC4418), is about twice as fast as HPolyC's;
      consequently, Adiantum is about 20% faster than HPolyC.
      
      This speed comes with no loss of security: Adiantum is provably just as
      secure as HPolyC, in fact slightly *more* secure.  Like HPolyC,
      Adiantum's security is reducible to that of XChaCha12 and AES-256,
      subject to a security bound.  XChaCha12 itself has a security reduction
      to ChaCha12.  Therefore, one need not "trust" Adiantum; one need only
      trust ChaCha12 and AES-256.  Note that the εA∆U hash function is only
      used for its proven combinatorical properties so cannot be "broken".
      
      Adiantum is also a true wide-block encryption mode, so flipping any
      plaintext bit in the sector scrambles the entire ciphertext, and vice
      versa.  No other such mode is available in the kernel currently; doing
      the same with XTS scrambles only 16 bytes.  Adiantum also supports
      arbitrary-length tweaks and naturally supports any length input >= 16
      bytes without needing "ciphertext stealing".
      
      For the stream cipher, Adiantum uses XChaCha12 rather than XChaCha20 in
      order to make encryption feasible on the widest range of devices.
      Although the 20-round variant is quite popular, the best known attacks
      on ChaCha are on only 7 rounds, so ChaCha12 still has a substantial
      security margin; in fact, larger than AES-256's.  12-round Salsa20 is
      also the eSTREAM recommendation.  For the block cipher, Adiantum uses
      AES-256, despite it having a lower security margin than XChaCha12 and
      needing table lookups, due to AES's extensive adoption and analysis
      making it the obvious first choice.  Nevertheless, for flexibility this
      patch also permits the "adiantum" template to be instantiated with
      XChaCha20 and/or with an alternate block cipher.
      
      We need Adiantum support in the kernel for use in dm-crypt and fscrypt,
      where currently the only other suitable options are block cipher modes
      such as AES-XTS.  A big problem with this is that many low-end mobile
      devices (e.g. Android Go phones sold primarily in developing countries,
      as well as some smartwatches) still have CPUs that lack AES
      instructions, e.g. ARM Cortex-A7.  Sadly, AES-XTS encryption is much too
      slow to be viable on these devices.  We did find that some "lightweight"
      block ciphers are fast enough, but these suffer from problems such as
      not having much cryptanalysis or being too controversial.
      
      The ChaCha stream cipher has excellent performance but is insecure to
      use directly for disk encryption, since each sector's IV is reused each
      time it is overwritten.  Even restricting the threat model to offline
      attacks only isn't enough, since modern flash storage devices don't
      guarantee that "overwrites" are really overwrites, due to wear-leveling.
      Adiantum avoids this problem by constructing a
      "tweakable super-pseudorandom permutation"; this is the strongest
      possible security model for length-preserving encryption.
      
      Of course, storing random nonces along with the ciphertext would be the
      ideal solution.  But doing that with existing hardware and filesystems
      runs into major practical problems; in most cases it would require data
      journaling (like dm-integrity) which severely degrades performance.
      Thus, for now length-preserving encryption is still needed.
      Signed-off-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
      Reviewed-by: NArd Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
      Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
      059c2a4d
    • E
      crypto: nhpoly1305 - add NHPoly1305 support · 26609a21
      Eric Biggers 提交于
      Add a generic implementation of NHPoly1305, an ε-almost-∆-universal hash
      function used in the Adiantum encryption mode.
      
      CONFIG_NHPOLY1305 is not selectable by itself since there won't be any
      real reason to enable it without also enabling Adiantum support.
      Signed-off-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
      Acked-by: NArd Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
      Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
      26609a21
    • E
      crypto: chacha - add XChaCha12 support · aa762409
      Eric Biggers 提交于
      Now that the generic implementation of ChaCha20 has been refactored to
      allow varying the number of rounds, add support for XChaCha12, which is
      the XSalsa construction applied to ChaCha12.  ChaCha12 is one of the
      three ciphers specified by the original ChaCha paper
      (https://cr.yp.to/chacha/chacha-20080128.pdf: "ChaCha, a variant of
      Salsa20"), alongside ChaCha8 and ChaCha20.  ChaCha12 is faster than
      ChaCha20 but has a lower, but still large, security margin.
      
      We need XChaCha12 support so that it can be used in the Adiantum
      encryption mode, which enables disk/file encryption on low-end mobile
      devices where AES-XTS is too slow as the CPUs lack AES instructions.
      
      We'd prefer XChaCha20 (the more popular variant), but it's too slow on
      some of our target devices, so at least in some cases we do need the
      XChaCha12-based version.  In more detail, the problem is that Adiantum
      is still much slower than we're happy with, and encryption still has a
      quite noticeable effect on the feel of low-end devices.  Users and
      vendors push back hard against encryption that degrades the user
      experience, which always risks encryption being disabled entirely.  So
      we need to choose the fastest option that gives us a solid margin of
      security, and here that's XChaCha12.  The best known attack on ChaCha
      breaks only 7 rounds and has 2^235 time complexity, so ChaCha12's
      security margin is still better than AES-256's.  Much has been learned
      about cryptanalysis of ARX ciphers since Salsa20 was originally designed
      in 2005, and it now seems we can be comfortable with a smaller number of
      rounds.  The eSTREAM project also suggests the 12-round version of
      Salsa20 as providing the best balance among the different variants:
      combining very good performance with a "comfortable margin of security".
      
      Note that it would be trivial to add vanilla ChaCha12 in addition to
      XChaCha12.  However, it's unneeded for now and therefore is omitted.
      
      As discussed in the patch that introduced XChaCha20 support, I
      considered splitting the code into separate chacha-common, chacha20,
      xchacha20, and xchacha12 modules, so that these algorithms could be
      enabled/disabled independently.  However, since nearly all the code is
      shared anyway, I ultimately decided there would have been little benefit
      to the added complexity.
      Reviewed-by: NArd Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
      Acked-by: NMartin Willi <martin@strongswan.org>
      Signed-off-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
      Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
      aa762409
    • E
      crypto: chacha20-generic - add XChaCha20 support · de61d7ae
      Eric Biggers 提交于
      Add support for the XChaCha20 stream cipher.  XChaCha20 is the
      application of the XSalsa20 construction
      (https://cr.yp.to/snuffle/xsalsa-20081128.pdf) to ChaCha20 rather than
      to Salsa20.  XChaCha20 extends ChaCha20's nonce length from 64 bits (or
      96 bits, depending on convention) to 192 bits, while provably retaining
      ChaCha20's security.  XChaCha20 uses the ChaCha20 permutation to map the
      key and first 128 nonce bits to a 256-bit subkey.  Then, it does the
      ChaCha20 stream cipher with the subkey and remaining 64 bits of nonce.
      
      We need XChaCha support in order to add support for the Adiantum
      encryption mode.  Note that to meet our performance requirements, we
      actually plan to primarily use the variant XChaCha12.  But we believe
      it's wise to first add XChaCha20 as a baseline with a higher security
      margin, in case there are any situations where it can be used.
      Supporting both variants is straightforward.
      
      Since XChaCha20's subkey differs for each request, XChaCha20 can't be a
      template that wraps ChaCha20; that would require re-keying the
      underlying ChaCha20 for every request, which wouldn't be thread-safe.
      Instead, we make XChaCha20 its own top-level algorithm which calls the
      ChaCha20 streaming implementation internally.
      
      Similar to the existing ChaCha20 implementation, we define the IV to be
      the nonce and stream position concatenated together.  This allows users
      to seek to any position in the stream.
      
      I considered splitting the code into separate chacha20-common, chacha20,
      and xchacha20 modules, so that chacha20 and xchacha20 could be
      enabled/disabled independently.  However, since nearly all the code is
      shared anyway, I ultimately decided there would have been little benefit
      to the added complexity of separate modules.
      Reviewed-by: NArd Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
      Acked-by: NMartin Willi <martin@strongswan.org>
      Signed-off-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
      Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
      de61d7ae
  16. 16 11月, 2018 1 次提交
  17. 09 11月, 2018 1 次提交