- 09 12月, 2021 3 次提交
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由 Peter Zijlstra 提交于
Make use of an upcoming GCC feature to mitigate straight-line-speculation for x86: https://gcc.gnu.org/g:53a643f8568067d7700a9f2facc8ba39974973d3 https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=102952 https://bugs.llvm.org/show_bug.cgi?id=52323 It's built tested on x86_64-allyesconfig using GCC-12 and GCC-11. Maintenance overhead of this should be fairly low due to objtool validation. Size overhead of all these additional int3 instructions comes to: text data bss dec hex filename 22267751 6933356 2011368 31212475 1dc43bb defconfig-build/vmlinux 22804126 6933356 1470696 31208178 1dc32f2 defconfig-build/vmlinux.sls Or roughly 2.4% additional text. Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211204134908.140103474@infradead.org
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由 Peter Zijlstra 提交于
Currently, text_poke_bp() is very strict to only allow patching a single instruction; however with straight-line-speculation it will be required to patch: ret; int3, which is two instructions. As such, relax the constraints a little to allow int3 padding for all instructions that do not imply the execution of the next instruction, ie: RET, JMP.d8 and JMP.d32. While there, rename the text_poke_loc::rel32 field to ::disp. Note: this fills up the text_poke_loc structure which is now a round 16 bytes big. [ bp: Put comments ontop instead of on the side. ] Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211204134908.082342723@infradead.org
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由 Peter Zijlstra 提交于
Replace all ret/retq instructions with ASM_RET in preparation of making it more than a single instruction. Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211204134907.964635458@infradead.org
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- 08 12月, 2021 5 次提交
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由 Peter Zijlstra 提交于
Replace all ret/retq instructions with RET in preparation of making RET a macro. Since AS is case insensitive it's a big no-op without RET defined. find arch/x86/ -name \*.S | while read file do sed -i 's/\<ret[q]*\>/RET/' $file done Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211204134907.905503893@infradead.org
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由 Peter Zijlstra 提交于
Principally, in order to get rid of #define RET in this code to make place for a new RET, but also to clarify the code, rename a bunch of things: s/UNLOCK/IRQ_RESTORE/ s/LOCK/IRQ_SAVE/ s/BEGIN/BEGIN_IRQ_SAVE/ s/\<RET\>/RET_IRQ_RESTORE/ s/RET_ENDP/\tRET_IRQ_RESTORE\rENDP/ which then leaves RET unused so it can be removed. Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211204134907.841623970@infradead.org
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由 Peter Zijlstra 提交于
In order to further enable commit: bbe2df3f ("x86/alternative: Try inline spectre_v2=retpoline,amd") add the new GCC flag -mindirect-branch-cs-prefix: https://gcc.gnu.org/g:2196a681d7810ad8b227bf983f38ba716620545e https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=102952 https://bugs.llvm.org/show_bug.cgi?id=52323 to RETPOLINE=y builds. This should allow fully inlining retpoline,amd for GCC builds. Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: NNick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211119165630.276205624@infradead.org
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由 Peter Zijlstra 提交于
Currently, RETPOLINE*_CFLAGS are defined in the top-level Makefile but only x86 makes use of them. Move them there. If ever another architecture finds the need, it can be reconsidered. [ bp: Massage a bit. ] Suggested-by: NNick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com> Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: NNick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211119165630.219152765@infradead.org
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由 Eric Dumazet 提交于
With more NICs supporting CHECKSUM_COMPLETE, and IPv6 being widely used csum_partial() is heavily used with small amount of bytes, and is consuming many cycles. IPv6 header size, for instance, is 40 bytes. Another thing to consider is that NET_IP_ALIGN is 0 on x86, meaning that network headers are not word-aligned, unless the driver forces this. This means that csum_partial() fetches one u16 to 'align the buffer', then performs three u64 additions with carry in a loop, then a remaining u32, then a remaining u16. With this new version, it performs a loop only for the 64 bytes blocks, then the remaining is bisected. Testing on various CPUs, all of them show a big reduction in csum_partial() cost (by 50 to 80 %) Before: 4.16% [kernel] [k] csum_partial After: 0.83% [kernel] [k] csum_partial If run in a loop 1,000,000 times: Before: 26,922,913 cycles # 3846130.429 GHz 80,302,961 instructions # 2.98 insn per cycle 21,059,816 branches # 3008545142.857 M/sec 2,896 branch-misses # 0.01% of all branches After: 17,960,709 cycles # 3592141.800 GHz 41,292,805 instructions # 2.30 insn per cycle 11,058,119 branches # 2211623800.000 M/sec 2,997 branch-misses # 0.03% of all branches [ bp: Massage, merge in subsequent fixes into a single patch: - um compilation error due to missing load_unaligned_zeropad(): - Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> - Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211118175239.1525650-1-eric.dumazet@gmail.com - Fix initial seed for odd buffers - Reported-by: Noah Goldstein <goldstein.w.n@gmail.com> - Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211125141817.3541501-1-eric.dumazet@gmail.com ] Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: NAlexander Duyck <alexanderduyck@fb.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211112161950.528886-1-eric.dumazet@gmail.com
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- 05 12月, 2021 5 次提交
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由 Tom Lendacky 提交于
Currently, an SEV-ES guest is terminated if the validation of the VMGEXIT exit code or exit parameters fails. The VMGEXIT instruction can be issued from userspace, even though userspace (likely) can't update the GHCB. To prevent userspace from being able to kill the guest, return an error through the GHCB when validation fails rather than terminating the guest. For cases where the GHCB can't be updated (e.g. the GHCB can't be mapped, etc.), just return back to the guest. The new error codes are documented in the lasest update to the GHCB specification. Fixes: 291bd20d ("KVM: SVM: Add initial support for a VMGEXIT VMEXIT") Signed-off-by: NTom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Message-Id: <b57280b5562893e2616257ac9c2d4525a9aeeb42.1638471124.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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由 Sean Christopherson 提交于
Use kvzalloc() to allocate KVM's buffer for SEV-ES's GHCB scratch area so that KVM falls back to __vmalloc() if physically contiguous memory isn't available. The buffer is purely a KVM software construct, i.e. there's no need for it to be physically contiguous. Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Message-Id: <20211109222350.2266045-3-seanjc@google.com> Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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由 Sean Christopherson 提交于
Return appropriate error codes if setting up the GHCB scratch area for an SEV-ES guest fails. In particular, returning -EINVAL instead of -ENOMEM when allocating the kernel buffer could be confusing as userspace would likely suspect a guest issue. Fixes: 8f423a80 ("KVM: SVM: Support MMIO for an SEV-ES guest") Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Message-Id: <20211109222350.2266045-2-seanjc@google.com> Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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由 Helge Deller 提交于
In commit c8c37359 ("parisc: Enhance detection of synchronous cr16 clocksources") I assumed that CPUs on the same physical core are syncronous. While booting up the kernel on two different C8000 machines, one with a dual-core PA8800 and one with a dual-core PA8900 CPU, this turned out to be wrong. The symptom was that I saw a jump in the internal clocks printed to the syslog and strange overall behaviour. On machines which have 4 cores (2 dual-cores) the problem isn't visible, because the current logic already marked the cr16 clocksource unstable in this case. This patch now marks the cr16 interval timers unstable if we have more than one CPU in the system, and it fixes this issue. Fixes: c8c37359 ("parisc: Enhance detection of synchronous cr16 clocksources") Signed-off-by: NHelge Deller <deller@gmx.de> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v5.15+
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由 Helge Deller 提交于
On newer debian releases the debian-provided "installkernel" script is installed in /usr/sbin. Fix the kernel install.sh script to look for the script in this directory as well. Signed-off-by: NHelge Deller <deller@gmx.de> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.13+
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- 04 12月, 2021 4 次提交
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由 Lai Jiangshan 提交于
In the native case, PER_CPU_VAR(cpu_tss_rw + TSS_sp0) is the trampoline stack. But XEN pv doesn't use trampoline stack, so PER_CPU_VAR(cpu_tss_rw + TSS_sp0) is also the kernel stack. In that case, source and destination stacks are identical, which means that reusing swapgs_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode() in XEN pv would cause %rsp to move up to the top of the kernel stack and leave the IRET frame below %rsp. This is dangerous as it can be corrupted if #NMI / #MC hit as either of these events occurring in the middle of the stack pushing would clobber data on the (original) stack. And, with XEN pv, swapgs_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode() pushing the IRET frame on to the original address is useless and error-prone when there is any future attempt to modify the code. [ bp: Massage commit message. ] Fixes: 7f2590a1 ("x86/entry/64: Use a per-CPU trampoline stack for IDT entries") Signed-off-by: NLai Jiangshan <laijs@linux.alibaba.com> Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: NBoris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211126101209.8613-4-jiangshanlai@gmail.com
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由 Lai Jiangshan 提交于
The commit c7589070 ("x86/entry/64: Remove unneeded kernel CR3 switching") removed a CR3 write in the faulting path of load_gs_index(). But the path's FENCE_SWAPGS_USER_ENTRY has no fence operation if PTI is enabled, see spectre_v1_select_mitigation(). Rather, it depended on the serializing CR3 write of SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 and since it got removed, add a FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL_ENTRY call to make sure speculation is blocked. [ bp: Massage commit message and comment. ] Fixes: c7589070 ("x86/entry/64: Remove unneeded kernel CR3 switching") Signed-off-by: NLai Jiangshan <laijs@linux.alibaba.com> Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211126101209.8613-3-jiangshanlai@gmail.com
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由 Lai Jiangshan 提交于
Commit 18ec54fd ("x86/speculation: Prepare entry code for Spectre v1 swapgs mitigations") added FENCE_SWAPGS_{KERNEL|USER}_ENTRY for conditional SWAPGS. In paranoid_entry(), it uses only FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL_ENTRY for both branches. This is because the fence is required for both cases since the CR3 write is conditional even when PTI is enabled. But 96b23714 ("x86/entry/64: Switch CR3 before SWAPGS in paranoid entry") changed the order of SWAPGS and the CR3 write. And it missed the needed FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL_ENTRY for the user gsbase case. Add it back by changing the branches so that FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL_ENTRY can cover both branches. [ bp: Massage, fix typos, remove obsolete comment while at it. ] Fixes: 96b23714 ("x86/entry/64: Switch CR3 before SWAPGS in paranoid entry") Signed-off-by: NLai Jiangshan <laijs@linux.alibaba.com> Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211126101209.8613-2-jiangshanlai@gmail.com
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由 Michael Sterritt 提交于
Properly type the operands being passed to __put_user()/__get_user(). Otherwise, these routines truncate data for dependent instructions (e.g., INSW) and only read/write one byte. This has been tested by sending a string with REP OUTSW to a port and then reading it back in with REP INSW on the same port. Previous behavior was to only send and receive the first char of the size. For example, word operations for "abcd" would only read/write "ac". With change, the full string is now written and read back. Fixes: f980f9c3 (x86/sev-es: Compile early handler code into kernel image) Signed-off-by: NMichael Sterritt <sterritt@google.com> Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: NMarc Orr <marcorr@google.com> Reviewed-by: NPeter Gonda <pgonda@google.com> Reviewed-by: NJoerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211119232757.176201-1-sterritt@google.com
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- 03 12月, 2021 2 次提交
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由 Joerg Roedel 提交于
The trampoline_pgd only maps the 0xfffffff000000000-0xffffffffffffffff range of kernel memory (with 4-level paging). This range contains the kernel's text+data+bss mappings and the module mapping space but not the direct mapping and the vmalloc area. This is enough to get the application processors out of real-mode, but for code that switches back to real-mode the trampoline_pgd is missing important parts of the address space. For example, consider this code from arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c, function machine_real_restart() for a 64-bit kernel: #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32 load_cr3(initial_page_table); #else write_cr3(real_mode_header->trampoline_pgd); /* Exiting long mode will fail if CR4.PCIDE is set. */ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PCID)) cr4_clear_bits(X86_CR4_PCIDE); #endif /* Jump to the identity-mapped low memory code */ #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32 asm volatile("jmpl *%0" : : "rm" (real_mode_header->machine_real_restart_asm), "a" (type)); #else asm volatile("ljmpl *%0" : : "m" (real_mode_header->machine_real_restart_asm), "D" (type)); #endif The code switches to the trampoline_pgd, which unmaps the direct mapping and also the kernel stack. The call to cr4_clear_bits() will find no stack and crash the machine. The real_mode_header pointer below points into the direct mapping, and dereferencing it also causes a crash. The reason this does not crash always is only that kernel mappings are global and the CR3 switch does not flush those mappings. But if theses mappings are not in the TLB already, the above code will crash before it can jump to the real-mode stub. Extend the trampoline_pgd to contain all kernel mappings to prevent these crashes and to make code which runs on this page-table more robust. Signed-off-by: NJoerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211202153226.22946-5-joro@8bytes.org
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由 Heiko Carstens 提交于
Signed-off-by: NHeiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
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- 02 12月, 2021 8 次提交
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由 Mark Rutland 提交于
When branch target identifiers are in use, code reachable via an indirect branch requires a BTI landing pad at the branch target site. When building FTRACE_WITH_REGS atop patchable-function-entry, we miss BTIs at the start start of the `ftrace_caller` and `ftrace_regs_caller` trampolines, and when these are called from a module via a PLT (which will use a `BR X16`), we will encounter a BTI failure, e.g. | # insmod lkdtm.ko | lkdtm: No crash points registered, enable through debugfs | # echo function_graph > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/current_tracer | # cat /sys/kernel/debug/provoke-crash/DIRECT | Unhandled 64-bit el1h sync exception on CPU0, ESR 0x34000001 -- BTI | CPU: 0 PID: 174 Comm: cat Not tainted 5.16.0-rc2-dirty #3 | Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) | pstate: 60400405 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=jc) | pc : ftrace_caller+0x0/0x3c | lr : lkdtm_debugfs_open+0xc/0x20 [lkdtm] | sp : ffff800012e43b00 | x29: ffff800012e43b00 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: ffff800012e43c88 | x26: 0000000000000000 x25: 0000000000000000 x24: ffff0000c171f200 | x23: ffff0000c27b1e00 x22: ffff0000c2265240 x21: ffff0000c23c8c30 | x20: ffff8000090ba380 x19: 0000000000000000 x18: 0000000000000000 | x17: 0000000000000000 x16: ffff80001002bb4c x15: 0000000000000000 | x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000900ff0 | x11: ffff0000c4166310 x10: ffff800012e43b00 x9 : ffff8000104f2384 | x8 : 0000000000000001 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 000000000000003f | x5 : 0000000000000040 x4 : ffff800012e43af0 x3 : 0000000000000001 | x2 : ffff8000090b0000 x1 : ffff0000c171f200 x0 : ffff0000c23c8c30 | Kernel panic - not syncing: Unhandled exception | CPU: 0 PID: 174 Comm: cat Not tainted 5.16.0-rc2-dirty #3 | Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) | Call trace: | dump_backtrace+0x0/0x1a4 | show_stack+0x24/0x30 | dump_stack_lvl+0x68/0x84 | dump_stack+0x1c/0x38 | panic+0x168/0x360 | arm64_exit_nmi.isra.0+0x0/0x80 | el1h_64_sync_handler+0x68/0xd4 | el1h_64_sync+0x78/0x7c | ftrace_caller+0x0/0x3c | do_dentry_open+0x134/0x3b0 | vfs_open+0x38/0x44 | path_openat+0x89c/0xe40 | do_filp_open+0x8c/0x13c | do_sys_openat2+0xbc/0x174 | __arm64_sys_openat+0x6c/0xbc | invoke_syscall+0x50/0x120 | el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0xdc/0x100 | do_el0_svc+0x84/0xa0 | el0_svc+0x28/0x80 | el0t_64_sync_handler+0xa8/0x130 | el0t_64_sync+0x1a0/0x1a4 | SMP: stopping secondary CPUs | Kernel Offset: disabled | CPU features: 0x0,00000f42,da660c5f | Memory Limit: none | ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Unhandled exception ]--- Fix this by adding the required `BTI C`, as we only require these to be reachable via BL for direct calls or BR X16/X17 for PLTs. For now, these are open-coded in the function prologue, matching the style of the `__hwasan_tag_mismatch` trampoline. In future we may wish to consider adding a new SYM_CODE_START_*() variant which has an implicit BTI. When ftrace is built atop mcount, the trampolines are marked with SYM_FUNC_START(), and so get an implicit BTI. We may need to change these over to SYM_CODE_START() in future for RELIABLE_STACKTRACE, in case we need to apply special care aroud the return address being rewritten. Fixes: 97fed779 ("arm64: bti: Provide Kconfig for kernel mode BTI") Signed-off-by: NMark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: NMark Brown <broonie@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211129135709.2274019-1-mark.rutland@arm.comSigned-off-by: NWill Deacon <will@kernel.org>
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由 Mark Rutland 提交于
In machine_kexec_post_load() we use __pa() on `empty_zero_page`, so that we can use the physical address during arm64_relocate_new_kernel() to switch TTBR1 to a new set of tables. While `empty_zero_page` is part of the old kernel, we won't clobber it until after this switch, so using it is benign. However, `empty_zero_page` is part of the kernel image rather than a linear map address, so it is not correct to use __pa(x), and we should instead use __pa_symbol(x) or __pa(lm_alias(x)). Otherwise, when the kernel is built with DEBUG_VIRTUAL, we'll encounter splats as below, as I've seen when fuzzing v5.16-rc3 with Syzkaller: | ------------[ cut here ]------------ | virt_to_phys used for non-linear address: 000000008492561a (empty_zero_page+0x0/0x1000) | WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 11492 at arch/arm64/mm/physaddr.c:15 __virt_to_phys+0x120/0x1c0 arch/arm64/mm/physaddr.c:12 | CPU: 3 PID: 11492 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.16.0-rc3-00001-g48bd452a045c #1 | Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) | pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) | pc : __virt_to_phys+0x120/0x1c0 arch/arm64/mm/physaddr.c:12 | lr : __virt_to_phys+0x120/0x1c0 arch/arm64/mm/physaddr.c:12 | sp : ffff80001af17bb0 | x29: ffff80001af17bb0 x28: ffff1cc65207b400 x27: ffffb7828730b120 | x26: 0000000000000e11 x25: 0000000000000000 x24: 0000000000000001 | x23: ffffb7828963e000 x22: ffffb78289644000 x21: 0000600000000000 | x20: 000000000000002d x19: 0000b78289644000 x18: 0000000000000000 | x17: 74706d6528206131 x16: 3635323934383030 x15: 303030303030203a | x14: 1ffff000035e2eb8 x13: ffff6398d53f4f0f x12: 1fffe398d53f4f0e | x11: 1fffe398d53f4f0e x10: ffff6398d53f4f0e x9 : ffffb7827c6f76dc | x8 : ffff1cc6a9fa7877 x7 : 0000000000000001 x6 : ffff6398d53f4f0f | x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : ffff1cc66f2a99c0 | x2 : 0000000000040000 x1 : d7ce7775b09b5d00 x0 : 0000000000000000 | Call trace: | __virt_to_phys+0x120/0x1c0 arch/arm64/mm/physaddr.c:12 | machine_kexec_post_load+0x284/0x670 arch/arm64/kernel/machine_kexec.c:150 | do_kexec_load+0x570/0x670 kernel/kexec.c:155 | __do_sys_kexec_load kernel/kexec.c:250 [inline] | __se_sys_kexec_load kernel/kexec.c:231 [inline] | __arm64_sys_kexec_load+0x1d8/0x268 kernel/kexec.c:231 | __invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:38 [inline] | invoke_syscall+0x90/0x2e0 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:52 | el0_svc_common.constprop.2+0x1e4/0x2f8 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:142 | do_el0_svc+0xf8/0x150 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:181 | el0_svc+0x60/0x248 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:603 | el0t_64_sync_handler+0x90/0xb8 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:621 | el0t_64_sync+0x180/0x184 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:572 | irq event stamp: 2428 | hardirqs last enabled at (2427): [<ffffb7827c6f2308>] __up_console_sem+0xf0/0x118 kernel/printk/printk.c:255 | hardirqs last disabled at (2428): [<ffffb7828223df98>] el1_dbg+0x28/0x80 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:375 | softirqs last enabled at (2424): [<ffffb7827c411c00>] softirq_handle_end kernel/softirq.c:401 [inline] | softirqs last enabled at (2424): [<ffffb7827c411c00>] __do_softirq+0xa28/0x11e4 kernel/softirq.c:587 | softirqs last disabled at (2417): [<ffffb7827c59015c>] do_softirq_own_stack include/asm-generic/softirq_stack.h:10 [inline] | softirqs last disabled at (2417): [<ffffb7827c59015c>] invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:439 [inline] | softirqs last disabled at (2417): [<ffffb7827c59015c>] __irq_exit_rcu kernel/softirq.c:636 [inline] | softirqs last disabled at (2417): [<ffffb7827c59015c>] irq_exit_rcu+0x53c/0x688 kernel/softirq.c:648 | ---[ end trace 0ca578534e7ca938 ]--- With or without DEBUG_VIRTUAL __pa() will fall back to __kimg_to_phys() for non-linear addresses, and will happen to do the right thing in this case, even with the warning. But we should not depend upon this, and to keep the warning useful we should fix this case. Fix this issue by using __pa_symbol(), which handles kernel image addresses (and checks its input is a kernel image address). This matches what we do elsewhere, e.g. in arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h: | #define ZERO_PAGE(vaddr) phys_to_page(__pa_symbol(empty_zero_page)) Fixes: 3744b528 ("arm64: kexec: install a copy of the linear-map") Signed-off-by: NMark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Cc: Pasha Tatashin <pasha.tatashin@soleen.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: NPasha Tatashin <pasha.tatashin@soleen.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211130121849.3319010-1-mark.rutland@arm.comSigned-off-by: NWill Deacon <will@kernel.org>
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由 Sean Christopherson 提交于
Bail from the page fault handler if the root shadow page was obsoleted by a memslot update. Do the check _after_ acuiring mmu_lock, as the TDP MMU doesn't rely on the memslot/MMU generation, and instead relies on the root being explicit marked invalid by kvm_mmu_zap_all_fast(), which takes mmu_lock for write. For the TDP MMU, inserting a SPTE into an obsolete root can leak a SP if kvm_tdp_mmu_zap_invalidated_roots() has already zapped the SP, i.e. has moved past the gfn associated with the SP. For other MMUs, the resulting behavior is far more convoluted, though unlikely to be truly problematic. Installing SPs/SPTEs into the obsolete root isn't directly problematic, as the obsolete root will be unloaded and dropped before the vCPU re-enters the guest. But because the legacy MMU tracks shadow pages by their role, any SP created by the fault can can be reused in the new post-reload root. Again, that _shouldn't_ be problematic as any leaf child SPTEs will be created for the current/valid memslot generation, and kvm_mmu_get_page() will not reuse child SPs from the old generation as they will be flagged as obsolete. But, given that continuing with the fault is pointess (the root will be unloaded), apply the check to all MMUs. Fixes: b7cccd39 ("KVM: x86/mmu: Fast invalidation for TDP MMU") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Ben Gardon <bgardon@google.com> Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Message-Id: <20211120045046.3940942-5-seanjc@google.com> Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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由 Dan Carpenter 提交于
The error paths in the prepare_vmcs02() function are supposed to set *entry_failure_code but this path does not. It leads to using an uninitialized variable in the caller. Fixes: 71f73470 ("KVM: nVMX: Load GUEST_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL MSR on VM-Entry") Signed-off-by: NDan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Message-Id: <20211130125337.GB24578@kili> Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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由 Paolo Bonzini 提交于
kvm_vcpu_apicv_active() returns false if a virtual machine has no in-kernel local APIC, however kvm_apicv_activated might still be true if there are no reasons to disable APICv; in fact it is quite likely that there is none because APICv is inhibited by specific configurations of the local APIC and those configurations cannot be programmed. This triggers a WARN: WARN_ON_ONCE(kvm_apicv_activated(vcpu->kvm) != kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu)); To avoid this, introduce another cause for APICv inhibition, namely the absence of an in-kernel local APIC. This cause is enabled by default, and is dropped by either KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP or the enabling of KVM_CAP_IRQCHIP_SPLIT. Reported-by: NIgnat Korchagin <ignat@cloudflare.com> Fixes: ee49a893 ("KVM: x86: Move SVM's APICv sanity check to common x86", 2021-10-22) Reviewed-by: NMaxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Tested-by: NIgnat Korchagin <ignat@cloudflare.com> Message-Id: <20211130123746.293379-1-pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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由 Like Xu 提交于
If we run the following perf command in an AMD Milan guest: perf stat \ -e cpu/event=0x1d0/ \ -e cpu/event=0x1c7/ \ -e cpu/umask=0x1f,event=0x18e/ \ -e cpu/umask=0x7,event=0x18e/ \ -e cpu/umask=0x18,event=0x18e/ \ ./workload dmesg will report a #GP warning from an unchecked MSR access error on MSR_F15H_PERF_CTLx. This is because according to APM (Revision: 4.03) Figure 13-7, the bits [35:32] of AMD PerfEvtSeln register is a part of the event select encoding, which extends the EVENT_SELECT field from 8 bits to 12 bits. Opportunistically update pmu->reserved_bits for reserved bit 19. Reported-by: NJim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Fixes: ca724305 ("KVM: x86/vPMU: Implement AMD vPMU code for KVM") Signed-off-by: NLike Xu <likexu@tencent.com> Message-Id: <20211118130320.95997-1-likexu@tencent.com> Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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由 Feng Tang 提交于
There are cases that the TSC clocksource is wrongly judged as unstable by the clocksource watchdog mechanism which tries to validate the TSC against HPET, PM_TIMER or jiffies. While there is hardly a general reliable way to check the validity of a watchdog, Thomas Gleixner proposed [1]: "I'm inclined to lift that requirement when the CPU has: 1) X86_FEATURE_CONSTANT_TSC 2) X86_FEATURE_NONSTOP_TSC 3) X86_FEATURE_NONSTOP_TSC_S3 4) X86_FEATURE_TSC_ADJUST 5) At max. 4 sockets After two decades of horrors we're finally at a point where TSC seems to be halfway reliable and less abused by BIOS tinkerers. TSC_ADJUST was really key as we can now detect even small modifications reliably and the important point is that we can cure them as well (not pretty but better than all other options)." As feature #3 X86_FEATURE_NONSTOP_TSC_S3 only exists on several generations of Atom processorz, and is always coupled with X86_FEATURE_CONSTANT_TSC and X86_FEATURE_NONSTOP_TSC, skip checking it, and also be more defensive to use maximal 2 sockets. The check is done inside tsc_init() before registering 'tsc-early' and 'tsc' clocksources, as there were cases that both of them had been wrongly judged as unreliable. For more background of tsc/watchdog, there is a good summary in [2] [tglx} Update vs. jiffies: On systems where the only remaining clocksource aside of TSC is jiffies there is no way to make this work because that creates a circular dependency. Jiffies accuracy depends on not missing a periodic timer interrupt, which is not guaranteed. That could be detected by TSC, but as TSC is not trusted this cannot be compensated. The consequence is a circulus vitiosus which results in shutting down TSC and falling back to the jiffies clocksource which is even more unreliable. [1]. https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/87eekfk8bd.fsf@nanos.tec.linutronix.de/ [2]. https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/87a6pimt1f.ffs@nanos.tec.linutronix.de/ [ tglx: Refine comment and amend changelog ] Fixes: 6e3cd952 ("x86/hpet: Use another crystalball to evaluate HPET usability") Suggested-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: NFeng Tang <feng.tang@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@kernel.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211117023751.24190-2-feng.tang@intel.com
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由 Feng Tang 提交于
The TSC_ADJUST register is checked every time a CPU enters idle state, but Thomas Gleixner mentioned there is still a caveat that a system won't enter idle [1], either because it's too busy or configured purposely to not enter idle. Setup a periodic timer (every 10 minutes) to make sure the check is happening on a regular base. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/875z286xtk.fsf@nanos.tec.linutronix.de/ Fixes: 6e3cd952 ("x86/hpet: Use another crystalball to evaluate HPET usability") Requested-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: NFeng Tang <feng.tang@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@kernel.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211117023751.24190-1-feng.tang@intel.com
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- 01 12月, 2021 4 次提交
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由 Marco Elver 提交于
save_sw_bytes() did not fully initialize sw_bytes, which caused KMSAN to report an infoleak (see below). Initialize sw_bytes explicitly to avoid this. KMSAN report follows: ===================================================== BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in instrument_copy_to_user ./include/linux/instrumented.h:121 BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in __copy_to_user ./include/linux/uaccess.h:154 BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in save_xstate_epilog+0x2df/0x510 arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c:127 instrument_copy_to_user ./include/linux/instrumented.h:121 __copy_to_user ./include/linux/uaccess.h:154 save_xstate_epilog+0x2df/0x510 arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c:127 copy_fpstate_to_sigframe+0x861/0xb60 arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c:245 get_sigframe+0x656/0x7e0 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:296 __setup_rt_frame+0x14d/0x2a60 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:471 setup_rt_frame arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:781 handle_signal arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:825 arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x417/0xdd0 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:870 handle_signal_work kernel/entry/common.c:149 exit_to_user_mode_loop+0x1f6/0x490 kernel/entry/common.c:173 exit_to_user_mode_prepare kernel/entry/common.c:208 __syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:290 syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x7e/0xc0 kernel/entry/common.c:302 do_syscall_64+0x60/0xd0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:88 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae ??:? Local variable sw_bytes created at: save_xstate_epilog+0x80/0x510 arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c:121 copy_fpstate_to_sigframe+0x861/0xb60 arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c:245 Bytes 20-47 of 48 are uninitialized Memory access of size 48 starts at ffff8880801d3a18 Data copied to user address 00007ffd90e2ef50 ===================================================== Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAG_fn=V9T6OKPonSjsi9PmWB0hMHFC=yawozdft8i1-MSxrv=w@mail.gmail.com/ Fixes: 53599b4d ("x86/fpu/signal: Prepare for variable sigframe length") Reported-by: NAlexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Signed-off-by: NMarco Elver <elver@google.com> Signed-off-by: NAlexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Signed-off-by: NDave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Tested-by: NAlexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211126124746.761278-1-glider@google.com
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由 Tony Luck 提交于
Convention for all the other "lake" CPUs is all one word. So s/RAPTOR_LAKE/RAPTORLAKE/ Fixes: fbdb5e8f ("x86/cpu: Add Raptor Lake to Intel family") Reported-by: NRui Zhang <rui.zhang@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NTony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NDave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211119170832.1034220-1-tony.luck@intel.com
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由 Helge Deller 提交于
Add some more config options which reflect what's needed to boot our 64-bit debian buildds out of the box. Signed-off-by: NHelge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
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由 Helge Deller 提交于
Default KBUILD_IMAGE to $(boot)/bzImage if a self-extracting (CONFIG_PARISC_SELF_EXTRACT=y) kernel is to be built. This fixes the bindeb-pkg make target. Signed-off-by: NHelge Deller <deller@gmx.de> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.14+
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- 30 11月, 2021 9 次提交
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由 Paolo Bonzini 提交于
avic_set_running() passes the current CPU to avic_vcpu_load(), albeit via vcpu->cpu rather than smp_processor_id(). If the thread is migrated while avic_set_running runs, the call to avic_vcpu_load() can use a stale value for the processor id. Avoid this by blocking preemption over the entire execution of avic_set_running(). Reported-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Fixes: 8221c137 ("svm: Manage vcpu load/unload when enable AVIC") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: NMaxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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由 Paolo Bonzini 提交于
There is nothing to synchronize if APICv is disabled, since neither other vCPUs nor assigned devices can set PIR.ON. Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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由 Paolo Bonzini 提交于
Generally, kvm->lock is not taken for a long time, but sev_lock_two_vms is different: it takes vCPU locks inside, so userspace can hold it back just by calling a vCPU ioctl. Play it safe and use mutex_lock_killable. Message-Id: <20211123005036.2954379-13-pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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由 Paolo Bonzini 提交于
Taking the lock is useless since there are no other references, and there are already accesses (e.g. to sev->enc_context_owner) that do not take it. So get rid of it. Reviewed-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Message-Id: <20211123005036.2954379-12-pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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由 Paolo Bonzini 提交于
VMs that mirror an encryption context rely on the owner to keep the ASID allocated. Performing a KVM_CAP_VM_MOVE_ENC_CONTEXT_FROM would cause a dangling ASID: 1. copy context from A to B (gets ref to A) 2. move context from A to L (moves ASID from A to L) 3. close L (releases ASID from L, B still references it) The right way to do the handoff instead is to create a fresh mirror VM on the destination first: 1. copy context from A to B (gets ref to A) [later] 2. close B (releases ref to A) 3. move context from A to L (moves ASID from A to L) 4. copy context from L to M So, catch the situation by adding a count of how many VMs are mirroring this one's encryption context. Fixes: 0b020f5a ("KVM: SEV: Add support for SEV-ES intra host migration") Message-Id: <20211123005036.2954379-11-pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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由 Paolo Bonzini 提交于
Now that we have a facility to lock two VMs with deadlock protection, use it for the creation of mirror VMs as well. One of COPY_ENC_CONTEXT_FROM(dst, src) and COPY_ENC_CONTEXT_FROM(src, dst) would always fail, so the combination is nonsensical and it is okay to return -EBUSY if it is attempted. This sidesteps the question of what happens if a VM is MOVE_ENC_CONTEXT_FROM'd at the same time as it is COPY_ENC_CONTEXT_FROM'd: the locking prevents that from happening. Cc: Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com> Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Reviewed-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Message-Id: <20211123005036.2954379-10-pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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由 Paolo Bonzini 提交于
Allow intra-host migration of a mirror VM; the destination VM will be a mirror of the same ASID as the source. Fixes: b5663931 ("KVM: SEV: Add support for SEV intra host migration") Reviewed-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Message-Id: <20211123005036.2954379-8-pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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由 Paolo Bonzini 提交于
This was broken before the introduction of KVM_CAP_VM_MOVE_ENC_CONTEXT_FROM, but technically harmless because the region list was unused for a mirror VM. However, it is untidy and it now causes a NULL pointer access when attempting to move the encryption context of a mirror VM. Fixes: 54526d1f ("KVM: x86: Support KVM VMs sharing SEV context") Message-Id: <20211123005036.2954379-7-pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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由 Paolo Bonzini 提交于
Encapsulate the handling of the migration_in_progress flag for both VMs in two functions sev_lock_two_vms and sev_unlock_two_vms. It does not matter if KVM_CAP_VM_MOVE_ENC_CONTEXT_FROM locks the destination struct kvm a bit later, and this change 1) keeps the cleanup chain of labels smaller 2) makes it possible for KVM_CAP_VM_COPY_ENC_CONTEXT_FROM to reuse the logic. Cc: Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com> Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Message-Id: <20211123005036.2954379-6-pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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