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  1. 10 8月, 2017 6 次提交
  3. 09 8月, 2017 1 次提交
  5. 29 7月, 2017 1 次提交
    • D
      IB/cma: Fix default RoCE type setting · 3c7f67d1
      由 Doug Ledford 提交于 
      The initial patch for changing the stack to use RoCEv2 GIDs by default
set the CMA_PREFERRED_ROCE_GID_TYPE to an incorrect value.  Instead of
an absolute value, we needed to set the right bit in a bitmask.  Correct
the default setting so we use RoCEv2 by default.

Fixes: 63a5f483 (IB/cma: Set default gid type to RoCEv2)
Signed-off-by: NDoug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
      3c7f67d1
  7. 24 7月, 2017 6 次提交
  9. 20 7月, 2017 3 次提交
  11. 18 7月, 2017 4 次提交
  13. 17 7月, 2017 3 次提交
    • M
      IB/core: Don't resolve IP address to the loopback device · cbd09aeb
      由 Moni Shoua 提交于 
      When resolving an IP address that is on the host of the caller the
result from querying the routing table is the loopback device. This is
not a valid response, because it doesn't represent the RDMA device and
the port.

Therefore, callers need to check the resolved device and if it is a
loopback device find an alternative way to resolve it. To avoid this we
make sure that the response from rdma_resolve_ip() will not be the
loopback device.

While that, we fix an static checker warning about dereferencing an
unintitialized pointer using the same solution as in commit abeffce9
("net/mlx5e: Fix a -Wmaybe-uninitialized warning") as a reference.
Signed-off-by: NMoni Shoua <monis@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: NLeon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NDoug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
      cbd09aeb
    • M
      IB/core: Namespace is mandatory input for address resolution · bebb2a47
      由 Moni Shoua 提交于 
      In function addr_resolve() the namespace is a required input parameter
and not an output. It is passed later for searching the routing table
and device addresses. Also, it shouldn't be copied back to the caller.

Fixes: 565edd1d ('IB/addr: Pass network namespace as a parameter')
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.3+
Signed-off-by: NMoni Shoua <monis@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: NLeon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NDoug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
      bebb2a47
    • G
      RDMA/core: Document confusing code · 28b5b3a2
      由 Gustavo A. R. Silva 提交于 
      While looking into Coverity ID 1351047 I ran into the following
piece of code at
drivers/infiniband/core/verbs.c:496:

ret = rdma_addr_find_l2_eth_by_grh(&dgid, &sgid,
                                   ah_attr->dmac,
                                   wc->wc_flags & IB_WC_WITH_VLAN ?
                                   NULL : &vlan_id,
                                   &if_index, &hoplimit);

The issue here is that the position of arguments in the call to
rdma_addr_find_l2_eth_by_grh() function do not match the order of
the parameters:

&dgid is passed to sgid
&sgid is passed to dgid

This is the function prototype:

int rdma_addr_find_l2_eth_by_grh(const union ib_gid *sgid,
 				 const union ib_gid *dgid,
 				 u8 *dmac, u16 *vlan_id, int *if_index,
 				 int *hoplimit)

My question here is if this is intentional?

Answer:
Yes. ib_init_ah_from_wc() creates ah from the incoming packet.
Incoming packet has dgid of the receiver node on which this code is
getting executed and sgid contains the GID of the sender.

When resolving mac address of destination, you use arrived dgid as
sgid and use sgid as dgid because sgid contains destinations GID whom to
respond to.
Signed-off-by: NGustavo A. R. Silva <garsilva@embeddedor.com>
Signed-off-by: NDoug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
      28b5b3a2
  15. 07 7月, 2017 2 次提交
  17. 03 7月, 2017 1 次提交
    • B
      RDMA/uverbs: Check port number supplied by user verbs cmds · 5ecce4c9
      由 Boris Pismenny 提交于 
      The ib_uverbs_create_ah() ind ib_uverbs_modify_qp() calls receive
the port number from user input as part of its attributes and assumes
it is valid. Down on the stack, that parameter is used to access kernel
data structures.  If the value is invalid, the kernel accesses memory
it should not.  To prevent this, verify the port number before using it.

BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ib_uverbs_create_ah+0x6d5/0x7b0
Read of size 4 at addr ffff880018d67ab8 by task syz-executor/313

BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in modify_qp.isra.4+0x19d0/0x1ef0
Read of size 4 at addr ffff88006c40ec58 by task syz-executor/819

Fixes: 67cdb40c ("[IB] uverbs: Implement more commands")
Fixes: 189aba99 ("IB/uverbs: Extend modify_qp and support packet pacing")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v2.6.14+
Cc: <security@kernel.org>
Cc: Yevgeny Kliteynik <kliteyn@mellanox.com>
Cc: Tziporet Koren <tziporet@mellanox.com>
Cc: Alex Polak <alexpo@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: NBoris Pismenny <borisp@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: NLeon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NDoug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
      5ecce4c9
  19. 28 6月, 2017 1 次提交
  21. 16 6月, 2017 1 次提交
    • J
      networking: make skb_put & friends return void pointers · 4df864c1
      由 Johannes Berg 提交于 
      It seems like a historic accident that these return unsigned char *,
and in many places that means casts are required, more often than not.

Make these functions (skb_put, __skb_put and pskb_put) return void *
and remove all the casts across the tree, adding a (u8 *) cast only
where the unsigned char pointer was used directly, all done with the
following spatch:

    @@
    expression SKB, LEN;
    typedef u8;
    identifier fn = { skb_put, __skb_put };
    @@
    - *(fn(SKB, LEN))
    + *(u8 *)fn(SKB, LEN)

    @@
    expression E, SKB, LEN;
    identifier fn = { skb_put, __skb_put };
    type T;
    @@
    - E = ((T *)(fn(SKB, LEN)))
    + E = fn(SKB, LEN)

which actually doesn't cover pskb_put since there are only three
users overall.

A handful of stragglers were converted manually, notably a macro in
drivers/isdn/i4l/isdn_bsdcomp.c and, oddly enough, one of the many
instances in net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c. In the former file, I also
had to fix one whitespace problem spatch introduced.
Signed-off-by: NJohannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      4df864c1
  23. 08 6月, 2017 1 次提交
    • R
      IB/addr: Fix setting source address in addr6_resolve() · 79e25959
      由 Roland Dreier 提交于 
      Commit eea40b8f ("infiniband: call ipv6 route lookup via the stub
interface") introduced a regression in address resolution when connecting
to IPv6 destination addresses.  The old code called ip6_route_output(),
while the new code calls ipv6_stub->ipv6_dst_lookup().  The two are almost
the same, except that ipv6_dst_lookup() also calls ip6_route_get_saddr()
if the source address is in6addr_any.

This means that the test of ipv6_addr_any(&fl6.saddr) now never succeeds,
and so we never copy the source address out.  This ends up causing
rdma_resolve_addr() to fail, because without a resolved source address,
cma_acquire_dev() will fail to find an RDMA device to use.  For me, this
causes connecting to an NVMe over Fabrics target via RoCE / IPv6 to fail.

Fix this by copying out fl6.saddr if ipv6_addr_any() is true for the original
source address passed into addr6_resolve().  We can drop our call to
ipv6_dev_get_saddr() because ipv6_dst_lookup() already does that work.

Fixes: eea40b8f ("infiniband: call ipv6 route lookup via the stub interface")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 3.12+
Signed-off-by: NRoland Dreier <roland@purestorage.com>
Acked-by: NPaolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NDoug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
      79e25959
  25. 02 6月, 2017 5 次提交
  27. 24 5月, 2017 3 次提交
    • D
      IB/core: Enforce security on management datagrams · 47a2b338
      由 Daniel Jurgens 提交于 
      Allocate and free a security context when creating and destroying a MAD
agent.  This context is used for controlling access to PKeys and sending
and receiving SMPs.

When sending or receiving a MAD check that the agent has permission to
access the PKey for the Subnet Prefix of the port.

During MAD and snoop agent registration for SMI QPs check that the
calling process has permission to access the manage the subnet  and
register a callback with the LSM to be notified of policy changes. When
notificaiton of a policy change occurs recheck permission and set a flag
indicating sending and receiving SMPs is allowed.

When sending and receiving MADs check that the agent has access to the
SMI if it's on an SMI QP.  Because security policy can change it's
possible permission was allowed when creating the agent, but no longer
is.
Signed-off-by: NDaniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com>
Acked-by: NDoug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
[PM: remove the LSM hook init code]
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
      47a2b338
    • D
      selinux lsm IB/core: Implement LSM notification system · 8f408ab6
      由 Daniel Jurgens 提交于 
      Add a generic notificaiton mechanism in the LSM. Interested consumers
can register a callback with the LSM and security modules can produce
events.

Because access to Infiniband QPs are enforced in the setup phase of a
connection security should be enforced again if the policy changes.
Register infiniband devices for policy change notification and check all
QPs on that device when the notification is received.

Add a call to the notification mechanism from SELinux when the AVC
cache changes or setenforce is cleared.
Signed-off-by: NDaniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com>
Acked-by: NJames Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Acked-by: NDoug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
      8f408ab6
    • D
      IB/core: Enforce PKey security on QPs · d291f1a6
      由 Daniel Jurgens 提交于 
      Add new LSM hooks to allocate and free security contexts and check for
permission to access a PKey.

Allocate and free a security context when creating and destroying a QP.
This context is used for controlling access to PKeys.

When a request is made to modify a QP that changes the port, PKey index,
or alternate path, check that the QP has permission for the PKey in the
PKey table index on the subnet prefix of the port. If the QP is shared
make sure all handles to the QP also have access.

Store which port and PKey index a QP is using. After the reset to init
transition the user can modify the port, PKey index and alternate path
independently. So port and PKey settings changes can be a merge of the
previous settings and the new ones.

In order to maintain access control if there are PKey table or subnet
prefix change keep a list of all QPs are using each PKey index on
each port. If a change occurs all QPs using that device and port must
have access enforced for the new cache settings.

These changes add a transaction to the QP modify process. Association
with the old port and PKey index must be maintained if the modify fails,
and must be removed if it succeeds. Association with the new port and
PKey index must be established prior to the modify and removed if the
modify fails.

1. When a QP is modified to a particular Port, PKey index or alternate
   path insert that QP into the appropriate lists.

2. Check permission to access the new settings.

3. If step 2 grants access attempt to modify the QP.

4a. If steps 2 and 3 succeed remove any prior associations.

4b. If ether fails remove the new setting associations.

If a PKey table or subnet prefix changes walk the list of QPs and
check that they have permission. If not send the QP to the error state
and raise a fatal error event. If it's a shared QP make sure all the
QPs that share the real_qp have permission as well. If the QP that
owns a security structure is denied access the security structure is
marked as such and the QP is added to an error_list. Once the moving
the QP to error is complete the security structure mark is cleared.

Maintaining the lists correctly turns QP destroy into a transaction.
The hardware driver for the device frees the ib_qp structure, so while
the destroy is in progress the ib_qp pointer in the ib_qp_security
struct is undefined. When the destroy process begins the ib_qp_security
structure is marked as destroying. This prevents any action from being
taken on the QP pointer. After the QP is destroyed successfully it
could still listed on an error_list wait for it to be processed by that
flow before cleaning up the structure.

If the destroy fails the QPs port and PKey settings are reinserted into
the appropriate lists, the destroying flag is cleared, and access control
is enforced, in case there were any cache changes during the destroy
flow.

To keep the security changes isolated a new file is used to hold security
related functionality.
Signed-off-by: NDaniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com>
Acked-by: NDoug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
[PM: merge fixup in ib_verbs.h and uverbs_cmd.c]
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
      d291f1a6
  29. 23 5月, 2017 1 次提交
  31. 02 5月, 2017 1 次提交