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  1. 22 8月, 2023 1 次提交
  3. 20 7月, 2023 1 次提交
  5. 16 5月, 2023 1 次提交
  7. 07 12月, 2022 1 次提交
  9. 18 11月, 2022 1 次提交
  11. 11 11月, 2022 3 次提交
    • S
      x86/msr: Add PerfCntrGlobal* registers · f29be156
      由 Sandipan Das 提交于 
      mainline inclusion
from mainline-v5.19
commit 089be16d
category: feature
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5S3WV
CVE: NA

-------------------------------------------------

Add MSR definitions that will be used to enable the new AMD
Performance Monitoring Version 2 (PerfMonV2) features. These
include:

  * Performance Counter Global Control (PerfCntrGlobalCtl)
  * Performance Counter Global Status (PerfCntrGlobalStatus)
  * Performance Counter Global Status Clear (PerfCntrGlobalStatusClr)

The new Performance Counter Global Control and Status MSRs
provide an interface for enabling or disabling multiple
counters at the same time and for testing overflow without
probing the individual registers for each PMC.

The availability of these registers is indicated through the
PerfMonV2 feature bit of CPUID leaf 0x80000022 EAX.
Signed-off-by: NSandipan Das <sandipan.das@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/cdc0d8f75bd519848731b5c64d924f5a0619a573.1650515382.git.sandipan.das@amd.comSigned-off-by: NXie Haocheng <haocheng.xie@amd.com>
      f29be156
    • X
      perf/x86/amd: Add AMD Fam19h Branch Sampling support · f760d3d7
      由 Xie Haocheng 提交于 
      mainline inclusion
from mainline-v5.19
commit ada54345
category: feature
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5S3WV
CVE: NA

-------------------------------------------------

Add support for the AMD Fam19h 16-deep branch sampling feature as
described in the AMD PPR Fam19h Model 01h Revision B1.  This is a model
specific extension. It is not an architected AMD feature.

The Branch Sampling (BRS) operates with a 16-deep saturating buffer in MSR
registers. There is no branch type filtering. All control flow changes are
captured. BRS relies on specific programming of the core PMU of Fam19h.  In
particular, the following requirements must be met:
 - the sampling period be greater than 16 (BRS depth)
 - the sampling period must use a fixed and not frequency mode

BRS interacts with the NMI interrupt as well. Because enabling BRS is
expensive, it is only activated after P event occurrences, where P is the
desired sampling period.  At P occurrences of the event, the counter
overflows, the CPU catches the interrupt, activates BRS for 16 branches until
it saturates, and then delivers the NMI to the kernel.  Between the overflow
and the time BRS activates more branches may be executed skewing the period.
All along, the sampling event keeps counting. The skid may be attenuated by
reducing the sampling period by 16 (subsequent patch).

BRS is integrated into perf_events seamlessly via the same
PERF_RECORD_BRANCH_STACK sample format. BRS generates perf_branch_entry
records in the sampling buffer. No prediction information is supported. The
branches are stored in reverse order of execution.  The most recent branch is
the first entry in each record.

No modification to the perf tool is necessary.

BRS can be used with any sampling event. However, it is recommended to use
the RETIRED_BRANCH_INSTRUCTIONS event because it matches what the BRS
captures.

$ perf record -b -c 1000037 -e cpu/event=0xc2,name=ret_br_instructions/ test

$ perf report -D
56531696056126 0x193c000 [0x1a8]: PERF_RECORD_SAMPLE(IP, 0x2): 18122/18230: 0x401d24 period: 1000037 addr: 0
... branch stack: nr:16
.....  0: 0000000000401d24 -> 0000000000401d5a 0 cycles      0
.....  1: 0000000000401d5c -> 0000000000401d24 0 cycles      0
.....  2: 0000000000401d22 -> 0000000000401d5c 0 cycles      0
.....  3: 0000000000401d5e -> 0000000000401d22 0 cycles      0
.....  4: 0000000000401d20 -> 0000000000401d5e 0 cycles      0
.....  5: 0000000000401d3e -> 0000000000401d20 0 cycles      0
.....  6: 0000000000401d42 -> 0000000000401d3e 0 cycles      0
.....  7: 0000000000401d3c -> 0000000000401d42 0 cycles      0
.....  8: 0000000000401d44 -> 0000000000401d3c 0 cycles      0
.....  9: 0000000000401d3a -> 0000000000401d44 0 cycles      0
..... 10: 0000000000401d46 -> 0000000000401d3a 0 cycles      0
..... 11: 0000000000401d38 -> 0000000000401d46 0 cycles      0
..... 12: 0000000000401d48 -> 0000000000401d38 0 cycles      0
..... 13: 0000000000401d36 -> 0000000000401d48 0 cycles      0
..... 14: 0000000000401d4a -> 0000000000401d36 0 cycles      0
..... 15: 0000000000401d34 -> 0000000000401d4a 0 cycles      0
 ... thread: test:18230
 ...... dso: test
Signed-off-by: NStephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220322221517.2510440-4-eranian@google.comSigned-off-by: NXie Haocheng <haocheng.xie@amd.com>
      f760d3d7
    • T
      x86/cpu: Add VM page flush MSR availablility as a CPUID feature · 66cccc91
      由 Tom Lendacky 提交于 
      mainline inclusion
from mainline-v5.11
commit 69372cf0
category: feature
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5S3WV
CVE: NA

-------------------------------------------------

On systems that do not have hardware enforced cache coherency between
encrypted and unencrypted mappings of the same physical page, the
hypervisor can use the VM page flush MSR (0xc001011e) to flush the cache
contents of an SEV guest page. When a small number of pages are being
flushed, this can be used in place of issuing a WBINVD across all CPUs.

CPUID 0x8000001f_eax[2] is used to determine if the VM page flush MSR is
available. Add a CPUID feature to indicate it is supported and define the
MSR.
Signed-off-by: NTom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <f1966379e31f9b208db5257509c4a089a87d33d0.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NXie Haocheng <haocheng.xie@amd.com>
      66cccc91
  13. 31 10月, 2022 1 次提交
  15. 08 10月, 2022 1 次提交
  17. 21 9月, 2022 1 次提交
    • D
      x86/speculation: Add RSB VM Exit protections · 30b1e4cb
      由 Daniel Sneddon 提交于 
      stable inclusion
from stable-v5.10.136
commit 509c2c9fe75ea7493eebbb6bb2f711f37530ae19
category: bugfix
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I5N1SO
CVE: CVE-2022-26373

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=509c2c9fe75ea7493eebbb6bb2f711f37530ae19

--------------------------------

commit 2b129932 upstream.

tl;dr: The Enhanced IBRS mitigation for Spectre v2 does not work as
documented for RET instructions after VM exits. Mitigate it with a new
one-entry RSB stuffing mechanism and a new LFENCE.

== Background ==

Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation (IBRS) was designed to help
mitigate Branch Target Injection and Speculative Store Bypass, i.e.
Spectre, attacks. IBRS prevents software run in less privileged modes
from affecting branch prediction in more privileged modes. IBRS requires
the MSR to be written on every privilege level change.

To overcome some of the performance issues of IBRS, Enhanced IBRS was
introduced.  eIBRS is an "always on" IBRS, in other words, just turn
it on once instead of writing the MSR on every privilege level change.
When eIBRS is enabled, more privileged modes should be protected from
less privileged modes, including protecting VMMs from guests.

== Problem ==

Here's a simplification of how guests are run on Linux' KVM:

void run_kvm_guest(void)
{
	// Prepare to run guest
	VMRESUME();
	// Clean up after guest runs
}

The execution flow for that would look something like this to the
processor:

1. Host-side: call run_kvm_guest()
2. Host-side: VMRESUME
3. Guest runs, does "CALL guest_function"
4. VM exit, host runs again
5. Host might make some "cleanup" function calls
6. Host-side: RET from run_kvm_guest()

Now, when back on the host, there are a couple of possible scenarios of
post-guest activity the host needs to do before executing host code:

* on pre-eIBRS hardware (legacy IBRS, or nothing at all), the RSB is not
touched and Linux has to do a 32-entry stuffing.

* on eIBRS hardware, VM exit with IBRS enabled, or restoring the host
IBRS=1 shortly after VM exit, has a documented side effect of flushing
the RSB except in this PBRSB situation where the software needs to stuff
the last RSB entry "by hand".

IOW, with eIBRS supported, host RET instructions should no longer be
influenced by guest behavior after the host retires a single CALL
instruction.

However, if the RET instructions are "unbalanced" with CALLs after a VM
exit as is the RET in #6, it might speculatively use the address for the
instruction after the CALL in #3 as an RSB prediction. This is a problem
since the (untrusted) guest controls this address.

Balanced CALL/RET instruction pairs such as in step #5 are not affected.

== Solution ==

The PBRSB issue affects a wide variety of Intel processors which
support eIBRS. But not all of them need mitigation. Today,
X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT triggers an RSB filling sequence that mitigates
PBRSB. Systems setting RSB_VMEXIT need no further mitigation - i.e.,
eIBRS systems which enable legacy IBRS explicitly.

However, such systems (X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED) do not set RSB_VMEXIT
and most of them need a new mitigation.

Therefore, introduce a new feature flag X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT_LITE
which triggers a lighter-weight PBRSB mitigation versus RSB_VMEXIT.

The lighter-weight mitigation performs a CALL instruction which is
immediately followed by a speculative execution barrier (INT3). This
steers speculative execution to the barrier -- just like a retpoline
-- which ensures that speculation can never reach an unbalanced RET.
Then, ensure this CALL is retired before continuing execution with an
LFENCE.

In other words, the window of exposure is opened at VM exit where RET
behavior is troublesome. While the window is open, force RSB predictions
sampling for RET targets to a dead end at the INT3. Close the window
with the LFENCE.

There is a subset of eIBRS systems which are not vulnerable to PBRSB.
Add these systems to the cpu_vuln_whitelist[] as NO_EIBRS_PBRSB.
Future systems that aren't vulnerable will set ARCH_CAP_PBRSB_NO.

  [ bp: Massage, incorporate review comments from Andy Cooper. ]
Signed-off-by: NDaniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>
Co-developed-by: NPawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NPawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

conflict:
    arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
Signed-off-by: NChen Jiahao <chenjiahao16@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NZhang Jianhua <chris.zjh@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NLiao Chang <liaochang1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>
      30b1e4cb
  19. 20 9月, 2022 3 次提交
  21. 29 7月, 2022 1 次提交
    • F
      x86/traps: Handle #DB for bus lock · c8db5890
      由 Fenghua Yu 提交于 
      mainline inclusion
from mainline-v5.12-rc4
commit ebb1064e
category: feature
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/intel-kernel/issues/I5G10C
CVE: NA
Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/
commit/?id=ebb1064e

Intel-SIG: commit ebb1064e x86/traps: Handle #DB for bus lock

--------------------------------

Bus locks degrade performance for the whole system, not just for the CPU
that requested the bus lock. Two CPU features "#AC for split lock" and
"#DB for bus lock" provide hooks so that the operating system may choose
one of several mitigation strategies.

bus lock feature to cover additional situations with new options to
mitigate.

split_lock_detect=
		#AC for split lock		#DB for bus lock

off		Do nothing			Do nothing

warn		Kernel OOPs			Warn once per task and
		Warn once per task and		and continues to run.
		disable future checking
	 	When both features are
		supported, warn in #AC

fatal		Kernel OOPs			Send SIGBUS to user.
		Send SIGBUS to user
		When both features are
		supported, fatal in #AC

ratelimit:N	Do nothing			Limit bus lock rate to
						N per second in the
						current non-root user.

Default option is "warn".

Hardware only generates #DB for bus lock detect when CPL>0 to avoid
nested #DB from multiple bus locks while the first #DB is being handled.
So no need to handle #DB for bus lock detected in the kernel.

while #AC for split lock is enabled by split lock detection bit 29 in
TEST_CTRL MSR.

Both breakpoint and bus lock in the same instruction can trigger one #DB.
The bus lock is handled before the breakpoint in the #DB handler.

Delivery of #DB for bus lock in userspace clears DR6[11], which is set by
the #DB handler right after reading DR6.
Signed-off-by: NFenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: NTony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210322135325.682257-3-fenghua.yu@intel.com

(cherry picked from commit ebb1064e)
Signed-off-by: NEthan Zhao <haifeng.zhao@linux.intel.com>
      c8db5890
  23. 08 7月, 2022 1 次提交
  25. 06 7月, 2022 2 次提交
  27. 22 2月, 2022 2 次提交
  29. 29 12月, 2021 2 次提交
  31. 18 9月, 2020 1 次提交
  33. 10 9月, 2020 1 次提交
  35. 08 9月, 2020 2 次提交
  37. 18 8月, 2020 2 次提交
    • K
      perf/x86/intel: Support TopDown metrics on Ice Lake · 59a854e2
      由 Kan Liang 提交于 
      Ice Lake supports the hardware TopDown metrics feature, which can free
up the scarce GP counters.

Update the event constraints for the metrics events. The metric counters
do not exist, which are mapped to a dummy offset. The sharing between
multiple users of the same metric without multiplexing is not allowed.

Implement set_topdown_event_period for Ice Lake. The values in
PERF_METRICS MSR are derived from the fixed counter 3. Both registers
should start from zero.

Implement update_topdown_event for Ice Lake. The metric is reported by
multiplying the metric (fraction) with slots. To maintain accurate
measurements, both registers are cleared for each update. The fixed
counter 3 should always be cleared before the PERF_METRICS.

Implement td_attr for the new metrics events and the new slots fixed
counter. Make them visible to the perf user tools.
Signed-off-by: NKan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200723171117.9918-11-kan.liang@linux.intel.com
      59a854e2
    • K
      perf/x86/intel: Generic support for hardware TopDown metrics · 7b2c05a1
      由 Kan Liang 提交于 
      Intro
=====

The TopDown Microarchitecture Analysis (TMA) Method is a structured
analysis methodology to identify critical performance bottlenecks in
out-of-order processors. Current perf has supported the method.

The method works well, but there is one problem. To collect the TopDown
events, several GP counters have to be used. If a user wants to collect
other events at the same time, the multiplexing probably be triggered,
which impacts the accuracy.

To free up the scarce GP counters, the hardware TopDown metrics feature
is introduced from Ice Lake. The hardware implements an additional
"metrics" register and a new Fixed Counter 3 that measures pipeline
"slots". The TopDown events can be calculated from them instead.

Events
======

The level 1 TopDown has four metrics. There is no event-code assigned to
the TopDown metrics. Four metric events are exported as separate perf
events, which map to the internal "metrics" counter register. Those
events do not exist in hardware, but can be allocated by the scheduler.

For the event mapping, a special 0x00 event code is used, which is
reserved for fake events. The metric events start from umask 0x10.

When setting up the metric events, they point to the Fixed Counter 3.
They have to be specially handled.
- Add the update_topdown_event() callback to read the additional metrics
  MSR and generate the metrics.
- Add the set_topdown_event_period() callback to initialize metrics MSR
  and the fixed counter 3.
- Add a variable n_metric_event to track the number of the accepted
  metrics events. The sharing between multiple users of the same metric
  without multiplexing is not allowed.
- Only enable/disable the fixed counter 3 when there are no other active
  TopDown events, which avoid the unnecessary writing of the fixed
  control register.
- Disable the PMU when reading the metrics event. The metrics MSR and
  the fixed counter 3 are read separately. The values may be modified by
  an NMI.

All four metric events don't support sampling. Since they will be
handled specially for event update, a flag PERF_X86_EVENT_TOPDOWN is
introduced to indicate this case.

The slots event can support both sampling and counting.
For counting, the flag is also applied.
For sampling, it will be handled normally as other normal events.

Groups
======

The slots event is required in a Topdown group.
To avoid reading the METRICS register multiple times, the metrics and
slots value can only be updated by slots event in a group.
All active slots and metrics events will be updated one time.
Therefore, the slots event must be before any metric events in a Topdown
group.

NMI
======

The METRICS related register may be overflow. The bit 48 of the STATUS
register will be set. If so, PERF_METRICS and Fixed counter 3 are
required to be reset. The patch also update all active slots and
metrics events in the NMI handler.

The update_topdown_event() has to read two registers separately. The
values may be modified by an NMI. PMU has to be disabled before calling
the function.

RDPMC
======

RDPMC is temporarily disabled. A later patch will enable it.
Suggested-by: NPeter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: NKan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200723171117.9918-9-kan.liang@linux.intel.com
      7b2c05a1
  39. 08 7月, 2020 1 次提交
  41. 02 7月, 2020 1 次提交
    • S
      cpufreq: intel_pstate: Allow enable/disable energy efficiency · ed7bde7a
      由 Srinivas Pandruvada 提交于 
      By default intel_pstate the driver disables energy efficiency by setting
MSR_IA32_POWER_CTL bit 19 for Kaby Lake desktop CPU model in HWP mode.
This CPU model is also shared by Coffee Lake desktop CPUs. This allows
these systems to reach maximum possible frequency. But this adds power
penalty, which some customers don't want. They want some way to enable/
disable dynamically.

So, add an additional attribute "energy_efficiency" under
/sys/devices/system/cpu/intel_pstate/ for these CPU models. This allows
to read and write bit 19 ("Disable Energy Efficiency Optimization") in
the MSR IA32_POWER_CTL.

This attribute is present in both HWP and non-HWP mode as this has an
effect in both modes. Refer to Intel Software Developer's manual for
details.

The scope of this bit is package wide. Also these systems are single
package systems. So read/write MSR on the current CPU is enough.

The energy efficiency (EE) bit setting needs to be preserved during
suspend/resume and CPU offline/online operation. To do this:
- Restoring the EE setting from the cpufreq resume() callback, if there
is change from the system default.
- By default, don't disable EE from cpufreq init() callback for matching
CPU models. Since the scope is package wide and is a single package
system, move the disable EE calls from init() callback to
intel_pstate_init() function, which is called only once.
Suggested-by: NLen Brown <lenb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NSrinivas Pandruvada <srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NRafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
      ed7bde7a
  43. 22 6月, 2020 1 次提交
    • B
      x86/msr: Move the F15h MSRs where they belong · 99e40204
      由 Borislav Petkov 提交于 
      1068ed45 ("x86/msr: Lift AMD family 0x15 power-specific MSRs")

moved the three F15h power MSRs to the architectural list but that was
wrong as they belong in the family 0x15 list. That also caused:

  In file included from trace/beauty/tracepoints/x86_msr.c:10:
  perf/trace/beauty/generated/x86_arch_MSRs_array.c:292:45: error: initialized field overwritten [-Werror=override-init]
    292 |  [0xc0010280 - x86_AMD_V_KVM_MSRs_offset] = "F15H_PTSC",
        |                                             ^~~~~~~~~~~
  perf/trace/beauty/generated/x86_arch_MSRs_array.c:292:45: note: (near initialization for 'x86_AMD_V_KVM_MSRs[640]')

due to MSR_F15H_PTSC ending up being defined twice. Move them where they
belong and drop the duplicate.

Also, drop the respective tools/ changes of the msr-index.h copy the
above commit added because perf tool developers prefer to go through
those changes themselves in order to figure out whether changes to the
kernel headers would need additional handling in perf.

Fixes: 1068ed45 ("x86/msr: Lift AMD family 0x15 power-specific MSRs")
Reported-by: NStephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: NArnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200621163323.14e8533f@canb.auug.org.au
      99e40204
  45. 16 6月, 2020 1 次提交
  47. 28 5月, 2020 1 次提交
  49. 20 4月, 2020 1 次提交
    • M
      x86/speculation: Add Special Register Buffer Data Sampling (SRBDS) mitigation · 7e5b3c26
      由 Mark Gross 提交于 
      SRBDS is an MDS-like speculative side channel that can leak bits from the
random number generator (RNG) across cores and threads. New microcode
serializes the processor access during the execution of RDRAND and
RDSEED. This ensures that the shared buffer is overwritten before it is
released for reuse.

While it is present on all affected CPU models, the microcode mitigation
is not needed on models that enumerate ARCH_CAPABILITIES[MDS_NO] in the
cases where TSX is not supported or has been disabled with TSX_CTRL.

The mitigation is activated by default on affected processors and it
increases latency for RDRAND and RDSEED instructions. Among other
effects this will reduce throughput from /dev/urandom.

* Enable administrator to configure the mitigation off when desired using
  either mitigations=off or srbds=off.

* Export vulnerability status via sysfs

* Rename file-scoped macros to apply for non-whitelist table initializations.

 [ bp: Massage,
   - s/VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPING/VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS/g,
   - do not read arch cap MSR a second time in tsx_fused_off() - just pass it in,
   - flip check in cpu_set_bug_bits() to save an indentation level,
   - reflow comments.
   jpoimboe: s/Mitigated/Mitigation/ in user-visible strings
   tglx: Dropped the fused off magic for now
 ]
Signed-off-by: NMark Gross <mgross@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: NTony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: NPawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: NJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Tested-by: NNeelima Krishnan <neelima.krishnan@intel.com>
      7e5b3c26
  51. 21 2月, 2020 1 次提交
    • P
      x86/split_lock: Enable split lock detection by kernel · 6650cdd9
      由 Peter Zijlstra (Intel) 提交于 
      A split-lock occurs when an atomic instruction operates on data that spans
two cache lines. In order to maintain atomicity the core takes a global bus
lock.

This is typically >1000 cycles slower than an atomic operation within a
cache line. It also disrupts performance on other cores (which must wait
for the bus lock to be released before their memory operations can
complete). For real-time systems this may mean missing deadlines. For other
systems it may just be very annoying.

Some CPUs have the capability to raise an #AC trap when a split lock is
attempted.

Provide a command line option to give the user choices on how to handle
this:

split_lock_detect=
	off	- not enabled (no traps for split locks)
	warn	- warn once when an application does a
		  split lock, but allow it to continue
		  running.
	fatal	- Send SIGBUS to applications that cause split lock

On systems that support split lock detection the default is "warn". Note
that if the kernel hits a split lock in any mode other than "off" it will
OOPs.

One implementation wrinkle is that the MSR to control the split lock
detection is per-core, not per thread. This might result in some short
lived races on HT systems in "warn" mode if Linux tries to enable on one
thread while disabling on the other. Race analysis by Sean Christopherson:

  - Toggling of split-lock is only done in "warn" mode.  Worst case
    scenario of a race is that a misbehaving task will generate multiple
    #AC exceptions on the same instruction.  And this race will only occur
    if both siblings are running tasks that generate split-lock #ACs, e.g.
    a race where sibling threads are writing different values will only
    occur if CPUx is disabling split-lock after an #AC and CPUy is
    re-enabling split-lock after *its* previous task generated an #AC.
  - Transitioning between off/warn/fatal modes at runtime isn't supported
    and disabling is tracked per task, so hardware will always reach a steady
    state that matches the configured mode.  I.e. split-lock is guaranteed to
    be enabled in hardware once all _TIF_SLD threads have been scheduled out.
Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Co-developed-by: NFenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NFenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Co-developed-by: NTony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NTony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200126200535.GB30377@agluck-desk2.amr.corp.intel.com
      6650cdd9
  53. 20 2月, 2020 1 次提交
    • K
      x86/cpu/amd: Enable the fixed Instructions Retired counter IRPERF · 21b5ee59
      由 Kim Phillips 提交于 
      Commit

  aaf24884 ("perf/x86/msr: Add AMD IRPERF (Instructions Retired)
		  performance counter")

added support for access to the free-running counter via 'perf -e
msr/irperf/', but when exercised, it always returns a 0 count:

BEFORE:

  $ perf stat -e instructions,msr/irperf/ true

   Performance counter stats for 'true':

             624,833      instructions
                   0      msr/irperf/

Simply set its enable bit - HWCR bit 30 - to make it start counting.

Enablement is restricted to all machines advertising IRPERF capability,
except those susceptible to an erratum that makes the IRPERF return
bad values.

That erratum occurs in Family 17h models 00-1fh [1], but not in F17h
models 20h and above [2].

AFTER (on a family 17h model 31h machine):

  $ perf stat -e instructions,msr/irperf/ true

   Performance counter stats for 'true':

             621,690      instructions
             622,490      msr/irperf/

[1] Revision Guide for AMD Family 17h Models 00h-0Fh Processors
[2] Revision Guide for AMD Family 17h Models 30h-3Fh Processors

The revision guides are available from the bugzilla Link below.

 [ bp: Massage commit message. ]

Fixes: aaf24884 ("perf/x86/msr: Add AMD IRPERF (Instructions Retired) performance counter")
Signed-off-by: NKim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=206537
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200214201805.13830-1-kim.phillips@amd.com
      21b5ee59
  55. 14 1月, 2020 1 次提交
    • S
      x86/msr-index: Clean up bit defines for IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL MSR · 32ad73db
      由 Sean Christopherson 提交于 
      As pointed out by Boris, the defines for bits in IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL
are quite a mouthful, especially the VMX bits which must differentiate
between enabling VMX inside and outside SMX (TXT) operation.  Rename the
MSR and its bit defines to abbreviate FEATURE_CONTROL as FEAT_CTL to
make them a little friendlier on the eyes.

Arguably, the MSR itself should keep the full IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL name
to match Intel's SDM, but a future patch will add a dedicated Kconfig,
file and functions for the MSR. Using the full name for those assets is
rather unwieldy, so bite the bullet and use IA32_FEAT_CTL so that its
nomenclature is consistent throughout the kernel.

Opportunistically, fix a few other annoyances with the defines:

  - Relocate the bit defines so that they immediately follow the MSR
    define, e.g. aren't mistaken as belonging to MISC_FEATURE_CONTROL.
  - Add whitespace around the block of feature control defines to make
    it clear they're all related.
  - Use BIT() instead of manually encoding the bit shift.
  - Use "VMX" instead of "VMXON" to match the SDM.
  - Append "_ENABLED" to the LMCE (Local Machine Check Exception) bit to
    be consistent with the kernel's verbiage used for all other feature
    control bits.  Note, the SDM refers to the LMCE bit as LMCE_ON,
    likely to differentiate it from IA32_MCG_EXT_CTL.LMCE_EN.  Ignore
    the (literal) one-off usage of _ON, the SDM is simply "wrong".
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191221044513.21680-2-sean.j.christopherson@intel.com
      32ad73db
  57. 14 11月, 2019 1 次提交
  59. 04 11月, 2019 1 次提交
  61. 28 10月, 2019 1 次提交
    • P
      x86/speculation/taa: Add mitigation for TSX Async Abort · 1b42f017
      由 Pawan Gupta 提交于 
      TSX Async Abort (TAA) is a side channel vulnerability to the internal
buffers in some Intel processors similar to Microachitectural Data
Sampling (MDS). In this case, certain loads may speculatively pass
invalid data to dependent operations when an asynchronous abort
condition is pending in a TSX transaction.

This includes loads with no fault or assist condition. Such loads may
speculatively expose stale data from the uarch data structures as in
MDS. Scope of exposure is within the same-thread and cross-thread. This
issue affects all current processors that support TSX, but do not have
ARCH_CAP_TAA_NO (bit 8) set in MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES.

On CPUs which have their IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR bit MDS_NO=0,
CPUID.MD_CLEAR=1 and the MDS mitigation is clearing the CPU buffers
using VERW or L1D_FLUSH, there is no additional mitigation needed for
TAA. On affected CPUs with MDS_NO=1 this issue can be mitigated by
disabling the Transactional Synchronization Extensions (TSX) feature.

A new MSR IA32_TSX_CTRL in future and current processors after a
microcode update can be used to control the TSX feature. There are two
bits in that MSR:

* TSX_CTRL_RTM_DISABLE disables the TSX sub-feature Restricted
Transactional Memory (RTM).

* TSX_CTRL_CPUID_CLEAR clears the RTM enumeration in CPUID. The other
TSX sub-feature, Hardware Lock Elision (HLE), is unconditionally
disabled with updated microcode but still enumerated as present by
CPUID(EAX=7).EBX{bit4}.

The second mitigation approach is similar to MDS which is clearing the
affected CPU buffers on return to user space and when entering a guest.
Relevant microcode update is required for the mitigation to work.  More
details on this approach can be found here:

  https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/mds.html

The TSX feature can be controlled by the "tsx" command line parameter.
If it is force-enabled then "Clear CPU buffers" (MDS mitigation) is
deployed. The effective mitigation state can be read from sysfs.

 [ bp:
   - massage + comments cleanup
   - s/TAA_MITIGATION_TSX_DISABLE/TAA_MITIGATION_TSX_DISABLED/g - Josh.
   - remove partial TAA mitigation in update_mds_branch_idle() - Josh.
   - s/tsx_async_abort_cmdline/tsx_async_abort_parse_cmdline/g
 ]
Signed-off-by: NPawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: NJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      1b42f017