1. 17 8月, 2009 3 次提交
    • E
      Security/SELinux: seperate lsm specific mmap_min_addr · 788084ab
      Eric Paris 提交于
      Currently SELinux enforcement of controls on the ability to map low memory
      is determined by the mmap_min_addr tunable.  This patch causes SELinux to
      ignore the tunable and instead use a seperate Kconfig option specific to how
      much space the LSM should protect.
      
      The tunable will now only control the need for CAP_SYS_RAWIO and SELinux
      permissions will always protect the amount of low memory designated by
      CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR.
      
      This allows users who need to disable the mmap_min_addr controls (usual reason
      being they run WINE as a non-root user) to do so and still have SELinux
      controls preventing confined domains (like a web server) from being able to
      map some area of low memory.
      Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
      788084ab
    • E
      SELinux: call cap_file_mmap in selinux_file_mmap · 8cf948e7
      Eric Paris 提交于
      Currently SELinux does not check CAP_SYS_RAWIO in the file_mmap hook.  This
      means there is no DAC check on the ability to mmap low addresses in the
      memory space.  This function adds the DAC check for CAP_SYS_RAWIO while
      maintaining the selinux check on mmap_zero.  This means that processes
      which need to mmap low memory will need CAP_SYS_RAWIO and mmap_zero but will
      NOT need the SELinux sys_rawio capability.
      Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
      8cf948e7
    • E
      Capabilities: move cap_file_mmap to commoncap.c · 9c0d9010
      Eric Paris 提交于
      Currently we duplicate the mmap_min_addr test in cap_file_mmap and in
      security_file_mmap if !CONFIG_SECURITY.  This patch moves cap_file_mmap
      into commoncap.c and then calls that function directly from
      security_file_mmap ifndef CONFIG_SECURITY like all of the other capability
      checks are done.
      Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
      Acked-by: NSerge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
      Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
      9c0d9010
  2. 11 8月, 2009 1 次提交
  3. 29 6月, 2009 2 次提交
  4. 19 6月, 2009 1 次提交
  5. 09 6月, 2009 2 次提交
  6. 05 6月, 2009 1 次提交
  7. 04 6月, 2009 2 次提交
  8. 03 6月, 2009 4 次提交
  9. 02 6月, 2009 2 次提交
  10. 28 5月, 2009 1 次提交
  11. 27 5月, 2009 2 次提交
  12. 22 5月, 2009 4 次提交
    • R
      smack: do not beyond ARRAY_SIZE of data · 6470c077
      Roel Kluin 提交于
      Do not go beyond ARRAY_SIZE of data
      Signed-off-by: NRoel Kluin <roel.kluin@gmail.com>
      Acked-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
      Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
      6470c077
    • M
      integrity: path_check update · b9fc745d
      Mimi Zohar 提交于
      - Add support in ima_path_check() for integrity checking without
      incrementing the counts. (Required for nfsd.)
      - rename and export opencount_get to ima_counts_get
      - replace ima_shm_check calls with ima_counts_get
      - export ima_path_check
      Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
      Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
      b9fc745d
    • E
      IMA: Add __init notation to ima functions · 932995f0
      Eric Paris 提交于
      A number of IMA functions only used during init are not marked with __init.
      Add those notations so they are freed automatically.
      Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
      Acked-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
      Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
      932995f0
    • E
      IMA: Minimal IMA policy and boot param for TCB IMA policy · 5789ba3b
      Eric Paris 提交于
      The IMA TCB policy is dangerous.  A normal use can use all of a system's
      memory (which cannot be freed) simply by building and running lots of
      executables.  The TCB policy is also nearly useless because logging in as root
      often causes a policy violation when dealing with utmp, thus rendering the
      measurements meaningless.
      
      There is no good fix for this in the kernel.  A full TCB policy would need to
      be loaded in userspace using LSM rule matching to get both a protected and
      useful system.  But, if too little is measured before userspace can load a real
      policy one again ends up with a meaningless set of measurements.  One option
      would be to put the policy load inside the initrd in order to get it early
      enough in the boot sequence to be useful, but this runs into trouble with the
      LSM.  For IMA to measure the LSM policy and the LSM policy loading mechanism
      it needs rules to do so, but we already talked about problems with defaulting
      to such broad rules....
      
      IMA also depends on the files being measured to be on an FS which implements
      and supports i_version.  Since the only FS with this support (ext4) doesn't
      even use it by default it seems silly to have any IMA rules by default.
      
      This should reduce the performance overhead of IMA to near 0 while still
      letting users who choose to configure their machine as such to inclue the
      ima_tcb kernel paramenter and get measurements during boot before they can
      load a customized, reasonable policy in userspace.
      Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
      Acked-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
      Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
      5789ba3b
  13. 19 5月, 2009 2 次提交
    • S
      selinux: remove obsolete read buffer limit from sel_read_bool · c5642f4b
      Stephen Smalley 提交于
      On Tue, 2009-05-19 at 00:05 -0400, Eamon Walsh wrote:
      > Recent versions of coreutils have bumped the read buffer size from 4K to
      > 32K in several of the utilities.
      >
      > This means that "cat /selinux/booleans/xserver_object_manager" no longer
      > works, it returns "Invalid argument" on F11.  getsebool works fine.
      >
      > sel_read_bool has a check for "count > PAGE_SIZE" that doesn't seem to
      > be present in the other read functions.  Maybe it could be removed?
      
      Yes, that check is obsoleted by the conversion of those functions to
      using simple_read_from_buffer(), which will reduce count if necessary to
      what is available in the buffer.
      Signed-off-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
      Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
      c5642f4b
    • E
      SELinux: move SELINUX_MAGIC into magic.h · 75834fc3
      Eric Paris 提交于
      The selinuxfs superblock magic is used inside the IMA code, but is being
      defined in two places and could someday get out of sync.  This patch moves the
      declaration into magic.h so it is only done once.
      Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
      75834fc3
  14. 15 5月, 2009 2 次提交
  15. 12 5月, 2009 4 次提交
  16. 09 5月, 2009 1 次提交
  17. 06 5月, 2009 3 次提交
  18. 05 5月, 2009 1 次提交
  19. 30 4月, 2009 2 次提交