1. 07 9月, 2022 7 次提交
  2. 08 7月, 2022 1 次提交
    • E
      tcp: tcp_rtx_synack() can be called from process context · dbed45ae
      Eric Dumazet 提交于
      stable inclusion
      from stable-4.19.247
      commit 58bd38cbc961fd799842b7be8c5222310f04b908
      category: bugfix
      bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5FNPY
      CVE: NA
      
      --------------------------------
      
      [ Upstream commit 0a375c82 ]
      
      Laurent reported the enclosed report [1]
      
      This bug triggers with following coditions:
      
      0) Kernel built with CONFIG_DEBUG_PREEMPT=y
      
      1) A new passive FastOpen TCP socket is created.
         This FO socket waits for an ACK coming from client to be a complete
         ESTABLISHED one.
      2) A socket operation on this socket goes through lock_sock()
         release_sock() dance.
      3) While the socket is owned by the user in step 2),
         a retransmit of the SYN is received and stored in socket backlog.
      4) At release_sock() time, the socket backlog is processed while
         in process context.
      5) A SYNACK packet is cooked in response of the SYN retransmit.
      6) -> tcp_rtx_synack() is called in process context.
      
      Before blamed commit, tcp_rtx_synack() was always called from BH handler,
      from a timer handler.
      
      Fix this by using TCP_INC_STATS() & NET_INC_STATS()
      which do not assume caller is in non preemptible context.
      
      [1]
      BUG: using __this_cpu_add() in preemptible [00000000] code: epollpep/2180
      caller is tcp_rtx_synack.part.0+0x36/0xc0
      CPU: 10 PID: 2180 Comm: epollpep Tainted: G           OE     5.16.0-0.bpo.4-amd64 #1  Debian 5.16.12-1~bpo11+1
      Hardware name: Supermicro SYS-5039MC-H8TRF/X11SCD-F, BIOS 1.7 11/23/2021
      Call Trace:
       <TASK>
       dump_stack_lvl+0x48/0x5e
       check_preemption_disabled+0xde/0xe0
       tcp_rtx_synack.part.0+0x36/0xc0
       tcp_rtx_synack+0x8d/0xa0
       ? kmem_cache_alloc+0x2e0/0x3e0
       ? apparmor_file_alloc_security+0x3b/0x1f0
       inet_rtx_syn_ack+0x16/0x30
       tcp_check_req+0x367/0x610
       tcp_rcv_state_process+0x91/0xf60
       ? get_nohz_timer_target+0x18/0x1a0
       ? lock_timer_base+0x61/0x80
       ? preempt_count_add+0x68/0xa0
       tcp_v4_do_rcv+0xbd/0x270
       __release_sock+0x6d/0xb0
       release_sock+0x2b/0x90
       sock_setsockopt+0x138/0x1140
       ? __sys_getsockname+0x7e/0xc0
       ? aa_sk_perm+0x3e/0x1a0
       __sys_setsockopt+0x198/0x1e0
       __x64_sys_setsockopt+0x21/0x30
       do_syscall_64+0x38/0xc0
       entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
      
      Fixes: 168a8f58 ("tcp: TCP Fast Open Server - main code path")
      Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
      Reported-by: NLaurent Fasnacht <laurent.fasnacht@proton.ch>
      Acked-by: NNeal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
      Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220530213713.601888-1-eric.dumazet@gmail.comSigned-off-by: NJakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
      Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
      Signed-off-by: NYongqiang Liu <liuyongqiang13@huawei.com>
      Signed-off-by: NLaibin Qiu <qiulaibin@huawei.com>
      dbed45ae
  3. 02 6月, 2022 2 次提交
    • E
      tcp: fix potential xmit stalls caused by TCP_NOTSENT_LOWAT · 6cba1671
      Eric Dumazet 提交于
      stable inclusion
      from stable-4.19.242
      commit cc639aa3c2f5ec7189a2917af49559006f678c62
      category: bugfix
      bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5A6BA
      CVE: NA
      
      --------------------------------
      
      [ Upstream commit 4bfe744f ]
      
      I had this bug sitting for too long in my pile, it is time to fix it.
      
      Thanks to Doug Porter for reminding me of it!
      
      We had various attempts in the past, including commit
      0cbe6a8f ("tcp: remove SOCK_QUEUE_SHRUNK"),
      but the issue is that TCP stack currently only generates
      EPOLLOUT from input path, when tp->snd_una has advanced
      and skb(s) cleaned from rtx queue.
      
      If a flow has a big RTT, and/or receives SACKs, it is possible
      that the notsent part (tp->write_seq - tp->snd_nxt) reaches 0
      and no more data can be sent until tp->snd_una finally advances.
      
      What is needed is to also check if POLLOUT needs to be generated
      whenever tp->snd_nxt is advanced, from output path.
      
      This bug triggers more often after an idle period, as
      we do not receive ACK for at least one RTT. tcp_notsent_lowat
      could be a fraction of what CWND and pacing rate would allow to
      send during this RTT.
      
      In a followup patch, I will remove the bogus call
      to tcp_chrono_stop(sk, TCP_CHRONO_SNDBUF_LIMITED)
      from tcp_check_space(). Fact that we have decided to generate
      an EPOLLOUT does not mean the application has immediately
      refilled the transmit queue. This optimistic call
      might have been the reason the bug seemed not too serious.
      
      Tested:
      
      200 ms rtt, 1% packet loss, 32 MB tcp_rmem[2] and tcp_wmem[2]
      
      $ echo 500000 >/proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_notsent_lowat
      $ cat bench_rr.sh
      SUM=0
      for i in {1..10}
      do
       V=`netperf -H remote_host -l30 -t TCP_RR -- -r 10000000,10000 -o LOCAL_BYTES_SENT | egrep -v "MIGRATED|Bytes"`
       echo $V
       SUM=$(($SUM + $V))
      done
      echo SUM=$SUM
      
      Before patch:
      $ bench_rr.sh
      130000000
      80000000
      140000000
      140000000
      140000000
      140000000
      130000000
      40000000
      90000000
      110000000
      SUM=1140000000
      
      After patch:
      $ bench_rr.sh
      430000000
      590000000
      530000000
      450000000
      450000000
      350000000
      450000000
      490000000
      480000000
      460000000
      SUM=4680000000  # This is 410 % of the value before patch.
      
      Fixes: c9bee3b7 ("tcp: TCP_NOTSENT_LOWAT socket option")
      Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
      Reported-by: NDoug Porter <dsp@fb.com>
      Cc: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
      Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
      Acked-by: NSoheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
      Signed-off-by: NYongqiang Liu <liuyongqiang13@huawei.com>
      6cba1671
    • J
      tcp: ensure PMTU updates are processed during fastopen · 261f0a83
      Jakub Kicinski 提交于
      stable inclusion
      from stable-4.19.238
      commit 270b9e733f035af26cbccc7a0e3a7f5b005e7f3f
      category: bugfix
      bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5A6BA
      CVE: NA
      
      --------------------------------
      
      [ Upstream commit ed0c99dc ]
      
      tp->rx_opt.mss_clamp is not populated, yet, during TFO send so we
      rise it to the local MSS. tp->mss_cache is not updated, however:
      
      tcp_v6_connect():
        tp->rx_opt.mss_clamp = IPV6_MIN_MTU - headers;
        tcp_connect():
           tcp_connect_init():
             tp->mss_cache = min(mtu, tp->rx_opt.mss_clamp)
           tcp_send_syn_data():
             tp->rx_opt.mss_clamp = tp->advmss
      
      After recent fixes to ICMPv6 PTB handling we started dropping
      PMTU updates higher than tp->mss_cache. Because of the stale
      tp->mss_cache value PMTU updates during TFO are always dropped.
      
      Thanks to Wei for helping zero in on the problem and the fix!
      
      Fixes: c7bb4b89 ("ipv6: tcp: drop silly ICMPv6 packet too big messages")
      Reported-by: NAndre Nash <alnash@fb.com>
      Reported-by: NNeil Spring <ntspring@fb.com>
      Reviewed-by: NWei Wang <weiwan@google.com>
      Acked-by: NYuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
      Acked-by: NMartin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
      Signed-off-by: NJakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
      Reviewed-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
      Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220321165957.1769954-1-kuba@kernel.orgSigned-off-by: NJakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
      Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
      Signed-off-by: NYongqiang Liu <liuyongqiang13@huawei.com>
      261f0a83
  4. 29 1月, 2022 1 次提交
  5. 12 11月, 2021 1 次提交
  6. 02 8月, 2021 4 次提交
  7. 14 4月, 2021 2 次提交
  8. 22 2月, 2021 1 次提交
  9. 22 9月, 2020 3 次提交
    • Y
      tcp: allow at most one TLP probe per flight · e9dfbe8f
      Yuchung Cheng 提交于
      stable inclusion
      from linux-4.19.136
      commit 55c73db2995826dcd63b08605c53e0e37c80b306
      
      --------------------------------
      
      [ Upstream commit 76be93fc ]
      
      Previously TLP may send multiple probes of new data in one
      flight. This happens when the sender is cwnd limited. After the
      initial TLP containing new data is sent, the sender receives another
      ACK that acks partial inflight.  It may re-arm another TLP timer
      to send more, if no further ACK returns before the next TLP timeout
      (PTO) expires. The sender may send in theory a large amount of TLP
      until send queue is depleted. This only happens if the sender sees
      such irregular uncommon ACK pattern. But it is generally undesirable
      behavior during congestion especially.
      
      The original TLP design restrict only one TLP probe per inflight as
      published in "Reducing Web Latency: the Virtue of Gentle Aggression",
      SIGCOMM 2013. This patch changes TLP to send at most one probe
      per inflight.
      
      Note that if the sender is app-limited, TLP retransmits old data
      and did not have this issue.
      Signed-off-by: NYuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
      Signed-off-by: NNeal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
      Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
      Signed-off-by: NLi Aichun <liaichun@huawei.com>
      Reviewed-by: Nguodeqing <geffrey.guo@huawei.com>
      Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
      e9dfbe8f
    • E
      tcp: md5: do not send silly options in SYNCOOKIES · 19defe34
      Eric Dumazet 提交于
      stable inclusion
      from linux-4.19.134
      commit c83943a78ed9c6a979a6d0ede5c2aafd6ea8b3e8
      
      --------------------------------
      
      [ Upstream commit e114e1e8 ]
      
      Whenever cookie_init_timestamp() has been used to encode
      ECN,SACK,WSCALE options, we can not remove the TS option in the SYNACK.
      
      Otherwise, tcp_synack_options() will still advertize options like WSCALE
      that we can not deduce later when receiving the packet from the client
      to complete 3WHS.
      
      Note that modern linux TCP stacks wont use MD5+TS+SACK in a SYN packet,
      but we can not know for sure that all TCP stacks have the same logic.
      
      Before the fix a tcpdump would exhibit this wrong exchange :
      
      10:12:15.464591 IP C > S: Flags [S], seq 4202415601, win 65535, options [nop,nop,md5 valid,mss 1400,sackOK,TS val 456965269 ecr 0,nop,wscale 8], length 0
      10:12:15.464602 IP S > C: Flags [S.], seq 253516766, ack 4202415602, win 65535, options [nop,nop,md5 valid,mss 1400,nop,nop,sackOK,nop,wscale 8], length 0
      10:12:15.464611 IP C > S: Flags [.], ack 1, win 256, options [nop,nop,md5 valid], length 0
      10:12:15.464678 IP C > S: Flags [P.], seq 1:13, ack 1, win 256, options [nop,nop,md5 valid], length 12
      10:12:15.464685 IP S > C: Flags [.], ack 13, win 65535, options [nop,nop,md5 valid], length 0
      
      After this patch the exchange looks saner :
      
      11:59:59.882990 IP C > S: Flags [S], seq 517075944, win 65535, options [nop,nop,md5 valid,mss 1400,sackOK,TS val 1751508483 ecr 0,nop,wscale 8], length 0
      11:59:59.883002 IP S > C: Flags [S.], seq 1902939253, ack 517075945, win 65535, options [nop,nop,md5 valid,mss 1400,sackOK,TS val 1751508479 ecr 1751508483,nop,wscale 8], length 0
      11:59:59.883012 IP C > S: Flags [.], ack 1, win 256, options [nop,nop,md5 valid,nop,nop,TS val 1751508483 ecr 1751508479], length 0
      11:59:59.883114 IP C > S: Flags [P.], seq 1:13, ack 1, win 256, options [nop,nop,md5 valid,nop,nop,TS val 1751508483 ecr 1751508479], length 12
      11:59:59.883122 IP S > C: Flags [.], ack 13, win 256, options [nop,nop,md5 valid,nop,nop,TS val 1751508483 ecr 1751508483], length 0
      11:59:59.883152 IP S > C: Flags [P.], seq 1:13, ack 13, win 256, options [nop,nop,md5 valid,nop,nop,TS val 1751508484 ecr 1751508483], length 12
      11:59:59.883170 IP C > S: Flags [.], ack 13, win 256, options [nop,nop,md5 valid,nop,nop,TS val 1751508484 ecr 1751508484], length 0
      
      Of course, no SACK block will ever be added later, but nothing should break.
      Technically, we could remove the 4 nops included in MD5+TS options,
      but again some stacks could break seeing not conventional alignment.
      
      Fixes: 4957faad ("TCPCT part 1g: Responder Cookie => Initiator")
      Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
      Cc: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
      Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
      Signed-off-by: NLi Aichun <liaichun@huawei.com>
      Reviewed-by: Nguodeqing <geffrey.guo@huawei.com>
      Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
      19defe34
    • E
      tcp: do not leave dangling pointers in tp->highest_sack · 72f11987
      Eric Dumazet 提交于
      stable inclusion
      from linux-4.19.100
      commit 9bbde0825846002c6931f41fbbd71eeb848ca0e1
      
      --------------------------------
      
      [ Upstream commit 2bec445f ]
      
      Latest commit 85369750 ("tcp: Fix highest_sack and highest_sack_seq")
      apparently allowed syzbot to trigger various crashes in TCP stack [1]
      
      I believe this commit only made things easier for syzbot to find
      its way into triggering use-after-frees. But really the bugs
      could lead to bad TCP behavior or even plain crashes even for
      non malicious peers.
      
      I have audited all calls to tcp_rtx_queue_unlink() and
      tcp_rtx_queue_unlink_and_free() and made sure tp->highest_sack would be updated
      if we are removing from rtx queue the skb that tp->highest_sack points to.
      
      These updates were missing in three locations :
      
      1) tcp_clean_rtx_queue() [This one seems quite serious,
                                I have no idea why this was not caught earlier]
      
      2) tcp_rtx_queue_purge() [Probably not a big deal for normal operations]
      
      3) tcp_send_synack()     [Probably not a big deal for normal operations]
      
      [1]
      BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in tcp_highest_sack_seq include/net/tcp.h:1864 [inline]
      BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in tcp_highest_sack_seq include/net/tcp.h:1856 [inline]
      BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in tcp_check_sack_reordering+0x33c/0x3a0 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:891
      Read of size 4 at addr ffff8880a488d068 by task ksoftirqd/1/16
      
      CPU: 1 PID: 16 Comm: ksoftirqd/1 Not tainted 5.5.0-rc5-syzkaller #0
      Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
      Call Trace:
       __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
       dump_stack+0x197/0x210 lib/dump_stack.c:118
       print_address_description.constprop.0.cold+0xd4/0x30b mm/kasan/report.c:374
       __kasan_report.cold+0x1b/0x41 mm/kasan/report.c:506
       kasan_report+0x12/0x20 mm/kasan/common.c:639
       __asan_report_load4_noabort+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/generic_report.c:134
       tcp_highest_sack_seq include/net/tcp.h:1864 [inline]
       tcp_highest_sack_seq include/net/tcp.h:1856 [inline]
       tcp_check_sack_reordering+0x33c/0x3a0 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:891
       tcp_try_undo_partial net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:2730 [inline]
       tcp_fastretrans_alert+0xf74/0x23f0 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:2847
       tcp_ack+0x2577/0x5bf0 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:3710
       tcp_rcv_established+0x6dd/0x1e90 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:5706
       tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x619/0x8d0 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:1619
       tcp_v4_rcv+0x307f/0x3b40 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:2001
       ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x5a/0x880 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:204
       ip_local_deliver_finish+0x23b/0x380 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:231
       NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:307 [inline]
       NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:301 [inline]
       ip_local_deliver+0x1e9/0x520 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:252
       dst_input include/net/dst.h:442 [inline]
       ip_rcv_finish+0x1db/0x2f0 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:428
       NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:307 [inline]
       NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:301 [inline]
       ip_rcv+0xe8/0x3f0 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:538
       __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x113/0x1a0 net/core/dev.c:5148
       __netif_receive_skb+0x2c/0x1d0 net/core/dev.c:5262
       process_backlog+0x206/0x750 net/core/dev.c:6093
       napi_poll net/core/dev.c:6530 [inline]
       net_rx_action+0x508/0x1120 net/core/dev.c:6598
       __do_softirq+0x262/0x98c kernel/softirq.c:292
       run_ksoftirqd kernel/softirq.c:603 [inline]
       run_ksoftirqd+0x8e/0x110 kernel/softirq.c:595
       smpboot_thread_fn+0x6a3/0xa40 kernel/smpboot.c:165
       kthread+0x361/0x430 kernel/kthread.c:255
       ret_from_fork+0x24/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:352
      
      Allocated by task 10091:
       save_stack+0x23/0x90 mm/kasan/common.c:72
       set_track mm/kasan/common.c:80 [inline]
       __kasan_kmalloc mm/kasan/common.c:513 [inline]
       __kasan_kmalloc.constprop.0+0xcf/0xe0 mm/kasan/common.c:486
       kasan_slab_alloc+0xf/0x20 mm/kasan/common.c:521
       slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:584 [inline]
       slab_alloc_node mm/slab.c:3263 [inline]
       kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x138/0x740 mm/slab.c:3575
       __alloc_skb+0xd5/0x5e0 net/core/skbuff.c:198
       alloc_skb_fclone include/linux/skbuff.h:1099 [inline]
       sk_stream_alloc_skb net/ipv4/tcp.c:875 [inline]
       sk_stream_alloc_skb+0x113/0xc90 net/ipv4/tcp.c:852
       tcp_sendmsg_locked+0xcf9/0x3470 net/ipv4/tcp.c:1282
       tcp_sendmsg+0x30/0x50 net/ipv4/tcp.c:1432
       inet_sendmsg+0x9e/0xe0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:807
       sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:652 [inline]
       sock_sendmsg+0xd7/0x130 net/socket.c:672
       __sys_sendto+0x262/0x380 net/socket.c:1998
       __do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2010 [inline]
       __se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2006 [inline]
       __x64_sys_sendto+0xe1/0x1a0 net/socket.c:2006
       do_syscall_64+0xfa/0x790 arch/x86/entry/common.c:294
       entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
      
      Freed by task 10095:
       save_stack+0x23/0x90 mm/kasan/common.c:72
       set_track mm/kasan/common.c:80 [inline]
       kasan_set_free_info mm/kasan/common.c:335 [inline]
       __kasan_slab_free+0x102/0x150 mm/kasan/common.c:474
       kasan_slab_free+0xe/0x10 mm/kasan/common.c:483
       __cache_free mm/slab.c:3426 [inline]
       kmem_cache_free+0x86/0x320 mm/slab.c:3694
       kfree_skbmem+0x178/0x1c0 net/core/skbuff.c:645
       __kfree_skb+0x1e/0x30 net/core/skbuff.c:681
       sk_eat_skb include/net/sock.h:2453 [inline]
       tcp_recvmsg+0x1252/0x2930 net/ipv4/tcp.c:2166
       inet_recvmsg+0x136/0x610 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:838
       sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:886 [inline]
       sock_recvmsg net/socket.c:904 [inline]
       sock_recvmsg+0xce/0x110 net/socket.c:900
       __sys_recvfrom+0x1ff/0x350 net/socket.c:2055
       __do_sys_recvfrom net/socket.c:2073 [inline]
       __se_sys_recvfrom net/socket.c:2069 [inline]
       __x64_sys_recvfrom+0xe1/0x1a0 net/socket.c:2069
       do_syscall_64+0xfa/0x790 arch/x86/entry/common.c:294
       entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
      
      The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8880a488d040
       which belongs to the cache skbuff_fclone_cache of size 456
      The buggy address is located 40 bytes inside of
       456-byte region [ffff8880a488d040, ffff8880a488d208)
      The buggy address belongs to the page:
      page:ffffea0002922340 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff88821b057000 index:0x0
      raw: 00fffe0000000200 ffffea00022a5788 ffffea0002624a48 ffff88821b057000
      raw: 0000000000000000 ffff8880a488d040 0000000100000006 0000000000000000
      page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
      
      Memory state around the buggy address:
       ffff8880a488cf00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
       ffff8880a488cf80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
      >ffff8880a488d000: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
                                                                ^
       ffff8880a488d080: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
       ffff8880a488d100: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
      
      Fixes: 85369750 ("tcp: Fix highest_sack and highest_sack_seq")
      Fixes: 50895b9d ("tcp: highest_sack fix")
      Fixes: 737ff314 ("tcp: use sequence distance to detect reordering")
      Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
      Cc: Cambda Zhu <cambda@linux.alibaba.com>
      Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
      Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
      Acked-by: NNeal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
      Acked-by: NYuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
      Signed-off-by: NLi Aichun <liaichun@huawei.com>
      Reviewed-by: Nguodeqing <geffrey.guo@huawei.com>
      Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
      72f11987
  10. 05 3月, 2020 3 次提交
  11. 27 12月, 2019 10 次提交
  12. 17 12月, 2018 3 次提交
  13. 06 12月, 2018 1 次提交
    • E
      tcp: defer SACK compression after DupThresh · aaa7e45c
      Eric Dumazet 提交于
      [ Upstream commit 86de5921 ]
      
      Jean-Louis reported a TCP regression and bisected to recent SACK
      compression.
      
      After a loss episode (receiver not able to keep up and dropping
      packets because its backlog is full), linux TCP stack is sending
      a single SACK (DUPACK).
      
      Sender waits a full RTO timer before recovering losses.
      
      While RFC 6675 says in section 5, "Algorithm Details",
      
         (2) If DupAcks < DupThresh but IsLost (HighACK + 1) returns true --
             indicating at least three segments have arrived above the current
             cumulative acknowledgment point, which is taken to indicate loss
             -- go to step (4).
      ...
         (4) Invoke fast retransmit and enter loss recovery as follows:
      
      there are old TCP stacks not implementing this strategy, and
      still counting the dupacks before starting fast retransmit.
      
      While these stacks probably perform poorly when receivers implement
      LRO/GRO, we should be a little more gentle to them.
      
      This patch makes sure we do not enable SACK compression unless
      3 dupacks have been sent since last rcv_nxt update.
      
      Ideally we should even rearm the timer to send one or two
      more DUPACK if no more packets are coming, but that will
      be work aiming for linux-4.21.
      
      Many thanks to Jean-Louis for bisecting the issue, providing
      packet captures and testing this patch.
      
      Fixes: 5d9f4262 ("tcp: add SACK compression")
      Reported-by: NJean-Louis Dupond <jean-louis@dupond.be>
      Tested-by: NJean-Louis Dupond <jean-louis@dupond.be>
      Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
      Acked-by: NNeal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      aaa7e45c
  14. 02 8月, 2018 1 次提交