1. 10 9月, 2009 3 次提交
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      sysfs: Add labeling support for sysfs · ddd29ec6
      David P. Quigley 提交于
      This patch adds a setxattr handler to the file, directory, and symlink
      inode_operations structures for sysfs. The patch uses hooks introduced in the
      previous patch to handle the getting and setting of security information for
      the sysfs inodes. As was suggested by Eric Biederman the struct iattr in the
      sysfs_dirent structure has been replaced by a structure which contains the
      iattr, secdata and secdata length to allow the changes to persist in the event
      that the inode representing the sysfs_dirent is evicted. Because sysfs only
      stores this information when a change is made all the optional data is moved
      into one dynamically allocated field.
      
      This patch addresses an issue where SELinux was denying virtd access to the PCI
      configuration entries in sysfs. The lack of setxattr handlers for sysfs
      required that a single label be assigned to all entries in sysfs. Granting virtd
      access to every entry in sysfs is not an acceptable solution so fine grained
      labeling of sysfs is required such that individual entries can be labeled
      appropriately.
      
      [sds:  Fixed compile-time warnings, coding style, and setting of inode security init flags.]
      Signed-off-by: NDavid P. Quigley <dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov>
      Signed-off-by: NStephen D. Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
      Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
      ddd29ec6
    • D
      LSM/SELinux: inode_{get,set,notify}secctx hooks to access LSM security context information. · 1ee65e37
      David P. Quigley 提交于
      This patch introduces three new hooks. The inode_getsecctx hook is used to get
      all relevant information from an LSM about an inode. The inode_setsecctx is
      used to set both the in-core and on-disk state for the inode based on a context
      derived from inode_getsecctx.The final hook inode_notifysecctx will notify the
      LSM of a change for the in-core state of the inode in question. These hooks are
      for use in the labeled NFS code and addresses concerns of how to set security
      on an inode in a multi-xattr LSM. For historical reasons Stephen Smalley's
      explanation of the reason for these hooks is pasted below.
      
      Quote Stephen Smalley
      
      inode_setsecctx:  Change the security context of an inode.  Updates the
      in core security context managed by the security module and invokes the
      fs code as needed (via __vfs_setxattr_noperm) to update any backing
      xattrs that represent the context.  Example usage:  NFS server invokes
      this hook to change the security context in its incore inode and on the
      backing file system to a value provided by the client on a SETATTR
      operation.
      
      inode_notifysecctx:  Notify the security module of what the security
      context of an inode should be.  Initializes the incore security context
      managed by the security module for this inode.  Example usage:  NFS
      client invokes this hook to initialize the security context in its
      incore inode to the value provided by the server for the file when the
      server returned the file's attributes to the client.
      Signed-off-by: NDavid P. Quigley <dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov>
      Acked-by: NSerge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
      Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
      1ee65e37
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      VFS: Factor out part of vfs_setxattr so it can be called from the SELinux hook for inode_setsecctx. · b1ab7e4b
      David P. Quigley 提交于
      This factors out the part of the vfs_setxattr function that performs the
      setting of the xattr and its notification. This is needed so the SELinux
      implementation of inode_setsecctx can handle the setting of the xattr while
      maintaining the proper separation of layers.
      Signed-off-by: NDavid P. Quigley <dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov>
      Acked-by: NSerge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
      Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
      b1ab7e4b
  2. 09 9月, 2009 1 次提交
  3. 07 9月, 2009 3 次提交
  4. 03 9月, 2009 1 次提交
  5. 02 9月, 2009 9 次提交
    • D
      KEYS: Add a keyctl to install a process's session keyring on its parent [try #6] · ee18d64c
      David Howells 提交于
      Add a keyctl to install a process's session keyring onto its parent.  This
      replaces the parent's session keyring.  Because the COW credential code does
      not permit one process to change another process's credentials directly, the
      change is deferred until userspace next starts executing again.  Normally this
      will be after a wait*() syscall.
      
      To support this, three new security hooks have been provided:
      cred_alloc_blank() to allocate unset security creds, cred_transfer() to fill in
      the blank security creds and key_session_to_parent() - which asks the LSM if
      the process may replace its parent's session keyring.
      
      The replacement may only happen if the process has the same ownership details
      as its parent, and the process has LINK permission on the session keyring, and
      the session keyring is owned by the process, and the LSM permits it.
      
      Note that this requires alteration to each architecture's notify_resume path.
      This has been done for all arches barring blackfin, m68k* and xtensa, all of
      which need assembly alteration to support TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME.  This allows the
      replacement to be performed at the point the parent process resumes userspace
      execution.
      
      This allows the userspace AFS pioctl emulation to fully emulate newpag() and
      the VIOCSETTOK and VIOCSETTOK2 pioctls, all of which require the ability to
      alter the parent process's PAG membership.  However, since kAFS doesn't use
      PAGs per se, but rather dumps the keys into the session keyring, the session
      keyring of the parent must be replaced if, for example, VIOCSETTOK is passed
      the newpag flag.
      
      This can be tested with the following program:
      
      	#include <stdio.h>
      	#include <stdlib.h>
      	#include <keyutils.h>
      
      	#define KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT	18
      
      	#define OSERROR(X, S) do { if ((long)(X) == -1) { perror(S); exit(1); } } while(0)
      
      	int main(int argc, char **argv)
      	{
      		key_serial_t keyring, key;
      		long ret;
      
      		keyring = keyctl_join_session_keyring(argv[1]);
      		OSERROR(keyring, "keyctl_join_session_keyring");
      
      		key = add_key("user", "a", "b", 1, keyring);
      		OSERROR(key, "add_key");
      
      		ret = keyctl(KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT);
      		OSERROR(ret, "KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT");
      
      		return 0;
      	}
      
      Compiled and linked with -lkeyutils, you should see something like:
      
      	[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ keyctl show
      	Session Keyring
      	       -3 --alswrv   4043  4043  keyring: _ses
      	355907932 --alswrv   4043    -1   \_ keyring: _uid.4043
      	[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ /tmp/newpag
      	[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ keyctl show
      	Session Keyring
      	       -3 --alswrv   4043  4043  keyring: _ses
      	1055658746 --alswrv   4043  4043   \_ user: a
      	[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ /tmp/newpag hello
      	[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ keyctl show
      	Session Keyring
      	       -3 --alswrv   4043  4043  keyring: hello
      	340417692 --alswrv   4043  4043   \_ user: a
      
      Where the test program creates a new session keyring, sticks a user key named
      'a' into it and then installs it on its parent.
      Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
      ee18d64c
    • D
      KEYS: Extend TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME to (almost) all architectures [try #6] · d0420c83
      David Howells 提交于
      Implement TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME for most of those architectures in which isn't yet
      available, and, whilst we're at it, have it call the appropriate tracehook.
      
      After this patch, blackfin, m68k* and xtensa still lack support and need
      alteration of assembly code to make it work.
      
      Resume notification can then be used (by a later patch) to install a new
      session keyring on the parent of a process.
      Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
      Acked-by: NRussell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
      
      cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
      Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
      d0420c83
    • D
      KEYS: Do some whitespace cleanups [try #6] · 7b1b9164
      David Howells 提交于
      Do some whitespace cleanups in the key management code.
      Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
      Acked-by: NSerge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
      Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
      7b1b9164
    • S
      KEYS: Make /proc/keys use keyid not numread as file position [try #6] · ad73a717
      Serge E. Hallyn 提交于
      Make the file position maintained by /proc/keys represent the ID of the key
      just read rather than the number of keys read.  This should make it faster to
      perform a lookup as we don't have to scan the key ID tree from the beginning to
      find the current position.
      Signed-off-by: NSerge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
      ad73a717
    • D
      KEYS: Add garbage collection for dead, revoked and expired keys. [try #6] · 5d135440
      David Howells 提交于
      Add garbage collection for dead, revoked and expired keys.  This involved
      erasing all links to such keys from keyrings that point to them.  At that
      point, the key will be deleted in the normal manner.
      
      Keyrings from which garbage collection occurs are shrunk and their quota
      consumption reduced as appropriate.
      
      Dead keys (for which the key type has been removed) will be garbage collected
      immediately.
      
      Revoked and expired keys will hang around for a number of seconds, as set in
      /proc/sys/kernel/keys/gc_delay before being automatically removed.  The default
      is 5 minutes.
      Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
      5d135440
    • D
      KEYS: Flag dead keys to induce EKEYREVOKED [try #6] · f041ae2f
      David Howells 提交于
      Set the KEY_FLAG_DEAD flag on keys for which the type has been removed.  This
      causes the key_permission() function to return EKEYREVOKED in response to
      various commands.  It does not, however, prevent unlinking or clearing of
      keyrings from detaching the key.
      Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
      Acked-by: NSerge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
      Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
      f041ae2f
    • D
      KEYS: Allow keyctl_revoke() on keys that have SETATTR but not WRITE perm [try #6] · 0c2c9a3f
      David Howells 提交于
      Allow keyctl_revoke() to operate on keys that have SETATTR but not WRITE
      permission, rather than only on keys that have WRITE permission.
      Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
      Acked-by: NSerge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
      Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
      0c2c9a3f
    • D
      KEYS: Deal with dead-type keys appropriately [try #6] · 5593122e
      David Howells 提交于
      Allow keys for which the key type has been removed to be unlinked.  Currently
      dead-type keys can only be disposed of by completely clearing the keyrings
      that point to them.
      Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
      Acked-by: NSerge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
      Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
      5593122e
    • D
      CRED: Add some configurable debugging [try #6] · e0e81739
      David Howells 提交于
      Add a config option (CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS) to turn on some debug checking
      for credential management.  The additional code keeps track of the number of
      pointers from task_structs to any given cred struct, and checks to see that
      this number never exceeds the usage count of the cred struct (which includes
      all references, not just those from task_structs).
      
      Furthermore, if SELinux is enabled, the code also checks that the security
      pointer in the cred struct is never seen to be invalid.
      
      This attempts to catch the bug whereby inode_has_perm() faults in an nfsd
      kernel thread on seeing cred->security be a NULL pointer (it appears that the
      credential struct has been previously released):
      
      	http://www.kerneloops.org/oops.php?number=252883Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
      e0e81739
  6. 01 9月, 2009 2 次提交
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      selinux: Support for the new TUN LSM hooks · ed6d76e4
      Paul Moore 提交于
      Add support for the new TUN LSM hooks: security_tun_dev_create(),
      security_tun_dev_post_create() and security_tun_dev_attach().  This includes
      the addition of a new object class, tun_socket, which represents the socks
      associated with TUN devices.  The _tun_dev_create() and _tun_dev_post_create()
      hooks are fairly similar to the standard socket functions but _tun_dev_attach()
      is a bit special.  The _tun_dev_attach() is unique because it involves a
      domain attaching to an existing TUN device and its associated tun_socket
      object, an operation which does not exist with standard sockets and most
      closely resembles a relabel operation.
      Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
      Acked-by: NEric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>
      Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
      ed6d76e4
    • P
      lsm: Add hooks to the TUN driver · 2b980dbd
      Paul Moore 提交于
      The TUN driver lacks any LSM hooks which makes it difficult for LSM modules,
      such as SELinux, to enforce access controls on network traffic generated by
      TUN users; this is particularly problematic for virtualization apps such as
      QEMU and KVM.  This patch adds three new LSM hooks designed to control the
      creation and attachment of TUN devices, the hooks are:
      
       * security_tun_dev_create()
         Provides access control for the creation of new TUN devices
      
       * security_tun_dev_post_create()
         Provides the ability to create the necessary socket LSM state for newly
         created TUN devices
      
       * security_tun_dev_attach()
         Provides access control for attaching to existing, persistent TUN devices
         and the ability to update the TUN device's socket LSM state as necessary
      Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
      Acked-by: NEric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>
      Acked-by: NSerge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
      Acked-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
      2b980dbd
  7. 24 8月, 2009 1 次提交
  8. 21 8月, 2009 2 次提交
  9. 20 8月, 2009 6 次提交
  10. 19 8月, 2009 12 次提交